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Why do organisms reproduce? Why do birds have wings? Why do neither snakes nor 
stars have feet? Why do most of the hoofed life-bearing animals have horns (but not 
all of them)? Why do human beings build houses, or walk after dinner?   
 For Aristotle, questions such as these go to the heart of natural philosophy, 
which is the study of the coming to be and presence of beings that have their own 
internal principle of change and rest. Throughout his lifetime, Aristotle was deeply 
committed to investigating and explaining natural phenomena, which is reflected in 
the large amount of natural treatises we possess today. Among these treatises, 
Aristotle’s Physics is most fundamental. In this treatise, Aristotle lays out the general 
theoretical framework for his natural philosophy, defining notions such as nature, 
motion, causation, place, and time. In the other treatises, Aristotle explores more 
specific problems related to the study of natural beings, like coming to be and 
passing away (in De Generatione et Corruptione), the nature and motion of the elements 
(in De Generatione et Corruptione and the second part of De Caelo), the motions and 
features of the heavenly bodies (in the first part of De Caelo), atmospheric causes and 
changes (in Meteorologica), the notion of soul and its dependence on natural bodies (in 
De Anima), and finally, the causes of the coming to be and presence of living beings 
and of their parts and motions (in the biological works).   
What unites the questions explored in these natural treatises, exemplified 
by the questions above, is that they are predominantly questions asking for the 
reason why, or, as Aristotle puts it, questions asking ‘for the sake of which’. By 
posing this specific kind of why-question, Aristotle is inquiring after the function 
served by the presence, absence, or material differentiation of a certain natural 
feature, or after the goal for the sake of which some animal motion or natural process 
takes place. According to Aristotle’s understanding of scientific knowledge, the 
answers to these questions constitute teleological explanations, because they pick out 
the final cause (in the form of a function or goal) for the sake of which something 
has come to be or is present (or absent, etc.). These teleological explanations are a 
central feature of Aristotle’s investigation of nature, and reflect the importance he 




phenomena. According to Aristotle, everything that exists or comes to be ‘by nature’ 
comes to be or changes, unless prevented, for a purpose and towards an end, and is 
present for the sake of that purpose or end. Final causality thus operates among all 
natural beings, from the level of the inanimate elements, through that of living 
beings, and on to the eternal realm of the heavenly bodies.  
Although the importance of teleology for Aristotle (and in the ancient 
world in general)1 has been acknowledged widely,2 its nature and scope have 
consistently been the focus of much debate.3 These debates have progressively led to 
a better understanding of Aristotle’s notion of teleology. This is especially the case 
with regard to teleology as a descriptive principle of nature entailing the internal 
goal-directed tendency of natural processes (which is to be contrasted with processes 
due to spontaneity or necessity).4 What I have found to be lacking in the literature, 
however, is an understanding of the role Aristotle attributes to teleology in explaining 
natural phenomena. Setting aside the other issues that remain concerning the nature 
and scope of teleology, the question that this dissertation sets out to resolve is how – 
granted that Aristotle has established teleology as a cause of natural phenomena – he 
then uses (e.g. refers to, draws inferences from, builds premises upon, rejects other 
possible explanations on the basis of) this teleology as a principle of scientific 
explanation. 
 
I believe that this gap in our current understanding of the role of teleology within 
Aristotle’s theory of science is unfortunate for the following four reasons.  
First, Aristotle argues at several instances throughout the corpus that final 
causes possess some kind of priority over his other three types of causes, and that 
                                                 
1 Hankinson (1998), 6.  
2 E.g. Caston (2006), 341; Gotthelf & Lennox (1987), 199; Gotthelf (1997b), 82; Johnson (2005), 1-2.  
3 Cf. Quarantotto (2005), 17. For an historical overview of the trends and circumstances that shaped the 
earlier interpretations of Aristotle, see Johnson (2005), 15-39. On the nature of Aristotle’s teleology, see in 
particular Bradie & Miller (1999); Cameron (2002); Charles (1988); Cooper (1982; 1985; 1987); Gotthelf 
(1987); Irwin (1988); Johnson (2005); Lennox (2001a; 2001b); Nussbaum (1978); Sauvé Meyer (1992); 
Sorabji (1980); and Wieland (1975). On the metaphysics of Aristotle’s teleology, see in particular Charles 
(1994); Mirus (2004); Pavloupoulos (2003); and Witt (1998). On the scope of Aristotle’s teleology, see in 
particular Cooper (1982); Furley (1985); Matthen (2001) and (2007); Owens (1968); Sedley (1991); and 
Wardy (1993). 
4 See especially Johnson (2005), who brings together many of the recent new insights in Aristotle’s notion 
of teleology as a principle of nature in his monograph, and explicitly addresses and eliminates some of the 
most persistent ‘popular misconceptions’ about Aristotle’s teleology. See also Cooper (1982; 1985; 1987) 
and Lennox (2001a), 225; 251. 
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the task of the natural philosopher is foremost (although not exclusively) to provide 
teleological explanations. This suggests that Aristotle assigns special explanatory 
power to explanations that pick out final causes. However, studies have not made 
sufficiently clear yet what this explanatory power exactly amounts to in each of the 
various types of teleological explanations used, nor how teleological explanations 
actually explain each of the specific kinds of natural phenomena they are supposed 
to explain.5 
Secondly, the wide range of teleological explanations found in Aristotle’s 
works is often taken as one homogeneous category, unified by the fact that they all 
refer in some way or another to teleology. The existing literature hardly differentiates 
between, for instance, explanations that refer directly to final causes and 
explanations that operate through the supposition of teleological principles (such as 
‘nature does nothing in vain’).6 It often fails to take the different explanatory 
contexts into account.7 The unifying approach to teleology overly simplifies several 
questions: What types of answers can constitute teleological explanations according 
to Aristotle, how other types of causes can be integrated in a teleological 
explanation, and especially how the various types of teleological explanations are 
applied in practice.8  
A third question pertains to the understanding of references to necessity as 
part of (instead of ‘as opposed to’) explanations that also contain references to 
teleology. Scholars have often tried to reconstruct the nature of Aristotle’s teleology 
by contrasting it to forces such as material necessity and spontaneity. In doing so, 
however, they have either overlooked or misunderstood those teleological 
explanations that refer to both final causes and material necessity to explain the same 
                                                 
5 These questions have been addressed on a general level by Code (1997) and by Bolton (2004; 
unpublished) within the context of Aristotle’s methodological remarks in Ph.II and PA.I; the analysis 
called for here is one that addresses this question at the level of Aristotle’s actual teleological explanations 
in the varieties of contexts in which they are applied.  
6 Johnson (2005), for instance, does not distinguish between these two types of explanations.  
7 Although Lennox’s work on the principle that nature does nothing in vain (2001a, 205-222) suggests 
that Aristotle uses all his teleological principles in a very specific way to explain very specific explananda, 
scholars still seem to think that they are just ‘didactic mantras’, reminding his students that he believes 
nature is goal-directed. See, for instance, Quarantotto (2005), 13. 
8 Sorabji (1980, 155-174) offers an account of how according to him the various kinds of teleological 
explanations work, but I believe his distinctions are not subtle enough to cover Aristotle’s actual practice 




natural phenomenon.9 What is lacking is an account of Aristotle’s use of teleological 
explanations that integrates these references to material necessity instead of 
explaining them away.  
A fourth question concerning the use of teleology in explanations of 
natural phenomena arises from a research program initiated relatively recently by 
scholars such as Lennox and Lloyd.10 This program has set out to explore the 
interplay between Aristotle’s philosophy of science and his practice in the sciences 
themselves. Although there have been some studies on Aristotle’s (teleological) 
explanations within the context of the first book of the Parts of Animals and the 
second book of the Physics,11 with a few exceptions,12 Aristotle’s theoretical remarks 
on the structure of teleological explanations in the Analytica Posteriora (APo.II.11) 
have been ignored. So have many other passages in the Aristotelian corpus that bear 
on these issues.13 Consequently, there have only been a few attempts to give a more 
comprehensive view of Aristotle’s practice of providing teleological explanations 
including some of the other key treatises in Aristotle’s natural philosophy, such as De 
Anima and De Caelo.14  
 
                                                 
9 I mainly disagree with scholars who have either explained away the role of material necessity in 
teleological explanations (Balme, 1987c); reduced it to conditional necessity (Cooper, 1987; Johnson, 
2005); or assigned only a negative role to it in constraining the realizations of function (Lennox, 2001a). 
10 Lennox, who focuses on the similarities between theory and practice, summarizes his main views on the 
relation between Aristotle’s theory and practice in the sciences in (2001a), 1-6; see also Lennox (1997a), 
(2004a), (2006). Lloyd, who focuses on the dissimilarities between theory and practice, formulates his 
main views on this issue in (1990) and (1996), 7-37. 
11 Next to the aforementioned literature by Lennox and Lloyd, see especially Balme (1987b); Bolton 
(1987; 1997); Charles (1997; 1999); Detel (1997; 1999); Gotthelf (1987; 1997); Pellegrin (1986); note, 
however, that not all of these works deal specifically with teleological explanations. 
12 Bolton (1997), Detel (1997), and Johnson (2005). 
13 Cf. Quarantotto (2005), 27: “Le interpretazioni del concetto aristotelico di ‘causa finale’ avanzate negli 
ultimi decenni, come si è già osservato, si basano spesso su passi differenti o su brani divesi di uno stesso 
testo. E tale selezione del materiale documentario è, almeno in parte, la causa della loro difformità e 
motlteplicità.” Quarantotto points to Ph.II.8-9 and PA.I.1 as the key texts on which most scholars have 
based their interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of teleology; in her own work, she studies teleology from a 
more comprehensive perspective, including the whole of Ph.II, the whole of PA, a few passages from 
DA, and Mete.I.3-10.  
14 With the exception of Quarantotto (2005). Johnson (2005, 1 and 7) introduces his investigations into 
Aristotle’s teleology as an investigation of “how ends are used by Aristotle as explanations in natural 
philosophy” (2005, 1). However, the core of his monograph contains a discussion of the sorts of things 
that according to Aristotle behave in a goal-directed way, and of the reasons for why these things behave 
that way (and are thus explainable by reference to teleology). I have found no analysis of the different 
types of teleological explanations Aristotle uses, or any reflections upon why Aristotle uses the types of 
teleological explanations he uses, or what he thinks these explanations amount to, which is the sort of 
reflection I intend to offer in this dissertation. 
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The present dissertation intends to fill these gaps in our understanding of Aristotle’s 
use of teleology as a principle of explanation, especially as it is used in the natural 
treatises. 
Its main purposes are, first, to determine the function, structure, and 
explanatory power of teleological explanations in four of Aristotle’s natural treatises, 
that is, in Physica (book II), De Anima, De Partibus Animalium (including the practice in 
books II-IV), and De Caelo (book II). These are the treatises that I believe to be most 
relevant to the present investigation.  
Its second purpose is to confront these findings about Aristotle’s practice 
in the natural treatises with the theoretical picture of the structure of teleological 
explanations gained from Aristotle’s theory of scientific demonstration. For this 
purpose I will present a new interpretation of APo.II.11, a notoriously difficult 
chapter in which Aristotle introduces his theory of four causes into the syllogistic 
framework of scientific demonstration. This study thereby contributes to recent 
scholarship on the relation between Aristotle’s philosophy of science and philosophy 
of nature, while at the same time adding to our knowledge of Aristotle’s notion of 
teleology in terms of its explanatory merits and limits.  
Although this dissertation attempts to explore Aristotle’s theory and 
practice of providing teleological explanations as broadly as possible, due the limits 
of space and time I have narrowed down this study to Aristotle’s science of living nature. 
The ethical and political works of Aristotle fall outside the scope of this dissertation. 
My central tenet is that Aristotle’s notion of teleology has been developed primarily 
and applied most successfully in the context of Aristotle’s investigations of living 
nature; a further study of the use, function, and explanatory power of teleological 
explanations in, among others, his ethics or politics, would have to start from and 
build upon the more ‘basic’ uses in the natural treatises.  
 
This dissertation comprises five separate, but interrelated studies into the function, 
structure, and explanatory power of teleological explanations in Aristotle’s 
philosophy of nature.   
The core of my dissertation, consisting of chapters one to four, is devoted 




selection of his natural treatises stated above. In these chapters, I do not intend to 
provide a comprehensive picture of Aristotle’s views on the nature and scope of 
teleology in the natural world (although it must be understood that any study dealing 
with Aristotle’s teleology will have to discuss these issues somewhat), but rather 
focus on exploring the function, structure, and explanatory power of the teleological 
explanations used.  
In the final chapter, chapter five, I will relate these findings concerning 
Aristotle’s practice to the theory of scientific demonstrations described in APo.II.11. 
in order to determine the relationships between them and the extent to which his 
theory is reflected in his practice. Let me conclude by briefly introducing the main 
subject matter and the lines of argument set out in the five chapters of this 
dissertation.    
 
In chapter one, I will examine Aristotle’s defense of natural teleology in the second 
book of the Physica, and discuss its consequences for Aristotle’s views on the use and 
function of teleological explanations in natural philosophy. Aristotle introduces his 
theory of causal explanation in the context of his general project of trying to gain 
knowledge of natural phenomena. He then singles out teleological explanations for 
further discussion in the light of potential objections raised by his materialist 
predecessors. The purpose of this chapter is, first, to illuminate the place of final 
causes in Aristotle’s theory of causal explanation. This constitutes an analysis of: (a) 
the relation of final causes to the other three types of causes (here the formal identity 
between formal, efficient, and final causes will turn out to be important); (b) the 
different notions of final cause that Aristotle seems to employ (i.e. ‘structural’ versus 
‘generative’ ends); and also includes (c) an attempt to answer the question why and 
in what sense Aristotle attributes priority to final causes over the other three types of 
causes. Secondly, I will analyze the causal patterns underlying the three major 
domains of teleological explanations from which Aristotle draws his examples in the 
Physics (i.e. artistic production, deliberative action, and natural generation), and assess 
how he uses the analogy between nature and art. An important part of my argument 
will be that art and nature are used as analogies by Aristotle because of the absence of 
deliberation in either domain. Thirdly, I will turn to Aristotle’s defense of teleology 
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itself. For Aristotle, the for-the-most-part character of natural processes and the 
regularity of their outcomes offer empirical evidence that they cannot be due to 
spontaneity but must have intrinsic causes. The operation of final causality must 
then be assumed to be an inference to the best explanation of our perception of the 
regular coming to be and presence of natural phenomena. Here it will be necessary 
to distinguish between the operations of two types of teleology (i.e. ‘primary 
teleology’ and ‘secondary teleology’) and hence of two – structurally different – types 
of teleological explanations in order to be able to determine more precisely the 
domain of things to which teleological explanations are to be applied if we want to 
gain knowledge of it. 
 Next, in chapter two, I will provide an analysis of Aristotle’s bio-functional 
notion of the soul and the soul-functions, and their relationship to the body, as 
described in De Anima. The main purpose of this chapter is to show how in this 
treatise Aristotle lays the foundations for the teleological explanations of living 
nature in the biological works by differentiating the various life-functions and then 
grounding them teleologically. That is, living beings have the functions they have for 
a natural purpose. For Aristotle, the soul is not only the principle of life in an 
ontological sense; it is also the explanatory principle of living beings and their 
features in an epistemological sense. Thus, while in the Physica Aristotle grounds the 
existence of natural teleology itself, in the De Anima he rather grounds the possibility 
of providing teleological explanations for the domain of living nature: the life-
functions will form the starting-points of the explanation of the realized living being 
with its kind specific parts and features. Two issues will receive my main attention in 
this chapter. First, I explore the function, structure, and explanatory power of the 
teleological explanations Aristotle uses in his account of the nature of the soul and 
of its functions. Here it will be important to recognize Aristotle’s use of the 
teleological notion of conditional necessity to describe the relationship between 
functions and the natural body in which they are realized. Further, I will differentiate 
between necessary and non-necessary functions of the soul. Secondly, I will analyze 
Aristotle’s teleological model of human and animal locomotion. In an appendix, I 
will discuss the role of intentionality in this model, while distinguishing between 




thus be shown to ground the paradigm of action used for didactic purposes in the 
Physica.    
In chapter three, the heart of this dissertation, I will examine the rich 
material of actual teleological explanations found in De Partibus Animalium. It is in the 
biological works that Aristotle builds upon the foundations laid out in his De Anima 
and employs final causes and teleological principles most successfully to explain the 
presence, absence, and material differentiation of living beings. The purpose of this 
chapter is to get a clearer understanding of the various types of explanations, and 
especially of the teleological ones, that Aristotle offers for biological phenomena. In 
particular, I will clarify their structure, the roles played by the various types of causes 
picked out in the explanations, and their explanatory power. I will set the stage by 
introducing Aristotle’s explanatory project in De Partibus Animalium as a 
demonstrative science of living nature. Next, I will discuss the types of explanations 
provided by Aristotle that refer directly to causes, while paying special attention to 
the interrelatedness of the different causes picked out in one and the same 
explanation, and to the issue of causal versus epistemological priority. Third, I will 
turn to those explanations that make use of teleological principles, and argue how 
they are used heuristically as a framework for explanation in those cases where final 
causes are not immediately discernable. A final issue to be addressed in this chapter 
is the relation between teleology and necessity, both in theory and in practice. Here I 
hope to show that Aristotle does not deny any causal role for material necessity in 
the coming to be of sublunary natural generations, but rather attributes a positive 
role to it in the formation of non-necessary, luxurious parts. The distinction between 
primary and secondary teleology, and between the explanation of the coming to be 
of natural phenomena and the explanation of their presence, will prove to be crucial 
in this context.  
In chapter four, I will reveal the limits of Aristotle’s use of teleology as a 
principle of explanation in De Caelo. In this treatise, Aristotle tries to gain scientific 
understanding of otherwise incomprehensible cosmological phenomena almost 
exclusively through mathematical reasoning. The only exceptions are formed by 
seven teleological explanations. It is striking that these latter explanations, which are 
the only ‘physical’ explanations given, all make use of teleological principles. I will 
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argue that Aristotle uses teleological principles to explain the presence and absence 
of heavenly phenomena, on the assumption that they are part of the realm of nature, 
and that they therefore have to be explained in terms of the four causes. The 
principles Aristotle uses are well-established in biology, and by applying them to the 
heavenly domain Aristotle hopes to make as much sense of the heavenly phenomena 
as possible. I will first discuss the teleological explanations offered for the presence of 
heavenly phenomena and next the explanations that are set out to account for the 
absence of heavenly phenomena. The purpose of this chapter is to show that although 
the use of teleological principles in the heavenly realm is similar to that in biology (in 
both cases they are used because the final causes are not immediately discernable), 
their explanatory power in biology is much stronger than in cosmology. As I will 
show, the lack of empirical evidence in the heavenly domain weakens the inferences 
Aristotle draws within his cosmology: as he himself points out repeatedly, the 
teleological explanations presented are plausible, but do not reach the same level of 
detail as the ones presented in biology.  
In chapter five, I finally turn to Aristotle’s theoretical account in the 
Posterior Analytics of how the four causes, and in particular the final cause, are to be 
picked out within the syllogistic structure of explanations in order for those 
explanations to qualify as ‘demonstrations of the reason why’, and thereby to 
generate scientific knowledge. The main part of the chapter consists of a careful 
reinterpretation of APo.II.11 in which Aristotle discusses these vexed issues. The 
aim of this chapter is to show how comprehensive and flexible Aristotle’s theory of 
scientific demonstration truly is. Of particular interest, is how in teleological 
demonstrations, material, formal, and efficient causes can all play an explanatorily 
basic role in establishing a teleological relation between two states of affairs. On the 
other hand, the final cause itself, so I will argue, never plays such a role, but is always 
demonstrated to hold of something else. The scientific value of final causes is 
primarily one of explanatory priority: final causes are picked out first in explanations, 
but have no causal priority in the world. Once the theoretical picture has become 
clear, I will relate this picture to my findings concerning Aristotle’s practice of 
providing teleological explanations in the previous chapters, and in particular to the 




‘theoretical format’ as presented in APo.II.11 can easily accommodate the variety of 
types of teleological explanations that are found in practice, and how closely the two 
domains are related.  
In the conclusion, I will bring together the various findings and distinctions 
drawn concerning the practice and theory of providing teleological explanations in 
Aristotle’s philosophy of nature, so as to lay out the merits and limits of the use of 




CHAPTER ONE: ARISTOTLE’S DEFENSE OF NATURAL TELEOLOGY 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR TELEOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS IN THE PHYSICA 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The Physica forms Aristotle’s first treatise of a didactically sequenced series of studies 
of nature.1 In this treatise, Aristotle investigates the principles and causes of all 
things that have a nature, that is, of all things that have an internal principle of 
change and rest. In the course of doing so, Aristotle defines a large number of key 
notions of his natural philosophy, such as motion and change, space and time, 
matter and form, causal explanation, teleology and necessity. The conceptual 
apparatus and framework laid out in the Physica are consequently applied and 
reshaped for the inquiries into the more specific and more complex segments of the 
natural world. These inquiries are written down in numerous other treatises dealing 
with natural philosophy.2  
In this chapter, I will focus mainly on book II of the Physica, in which 
Aristotle introduces his theory of causal explanation and offers a defense of natural 
teleology against the views of his predecessors. In this context, teleology is primarily 
put forward by Aristotle as the internal goal-directed tendency of natural processes 
towards their actualization, which is to be contrasted with the operations of 
spontaneity and necessity in the natural world. It is from this perspective that the 
concept of teleology has received most of its attention in the scholarly debate. While 
trying to do justice to the progress that has been made in the study of teleology as a 
natural tendency, I will focus here also on the use and function of teleology as a 
principle of explanation. In particular an attempt will be made to reconstruct the 
ways in which final causes or teleological principles feature in causal accounts of 
natural processes. The second book of the Physica is of programmatic interest not 
only with regard to Aristotle’s theoretical views on teleological explanation, but also 
                                                 
1 I believe that the cross-references in Aristotle are his own, and that they reflect a didactic order in which 
his treatises should be studied; on this issue, see Burnyeat (2001), 87-125 and Nussbaum (1978), 107-109. 
2 As Aristotle makes clear in his programmatic opening of Meteorologica, I.1 (338a20-339a10), the whole 
investigation of nature will comprise the study of change and motion in the heavens (De Caelo), the 
elements and coming to be and perishing in general (De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione), atmospheric 
causes and changes (Meteorologica), and finally soul (De Anima) and living beings (biological works). On the 
importance of the Meteorologica passage for the systematic connection between Aristotle’s works, see 
Burnyeat (2001), 118-119 and Nussbaum (1978), 107-109. 
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with regard to his actual use of teleological explanations. In the following sections I 
will address the question of the place of final causes in Aristotle’s theory of causal 
explanation (section 1.1), analyze the three models operative in Aristotle’s 
teleological explanations (human action, artistic production, and natural processes; 
section 1.2), and finally discuss Aristotle’s defense of the need to use teleology in the 
explanation of natural phenomena (section 1.3).  
The chapter will thus serve a threefold purpose. In the first place, it will 
provide an introduction to the basic concepts necessary for the understanding of 
Aristotle’s use of teleological explanations in the other natural treatises, some of 
which will be discussed in the following chapters. In the second place, it will offer a 
status quaestionis of recent work on Aristotle’s teleology, which will be taken as a 
reference point for the next chapters. In the third place, it will also give us some 
indications of the expectations Aristotle himself has with regard to the cash-value (in 
terms of explanatory force and broadness) of the use of teleological explanations. 
 
1.1 The theory of causal explanation of the Physica 
 
In the first two chapters of the second book of the Physica, Aristotle discusses the 
question of what nature is, and consequently of what subjects the student of nature 
should study. In the course of answering these questions, Aristotle subtly introduces 
and connects his four notions of cause to his definition of nature as the internal 
principle of motion and rest. However, it is not until the third chapter that Aristotle 
explicitly introduces his four causes (here presented by the names derived from their 
medieval appellations): the material cause, the formal cause, the efficient cause, and 
the final cause.  
In the first section (1.1.1), I will discuss Aristotle’s ‘theory of the four aitiai’ 
and its relation with knowledge according to Ph.II.3,3 and its relation with Aristotle’s 
notion of nature according to Ph.II.1-2. In the next section (1.1.2), I offer an analysis 
of the way in which the four causes are related to each other, while paying special 
attention to Aristotle’s account of the final cause and its role in teleological 
explanations. 
                                                 
3 The account in Ph.II.3 is virtually identical to the entry on aition in Aristotle’s ‘philosophical dictionary’ in 
Met.V.2, 1013a24-1014a25. 
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1.1.1 Four ways to answer the question ‘why?’ 
 
1.1.1.a Knowledge, explanation, and causation 
In recent years, scholars of Aristotle have shifted away from older interpretations of 
Aristotle’s doctrine as a theory of causation towards a reading of it as a theory of 
explanation. Under this interpretation, the four categories Aristotle distinguishes 
represent four types of explanation, or perhaps four types of causation that provide 
corresponding explanations.4 Accordingly, ‘explanation’ (or, ‘explanatory factor’), 
rather than ‘cause’, has become the preferred translation5 of to aition and hê aitia 
(these terms are usually used interchangeably by Aristotle).6 In addition, discussions 
have focused on Aristotle’s supposed instrumentalist stance towards explanation. 
This is the theory that Aristotle’s four categories of causes (and in particular the 
material, formal, and final cause, which – unlike the efficient cause – do not 
resemble our modern cause-and-effect conception of causation in any way) are not 
supposed to represent actual causal factors operative in physical reality. The four 
causes are merely considered to be kinds of factors that are explanatory in virtue of 
being appropriate answers to why-questions – appropriate in view of the interests, 
contexts, and presuppositions of the questioner.7  
I agree with Freeland’s conclusion8 that Aristotle was most certainly a 
realist both concerning causes and explanations, which means that the four types of 
explanation Aristotle distinguishes are grounded in four types of causal relations that 
obtain in the world. In some sense, this renders the discussion about the distinction 
                                                 
4 See e.g. Annas (1982); Moravcsik (1974a&b) and (1991); and Sorabji (1980). Freeland (1991), although 
critical of the interpretation of aitia as explanations, ultimately also endorses this view. I agree with 
Johnson (2005), 41n.3 that part of Freeland’s problems with this interpretation (namely that Aristotle’s 
presentation of explanation in the Physica does not correspond with the ‘canonical presentation’ in the 
Posterior Analytics) stem from not taking APo.II.11 sufficiently into account; in chapter five on the Posterior 
Analytics I hope to show that Aristotle makes both a philosophical and a lexical distinction between causes 
and explanations, and that both play a vital role in Aristotle’s theory of scientific demonstration. This 
distinction does not hold in the context of the Physica, but as I will show in the following paragraphs the 
general frameworks still stands: knowledge is defined as knowledge of explanations of things, and 
explanations are accounts that bring out causal relevant factors under their right description.  
5 See e.g. Barnes (1975), 89-90; Gill (1980), 129; and Hankinson (1998), 132. 
6 Both terms go back to the adjective form aitios which originated in legal context, designating the person 
responsible or culpable for something. The two substantive forms probably had different meanings 
before Aristotle; in Plato, for instance, to aition meant ‘cause’, while hê aitia meant ‘causal account’ or 
‘explanation.’ On these issues, see Frede (1980), 222-223, Sedley (1998), 115(n.1), and Lennox (2001a), 
282-283. See also chapter five.  
7 Van Fraassen (1980), 21-22. 
8 Freeland (1991). 
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between causation and explanation futile. Aristotle’s theory of four aitiai is a theory 
of four types of causal explanations. The four aitiai are the kinds of answers one gives 
to four different why-questions, and these answers will only be explanatory if they 
pick out real causes (and not merely epistemic reasons why) under their causally 
relevant description.  
 
I hold that both his account of explanation in the Posterior Analytics (especially in 
APo.I.2 and APo.II.11) and in the Physica show Aristotle’s erotetic approach to the 
project of gaining knowledge of nature and natural processes.9 The context in which 
Aristotle introduces his four types of causal explanation in Ph.II.3 is significant in 
this respect (Ph.II.3, 194b17-23):  
ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν ἡ πραγματεία, εἰδέναι δὲ οὐ πρότερον οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον 
πρὶν ἂν λάβωμεν τὸ διὰ τί περὶ ἕκαστον (τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ λαβεῖν τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν), 
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦτο ποιητέον καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ πάσης τῆς 
φυσικῆς μεταβολῆς, ὅπως εἰδότες αὐτῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀνάγειν εἰς αὐτὰς πειρώμεθα τῶν 
ζητουμένων ἕκαστον.  
“Since this undertaking is for the sake of knowing – and we think that we have 
knowledge not earlier than when we grasp the reason why with regard to each thing 
(and that is, to grasp the first aitia) – it is clear that we must do this also with regard 
to generation and corruption and every natural change, so that once we know the 
first principles we can try to lead back to them each of the things that we inquire 
about.”10   
The opening sub-clause of this passage (“Since...knowing”) is revealing: it is because 
knowledge of the reason why is a necessary prerequisite for the understanding of 
natural processes such as change, generation, and motion, that Aristotle now opens 
up the discussion of the nature and number of causes. The “since” in Ph.II.3, 
194b17 picks up on the general project of the Physica that was defined in a similar 
manner (Ph.I.1, 194a10-16): since knowledge concerns the knowing of the principles, 
causes, and elements of things, the ‘science’ of nature too must start with an attempt 
                                                 
9 Aristotle’s categorization of answers that can be given to questions why are rooted in what Schofield 
calls ‘the explanatory projects’ of Aristotle’s predecessors; Schofield (1991), 29-40. However, based on the 
doxographical discussion in Met.I.3-9, I believe that Aristotle thinks that all four of his ‘explanatory 
projects’ go back to his predecessors, and not only the investigations into the material and formal cause as 
Schofield holds. 
10 All translations are mine, unless indicated otherwise. 
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to establish those principles. If Aristotle’s prime goal is to gain scientific knowledge 
of how things actually are in nature, then the explanations he will introduce must 
pick out real causes; purely linguistic explanations will not do the trick.11 
Aristotle conceives of scientific inquiry as a questioning procedure in which 
the answer to the question why provides the most fundamental knowledge, because 
it brings out the cause of something.12 In Ph.II.3, Aristotle introduces four types of 
causes that may figure in such explanations: (1) the ‘that out of which’ (Ph.II.3, 
194b24: τὸ ἐξ οὗ) or the material13  cause; (2) the ‘what it is to be’ (Ph.II.3, 194b27: 
τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) or the formal cause; (3) the ‘that from which the origin of motion or 
rest comes’ (Ph.II.3, 194b29-30: ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς 
ἠρεμήσεως) or the efficient cause; and (4) the ‘that for the sake of which’ (Ph.II.3, 
194b33: τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) or the final cause. Aristotle exemplifies his concern for causal 
explanation most clearly in his introduction of the final cause (Ph.II.3, 194b33-35):  
ἔτι ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια· διὰ τί γὰρ 
περιπατεῖ; φαμέν ‘ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ’, καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον. 
“Moreover, there is [the cause] in the sense of the end. This is that for the sake of 
which, such as health of walking. Because of what does he walk? We say ‘in order to 
be healthy’, and in so saying we think that we have expressed the cause.”  
We know why someone walks when we know that he walks for the sake of being healthy, 
and in stating this explanation we have expressed the final cause of walking.14 In the 
remainder of the chapter, Aristotle discusses among others how causes (and their 
effects) need to be picked out under their causally relevant description in our 
statements in order for its expression to be truly explanatory (Ph.II.3, 195a29-b15). 
The purpose of this discussion is to specify which modes of reference are most 
appropriate and precise in the context of explanation (Ph.II.3, 195b21-22: δεῖ δ’ ἀεὶ 
                                                 
11 Cf. Hankinson (1998), 132; pace Van Fraassen (1980). 
12 APo.I.2, 71b9-13; APo.II.11, 94a20-27. On Aristotle’s erotetic concept of inquiry, see Hintikka (1989), 
73. 
13 The name ‘material cause’ is somewhat misleading, since for Aristotle ‘matter’ in the sense of physical 
stuff (hulê, literally, wood; the ancient Greeks did not have a term for matter in our modern sense) is just 
one sort of thing among many others that can be causative as a ‘that out of which’; cf. the examples 
Aristotle states in Ph.II.3, 195a16-20: “for the letters of syllables, and the material of processed things, and 
fire (and such things) of bodies, and parts of a whole, and hypotheses of a conclusion are causes as that 
out of which.” Cf. Hankinson (1995), 119n12. 
14 Cf. also Aristotle’s summary of this theory in Ph.II.7, 198a22-24: “And since there are four types of 
aitiai, it belongs to the physicist to know about them all, and by leading the reason why (τὸ διὰ τί) back to 
all [of them] he will supply (ἀποδώσει) it [i.e. the reason why] in the way of natural inquiry: the matter, the 
form, the mover, and that for the sake of which.” 
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τὸ αἴτιον ἑκάστου τὸ ἀκρότατον ζητεῖν). This shows that Aristotle is concerned with 
both cause and explanation.15 
According to Aristotle, causes need to be picked out, in the first place, at 
the right level of generality between the particular and the universal. We might refer 
to the cause of health as ‘doctor’ or as ‘skilled man’, and although the two causes are 
equal in form (ὁμοειδής) – both terms are designations of the efficient cause – 
‘doctor’ is prior (Ph.II.3, 195a29-32). In the second place, causes should be picked 
out in an intrinsic and thus definite way, rather than in an incidental and thus 
indefinite way. In the causal explanation of the coming to be of a statue, ‘Polycleitus’ 
picks out an incidental cause of the statue, while ‘a sculptor’ picks out an intrinsic 
cause: it is qua being a sculptor that Polycleitus is the cause of the statue, not qua 
being Polycleitus (Ph.II.3, 195a32-b3). In the third place, causes might also be 
designated singly (e.g. ‘Polycleitus’ or ‘sculptor’) or in combination (‘Polycleitus the 
sculptor’); in this case the latter is more specific, because it reveals both the property 
in virtue of which the statue comes to be and the particular substance in which this 
property resides (Ph.II.3, 195b10-16). Finally, one needs to say whether the cause is 
actually or potentially operative: for instance, the cause of the building of a house is 
most appropriately picked out in an explanation by designations such as ‘the house-
builder’ or ‘the house-builder while building’ (Ph.II.3, 195b3-6).  
In the example of the statue, the cause picked out in the appropriate 
explanatory way is the following predicative complex expression: ‘the instantiation of 
the sculptor’s art in Polycleitus.’ Polycleitus sculpts a statue in virtue of his possession 
of the art of sculpting, and it is his possession of the art of sculpting which gives the 
most accurate specification of the originator of the production that culminated in 
this particular statue.16 An explanation of the coming to be of the statue thus needs 
to refer in the appropriate way to both the art of sculpting and the agent in which 
                                                 
15 For instance, if Aristotle were only interested in knowing the causes of things, it would not matter to 
him how one refers to them (e.g. ‘Polycleitus’ and ‘the man in the beret’ may both refer to the same 
efficient cause of a particular statue). If Aristotle is also interested in explanation (that is, in the type that is 
conductive to knowledge), then one has to refer to causes under their causally relevant description (e.g. 
‘the sculptor’ or ‘the art of sculpting’ refer to same efficient cause of a particular statue, but do so while 
identifying it in a way that reveals the explanatory property). I have adopted this view that Aristotle’s 
explanations are intensional in form and the example, from Hankinson (1998), 133. 
16 Matthen (2007), 1-2. 
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the art resides (and without which the art could not initiate the process of 
sculpting).17  
Aristotle’s sensitivity to how people speak about causes and to how causes 
are most properly picked out in explanations (i.e. to the focalization and the 
categorization of causes) shows Aristotle’s causal realism (and emphatically not his 
supposed scientific instrumentalism concerning explanations):18 explanations need to 
pick out the causal relevant features that actually obtain in the world under their 
appropriate descriptions. Explanations that do not exhibit the real structure of the 
world are simply not conductive to scientific knowledge.  
 
1.1.1.b Nature defined by the four causes 
Aristotle defines nature as an inner source of change and rest (in respect of place, or 
of growth and decline, or by way of alteration) in that to which it belongs primarily 
of itself, and not accidentally (Ph.II.1, 192b13-14; 192b20-23). This conception of 
nature is later characterized as a hypothesis that belongs to the first principles of the 
science of nature (Ph.VIII.3, 253b2-6).19 It cannot be demonstrated through a 
syllogistic proof, and the same holds for the proposition that the world of natural 
changing things exists.20 The fact that there are such things as natures or natural 
things having natures (such as animals and their parts, plants, the simple elements) is 
evident (phaneron) – the attempt to demonstrate this would in fact be ridiculous 
(Ph.II.1, 193a1-9). Aristotle’s exploration of the concept of nature precedes his 
introduction of his theory of causal explanation, but as I said before, the notions of 
nature and the four causes are linked from the outset: the ways in which people 
speak about nature and the ways they speak about causes of things that are natural 
largely coincide. For natural phenomena, natures form the grounds for causal 
explanation.  
Aristotle introduces his notion of nature as an internal origin of change, by 
distinguishing it from the class of artifacts. Artifacts are characterized as things that 
                                                 
17 See Moravcsik (1991), 37-38. 
18 As Freeland points out, the different contexts “are generated by the world itself, and diverse kinds of 
causal statements are about relations that obtain in the world itself.” Freeland (1991), 66. 
19 For arguments for the view that the claim ‘nature is a source of motion’ is a hypothesis rather than a 
definitional posit, see Lennox (2001a), 209-210. 
20 Bolton (1991), 19-21. 
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do not in themselves have the source of their making or coming to be (Ph.II.1, 
192b28-32), but need an external efficient cause (the art, hand, or tool of the artist) 
to become what they are. The main difference between natural things and artifacts is 
thus that the latter lack an internal efficient cause through which they can effect their 
own realization. This shows that for Aristotle natures are in the first place conceived 
of as the efficient causes of the motions, changes, and rests they bring about. In the 
context of Aristotle’s psychology and biology, nature in the sense of the internal 
principle of motion of a living being will be identified with that living being’s the 
soul: the principle of life is thus in an important sense a principle of motion.21  
Artifacts, on the other hand, only have an inner source of motion in so far 
as they are constituted from natural things. The natural capacities and tendencies of 
an artifact do not belong to the artifact qua that artifact, but qua being composed of 
particular combinations of natural elements, just as a man who heals himself does so 
only accidentally because the art of healing and the person healed happen to concur 
in the same person (Ph.II.1, 192b23-27). Antiphon’s example of a bed, cited by 
Aristotle in Ph.II.1, 193a11-17, brings out this difference very clearly:  
εἴ τις κατορύξειε κλίνην καὶ λάβοι δύναμιν ἡ σηπεδὼν ὥστε ἀνεῖναι βλαστόν, οὐκ ἂν 
γενέσθαι κλίνην ἀλλὰ ξύλον, ὡς τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχον, τὴν κατὰ νόμον 
διάθεσιν καὶ τὴν τέχνην, τὴν δ’ οὐσίαν οὖσαν ἐκείνην ἣ καὶ διαμένει ταῦτα πάσχουσα 
συνεχῶς. 
“If someone planted a bed, and the decomposition acquired the ability to send up a 
shoot, what would come up would not be a bed but wood: this seems to show that 
the arrangement in accordance with habit and art belongs accidentally, while its 
substantial being is that which persists continuously while being affected in these 
ways.” 
The bed is an artifact (something that exists by convention and art, not by nature) 
and as such does not have an internal source of change: it cannot on its own accord 
(re)produce itself. The wood from which the bed is made, on the other hand, is not 
an artifact, but a natural thing: it has the dunamis (given that the required background 
conditions are fulfilled) to replicate itself on its own accord. Being shaped into the 
structure of a bed is incidental to the wood, which can be inferred from the fact that 
in the absence of other external efficient causes the bed will still ‘act’ and change like 
                                                 
21 Bodnár (2006), 3. 
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wood (the only conceivable kind of generation a bed might produce is that of a 
tree).22 The nature of the bed is thus its internal efficient cause of its own 
actualization, perseverance, and reproduction, which can be seen to inhere in the 
wood (not in the bed qua bed), for a tree begets a tree.  
Note that for the most part, where nature acts as an efficient cause in 
natural generation, the first efficient cause (of the father) and its effect (the efficient 
cause of the offspring) will be the same (not numerically, but) in kind.23 That means 
that, in natural generation, efficient causes transmit the form they possess in actuality 
to the entities they change, which must possess this form in potentiality; natural 
generation consists in the replication of form. Hence Aristotle’s famous adage that 
‘man begets man’:24 only a human being who possesses the form of a human being 
in actuality can produce a human being from that which possesses this form in 
potentiality.25   
After having identified nature as an efficient cause, Aristotle takes up the 
example of Antiphon’s bed in order to link nature with formal and material causes. 
He argues that the nature of a thing is rather its form than its matter, and also that 
artifacts (at least in some sense) possess their form only accidentally. Nature is 
always in what underlies change, and substantial being (ousia) is such an underlying 
thing (Ph.II.1, 192b32-34): in artifacts the substantial being is the material 
constituent, in natural things, it is the thing itself, or rather its form. Aristotle’s 
analysis of the concept of nature in language of change and efficient causality thus 
becomes intertwined with his hylomorphism.26 According to Aristotle, there is 
always something that persists (at whatever level) throughout the process of change, 
i.e. the substrate or matter, and something that is generated in the change, i.e. the 
form. Every substance consists of (several stages or ‘layers’ of) informed matter – of 
matter arranged and determined by form. Some people called the first thing a 
‘nature’, describing it as (Ph.II.1, 193a29-30):  
                                                 
22 Cf. Bodnár (2006), 3. 
23 Bodnár & Pellegrin (2006; 277-281) label this ‘the principle of synonymy’. 
24 See for instance Ph.II.1, 193b8-9; Ph.II.1, 193b 12; PA.I.1, 640a23-26; Met.VII.7, 1032a25; Met.VII.8, 
1033b32; Met.IX.8, 1049b25, Met.XII.3, 1070a8, and Met.XIV.5, 1092 a 16. 
25 For Aristotle’s general analysis of natural change in terms of potentialities that are actualized, see 
Ph.III.1-3. 
26 The question of the metaphysics of Aristotle’s teleology is outside the scope of this dissertation, but see 
Charles (1994), Mirus (2004), and Witt (1994a&b), who all connect teleology to Aristotle’s metaphysics of 
matter and form, and potentiality and actuality. 
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ἡ πρώτη ἑκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ 
μεταβολῆς. 
“The in each case primary underlying matter27 of those things that have in 
themselves a principle of motion and change.”  
The name ‘nature’ is also used for the second thing, which is described as (Ph.II.1, 
193a30-31): 
  ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. 
“The shape and form that is according to the definition.” 
Although Aristotle argues that form is more a nature than matter (for forms are what 
is actual and what is transmitted in reproduction; Ph.II.1, 193b6-12), ultimately 
nature is both: it is both the matter out of which things are constituted, and the form 
that picks out their essence (Ph.II.2, 194a12-27). Since natural things cannot be 
defined without change – “they are like the snub nose, not like curved (Ph.II.2, 
194a3-7)”, and since change involves matter and form, the student of nature should 
study both kinds of nature – “as if we were to investigate what snubness is (Ph.II.2, 
194a12-27).”28  
Finally, after having analyzed nature in terms of the efficient, formal, and 
material cause, Aristotle connects his concept of nature to that of the final cause. In 
providing an etymological argument29 for why form has more claim to be called a 
nature than matter (Ph.II.1, 193b12-18), Aristotle touches upon an important 
difference between natural processes and artificial processes concerning the ‘towards 
which’ (eis ho) the process takes place. Without using the technical language of 
teleology yet, Aristotle points out that in artificial processes the end lies not in the 
performance of the art, but in something outside the art (for instance, doctoring 
proceeds from the art of medicine towards health). In natural processes, on the 
other hand, the process of generation is towards the realization of the thing’s own 
                                                 
27 This is presumably the ‘proximate matter,’ i.e. the highest level of enformed matter that is used in the 
generation of some compound (e.g. ‘instrumental body’ or ‘brick’, and not the matter that underlies these 
materials, such as ‘earthy elements’); for the distinction between proximate and non-proximate matter, see 
Met.V.6, 1016a19-24; Met.VIII.4, 1044a15-25; Met.IX.7, 1049a24-7. Cf. Bodnár & Pellegrin (2006), 274-
275. 
28 For a similar discussion about the task of the natural philosopher and the relation between matter, 
function, essence and substance, see DA.I.1 and Met.VII, discussed below in 2.1.2. 
29 Charlton (1970), 91. 
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nature or form: nature is that towards which natural generation takes place. A natural 
thing ‘grows’, so to speak, into its own nature.30 
Aristotle makes a similar point, but this time more explicitly and in a more 
technical manner, in the context of his discussion of the task of the student of 
nature. For the student of nature also needs to have knowledge of the ‘that for the 
sake of which’ (Ph.II.2, 194a27-33):31  
ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἕνεκα. ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ 
ἕνεκα (ὧν γὰρ συνεχοῦς τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης ἔστι τι τέλος, τοῦτο <τὸ> ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ 
οὗ ἕνεκα· διὸ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς γελοίως προήχθη εἰπεῖν “ἔχει τελευτήν, ἧσπερ οὕνεκ’ 
ἐγένετο”· βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον)· 
“Moreover it belongs to the same [study] [to know] that for the sake of which and 
the end, and whatever is for the sake of those [ends]. Now nature is an end and a 
‘what something is for’. (For if there is some end to things which undergo a 
continuous change, that [end] will be its end point and that for the sake of which. 
That is also why the poet was carried away into making the comical statement that 
‘he reached his end, for the sake of which he was born.’ For not every end point 
wants to be an end, but only the one which is best.)” 
In this passage, Aristotle argues that nature is an end, too, for the reason that if there 
is a (natural) end to a continuous change, this end must be what the change was for. 
The ends towards which natural processes tend are inherent and intrinsic to the 
natures of the things undergoing those processes. Aristotle is eager to point out that 
not every final point of a continuous change is ‘naturally disposed’32 to be an end, 
but only that stage which is best. At least part of what it is to be an end properly so 
called is to be a good,33 that is, to constitute the culmination of the process whose 
                                                 
30 Cf. Hankinson (1998), 134-135. 
31 As Charlton (1970; 97), points out: “if you study that which is for something, you should study what it 
is for”. 
32 Aristotle uses verbs as boulomai (Ph.II.3, 195a24-25) or ethelô (Ph.II.2, 194a32) to describe the relation of 
ends and what is good or best. 
33 The reference to the ‘being the best’ of natural ends is significant: ‘goodness’ – in the sense of being 
contributory to the actualization of the living being’s nature and well-being – is a defining property of 
natural ends. End results that do a living being no good are not part of the nature of that living being, but 
must be the result of material necessity or spontaneity (Cf. Met.VIII.5, 1044b34-1045a2). This will become 
important in the context of biology, where one of the most important principles is that nature does 
nothing in vain or superfluous: nature is not responsible for all ends in the sense of end-results, but only 
for those that contribute to the larger whole of which they are part. We should be careful not to read any 
values or intentions into Aristotle’s use of the good or best in these contexts: the good is used as a 
functional and relative term picking out what is good or best for the relevant organism in terms of its 
coming to be, surviving, and reproducing. This does not imply any awareness on the part of the organism 
to the goodness of the end that is being realized (Charles (1991), 108-109n.7), or a metaphysical notion of 
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end it is. The culmination of processes occurring in the natural realm is generally the 
realization of a form.  
 After this explanation of the nature of the final cause, Aristotle immediately 
returns to his analogy between art and nature (Ph.II.2, 194a33-34):  
ἐπεὶ καὶ ποιοῦσιν αἱ τέχναι τὴν ὕλην αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς αἱ δὲ εὐεργόν, καὶ χρώμεθα ὡς ἡμῶν 
ἕνεκα πάντων ὑπαρχόντων. 
“Indeed,34 the arts make their matter, some [make it] without qualification, others 
[make it] good to work with, and we use everything that there is as if it is for the 
sake of us.”  
That is, the arts are goal-directed, too: they make the matter such that it is good for 
us and usable for the sake of something.35 What Aristotle indicates here is that the 
final cause in artistic productions lies outside the performance of the art, and is 
always relative to what is beneficial to us: our desires and needs determine what will 
be the end-results of art. Therefore, indirectly and on a secondary level, Aristotle 
states that we are ends, too (Ph.II.2, 194a34-35):  
ἐσμὲν γάρ πως καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος· διχῶς γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· εἴρηται δ’ ἐν τοῖς περὶ 
φιλοσοφίας. 
“For we, too, are ends in some way: for that for the sake of which is double; this 
has been said in On Philosophy.”  
The doubleness of the term ‘that for the sake of which’ pertains to the two senses of 
end: that of which and that for which. In the strict sense, an end is that towards 
which something tends; in a non-technical sense, it is the beneficiary of something.36 
For instance, the generation of trees takes place for the sake of realizing the 
numerical replication of trees; in natural processes, the end of a continuous change is 
the realization of the form that is inherent in the natural thing itself. On the other 
hand, since we benefit from the coming to be of trees (we use them to produce 
artifacts such as beds and tables), in some sense, one could say that trees come to be 
for our sake, too.  
                                                                                                               
the absolute good. In a later chapter, Aristotle adds to his identification of the end with the best that 
“there is no difference between the good itself and the apparent good” (Ph.II.3, 195a23-26); I submit that 
the good here means the practical good, which is capable of being otherwise; cf. DA.III.10, 433a28-31. 
34 The ‘epei’ picks up on the conditional sentence in Ph.II.2, 194a21-22 “if art imitates nature”. 
35 Cf. Ph.II.2, 194b7-8: “in the case of artifacts, we make the matter for the sake of the function, in the 
case of natural things it is already available.” 
36 I will discuss this distinction in more detail in section 2.1.1.c.  
Setting the stage for teleological explanations in the Physica 
 23
 
In sum, natural beings possess in themselves all the causal factors needed to bring 
about their own realization: they are matter, form, internal source of motion, and 
end in one. In some contexts, Aristotle reduces these four ‘causal’ uses of nature to 
two, i.e. to ‘formal nature’ and ‘material nature’.37 The animal’s formal nature 
incorporates its formal, efficient, and final cause: nature in this sense is the goal-
directed efficient cause, directed at the realization of its own form. The animal’s 
material nature, on the other hand, is nature in the sense of the underlying material 
in which the form is realized. Thus, in realizing itself, the formal nature interacts 
with the living being’s material nature, which helps define the actions of the formal 
nature.  
 
1.1.2 Final causes in causal explanations 
The predominant type of teleological explanations given in Ph.II is the one in which 
that for the sake of which is picked out as the cause for why some process or action 
takes place. However, we have also seen that the causal patterns and structures 
underlying natural the things or processes that are to be explained teleologically in 
fact may exhibit all four causes, and that Aristotle claims that all four of them need 
to be known in order for something to be fully understood. In this section, I will 
discuss in more detail Aristotle’s notion of the final cause and its causal role, and lay 
out its relations with the other three causes.  
 
1.1.2.a Types of final causes in Ph.II 
Aristotle introduces a wide variety of kinds of final causes in the second book of the 
Physica.38 These include final causes such as:    
(a) man as the end of natural generation;39 mature animal as the end of 
seed;40 house as the end of the art of building;41 
(b) cutting as the ‘work’ of a saw;42 biting as the ‘work’ of front teeth;43 and 
                                                 
37 See e.g. PA.III.2, 663b22-24 and Met.VII.7, 1032a23. On this distinction and its use in the biological 
works, see Lennox (2001a), 182-204.   
38 Charles (1991), 102-103. 
39 Ph.II.9, 200b3-4. 
40 Ph.II.8, 199b8. 
41 Ph.II.8, 13-14. 
42 Ph.II.9, 200b5-8. 
43 Ph.II.8, 198b24-28. 
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(c) health as the end of walking.44  
Broadly speaking, Aristotle identifies as final causes (a) actual natural substances or 
artifacts that are the outcome of a process of generation; (b) functions that are 
performed by parts of living beings or by tools; and finally (c) objects of desire that 
are acquired through actions.  
 
The first type of final cause, constituted by actual natural substances or artifacts, is 
picked out in explanation of why processes of natural or artificial generation take 
place. For Aristotle, processes of coming to be always involve the reproduction of 
form,45 consisting in the realization of a pre-existing form in a new entity.  
In natural processes, the form of the natural being that comes to be is 
present in potentiality in the seed of its father, who possess this form in actuality. 
The mother of the natural being contributes the matter in the form of the menstrual 
fluid, which is blood that is concocted up to a certain point: it is in potentiality the 
same in form as the mother is, but lacks the source of soul (GA II.3, 737a28-9; GA 
II.4, 740b19-25). The source of soul or the initial efficient cause are provided by the 
father, or more specifically by his seed, which possess ‘movements’ (GA.I.22, 730b5-
32); however, once the heart of the embryo has come into being, this provides the 
new being’s own source of motion through which it can realize its form (Ph.II.8, 
199b15-17). The goal of the process of natural generation is the full realization of 
this potentiality for form46 that is transmitted by the father into the new entity and 
that is inherent in the new entity from the moment of its fertilization.47  
The core of Aristotle’s teleological theory of natural generation lies thus in 
the fact that whatever comes to be already possesses that form in potentiality, and 
that its source already possesses that form in actuality.48 Empedocles is criticized by 
Aristotle exactly because he failed to see these facts (PA.I.1, 640a22-26):  
 
 
                                                 
44 Ph.II.3, 194b33-34. 
45 Lennox (2001a), 231. 
46 Gotthelf calls this potential the ‘irreducible potentiality for form’; Gotthelf (1987), passim. I will later 
return to the question of to what extent this potential is really ‘irreducible’.  
47 Bradie & Miller (1999, 79) label this type of final cause ‘the actualization of natural potentialities’.  
48 Witt (1994b), 222-228. 
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ἀγνοῶν πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι δεῖ τὸ σπέρμα τὸ συνιστὰν ὑπάρχειν τοιαύτην ἔχον δύναμιν, 
εἶτα ὅτι τὸ ποιῆσαν πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν οὐ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ· γεννᾷ 
γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖνον τοιόνδ’ εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοιάδε 
συμβαίνει τῳδί. 
“He failed to see, first, that the seed previously constituted must already possess this 
sort of potentiality, and, next, that the producer was prior not only in definition but 
in time; for it is the man that generates a man, and therefore it is because that man 
is such, that this man’s coming to be happens so.”49 
There is thus no backwards pull by final causes from the future:50 it is the form that 
is present from the outset, received from another natural being in which that form 
has already been realized, that determines the outcome of the process of generation 
which is its actualization and final cause; it is the fully actualized form of the father 
that is used as a starting point of the explanation of the development of the 
offspring.  
 In artificial processes, the form of the artificial product that comes to be is 
present in the art, which is present in the soul of the craftsman. The matter is 
provided by whatever natural materials are available to the craftsman. It is through 
the movements of the tools employed by the craftsman following the form that is 
present in his soul that the form of the artificial product is transferred to some new 
material (which possess this form in potentiality) and is realized (so that the material 
possesses this form in actuality). Art is thus both the formal and the efficient cause 
in artificial production, both of which are residing in the craftsman (GA.II.1, 735a2-
4; GA.II.4, 740b25-29). The goal of the process of artificial production is the full 
realization of the potentiality for form that is transmitted by the craftsman into some 
new material; (unlike nature) the craftsman thus does not reproduce his own form, 
but rather that of the art that he possesses in his soul.51  
                                                 
49 Cf. GA.II.1, 735a3-4. 
50 This misunderstanding of Aristotle’s theory of natural teleology still persists among some philosophers 
of biology; see, for instance, Buller (1999), 5. 
51 Note that while the form of art is mediated by the mind of the craftsman (he works with a mental 
model of the finished product; Met.VII.7, 1032b1-25; cf. Hankinson(1998), 134), his intentions or aims are 
not strictly speaking part of the causal explanation of artifacts. This is why Aristotle uses artificial 
productions as an analogy to natural generation, and why he does not recognize mistakes of conception 
(i.e. in the sense that there is something wrong with the design drawn up by the craftsman), but only of 
production and of failing materials (Ph.II.8, 199a34-b5; pace Matthen, 2006; 2). I will return to this subject 
below in 1.2.1.  
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The second type of final cause, which is constituted by functions, is invoked in the 
explanations of the presence of (the material make-up and formal structure of) 
natural and artificial instruments. Just as actual natural beings and artifacts are the 
realizations of pre-existing forms, so are these functions the actualizations of pre-
existing capacities for activities (residing in the soul or in the material potentials of 
something).52 The functions play a contributory role in the system of which they are 
part; they are ends “above and beyond actuality (EN.I.1, 1094a4-5: τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν 
ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ’ αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά),” that is, they supervene on the actual natural 
substances (or their parts) and artifacts that are ends themselves (e.g. a finished 
house is the final cause of the art of building, while shelter is the function of that 
house). Natural functions are the capacities to perform the distinctive life-functions 
of each kind of animal, which are grounded in and activated by the animal’s soul. 
Artificial functions will be the various uses made by artists of tools for the sake of 
artistic production. 
The third type of final cause, constituted by objects of desire, is picked out 
in the explanation of action. Since action does not involve a replication of form, the 
model of teleological explanation that Aristotle employs in these cases is very 
different from that of natural or artificial generation in that it is intentional in nature. 
It is the desire of a living being for something that directs that living being towards 
that object as an efficient cause; the living being is both awareness of the goodness 
that the goal has to him, and – in the case of human beings – also of the best means 
towards the achievement of that goal.53 The object of desire are ends only in the 
sense that once they (as efficient causes) have activated the animal’s capacity of 
perception, desire, and locomotion, the movements of the animal are directed 
towards this object. 
                                                 
52 The functions are those erga that play a contributory role in the system of which they are part. The 
addition of ‘contributory’ reflects the way Aristotle connects something’s ‘work’ to his notion of the good: 
not every feature of a system is an end (e.g. the fact that the beating of the heart produces noise), but only 
those features that contribute to the system to which they belong (e.g. the fact that the beating of the 
heart – in Aristotle’s theory – produces heat).  
53 Cf. Charles (1991), 107-108. By distinguishing art and agency in this way, I hope to solve the problem 
Charles (1991; 106) notes with regard to the plurality of types of final causes and teleological relations 
sketched in Ph.II.; the concept of teleological causation is unified in the cases of art and nature in that 
both consist in the replication of a pre-existing form, where the realization of this form constitutes the 
final cause; for the cases of agency, Aristotle employs a completely different concept of teleological 
causation, namely one that is intentional in nature. 
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I will use these distinctions between three types of ends to lay out the causal 
relations between final causes and the other three causes.  
 
1.1.2.b Material potentials and function 
Let me start by giving a basic sketch of the interdependence of matter and the final 
cause. The material make-up of artifacts and (parts of) natural substances alike is 
determined (to various extents in artifacts and natural substances) by final causes in the 
sense of function. For Aristotle, the relation between function and the material 
constitution of something is one of conditional necessity (Ph.II.9, 200a10-15): 
οἷον διὰ τί ὁ πρίων τοιοσδί; ὅπως τοδὶ καὶ ἕνεκα τουδί. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα 
ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι, ἂν μὴ σιδηροῦς ᾖ· ἀνάγκη ἄρα σιδηροῦν εἶναι, εἰ πρίων ἔσται καὶ 
τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δὴ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς τέλος· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ 
ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δ’ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. 
“Thus on account of what is a saw like this? That this may be, and for this. It is 
impossible, however, that this thing which it is for should come to be, unless it is 
made of iron. It is necessary, then, that it should be made of iron, if there is to be a saw, and its 
work to be done. The necessary, then, is necessary starting from some hypothesis,54 
and not as an end: the necessary is in the matter, the ‘that for the sake of which’ in 
the form.” 
If there is to be a saw that saws, it must be made from some strong and solid 
material, like iron, and the same holds for bodily instruments:55 if there is to be a 
functioning (natural or artificial) instrument, then it has to be made from a certain 
type of material with certain material potentials56 which will have to be present first 
and undergo certain changes,57 if the instrument is to come about. The final and the 
                                                 
54 On the connection between the expression ‘ex hypotheseôs’ and the idea of conditionality, see Bobzien 
(2002), 363. 
55 Cf. PA.I.1, 642a8-13: “And this is, as it were, conditionally necessary; for just as, since the axe must 
split, it is a necessity that it be hard, and if hard, then made of bronze or iron, so too since the body is an 
instrument (for each of the parts is for the sake of something, and likewise also the whole), it is therefore 
a necessity that it be of such a character and constituted from such things, if that is to be.” 
56 In the case of the generation of natural parts and substances, the material properties will even be more 
strongly determined by the function(s) they will need to perform; on this issue, see below 2.1.2. 
57 Aristotle’s notion of conditional necessity seems to be restricted to material conditions that are 
necessary for the performance of a function. On the other hand, Aristotle sometimes gives examples that 
at least seem to imply that a ‘maker’ or ‘producer’, i.e. an efficient cause, also belongs to the necessary 
conditions; see, for instance, PA.I.1, 639b25-30 (“It is necessary that a certain sort of matter be present if 
there is to be a house or any other end, and this must come to be and be changed first, then that, and so step 
by step up to the end and that for the sake of which each comes to be and is.”) and GA.II.6, 743a21-26 
(“But it is not anything whatever that is made into flesh or bone by the heat, but only something naturally 
fitted for the purpose; nor is it made in any place or time whatever, but only in a place and time naturally 
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material cause are thus intrinsically connected to each other: the need for some 
function to be realized conditionally necessitates the coming to be of a material with 
certain potentials, while the presence of those materials with their particular material 
potentials facilitates the performance of functions.  
 
1.1.2.c The efficient cause as the producer of end products 
The efficient and final cause in natural generation and artificial production are always 
complementary to each other:58 the efficient causes in these generations are always 
limited by and directed towards the final cause, while the end that constitutes the 
final cause is the outcome of this efficient causal process. 
Aristotle describes the interrelation between efficient and final causation as 
follows: (GA.II.6, 742a16-b18; 742a28-36): 
τριῶν δ’ ὄντων—ἑνὸς μὲν τοῦ τέλους ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι οὗ ἕνεκα, δευτέρου δὲ τῶν 
τούτου ἕνεκα τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς κινητικῆς καὶ γεννητικῆς (τὸ γὰρ ποιητικὸν καὶ γεννητικόν, 
ᾗ τοιαῦτα, πρὸς τὸ ποιούμενόν ἐστι καὶ γεννώμενον), (…) πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχειν 
ἀναγκαῖόν τι μόριον ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως (…), ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ 
τέλος, (…). 
“Thus there are three things: first, the end, by which we mean that for the sake of 
which something else exists; secondly, the principle of movement and of 
generation, existing for the sake of the end (for that which can make and generate, 
considered simply as such, exists only in relation to what is made and generated); 
(...). Accordingly, there must first be some part in which the principle of movement 
is (...); next after this the whole and the end (…).” 
The efficient cause is the origin or beginning of the continuous movement or 
change, which needs to stay operative throughout this movement or change (or 
transmit its motion to another moving cause; causation for Aristotle requires 
contact).59 In the case of natural generation, we saw that the efficient cause is first 
identified with the father who sets the process of generation in motion, then with 
the motive power residing in the male semen, and finally with the formal nature or 
the soul of the living being which, as it were, ‘produces’ or ‘makes’ and then sustains 
                                                                                                               
so fitted. For neither will that which exists potentially be made except by that moving agent which possesses the actuality, 
nor will a box be made out of the wood without the carpenter.”); cf. Lennox (2001a), 102 and Lewis (1988), 87n8.   
58 Broadie (1990), 391. 
59 For this distinctive aspect of efficient causation in Aristotle, see Hankinson (2007), 5. 
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that living being from the inside out.60 The actual living being, and its parts, comes 
to be as an end result of this process of ‘natural production’. In the case of artistic 
production, we saw that the efficient cause is the art, which is present in the soul of 
the craftsman. In both cases, the endpoint of this movement or change is given with 
the form that is being realized: once this form is realized, and the generation has 
reached the end that constitutes its final cause, the process ends.61 Aristotle argues 
that the two causes are in fact complementary (Ph.II.3, 195a8-11):62 
ἔστιν δέ τινα καὶ ἀλλήλων αἴτια, οἷον τὸ πονεῖν τῆς εὐεξίας καὶ αὕτη τοῦ πονεῖν· ἀλλ’ οὐ 
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὡς τέλος τὸ δ’ ὡς ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.  
“And some are also causes of one another, as training is a cause of fine condition, 
and this in turn is a cause of training, though again not in the same way, but the one 
as end and the other as source of motion.” 
This means that final causes can never operate in a vacuum – ends are realized in 
conjunction with an efficient cause that is directed towards this end. The actual 
realization of an end implies that some kind of active efficiency has taken place.63 
The reason for this is that in natural generation, as in artificial production, the final, 
the formal, and the efficient cause “coincide” (Ph.II.7, 198a24-7):   
ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ τρία εἰς [τὸ] ἓν πολλάκις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἕν ἐστι, τὸ δ’ 
ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις πρῶτον τῷ εἴδει ταὐτὸ τούτοις· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ. 
“In many cases three [of these causes] run together; for what something is and that 
for the sake of which it is are the same, while that from which motion first 
originates is the same as them in kind: for man generates man.”  
The efficient cause of the father is not numerically the same as the efficient cause of 
the son, but they are the same in kind: both efficient causes are directed towards the 
realization and maintenance of the same form,64 which in its fullest expression 
constitutes the final cause. 
 
                                                 
60 Hankinson (2007), 7-9. 
61 Cf. DA.II.4, 416a15-18: “For while the growth of fire goes on without limit so long as there is a supply 
of fuel, in the case of all complex wholes formed in the course of nature there is a limit or ratio which 
determines their size and increase, and limit and ratio are marks of soul but not of fire, and belong to the 
side of account rather than that of matter.”  
62 Cf. EE.I.8, 1218b11-22; Met.I.3, 983a31: “in a third way [we speak of a cause as] the source of the 
change, and in a fourth the cause opposed to this (τετάρτην δὲ τὴν ἀντικειμένην αἰτίαν ταύτῃ), that for the 
sake of which and the good – for this is the end of all generation and change.”  
63 Cf. Broadie (1990), 391. 
64 Moravcsik calls it a ‘built-in schedule of development and maintenance;’ Moravcsik (1994), 236. 
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1.1.2.d Forms are realized for the sake of activities 
Aristotle analyzes natural generation and artistic production in terms of the 
transmission of form from something which has that form in actuality to something 
which is capable of receiving it because it possesses that same form in potentiality.65 
This relation between form in potentiality and form in actuality is a teleological one, 
since potentiality is for the sake of actuality (Met.IX.8, 1050a4-10).66  
Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσίᾳ γε, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ 
πρότερα (οἷον ἀνὴρ παιδὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος σπέρματος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ 
δ’ οὔ), καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, 
τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἕνεκα ἡ γένεσις), τέλος δ’ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις 
λαμβάνεται.  
“But [actuality] is also prior in substance; firstly, because the things that are 
posterior in becoming are prior in form and in substance (e.g. man is prior to boy 
and human being to seed; for the one already has its form, and the other has not), 
but also because everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, namely an 
end (for that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is for 
the sake of the end); and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the 
potentiality is acquired.” 
Forms are transmitted in generation for the sake of the realization of that form in a 
new natural being (or artifact), and this realization of form is itself for the sake of 
activity (PA.I.5, 645b14-20):  
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν ὄργανον πᾶν ἕνεκά του, τῶν δὲ τοῦ σώματος μορίων ἕκαστον ἕνεκά 
του, τὸ δ’ οὗ ἕνεκα πρᾶξίς τις, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ σύνολον σῶμα συνέστηκε πράξεώς 
τινος ἕνεκα πολυμεροῦς. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ πρίσις τοῦ πρίονος χάριν γέγονεν, ἀλλ’ ὁ πρίων τῆς 
πρίσεως· χρῆσις γάρ τις ἡ πρίσις ἐστίν. Ὥστε καὶ τὸ σῶμά πως τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν, καὶ 
τὰ μόρια τῶν ἔργων πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον.   
                                                 
65 Hankinson (2007), 10; for the principle of ‘causal synonymy’ (i.e. the principle that the causes that 
transmit form in effecting change are synonymous with their effects), see Bodnár (2006), 5-7. 
66 This type of explanation in terms of ‘potential being’ being for the sake of ‘actual being’ in answer to 
the question of the being (the identity and unity) of substances, is what Witt (1998) singles out as 
‘metaphysical teleology’. I disagree with her claim, however, that “metaphysical teleology has not a word 
to say” on the central explananda of natural teleology, which are according to her the presence and 
formation of parts and the generation of animals; see Witt (1998), 257. In the chapter on teleology in 
biology, I will show that Aristotle in his explanations of animal development is also concerned with being. 
For, as it turns out, the causes that explain the coming to be of a part are not always the same as those 
that explain its presence; often, Aristotle needs to provide an extra explanation for why animals have the 
features they have or why certain available materials are not disposed off but put to a good use. Moreover, 
while Aristotle may not address the question of what it is to be a substance in the biological works, he 
does address the question of what it is for an animal to be the animal it is (which pertains to the questions 
of the unity and identity of substance), both in his biology and in his psychology.   
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“Since every instrument is for the sake of something, and each of the parts of the 
body is for the sake of something, and what they are for the sake of is a certain action, it is 
apparent that the entire body too has been constituted for the sake of a certain 
manifold action. For sawing is not for the sake of the saw, but the saw for sawing; 
for sawing is a certain use. So the body too is in a way for the sake of the soul, and 
the parts are for the sake of the functions in relation to which each of them has 
naturally developed.” 
Potentiality is for the sake of actuality, and this is for the sake of activity:67 the whole 
process of generation is directed towards an ever fuller realization of form, which 
culminates in a state of full actuality, which constitutes the final cause. It is in this 
sense that formal and final causes are said to be “almost one (ἕν τι σχεδὸν).”68 The 
ultimate final cause is the living being’s life.69 
 
In some cases, Aristotle also pairs the four causes together in two contrasting 
groups. This may suggest an ontological division of types of causes that do and do 
not go together, but I think it rather means that Aristotle singles out certain aspects 
of the causal pattern (that in fact may or may not include all four causes) for the sake 
of clarity of explanation.  
For instance, sometimes Aristotle contrasts matter and form with efficient 
and final causes. The combination of matter and form is taken to provide mainly an 
explanation of being, that is, of the static composition of things that are (i.e. the 
composite substances). If one focuses on the result of a process of generation, the 
properties of that thing can be explained best in terms of its structure and material 
potentials. On the other hand, the combination of efficient and final causes is 
invoked in particular to explain the dynamic processes of coming to be (i.e. natural 
generation, artistic production, and deliberative action). If one focuses on the 
process of generation itself, the properties of that process can be explained best in 
terms of the origin of change and the direction and destination of the change.  
                                                 
67 Met.IX.8, 1050a21-23. 
68 E.g. GA.I.1, 715a4-6. 
69 Formal and final causes are also connected in the sense that forms or essences are themselves 
“determined by their role in a teleological system;” Charles (1988), passim; Charles (1991), 102. For 
Aristotle’s claim that things are defined by their function or typical activity, see e.g. Meteor.IV.12, 390a10-
12 and Pol.I.2, 1253a19-25. 
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At other times Aristotle joins the formal and final cause together,70 while contrasting 
them with the material and efficient cause.71 The first pair is singled out as the basis 
of proper teleological explanation, which stands out from all other types of 
explanation in that it concerns a formal cause whose full realization is the final cause 
of the process. Processes that do not have a fully realized form as an outcome that 
can properly be defined as its end and that do not involve some kind of form that is 
prior to and causative for the process, do not generate teleological explanations. The 
latter pair of material and efficient causation is supposed to pick out the typical 
workings of necessity (usually material necessity), which involves materials moving 
and acting according to their own natures without the structuring presence of form 
and unconditional upon some end that is to be realized.  
 
1.2 Three Models of Teleology:  
Natural Generation, Artistic Production, and Deliberative Action 
 
The most striking characteristics of Aristotle’s introduction of teleological 
explanation in the Physica are his appeal to art or artistic production as an analogue 
for his conception of nature, and his use of examples of both artistic production and 
deliberative action to illustrate natural goal-directedness. This indicates that Aristotle 
in fact employs a threefold model of teleology, according to which nature, artists, 
and agents in general are all claimed to act along similar, but different teleological 
patterns. This plurality of teleological models has been thought to threaten the unity 
of Aristotle’s theory of teleology, and hence his success in justifying his use of 
teleology as a principle of explanation in the natural sciences.72 Others believe that 
the analogy between natural teleology and cases involving agency, and Aristotle’s 
failure to distinguish clearly between these two,73 bring in false or unsubstantiated 
claims concerning the operation of natural teleology.74 
                                                 
70 E.g. GA.I.1, 715a4-6; GA.I.1, 715a8-9; GA.V.1, 778b11-19; DA.II.4, 415b10-12. 
71 E.g. GA. II.1, 731b18-24; GA.V.1, 778b1-10; GA.V.8, 789b19-22. Cf. Cooper (1982), 201; Dudley 
(1997), 111. 
72 E.g. Charles (1991), 102-104; 109-110. 
73 Charles (1991), 118-119; 124; 127. 
74 E.g. Bolotin (1998), 35; Broadie (1990), 401; Owens (1981), 145. 
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In this section, I will explore the teleological models of artistic production and of 
deliberative action, each in conjunction with the model of natural teleology. I shall 
argue for the (more charitable) position that Aristotle puts each analogy to its own 
specific use, and is very clear about what parts of the base domain of the analogy (i.e. 
art, agency) may be mapped onto the target domain (i.e. nature) so as to prevent 
faulty inferences. The model from the arts will prove to be much more important as 
an analogy to natural generation than the agency model, exactly because Aristotle 
does not want to introduce intentions into the operations of nature. However, both 
the agency and the art model – so I will argue – are used for didactic purposes; 
Aristotle’s model of natural teleology is not dependent on either of these two 
models, and therefore I do not believe that his justifications for assuming the 
internal, non-intentional goal-directedness of nature are threatened.  
 
1.2.1 The analogy between nature and art in teleological explanations 
 
1.2.1.a Preliminary overview of Aristotle’s uses of the concept of art in the Physica 
The concept of technê (here translated by ‘art’)75 plays an important role in Aristotle’s 
exposition and defense of natural teleology. Within the Physica, the term technê is only 
used in the second book, and always in analogy to or in contrast with nature. Many 
of the examples used in the second book of the Physica are taken from the arts (see 
especially the examples used to illustrate Aristotle’s theory of causal explanation in 
Ph.II.3 and Ph.II.7), and Aristotle often draws an analogies between the two 
domains.  
For instance, as we have seen already, Aristotle first employs the model of 
the arts in his preliminary investigation into the concept of nature in Ph.II.1. In this 
chapter, nature is defined in contrast with art or products of art that do not have an 
internal source of change. The question of whether or not something has an internal 
source of change will remain a crucial difference between art and nature throughout 
the Physica,76 also when Aristotle uses the concept of art as analogous to that of 
                                                 
75 ‘Art’ seems the most common translation of technê; but see Hankinson (1998), 128n.2 and Löbl (2003), 
258-264, who point out that the notion of technê is in fact broader than that of the arts: it includes what we 
would call crafts, skills, and applied sciences.  
76 This distinction is even more crucial than the question of the presence or absence of intentionality, as I 
will explain below. 
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nature. In this context, Aristotle uses the concept of art to accentuate the defining 
features of nature.  
The analogy, rather than the contrast between art and nature, figures 
prominently in Ph.II.2, 194a22-27. In this passage, Aristotle introduces his famous 
adage that ‘art imitates nature’, but framed in a conditional sentence: if indeed art 
imitates nature, and if it belongs to the same branch of knowledge to know both 
form and matter as it belongs in art, then the student of nature, too, should study 
both matter and form. Aristotle does not argue for the analogy between art and 
nature, but rather posits it in a hypothetical way. The suggested inference serves as 
an a fortiori argument: because in art it is obvious that a craftsman, such as a builder, 
has to have knowledge of both the form of a house and of which kinds of materials 
to use, we may draw the conclusion that the same holds for the student of nature. In 
this context, Aristotle uses the argument primarily to induce further conclusions 
concerning nature and thereby to strengthen his argumentation.  
However, it is not until in Ph.II.8, 199a8-20 that we touch upon Aristotle’s 
most important and complicated use of the analogy. Here Aristotle uses the analogy 
between the goal-directedness of nature and the goal-directedness of art in order to 
defend the very existence of natural teleology. I will not go into the details of this 
argument just yet, but would instead like to call attention to the fact that again the 
argument that is established is an a fortiori one. The argument for the goal-
directedness of nature hinges on the acceptance of the claim that art is goal-directed 
and that nature is ontologically prior to art.  
This overview of the various uses of the analogy between nature and art 
should suffice as a preliminary framework within which we can assess the 
importance of the model of artistic production.  
 
1.2.1.b The importance of the teleological model of artistic production 
In modern scholarship, there is little agreement over the overall importance of the 
teleological model of artistic production.  
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According to some interpreters, Aristotle’s model of natural teleology is in fact based 
on the etiology of artifacts.77 Because the active exercise of art is evidently goal-
directed, it is argued that therefore the model of art must have offered Aristotle the 
metaphysical schema for his theory of natural generation.78 This interpretation places 
the analogy between nature and art at the heart of Aristotle’s defense of natural 
teleology, and considers the analysis of art to be a central heuristic within Aristotle’s 
scientific methodology. Other interpreters have downplayed the importance of the 
art analogy. In their view, the analogy is not fundamental to Aristotle’s concept of 
natural teleology,79 but rather serves a didactic function in explaining how natural 
teleology operates.80 I believe this latter view to be right, for the following two 
reasons.  
First, Aristotle offers a more fundamental argument in favor for the 
assumption of final causality in nature independently of the analogy between art and 
nature (this is the notorious rainfall example in Ph.II.8, 198b32-199a2, which will be 
discussed below in 1.3).81  
Second, Aristotle does not fail to stress the differences between the two 
domains. This is important, for Aristotle inherited the teleological model of the arts 
from Plato,82 whose concept of natural teleology was itself modeled on and perhaps 
also metaphysically grounded in (intelligent) artistic production.83 Against this view, 
Aristotle argues for the ontological priority of nature which is imitated and improved 
by art,84 while attributing to art only epistemological priority (because it is ‘closer to 
us’).85 Aristotle’s analysis of art is based on the same ontological framework as his 
analysis of nature, only because art is itself dependent on nature.86 I believe that 
                                                 
77 Granger (1993), 168 (Granger actually takes Aristotle’s theory of action to be the model behind 
Aristotle’s teleology, which is then exemplified in art); Matthen (2007), 1. 
78 This position is defended by Broadie (1990), 393-396; see e.g. 395-6: “Now this is the conception that 
the art analogy is surely intended to hammer home: the conception, namely, of particular physical things 
as themselves metaphysical centres of the development towards form. (...) By taking art as model for the 
specific natures of particular physical objects, Aristotle unambiguously declares their status as 
metaphysical centres of activity. Without the art analogy we should still have teleological explanation, but 
not the Aristotelian concept of natural substances.” 
79 E.g. Wieland (1975), 151. 
80 E.g. Cooper (1982), 198n.2. 
81 Cooper (1982), 198; 216. 
82 Furley (2004), 71-72.  
83 Johansen (2004), 83-86; Lennox (2001a), 281. 
84 Pace Charles (1991), 115. 
85 Cf. Granger (1993), 174. 
86 Cf. Katayama (1999), 79-80; 101-108. 
Chapter 1. Aristotle’s defense of natural teleology 
 
 36
Aristotle uses the teleological model of art to illuminate the workings of nature, but 
does not need this model to justify his assumption of natural teleology.  
 The key passage in determining the importance of the analogy is the first 
argument Aristotle provides in favor of the existence of natural teleology. Let me 
quote the passage in full (Ph.II.8, 199a8-20):  
ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις τέλος ἔστι τι, τούτου ἕνεκα πράττεται τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς. οὐκοῦν 
ὡς πράττεται, οὕτω πέφυκε, καὶ ὡς πέφυκεν, οὕτω πράττεται ἕκαστον, ἂν μή τι 
ἐμποδίζῃ. πράττεται δ’ ἕνεκά του· καὶ πέφυκεν ἄρα ἕνεκά του. οἷον εἰ οἰκία τῶν φύσει 
γιγνομένων ἦν, οὕτως ἂν ἐγίγνετο ὡς νῦν ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης· εἰ δὲ τὰ φύσει μὴ μόνον φύσει 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τέχνῃ γίγνοιτο, ὡσαύτως ἂν γίγνοιτο ᾗ πέφυκεν. ἕνεκα ἄρα θατέρου θάτερον. 
ὅλως δὲ ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. εἰ 
οὖν τὰ κατὰ τέχνην ἕνεκά του, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει πρὸς 
ἄλληλα ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν τὰ ὕστερα πρὸς τὰ πρότερα.  
“Further, in those things in which there is an end, what is earlier and successive is 
done for the sake of that. As it is done, so is it by nature, and as it is by nature, so is 
each thing done, if nothing interferes. But it is done for the sake of something: and 
therefore it is also by nature for the sake of something. For example, if a house 
were to be among things that come to be by nature, it would come to be in the 
same way as it does now by art. And if things that come to be by nature came to be 
not only by nature but also by art, they would come to be in the same way as they 
do now by nature. Each is for the sake of the other. In general, art will complete on 
the one hand the things which nature cannot bring to a finish, on the other hand 
imitate her. If now the things according to art are for the sake of something, it is 
clear that so too are the things that are according to nature. For the relation of 
things that are later to those which are earlier are the same among the things that 
are according to art and in those that are according to nature.”   
The analogy for which Aristotle argues here between the teleological processes of 
production in art and generation in nature is twofold:87 (i) if there is a sequence of 
which there is an end, the previous motions leading up to this end must have been 
for the sake of this end; the sequence is organized and teleological (Ph.II.8, 199a8-9); 
(ii) the temporal ordering of the various steps in the sequence leading up to the end 
are determined by this end (and are thus to be explained teleologically; Ph.II.8, 
199a18-20).  
                                                 
87 Charles (1991), 114-115. 
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The whole argument in which these basic features of teleological generation are 
presented runs something like this: ‘artistic processes supervene on natural processes 
(art is limited to the imitation and completion of natural goals, which it achieves by 
means congenial to nature), and if artistic processes are for the sake of something, 
then evidently (δῆλον; Ph.II.8, 199a17) natural processes, too, are for the sake of 
something – evidently, because the relations of priority and posteriority are the same 
in natural and artistic processes.’ Aristotle does not offer any evidence for the goal-
directedness of artistic production, nor for the ontological priority of nature over 
art.88 The goal-directedness of both is presupposed in this passage, which suggests 
that Aristotle’s defense of natural teleology does not lie in this analogy.  
 
1.2.1.c The four main points of analogy between the workings of art and nature 
The analogy Aristotle draws between art and nature to illustrate the workings of the 
latter usually pertains to one of the four following aspects:89   
 First of all, because Aristotle holds that the causes that are involved in 
artificial production are the same as in natural genesis, but are more clearly 
differentiated, the model of art exemplifies Aristotle’s account of natural generation 
really. For instance, both artifacts and the products of nature are compounds of 
matter and form, but in artifacts the two ‘components’ are more easily 
distinguishable, because the material component can actually persist outside the 
compound (bricks are still bricks long after the house has been broken down), which 
is not the case in the products of nature (a severed hand is only a hand 
homonymously). Moreover, what is replicated in both cases is form:90 in the one 
case it is the form of the specific art’s product (which is molded in the material by an 
external artist guided by that form), in the other the form of the specific animal 
species (which comes to exemplify itself in an organic body by its own internal 
source of change). 
                                                 
88 Aristotle simply seems to consider it to be a basic fact that artistic processes are goal-directed and that 
ends are present more in nature than in art; cf. PA.I.1, 639a19-21: “Yet that for the sake of which and the 
good are present more in the works of nature than in those of art.” 
89 In this overview, I draw heavily from Broadie (1990), 396-397, and Lennox (2001a), 287-290 (the latter 
actually discusses five distinctive features of craftsmanship in Plato; not all of these features are taken over 
by Aristotle). I have not tested the four features I list against evidence concerning Aristotle’s use of the 
image of art outside the Physica or the De Partibus Animalium. 
90 On the pattern of formal replication in the arts and in nature, see Lennox (2001a), 230-232. 
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A second point of analogy is the way the end and the means to realize the end (or 
the efficient cause) are not only complementary to each other, but also adjusted to 
each other. In nature, the efficient, formal, and final causes coincide, such that the 
formal nature becomes its own internal goal-direct agent of the realization of its own 
form (and not of some other form). In the case of art, the knowledge the craftsman 
has acquired is precisely for the sake of the reproduction of some specific form in 
matter: the art of house-building is acquired for and guides the use of tools for the 
production of houses, the art of shipbuilding is acquired for and guides the use of 
tools for the production of ships, etc.91 (For this reason the teleological model of 
deliberative agency constitutes a less good analogue for nature: there is much more 
flexibility between the end and the means to an end in cases of deliberative agency, 
while such a choice is usually absent in art and nature.)92  
Related to this is the third point of analogy. This concerns the 
specialization of the arts which resembles the ontological classification of natures: 
the arts are divided into different kinds of specializations, each of which aims at 
producing its own specific object. Things with a nature are similarly split into 
different kinds and species, each of which tends towards the realization of its own 
specific form or essence. 
The fourth and final point of analogy is the reliability and regularity of 
efficient causation in both domains: because of the above mentioned specialization 
of the arts, artists will always or for the most part produce the objects that they are 
supposed to produce, and they will do so almost ‘automatically’ and without 
mistakes. Ideally, (and it is the ideal case that is the paradigm) the experienced artist 
or craftsman will not have to deliberate about which object to produce (a shoemaker 
produces shoes, not dresses), nor about the means to produce it; his art dictates 
both.93 Nature as an internal efficient cause of change and generation operates much 
in the same way: it realizes on a regular bases its own form, without deliberating over 
                                                 
91 Cf. Broadie (1990), 397: “It is not as if the capacity, in any given case, could have been used to some 
other end, or is more than is needed for this.” 
92 These first two similarities between nature and art pertain to similarities in the causal framework of 
generation: in both cases, the same four kinds of cause are operative, but they are easiest distinguishable 
in the case of arts; this adds to the didactic force of the analogy. 
93 Broadie (1990), 398; cf. Lennox (2001a), 245n.9: “In the established arts, the practitioner need not 
deliberate how to achieve his desired end.”  
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the ends or the means to this ends, and realizes this form, unless something impedes 
it, without mistakes. 
 
In sum, Aristotle mainly focuses on art as another source of goal-directed coming to 
be in addition to nature (as opposed to necessity, luck, and spontaneity), and whose 
operations are in many ways like those of nature: form is realized in matter through a 
source of change, and the realized form is the end for the sake of which the change 
took place; each specific form is realized through its own specific source of change 
and these realizations are achieved regularly or for the most part, by following a 
particular sequence of operations, and usually without mistakes (but cf. Ph.II.8, 
199a33-b7).  
The largest difference is, as pointed out above, that natures possess their 
own internal efficient causes through which they realize their own forms, by 
permeating their material and by realizing form from the inside out. The products of 
art, on the other hand, are dependent for their realizations on external efficient 
causes, which are imposed from without on the material in order to dictate the 
appropriate form on it.  
 
1.2.1.d The non-intentional model of art and nature 
Some scholars believe that the above mentioned difference between art and nature 
with respect to the internality or externality of the source of change also entails the 
greatest weakness of the analogy. In the case of art, the efficient cause is located in 
and operates through a human artist, and human beings are held to operate through 
intentions, desires, and external needs. If such psychological concepts are to be 
found crucial for Aristotle’s depiction of artistic production, as some scholars think 
they are,94 then Aristotle must be accused of introducing intentionality into his 
concept of natural teleology. On the other hand, if psychological attitudes are not to 
be included in the causal story of natural teleology because they are not central to 
artistic production either (which is the view I will defend), we are faced with the 
challenge of answering the question whether Aristotle can coherently treat nature as 
                                                 
94 This seems in part to be due to the fact that scholars have insufficiently distinguished between 
deliberative action (which involves intentions and deliberation) and artistic production (which does not 
involve intentions or deliberation); see, e.g., Charles (1991), 108 and Johnson (2005), 126; 157; 166. 
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teleological at all. We will have to explain how a non-psychological natural teleology 
makes sense.95 
    
Let me first refute the view that Aristotle ‘psychologizes’ natural teleology through 
the analogy with artistic production. There are two passages in Ph.II.8 in which 
Aristotle points out explicitly that the notion of art that he employs in analogy to 
nature does not involve deliberation.  
The first passage I would like to draw attention to follows immediately 
upon Aristotle’s use of the analogy between art and nature to argue for the existence 
of natural teleology. In this passage, Aristotle offers support for this conclusion by 
focusing emphatically on examples of natural processes in which psychological states 
are absent (Ph.II.8, 199a20-30): 
μάλιστα δὲ φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ οὔτε τέχνῃ οὔτε ζητήσαντα οὔτε 
βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ· ὅθεν διαποροῦσί τινες πότερον νῷ ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ ἐργάζονται οἵ τ’ 
ἀράχναι καὶ οἱ μύρμηκες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. κατὰ μικρὸν δ’οὕτω προϊόντι καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
φυτοῖς φαίνεται τὰ συμφέροντα γιγνόμενα πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον τὰ φύλλα τῆς τοῦ 
καρποῦ ἕνεκα σκέπης. ὥστ’ εἰ φύσει τε ποιεῖ καὶ ἕνεκά του ἡ χελιδὼν τὴν νεοττιὰν καὶ ὁ 
ἀράχνης τὸ ἀράχνιον, καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τὰ φύλλα ἕνεκα τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς ῥίζας οὐκ ἄνω 
ἀλλὰ κάτω τῆς τροφῆς, φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ αἰτία ἡ τοιαύτη ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις 
καὶ οὖσιν.  
“And this is most obvious in the case of the other animals, which make things, 
neither with art, nor by inquiring, nor by deliberating. Because of this, people 
wonder whether spiders, ants, and the like produce things by means of intelligence 
or something else. Proceed a little further and you will find even among plants 
things that conduce towards an end, like leaves for the sake of protection of the 
fruit. So if it is both by nature and for the sake of something that the swallow makes 
the nest, and the spider the web, and the plant the leaves for the sake of the fruit, 
and the roots do not grow up but down for nourishment, then it is evident that this 
kind of cause exists in the things that come about and exist naturally.” 
According to Aristotle, natural teleology is present most obviously in the case of 
animals and plants that make or do things for the sake of something, but which do 
not possess art, nor are incapable of having the necessary psychological states 
                                                 
95 These are the problems raised and addressed by Broadie (1990), 390-391; passim; cf. also Charles 
(1991), 114-119, and Furley (1996), 67.  
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involved in purposeful agency (animals lack deliberation, plants lack intentional 
states altogether).96 The accomplishment of their goal-directed activities, therefore, 
cannot be dependent on or caused by intentions or deliberations, which shows that 
the ends they achieve exist naturally and are not the product of any kind of 
deliberation. The activities of animals and plants exhibit natural teleology because 
they are natural, not because of something else. 
The second passage that is relevant in this context is the conclusion of 
Ph.II.8. In this passage, Aristotle claims that art does not deliberate and that it is 
absurd to suppose that the goal-directedness of natural beings is dependent upon 
deliberation (Ph.II.8, 199b26-33):  
ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἕνεκά του γίγνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευσάμενον. 
καίτοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται· καὶ εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ ναυπηγική, ὁμοίως ἂν τῇ 
φύσει ἐποίει· ὥστ’ εἰ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ἔνεστι τὸ ἕνεκά του, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει. Μάλιστα δὲ 
δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἰατρεύῃ αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἰτία ἡ 
φύσις, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἕνεκά του, φανερόν. 
“It is absurd to suppose that a thing comes to be for something unless the thing 
which effects the change is seen to have deliberated. Art too does not deliberate. If the 
art of shipbuilding were present in wood, it would act in the same way as nature; so 
if the ‘for something’ is present in art, it is present in nature too. The point is 
clearest when someone doctors himself: nature is like that. So then, it is apparent 
that nature is a cause, and a cause in the manner of that for the sake of which.” 
Aristotle not only ‘de-psychologizes’ nature, but also eliminates deliberation from his 
conception of art.97 Artistic productions would come to be in the exact same way if 
the art of shipbuilding were part of a nature, instead of present in the soul of a 
shipbuilder: this implies that the presence of intentional states in the shipbuilder 
does not add anything to the generative process because it does not cause it. 
Psychological states only matter in the sense that art cannot exercise itself and 
depends for its actualization on the ‘rational potentiality’ of the artist, which is a 
separate psychological component. The example of the person doctoring himself is 
crucial in this context: it shows that the point of analogy between nature and art is 
strongest in the case of a process (rare and accidental in art) where the source of 
                                                 
96 Note that Aristotle mentions three items that plants and animals lack (art, inquiry, and deliberation): 
presumably, if art involved deliberation, Aristotle would not have mentioned it separately.  
97 This point is well brought out by Broadie (1990), 398 and passim.  
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change and the end are brought about in and through the same substance, as in this 
case where “the cause of the patient’s health lies within himself.”98 Psychological 
states are left completely out of the picture.  
Although the teleological model of art is didactically prior to that of natural 
teleology, because ‘it is closer to us’, what we see here is that Aristotle makes art 
analogous to nature, and uses nature as the paradigm.99   
 
In Aristotle’s account, psychological states play no role in type of teleology that is at 
play in artistic production, and hence should not be mapped onto the workings of 
natural teleology. This ‘de-psychologized’ picture of art, however, might encompass 
another problem for the coherence of the analogy. As has been brought out by 
Broadie, art is not autonomous in the way nature is.100 The ends aimed at by art are 
not themselves intrinsic to that art, but depend on and are determined by human 
desires and needs. In reality, the arts are dependent on their social context in which 
they function, and because Aristotle leaves this aspect out of the picture in drawing 
his analogy between nature and art, he in fact distorts the notion of art.101 This 
distortion is considered to be a flaw in the analogy, which threatens the inferences 
from the one domain to the other altogether.  
However, Broadie’s demands on the analogy seem to be a bit harsh. She 
claims that “he [i.e. Aristotle] cannot safely model nature on art, since if we take one 
thing as model for another, we expect the latter’s structure to exhibit all that is 
essential in the former (my italics).”102 I hope my previous discussions have made 
clear that Aristotle is well aware of the differences between art and nature on a 
metaphysical level (and points out these differences if relevant),103 and that he 
presents art and nature as being analogical only in certain ways.104 Since I see no 
evidence for the belief that Aristotle uses (or needed) the analogy as an argument to 
metaphysically ground natural teleology, a few disanalogies between the two notions 
are not necessarily a problem (but are rather to be expected – otherwise art and 
                                                 
98 Johansen (2004), 77. 
99 Cf. Depew (1997), 222. 
100 Broadie (1990), 400. 
101 Broadie (1990), 401. 
102 Broadie (1990), 401. 
103 E.g. in Ph.II.2, 194b7-9; GA.II.1, 735a2-4. 
104 Cf. Granger (1993), 174n.9. 
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nature would be the same). For Aristotle, the analogy between art and nature is a 
didactic tool, applied to point out and explain the underlying structures of a lesser 
known system (nature) through its similarities with a well understood system (art). 
The non-similar aspects of the base domain are not taken into consideration exactly 
because not all aspects can or need to be mapped onto nature; those that are, on the 
other hand, are highlighted by Aristotle.  
Aristotle’s depiction of art might be misleading for the understanding of art 
itself as Broadie thinks (that is, perhaps, for a historical understanding of the arts in 
the Greek world),105 but I believe it is part of the philosophical tradition and 
therefore not totally alien to Aristotle’s students.106 Plato’s Demiurge, the ultimate 
model of the craftsman, creates the world in a rational and intelligent way, and surely 
Plato depicts him as having intentions and thoughts.107 However, this does not make 
the Demiurge a free agent at all, nor is the model of teleology essentially 
psychological.108 According to the Timaeus, the world is good and ordered because 
the Demiurge wanted it to be good, but this order and goodness can only be secured 
by the assumption of eternal forms as the paradigms of the world. The Demiurge 
must look at the eternal forms and imitate them as well as possible, if he wants to 
realize his aims.109 The reason why Timaeus ‘opts’ for the explanation of the creation 
of the cosmos through the postulation of a divine craftsman, is because the model of 
a craftsman who looks at eternal models ensures and necessitates the beauty and 
                                                 
105 Although the philosophical emphasis on the proficiency and specialization of the arts is also confirmed 
by other sources; see, for instance, Xenophon, Cyropaedia VIII.2, 5: “That this, however, should be so is 
no marvel. For just as all other arts are developed to superior excellence in large cities, in that same way 
the food at the king’s palace is also elaborately prepared with superior excellence. For in small towns the 
same artist makes chairs and doors and plows and tables, and often this same artist builds houses, and 
even so he is thankful if he can only find employment enough to support him. And it is, of course, 
impossible for a man of many trades to be proficient in all of them. In large cities, on the other hand, 
inasmuch as many people have demands to make upon each branch of industry, one trade alone, and very 
often even less than a whole trade, is enough to support a man: one man, for instance, makes shoes for 
men, and another for women; and there are places even where one man earns a living by only stitching 
shoes, another by cutting them out, another by sewing the uppers together, while there is another who 
performs none of these operations but only assembles the parts. It follows, therefore, as a matter of 
course, that he who devotes himself to a very highly specialized line of work is bound to do it in the best 
possible manner.” I thank Peter Stork for bringing this passage to my attention. Cf. also Pl.Rep.II, 369e-
370a. 
106 Pace Broadie (1990), 403. 
107 Johansen (2004), 70; this sketch of Plato’s Demiurge relies heavily on the interpretation defended by 
Johansen (2004), 69-91. 
108 Pace Furley (1996), 62-65, who takes the creation by the Demiurge to be a paradigmatic case of 
intentional action. 
109 Pl.Tim.28a4-b1; Pl.Gorg.503d6-504a1. On Plato’s concept of craftsmanship, see Lennox (2001a), 287-
298.  
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goodness of the end result, and therefore offers the best explanation of our orderly 
world.110 The ‘psychology’ of the craftsman as an individual does not form an 
important aspect of the philosophical representation (or idealization) of the 
Demiurge or of the arts in general. On the contrary, Plato often personifies art and 
makes it produce things seemingly without the interference of craftsmen.111 As 
Johansen puts it: “The main difference between Plato’s and Aristotle’s ordering 
principle remains that Plato’s craftsman works on nature from without whereas 
Aristotle’s works from within. However, our explanation of the ways in which order 
is realised in nature need not make reference in either case to conscious desires or 
intentions. Plato’s divine demiurge is in this respect at least not unlike Aristotle’s 
master craftsman, nature.”112 
Aristotle rejects Plato’s concept of an ultimate and independent goodness, 
and de-psychologizes the concept of art even more than Plato already did: one could 
say that for Aristotle the artist is nothing but the tool of the art that he represents. 
Art operates through the artist,113 just as the soul operates through the natural body 
to which it belongs. Moreover, it is the presence of form as the organizing principle 
of change in both processes, which is causally relevant, not the ontological status of 
form as such.  
This also answers the second objection against Aristotle’s non-
psychological, natural teleology. For Aristotle returns the capacity of natural 
‘production’ to nature itself: natures carry within themselves their own potentials to 
realize themselves and do not need an external efficient cause in the form of divine 
craftsmanship. Aristotle thereby dismisses Plato’s picture of the natural world as the 
product of a divine personification of art114 – while retaining the analogy for didactic 
purposes. In Aristotle, nature115 becomes its own non-deliberating craftsman.116  
                                                 
110 Johansen (2004), 71-76. 
111 For references, see Johansen (2004), 84. 
112 Johansen (2004), 86. 
113 Cf. e.g. GA.I.22, 730b15-20: “It is his [i.e. the artist’s] hands that move his tools, his tools that move 
the material; it is his knowledge of his art, and his soul, in which is the form, that move his hands or any 
other part of him with a motion of some definite kind, a motion varying with the varying nature of the 
object made.” 
114 Lennox (2001a), 280-281. 
115 As Lennox has shown convincingly, nature, in this context, is the nature (or soul) of individual 
substances, rather than a personified Demiurgic or Cosmic nature over and above the individual natures 
of natural substances; see Lennox (2001a), 165-171; 183-184.  
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1.2.2 The teleological model of deliberative action 
 
1.2.2.a Deliberative action contrasted to nature 
The teleological model of deliberative action pertains to human beings who act in a 
goal-directed way, in virtue of being able to deliberate about the means to a certain 
end and to make rational choices (prohairesis) about which aims to pursue. (These 
actions should thus be distinguished from movements of animals who also move or 
act for the sake of something, but only possess a limited form of deliberation and are 
not able to make rational choices.)  
The model is much less pervasive in the second book of the Physica than 
the model of artistic production: only a few of the examples Aristotle offers in this 
book are taken from the realm of human agency. These examples involve a man 
who has deliberated as an example of efficient causation (and not teleology; see 
Ph.II.3, 194b30; Ph.II.3, 195a22) and the goal-directed actions of walking and going 
to war (Ph.II.3, 194b32-195a3; Ph.II.7, 198a19-20). The model is also virtually absent 
in Aristotle’s defense of natural teleology; surely the introduction of the analogy 
between art and nature in Ph.II.8, 199a8-11 is couched in terms of what is ‘done’ (the 
verb used is prattein), but this is because both art and action are forms of human 
agency. Examples of goal-directed actions figure most prominently in the account of 
tuchê (luck or fortune) in Ph.II.4-6 and Ph.II.8, to which I will turn later.  
The reason why Aristotle makes so little use of this model is that he does 
not feel the need of postulating any intentions lying behind the goal-directedness of 
natural processes so as to be able to account for them. However, intentionality is 
exactly what makes deliberative actions goal-directed. Aristotle thus uses the model 
of deliberative action to illustrate goal-directedness in general, but cannot and does 
not use it as an analogy to natural teleology.117 Nature is not like a deliberative agent, 
but like a highly skilled artist. The difference is twofold.  
                                                                                                               
116 This also explains why Aristotle will often describe the actions of the formal natures of living beings in 
terms of craftsmanship; see e.g. PA.I.5, 645a9 (hê dêmiourgêsasa physis); PA.II.9, 654b27-655a4; PA.II.1, 
647b5-6; PA.IV.10, 686a12; and IA.12, 711a18. For the close analogy between the generative process in 
biology and the productive process originated by artists or craftsmen, see e.g. GA.I.22, 730b5-32; 
GA.II.1, 734b20-735a4; GA.II.4, 740b25-741a4. 
117 Pace Charles (1991), 118-119 (especially n.20). 
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In the first place, the desires of individual agents play a major role as efficient causes 
in the account of action, while their role is minimalized in the account of artistic 
production and absent in natural teleology.  
In the causal account of artistic production, it is not really relevant whether 
Polycleitus or Pheidias made the statue of Aphrodite: the true efficient cause is the 
art of sculpting that inheres in these individuals, and the true formal cause is the 
form or the functional definition of a statue of Aphrodite.118 Both individuals would 
have followed the same rules of the art of sculpture and the same model in 
producing the statue. As was pointed out earlier, the (philosophical) concept of art 
exploits the professionalization and standardization of the productive process, while 
the individuality of the artist is minimized. Art, represented by or localized in 
craftsmen, produces the same outcomes on a regular basis, and mostly without 
mistakes.  
In the causal account of deliberative action, on the other hand, the 
individual’s desires, deliberations, beliefs, and choices are crucial. Deliberation in 
human beings takes the form of a mental plan of a series of actions that are 
anticipated to lead to some desired state of affairs (NE.III.3, 1112b11-1113a2). 
Moreover, human beings, in virtue of being rational self-movers, are autonomous in 
their choice for particular ends. The connection between ends and means to this end 
are less close in the case of deliberative action than they are in nature and art: the 
connection is not an ontological one, or one that has come forward in the process of 
the professionalization and streamlining of the arts; rather, the connection is 
produced by our own human desires and beliefs.119 There is also more room for 
mistakes, both in the choice for goals to pursue and in the choice for the means of 
achieving that goal (EE.II.11, 1227b19-22).  
In the second place, unlike artistic production and natural teleology, 
deliberative action is not a process of generation. It represents a different kind of 
motion (that is, the models differ in genus; see NE.VI.5, 1140b1-4), with a different 
underlying causal structure. 
                                                 
118 Cf. Johansen (2004), 83. 
119 This, incidentally, also explains why a given action might result in a completely unforeseen outcome: 
actions do not involve formal replications through an agent that possesses the form in actuality into 
matter that possesses the form in potentiality.  
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The model of deliberative action thus only has a modest didactic function in the 
context of Physica, book two, namely in illustrating goal-directedness.  
 
1.2.2.b Deliberative action in the analysis of luck 
In Ph.II.4-6 Aristotle focuses his investigation of causes on the notions of luck (hê 
tuchê) and spontaneity (to automaton). It is in this context that the teleological model of 
deliberate action is used most extensively, and mainly in order to differentiate proper 
teleological human actions from incidental ones which are due to luck;120 the notion 
of spontaneity (which is in fact the wider class to which luck belongs) is then 
explained in analogy to the many examples already offered for the case of luck.  
Aristotle points out that according to some people luck and spontaneity are 
to be counted among the causes of the coming to be of things, but that according to 
him they are merely ‘accidental causes’. This is not to say that Aristotle thinks that 
things that happen by luck or by spontaneity do not have a cause at all. He rather 
thinks that they do not have a determinable cause, and in particular, that they do not 
have a proper final cause. Things that happen by luck or by spontaneity are things 
that have an outcome that might be profitable or good in some way and thus seem 
to have happened for the sake of something, but did not happen for the sake of that 
good (this is called good fortune; luck can of course also be the cause of a bad result, 
which is then called bad fortune; see Ph.II.5, 197a25-32). In any case, the causes of 
such events are usually not identifiable.  
It is in this context that Aristotle offers his famous example of the person 
who goes to the marketplace for some reason or another, but happens to run into 
someone “whom he wanted to meet, but did not expect to be there” (Ph.II.4, 196a3-
5: καὶ καταλαβεῖν ὃν ἐβούλετο μὲν οὐκ ᾤετο δέ). The reason for going to the 
marketplace could have been, as Aristotle elaborates later (Ph.II.5, 196b29-197a8), 
that the person he met owed him money, and meeting his debtor would give him a 
chance of getting his money back. So would he in fact have known that his debtor 
was going to the marketplace, he might have gone there too for the sake of 
collecting his money. But, as it turns out, this was not the reason why he went to the 
marketplace (although, of course, he probably had some reason for going the market, 
                                                 
120 For the examples, see Ph.II.4, 196a3-5; Ph.II.5, 196b29-197a8; Ph.II.5, 197a16-18; Ph.II.6, 197b23-26; 
Ph.II.6, 197b30-32; Ph.II.8, 199b18-22. 
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such as for instance wanting to go the theatre; Ph.II.5, 197a16-18). However, he did 
receive his money back as the incidental result of going to the market; and this is 
what Aristotle calls being lucky. Aristotle adds that some people think such a 
meeting has a definite cause (namely the person’s wish to go and attend the market), 
and that it was not luck that caused it, but Aristotle ridicules this option and also the 
way his predecessors made use of the notions of luck and spontaneity in their 
explanations of natural phenomena. His predecessors apparently held that some 
things are the outcome of luck or spontaneity, yet did not offer a proper account of 
the way in which these ‘forces’ were supposed to be causally responsible for the 
coming to be or presence of things. Other people delegated luck and spontaneity to 
the realm of the divine and supernatural, making these causes inscrutable for the 
human mind. This, however, is certainly not Aristotle’s view, as he is eager to point 
out.   
After a dialectical discussion of the views of his predecessors, Aristotle 
starts off his own definition of the notions by pointing out that luck and spontaneity 
belong to the realm of things that do not happen always or for the most part; they 
belong to irregular events. However, because we know that there are such things 
that do not happen always or for the most part, clearly there must be such things as 
luck and spontaneity (Ph.II.5, 196b10-17). More specifically, Aristotle counts luck 
and spontaneity among the things that come to be for the sake of something.121 
Luck belongs to beings that are able of making rational choices and thus belongs to 
the realm of deliberative agency (Ph.II.5, 197a5-8; Ph.II.6, 197b2-13). Spontaneity 
encompasses all things that might have happened to animals and inanimate beings 
from nature, but in this case did not. For example, when a horse runs away all of a 
sudden, and happens to be saved because of that, but did not run away in order to 
be saved122 – then Aristotle says it happened accidentally (Ph.II.6, 197b14-18).  
In sum, the terms luck and spontaneity are used to indicate the causes of 
irregular and unexpected outcomes. These are outcomes that typically come to be due 
to thought, choice, or nature, but whose cause in these particular cases is either: 
                                                 
121 On these two requirements which an event must satisfy to qualify as an outcome of luck or spontaneity 
(i.e. being rare, and being among the things that are in general for the sake of something), see Judson 
(1991), 76-82. See also Lennox (2001a), 250-258. 
122 For how could it reasonably have done so – horses do not possess the capacity to think and act in that 
way. 
Setting the stage for teleological explanations in the Physica 
 49
 
(i.) An indeterminable cause; the event seems to have been for a purpose, but the 
expected corresponding action that typically leads to this outcome did not take place. 
For instance, in the case of luck, when some outcome z (‘a falling stone that hits a 
person’) could have been the result of an action that was for the sake of z (e.g. 
‘someone throwing that stone with the purpose of hitting the other person’), but in 
fact, that action did not take place, while z did. In that case, z must be the result of 
some other action that is from our perspective indeterminable; the outcome is called 
a case of (good or bad) luck. In this scenario, lucky or spontaneous events are only 
for the sake of something in a non-causal sense: they might have been for the sake of 
something, but in fact, they are not.123 The examples also suggest another scenario, 
where the cause is:  
(ii.) A determinate cause that has incidental and unforeseen results in 
addition to having a proper result and final cause. For instance, to take again the case 
of luck, when a person does x for the sake of y (e.g. ‘going to the marketplace in 
order to litigate as a plaintiff’), and the result was (not only y but also) z (e.g. 
‘meeting his debtor and getting his money back’), then x is the incidental cause of z 
and we say that z happened by luck.124 The outcome is the result of a goal-directed 
process, but the outcome is not what the process was for, and is thus not 
explanatory of it. 
Proper cases of the teleological model of deliberative action are thus 
actions that happen for the sake of something, because the agent has decided that 
this is the action that will allow him to achieve his self-chosen goal, and where the 
outcomes of those actions are that for the sake of which the actions were 
undertaken (where the outcome is explanatory of the action, and not in an incidental 
way). If the goal is not achieved, the action was in vain; if it has an accidental, 
unforeseen, or unintended outcome, the action was an incidental cause of some 
good or bad fortune.  
                                                 
123 This is largely in agreement with the interpretation of luck and spontaneity defended by Lennox 
(2001a), 250-258. 
124 Lennox (2001a), 250-258 rejects this second option, first put forward by Porphyry, in favor of the first 
option, put forward by Simplicius. However, the examples Aristotle offers support both options; Aristotle 
primary goal in his discussions of luck and spontaneity as I read it is to see in what sense luck and 
spontaneity can legitimately called causes and how they are to be differentiated from proper goal-directed 
processes. Both options show luck and spontaneity to be incidental causes, although they might be 
incidental in different ways. Cf. Boeri (1995), 87-96, who argues along much the same lines. 
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1.3 Aristotle’s defense of natural teleology 
 
Aristotle’s defense of natural teleology in Ph.II.8, and in particular the aporia he 
raises in this context with regard to the proper explanation of rainfall and the 
coming to be of animal parts (Ph.II.8, 198b16-199a8), are among the most disputed 
passages in the whole Aristotelian Corpus.  
In what follows, I will first offer a general outline of the passage and 
indicate the problems involved. In the next sections, I will pick up on these 
problems and offer my solutions to them. Aristotle’s purpose in this passage as I 
understand it is to demonstrate that (while granting the workings and importance of 
material necessity as a cause of coming to be to his opponents) form, more than 
matter, qualifies as a nature defined as an origin of change. Accordingly, one needs 
to assume the existence of formal natures that operate as an overarching, but 
internal and goal-directed source of change in order to account for regular beneficial 
outcomes. These formal natures are also operative in those cases where material 
necessity (rather than primary teleology and conditional necessity) is the cause of the 
coming to be of natural phenomena, as are exemplified by winter-rain and the 
generation of animal parts such as teeth. That material necessity is a part of nature 
seems to be presupposed; what Aristotle tries to establish here is that final causation, 
embedded in the actions of the formal nature, is a part – and that a crucial one – of 
nature, too. 
Ultimately, I hope to show that the crux for the understanding of this 
passage lies in my distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ teleology in 
Aristotle. This is not a distinction Aristotle himself draws explicitly in any of his 
works,125 but it is rather evidenced in the separate explanations he gives of the 
                                                 
125 My distinction between primary and secondary teleology does not rely on Aristotle’s own distinction 
between two types of final causes, that for the sake of which and that for the benefit of which. For 
instance, when Kullman (1985) uses the term ‘secondary teleology’ he means that some end is a 
beneficiary of something, but not a that for the sake of which in a strict sense (see e.g. Kullman (1985), 
173). Bodnár (2005; 24-25) distinguishes between two types of teleology in a similar way: in 
‘straightforward’ teleology the goals are not also the beneficiary of the teleological structure, while in inter-
species teleology the goals are the beneficiary of the teleological structure. However, I am not sure how 
this can be right: the natural goal of plants is to realize their own nature and it is the realized plant that 
benefits from its own realization; the goal of plants imposed by human activity is to serve as food: here 
the goal (serving as food) and the beneficiary (human beings) of plants are different. Finally, Johnson 
(2005) uses the distinction between the that for the sake of which and the beneficiary as one of his central 
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coming to be of natural phenomena and of their presence, and in addition in his use 
of different verbs of agency to describe the productive actions of the formal nature 
in the biological works (i.e. ‘making’ versus ‘using’). I will return to this distinction 
when discussing Aristotle’s explanations in the biological works in chapter three 
(where this distinction is most obvious); for now let me briefly explain what I mean 
by ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ teleology. 
Primary teleology is the teleology that is operative in the realizations of pre-
existing forms. Natural beings or their parts are present because they are the 
realizations of some pre-existing form, and their constitutive materials and their 
structure have come to be as the result of conditional necessity. The formal nature of 
some natural being ‘makes’ the necessary materials for the realizations of its own 
form. The natural being or parts that are the full actualizations of those forms are 
the final causes of both their presence and their coming to be. This is so to speak the 
default type of teleology. I use the term ‘secondary teleology’ for those cases in 
which natural beings or their parts have a final cause (in the strict sense of a that for 
the sake of which, and not ‘merely’ in the sense of a beneficiary), but where the 
constitutive materials or even the whole natural structure did not come to be for the 
sake of that final cause. In other words, in some cases Aristotle allows things to be 
for the sake of something even if they are not technically speaking the realizations of 
some pre-existing form. Usually, Aristotle refers to material necessity as the cause of 
the coming to be of such materials or structures,126 which are then ‘used’ by the 
formal nature of that natural being for the sake of some good, because those materials 
or structures possess properties that are usable by the formal nature. While primary 
teleology only pertains to individual formal natures and the realization of their own 
form, secondary teleology applies both to individual formal natures and – as will 
                                                                                                               
tools to make sense of Aristotle’s explanations, but does differentiate between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ 
teleology in the way that I do. 
126 Van der Eijk (1997, 238) also hints at a notion of ‘indirect teleology’ in Aristotle’s account of 
variations: “Thus variations that seem to be merely necessary concomitants of other, purposive biological 
structures and processes – and thus seem to be kata phusin only in the mechanical sense – can sometimes 
be accounted for indirectly as being kata phusin in a teleological sense as well” (Van der Eijk’s italics). This 
notion seems to indicate that for Aristotle variations that are the result of incidental material necessity are 
then explained by him as also being for the sake of something. This comes somewhat close to my own 
notion of secondary teleology, but Van der Eijk does not specify the causal patterns underlying this 
‘indirect’ teleology, nor does he develop this notion any further.  
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become relevant in my discussion below – to what has been called ‘inter-species’ 
teleology, where living beings use each other (for instance) as food.127  
 
1.3.1 Problems involved in Aristotle’s defense of natural teleology in Ph.II.8 
 
1.3.1.a Teleology versus necessity; intrinsic versus incidental causation 
As often at the beginning of a new section, Aristotle announces the issues to be 
investigated (Ph.II.8, 198b10-12): 
Λεκτέον δὴ πρῶτον μὲν διότι ἡ φύσις τῶν ἕνεκά του αἰτίων, ἔπειτα περὶ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου, 
πῶς ἔχει ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς·  
“We must state first the reason why nature (as a source of change) is among the 
things that are for the sake of something, and next, about necessity, how it is 
present among the things that are natural.”  
The reason why Aristotle wants to discuss this subject here is because all his 
predecessors seem to trace final causation – or at least processes with beneficial 
outcomes – back to this cause.128 They claim that things are and come to be in the 
way they do because of necessity, which is the necessity of the material elements 
acting according to their own natures and potentials. Even if occasionally they touch 
upon other causes (‘movers’ such as love and strife, and mind), they soon wave them 
goodbye (Ph.II.8, 198b14-16; cf. Met.I.3-9). While (at least according to Aristotle’s 
account) his predecessors explained all natural phenomena in terms of necessity, 
Aristotle wants to establish that there are other causes involved, too, in addition to 
and above material necessity.129 In particular, he wants to establish that nature as a 
source of change acts for the sake of something.  
                                                 
127 Things that have come to be for whatever reason can – if they possess the right properties from the 
perspective of the user – be used for the sake of something within natural beings (e.g. earthy material, because 
of its defensive potentials, can be used by the formal nature of deer for the production of horns), or 
among them (e.g. the branches of a tree, because of their water resistancy, can be used by the shipbuilder 
for the production of ships). The outcomes of these processes of ‘using’ (e.g. horns or the body of the 
ship) have genuine functions or final causes (e.g. defense or floating), even though it would not be right to 
say that they have come to be for the sake of these functions or final causes. 
128 Aristotle does not state explicitly that it is final causation that is traced back (anagousi) to necessity, but 
this reading makes the most sense in the light of the aporia Aristotle raises subsequently about ‘beneficial’ 
outcomes that are explained by reference to material necessity. Cf. GA.V.1, 778a34-778b1 and GA.V.8, 
789b2-4. 
129 As Sauvé Meyer rightly points out, Aristotle’s complaint about his predecessors is not that they refer 
everything to necessity as such, but that they are unwilling to seriously consider other types of causes in 
addition to the cause of necessity; Sauvé Meyer (1992), 792-793. 
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The way Aristotle introduces the issue here pertains directly to one of the most 
pressing problems in the scholarship on Aristotle’s teleology: how exactly does 
Aristotle think teleology and necessity in nature are related to each other?130 Recent 
scholarship has proposed four different interpretations for the way Aristotle 
perceives this relation between necessity and teleology.  
In the first place, based on the way Aristotle contrasts his own teleological 
view of nature with the views of his predecessors who explain everything in terms of 
material necessity, scholars have argued that Aristotle must have thought the two 
views were incompatible with each other, and that Aristotle ultimately denies that 
there is such thing as material necessity operative in nature that is independent on 
the operation of teleology.131  
Others think that for Aristotle the two ‘forces of nature’ are compatible,132 
but that the operation of material necessity and the actualizations of element 
potentials as such are not sufficient to produce regular, good, or complex results. 
According to these scholars, natural phenomena could not come about without the 
operation of a final cause, and therefore explanations in terms of formal and final 
causation cannot be reduced to explanations in terms of efficient and material 
causation.133  
Still others agree that necessity and teleology are compatible in Aristotle’s 
worldview, but do so on the grounds that teleology as opposed to necessity has no 
ontological consequences. They claim teleology is an explanatory framework which 
has the sole purpose of making things understandable for us humans. Accordingly 
they think that teleology is merely used by Aristotle as a heuristic device in his 
attempt to explain natural phenomena. It is argued that on the level of causation, 
material and efficient causes are all that is needed to bring about natural phenomena; 
                                                 
130 I will return to the question of the relation between teleology and necessity in section 3.4. For the 
present purposes, an outline of the problem and possible interpretations will have to suffice. 
131 This position has mainly been defended by Balme (1965, 1987a). 
132 This must certainly be true: as we have seen already, Aristotle thinks that final causes are real factors in 
the natural world, and as we will see in his actual explanations of natural phenomena, Aristotle often 
refers to both teleology and necessity in accounting for one and the same phenomenon, where this 
necessity cannot simply be identified with conditional necessity. Moreover, as I will argue more 
extensively in the chapter on biology, Aristotle acknowledges the existence and operations of material 
necessity in the realm of sublunary nature. 
133 Stronger and weaker versions of this so-called ‘irreducibility thesis’ have been defended by amongst 
others Bradie & Miller (1999), 75; Charles (1988), 1-53; Cooper (1982), 197-222; Gotthelf (1987), 204-242; 
Irwin (1988), 109-112; Lennox (1982; 2001b); and Waterlow (1982), 69.  
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on the level of explanation and understanding, however, we need the language of 
ends and functions in order to make sense of the natural phenomena.134  
All three views discussed above focus on the question of the compatibility 
and ontological reducibility of teleology and necessity. However, my own view on 
these matters is congenial to a fourth type of interpretation, first introduced by 
Sauvé Meyer (1992) and also defended in some form in Judson (2005) and Matthen 
(2007), which addresses the problem from a somewhat different perspective. This 
interpretation dismisses the question of whether or not teleology and necessity are 
compatible or even reducible to each other as besides the point from the perspective 
of Aristotle,135 and focuses on the other hand on the issue of intrinsic versus 
accidental or incidental causation.  
Under this interpretation, the question of whether materially necessitated 
processes suffice to bring about particular results with beneficial characteristics (such 
as a horn with a defensive potential) is answered to the affirmative. For Aristotle 
thinks that the interactions of the elements might on occasion result in a particular 
sequence of realizations of element-potentials that bring about this particular result. 
However, he also thinks – and this is crucial – that the result, and even more so its 
beneficial characteristics, will be incidental to these material interactions and hence 
will not come about regularly (there is nothing that prevents the sporadic and 
spontaneous coming to be of horns with a defensive potential by material necessity). 
The operations of an overarching final cause are necessary to explain the regularity of 
particular results, and especially those with beneficial characteristics. Things that 
happen ‘always or for the most part’, and in particular complex things that happen 
regularly, cannot be the result of the coincidental occurrence and sequencing of 
actualizations of element potentials, but must happen for a reason and be due to an 
overarching cause that orders and times the complex sequence of events. Matthen 
summarizes this position as follows: “the material explanation that cites only E [a 
particular series of materialist causes] is deficient, then, not because it gives causally 
                                                 
134 Stronger and weaker versions of this pragmatic viewpoint have been defended by Charles (1988); Irwin 
(1988); Nussbaum (1978); Sorabji (1980); and Wieland (1975).   
135 Of course, the question of the compatibility and reducibility might still be of interest and relevant to 
us, but it is not something Aristotle himself was directly concerned about.  
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insufficient conditions, but because it does not specify all the causes of O [an 
event].”136  
The reason why Aristotle contrasts his own teleological worldview with 
that of his materialist predecessors is that the latter deny that higher-order natural 
phenomena, such as animals and plants, have any privileged ontological status: 
according to them, only the elements are natures in a true sense, and things that are 
constituted from them are mere accidents or qualities or arrangements of these 
elements.137 The materialist view of nature eliminates those very things that Aristotle 
takes as ontologically basic, and which in his view are in particular need of 
explanation: for Aristotle an animal is a natural substance, for a materialist an animal 
is a coincidental conglomeration of elements (and elements are the only natures 
materialists acknowledge). The heart of the debate does not appertain (or at least not 
directly) to the question of reductionism, but rather to that of eliminativism: the 
mistake of the materialists is not so much that they reduce plants and animals to 
their material elements, but rather that they deny that plants and animals are 
substances at all.138 
As we saw above, Aristotle introduces his defense of natural teleology not 
in terms of the question whether or not phenomena with beneficial outcomes can or 
must be reduced to material necessity, but in terms of what forces in addition to 
material necessity can or must be responsible for these phenomena. The question 
pertains to the differentiation between different kinds of causality operative in the 
natural world, and to the clarification of what these different natural causes amount 
to. I thus think that the fourth and last type of the interpretations outlined above 
best captures the problems Aristotle introduces and discusses in Ph.II.8. 
Accordingly, I will follow Sauvé Meyer (1992) in her conclusion that the problem is 
really about intrinsic versus accidental causation, rather than about necessity versus 
teleology. Here I will provide additional evidence in support of her thesis, the main 
points of which I have outlined above. However, before turning to a detailed 
interpretation of the chapter let me first offer a preliminary discussion of the 
                                                 
136 Matthen (2007), 8. 
137 For Aristotle’s criticism of his materialist predecessors, see also chapter 3.4.1.c. 
138 Sauvé Meyer (1992), 794-795; 820-825; Johnson (2005), 98-99. 
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remainder of the section, and conjointly introduce two other problems that have 
larger implications for the interpretation of Aristotle’s defense of natural teleology.  
 
1.3.1.b Problems in the analogy between rain and an Empedoclean theory of generation 
Aristotle continues his argument in favor of the assumption of natural teleology as a 
cause in nature in addition to material necessity by raising an aporia. This aporia 
expresses an objection supposedly or possibly raised by one of Aristotle’s materialist 
predecessors entailing an analogy between rain and the generation of parts of 
animals (Ph.II.8, 198b16-32). What the analogy tries to establish is that there is 
nothing that prevents nature from not acting for the sake of something or for the 
better, but in some other way exemplified by rain (Ph.II.8, 198b17-18). The base 
domain of the analogy runs as follows (Ph.II.8, 198b18-23):  
ἔχει δ’ ἀπορίαν τί κωλύει τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἕνεκά του ποιεῖν μηδ’ ὅτι βέλτιον, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ 
ὕει ὁ Ζεὺς οὐχ ὅπως τὸν σῖτον αὐξήσῃ, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης (τὸ γὰρ ἀναχθὲν ψυχθῆναι δεῖ, 
καὶ τὸ ψυχθὲν ὕδωρ γενόμενον κατελθεῖν· τὸ δ’ αὐξάνεσθαι τούτου γενομένου τὸν 
σῖτον συμβαίνει), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἴ τῳ ἀπόλλυται ὁ σῖτος ἐν τῇ ἅλῳ, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ὕει 
ὅπως ἀπόληται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. 
“The difficulty is what prevents nature to acts in the way Zeus makes it rain, not in 
order to make the crops grow, but of necessity (for it is necessary that that which 
has risen turns cold, and that water that has turned cold comes down: after this has 
happened, it turns out (sumbainei) that the crops grow), and in the same way also 
that if the crops is ruined on the threshing floor, it does not rain for the sake of 
this, in order to make the crops go bad, but that it just happened (sumbebêken).” 
Aristotle’s opponent thus suggests that nature does not act for the sake of 
something, but rather operates by necessity and has incidental beneficial outcomes. 
It is equally absurd to suppose that Zeus makes it rain in order for the crops to grow 
as it is to suppose that it rains in order to ruin the crops: rain is a natural 
phenomenon that can be explained completely in terms of material necessity, and 
what occurs as a result of the falling of rain is a mere accident. As Sedley points 
out,139 the expression ‘Zeus rains’ indicates that Aristotle’s opponent is being 
portrayed as a materialist trying to provide a materialist explanation for something 
that is popularly viewed as an act of a providential god. This latter view, representing 
                                                 
139 Sedley (1991), 185. 
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a naïve, religious, and anthropocentric assumption about the supposed providential 
teleology of the world, is ridiculed and rejected in favor of an explanation in terms of 
the interactions of material elements.  
In the account provided by the materialist, there can be no 
misunderstanding of the causal relationship between an event and its outcome: first 
there is the event of rain, fully explained by the mechanical cycle of evaporation, 
next there is the result (either good or bad), which is unrelated and incidental to the 
event of rain itself. The end result does not explain the occurrence of the event, nor 
does the event itself intrinsically necessitate this particular end. Clearly, Aristotle’s 
opponent (and on a meta-level of course Aristotle himself) intends the example of 
the rainfall to be a very strong example of a natural process that occurs not for the 
sake of something, but which has a beneficial (or detrimental) outcome incidentally.  
Now suppose we agree with Aristotle’s opponent that this is the correct 
explanation of rain (and the argument assumes that we do in fact agree with the 
opponent), what does that mean for other natural processes, such as the generation 
of parts of animals? This is where the target domain of the analogy comes in (Ph.II.8, 
198b23-27):  
—ὥστε τί κωλύει οὕτω καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει, οἷον τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
ἀνατεῖλαι τοὺς μὲν ἐμπροσθίους ὀξεῖς, ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὸ διαιρεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους 
πλατεῖς καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν, ἐπεὶ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, 
ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν·  
“- in the same way, what prevents that things are also that way with regard to the 
parts in nature, for example that teeth shoot up of necessity, the ones in the front 
sharp, with the fitness (epitêdeious) for tearing, the molars broad and useful 
(chrêsimous) for grinding down the food – since they did not arise for the sake of 
this, but they fell together that way (sumpesein).” 
Aristotle’s opponent here suggests that there is no reason not to think that the way 
parts of animals come to be will be similar to the occurrence of rain: their coming to 
be can be explained completely in terms of material necessity, and their functions 
just happen to follow accidentally from their material potentials and coincidental 
structure. The causal relation between event and result is the same as in the example 
of the rainfall: teeth come to be the way they are of material necessity, and once they 
have appeared, it turns out that they have various potentials for use, some of which 
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are beneficial to the animal which has them. However, in this case, too, the 
beneficial outcomes are unrelated and incidental to the coming to be of the parts.  
The opponent goes on to elaborate on the second part of the analogy 
(Ph.II.8, 198b27-32):   
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν ὅσοις δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του. ὅπου μὲν 
οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἕνεκά του ἐγίγνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ 
αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ 
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρῳρα. 
“And the same holds for all the other parts, in as many as it seems (dokei) that they 
are for the sake of something. Wherever then all [the parts] turned out (sunebê) in 
such a way as they would also [had turned out] if they had come to be for the sake 
of something, such things survived, having been organized in a fitting way (epitêdeiôs) 
by spontaneity (apo tou automatou). So many as did not in such a way, perished and 
continue to perish, as Empedocles says about the man-faced ox-progeny.” 
The opponent now moves from parts of animals to their wholes: not only parts, but 
even whole animals could have come to be as the accidental results140 of necessary 
processes. Taking the present biological diversity of species as a starting point, there 
is according to the materialist no evidence that forces us to assume that nature in 
facts acts for the sake of something. Instead he offers a causal account in terms of 
necessary processes with accidental beneficial outcomes. According to this account, 
the animals that came to be in a ‘fitting way’ (how this ‘fittingness’ must be 
understood will be addressed below), that is, as it turns out, the presently existing 
animals, were preserved, while the mismatches and monsters perished. Finally, 
Aristotle identifies Empedocles as a possible propagator of this ‘incidental’ account 
of generation.  
With this addition Aristotle rounds off the analogy (Ph.II.8, 198b32-34: 
“This then is the argument, through which one might get into an aporia, or if there 
is another like this one.”). It is time for Aristotle to present his own resolution of the 
aporia (Ph.II.8, 198b34-199a8): 
ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ αἰεὶ οὕτω 
γίγνεται ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τῶν δ’ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ 
τύχης οὐδ’ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ὕειν πολλάκις τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ὑπὸ κύνα· 
                                                 
140 Aristotle actually speaks of ‘by spontaneity’ here, and not of ‘by accident’; Sauvé Meyer (1992; 797n.6) 
argues that Aristotle uses these terms interchangeably in setting out the opponents view of nature. 
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οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνα, ἀλλ’ ἂν χειμῶνος. εἰ οὖν ἢ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ἢ ἕνεκά 
του εἶναι, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε ταῦτ’ εἶναι μήτε ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μήτ’ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, ἕνεκά 
του ἂν εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν φύσει γ’ ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὡς κἂν αὐτοὶ φαῖεν οἱ ταῦτα 
λέγοντες. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.  
“It is impossible that things are that way. For those things, and all things that are by 
nature, either always come to be that way, or for the most part, and none of them 
belongs to things that are due to luck or spontaneity. For it does not seem that it is 
due to luck or spontaneity that it rains often in wintertime, but [it does seem so] 
each time when [it rains] during the dog-days. Nor [does it seem that it is due to 
luck or spontaneity that it is] hot during the dog-days, but only each time [when it is 
hot] during winter. If, then, these things seem to be either accidental or for the sake 
of something, [and] if they cannot be by accident or by spontaneity, they would be 
for the sake of something. But that those things are by nature would also be 
claimed by those very same people who say such things. Therefore that for the sake 
of something is present in things that come to be and are by nature.” 
The argument Aristotle offers in order to repudiate the opponent’s depiction of the 
workings of nature and to defend the operation of natural teleology in constituting 
outcomes with beneficial characteristics is quite complex.141 The first premise posits 
that natural things happen regularly (i.e. always or for the most part), and not by 
accident (i.e. incidentally and only on occasion, by luck or by spontaneity). In 
support of this premise Aristotle refers to the natural events of winter-rain and 
summer-heat: even the opponent would admit (this is the bearing of dokei) that these 
events are regular and thus cannot be incidental. The second premise posits, 
supposedly in agreement with the view of the opponent (Aristotle again uses dokei to 
suggest accordance), that regular natural events are either by accident or for the sake 
of something. In the first premise, however, Aristotle had already ruled out the 
possibility that regular events can be by accident, and thus it follows that they must 
                                                 
141 Schematically the argument runs as follows (note that the argument is represented differently by 
different scholars, but that there is consensus about its basic structure and purpose; cf. Quarantotto 
(2005), 90-95): 
Premise 1: R (regularity) holds of N (natural things and events) and  
A (being by accident) does not hold of N;  
Example:  R seems to hold of NW (the natural phenomenon of winter-rain) and  
R seems to hold of NS (the natural phenomenon of summer-heat); 
Premise 2: (A or T (being for the sake of something)) seems to hold of RN; 
Conclusion 1: A does not hold of RN; 
Conclusion 2: T holds of RN; 
Example: N holds of W and S;  
Conclusion 3: T holds of N. 
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be for the sake of something. Because the opponent would also agree that the 
examples mentioned (winter-rain, summer-heat, and perhaps also the generation of 
parts and animals) are natural, the general conclusion is that they must all be for the 
sake of something.  
Besides the fact that it is not at all clear that Aristotle’s opponent would 
accept the premises leading up to the conclusion about the goal-directedness of 
nature,142 I see three other problematic features of the rebuttal that are worth 
mentioning.  
First of all, Aristotle couches the dispute over the causes operative in 
nature exclusively in terms of luck, spontaneity, and the accidental on the one hand, 
and goal-directedness on the other hand; the notion of necessity is not mentioned at 
all. Where Aristotle’s opponent (or perhaps rather Aristotle in his representation of 
the opponent’s views) drew a distinction between processes that came to be due to 
necessity and (beneficial) results that were accidental, Aristotle now turns away from 
the talk about results, but focuses instead on the causes of the natural events. The 
causation involved must either be incidental or for the sake of something. This 
points to our earlier conclusion,143 that for Aristotle the issue at stake is whether 
natural phenomena can be explained incidentally or whether they exhibit intrinsic 
causation. According to Aristotle, the regularity of natural processes and especially 
their regular beneficial outcomes require an explanation in terms of intrinsic causes, 
and this requires the assumption of teleology: of the existence goal-directed formal 
causes that guide and limit the interactions of material elements so as to constitute 
beneficial outcomes.   
However, the ‘disappearance’ of necessity in Aristotle’s argument in favor 
of natural teleology is suspicious, for Aristotle usually acknowledges (material) 
necessity to be a cause for event that happens always or regularly.144 In fact, Aristotle 
often draws from examples of meteorological phenomena such as the evaporation 
cycle producing rain to illustrate the regularity of material necessity.145 As Aristotle 
                                                 
142 Cf. Waterlow (1982), 77. 
143 Adapted from Sauvé Meyer (1992), 797. 
144 Cf. Charlton (1970), 120. 
145 The key passage is GC.II.11, 338a14-b19, which will be discussed in more detail below in 3.4. See also 
APo.II.12, 96a2-7 and Met.VI.2, 1026b27-35: “Since, among things which are, some are always in the same 
state and are of necessity (nor necessity in the sense of compulsion but that which means the impossibility 
of being otherwise), and some are not of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the principle 
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explains elsewhere,146 rainfall is due to the circulation of material elements in the 
atmosphere, and so is a regular phenomenon, depending on the orbit of the sun and 
the change of seasons. Rainfall is a necessary and regular phenomenon in the winter-
season, but Aristotle states nowhere (or at least not explicitly; some argue that the 
statement is implicit in the passage quoted above from the Physica) that rain is for the 
sake of something.  
This brings us to the second remarkable and problematic feature in 
Aristotle’s solution to the aporia: the argument implies that if winter-rain and 
summer-heat are regular natural phenomena, and they cannot be incidental, they 
must be for the sake of something. This poses a problem for the interpretation of 
Aristotle’s teleology: does Aristotle endorse the view that (winter)rain is for the sake 
of something, or not? The traditional view has been that Aristotle does not think 
that it rains for a purpose,147 but more recently scholars have to my mind rightly 
pointed out that this conclusion would make the solution of the aporia 
incomprehensible.148 If the argument is to be coherent, then for Aristotle winter-rain 
must be for the sake of something. Moreover, if Aristotle is indeed committed to the 
view that winter-rain is for the sake of something, the question naturally arises of for 
the sake of what Aristotle thinks winter-rain comes to be.  
More importantly, and this is the third major problem in this passage, there 
is the question of whether it follows from the conclusion that winter rain is for the 
sake of something that the scope of Aristotle’s teleology is not restricted to 
individual natures and their structures and development as the more traditional view 
holds,149 but is in fact anthropocentric (the goal-directedness of natures is ultimately 
                                                                                                               
and this the cause of the existence of the accidental; for that which is neither always nor for the most part, 
we call accidental. For instance, if in the dog-days there is wintry and cold weather, we say this is an 
accident, but not if there is sultry heat, because the latter is always or for the most part so, but not the 
former.” 
146 The key passages where Aristotle discusses the phenomenon of rain in terms of material and efficient 
causes are Meteor.I.9, 346b16-31 and Meteor.I.11, 347b12-33; in the biological works, Aristotle sometimes 
uses the material circulation of rain by way of analogy to biological processes in the body: see e.g. DS.III, 
457b31-458a9 and PA.II.7, 653a2-7: “As a comparison of a great thing to a small, one should take this to 
happen similarly to the generation of rain – once vaporized and transported by the heat from the earth to 
the upper region, the mist, when it comes to be in the cold air above the earth, is reconstituted into water 
because of the cold and falls back down to earth.” 
147 See e.g. Charlton (1970), 120-123; Gotthelf (1987); and Irwin (1988), 102-107; the traditional view has 
recently been defended by Pellegrin (2002), 309; Johnson (2005), 149-158; and Judson (2005), 345-348. 
148 See e.g. Cooper (1982); Furley (1985); Sedley (1991); Wardy (1993); and Waterlow (1982), 80n.29. 
149 See in particular Gotthelf (1987). 
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for the benefit of man)150 or cosmic (the goal-directedness of nature is ultimately for 
the sake of preserving the existing balance in the cosmos)?151  
 In the next sections, I will first offer a more detailed interpretation of the 
Empedoclean account of the origin of species. Next I will return to the questions 
concerning the rainfall and the scope of Aristotle’s teleology.  
 
1.3.2 The nature and scope of natural teleology 
 
1.3.2.a An Empedoclean theory of the origin of species and the actions of nature according to 
Aristotle 
The account of the generation of parts of animals and their wholes, attributed to 
Empedocles, has not received as much attention as it deserves in the context of 
Aristotle’s defense of teleology. The debates usually concentrate on the rainfall-
example, which is arguably the more problematic part of the analogy, while the part 
about natural generation tends to be used to applaud Empedocles for offering a pre-
Darwinian theory of natural selection, supposedly involving both the survival of the 
fittest and the transformation of species.152 The details of this zoogony of 
Empedocles have been the subject of much debate. Especially after the publication 
of the new Strasbourg-papyrus (which contains some new material),153 Empedocles’ 
theory of the origin of species has received renewed attention. A short overview of 
my own interpretation of the zoogony of Empedocles will suffice to put the present 
passage from Aristotle’s Physica in context.154  
In his cosmogony, Empedocles distinguishes four stages of the generation 
of animals and plants.155 The first two stages probably occur under the increasing 
influence of Love, in which animals come to be in a way that could be described as 
bottom up, moving from parts to wholes. For the coincidental interactions amongst 
the four Empedoclean elements or roots lead to the coming to be of animal tissues 
such as flesh and bone. Similar interactions of these tissues lead to the coming to be 
                                                 
150 This controversial but thought-provoking interpretation is defended by Sedley (1991). 
151 A cosmic view of Aristotle’s teleology is assumed or defended by Cooper (1982); Furley (1985), 115-
116; (1996), 75; Kahn (1985); Matthen (2001) and (2006); and Wardy (1993), 19. 
152 For instance in Ross (1936), 78, but also more recently in Sedley (2003), 2 and 11. 
153 Martin & Primavesi (1999). 
154 On the zoogony of Empedocles, see Martin & Primavesi (1999), Parry (2005), Sedley (2003). 
155 DK31A72. 
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of animal parts, such as foreheads and arms. Finally, interactions of these isolated 
parts roaming the earth lead to the coming to be of different kinds of animals.156 
Once Love’s influence is strong enough, the parts will randomly stick together, 
forming all kinds of hybrids. Stages three and four probably occur under the 
increasing influence of Strife, in which complete plants, animals, and human beings 
come to be spontaneously from the earth.157 They rise up like shoots of plants, grow 
limbs, and then mature naturally to the point where they are able to reproduce 
themselves sexually (Strife, as it were, pulls the uniform masses apart and thereby 
creates the extremities). Presumably, this is the world in which we live now. Finally, 
Strife will break up the organisms into their four elements again and soon Love’s 
influence will make itself felt. 
Empedocles’ account of the biological past is thus cyclical, just as his 
cosmogony, and draws on two conceptually different models of the origin of 
species. One model is in the fashion of the mythological tradition of living beings 
coming to be spontaneously from the earth, while the other one seems to be original 
to Empedocles and follows a more materialist fashion current in early Greek 
philosophy. The first origin of species under Strife is explained as a transition from 
the stage of spontaneous generation of both male and female living beings, growing 
out the moisture due to fire, to a stage of sexual reproduction. This transition 
resembles a botanical process of plants getting more differentiated and mature, but 
without undergoing some kind of transformation of species. The second zoogony 
under Love, on the other hand, offers a fully naturalistic account of the growth of 
more complex organic compounds, resulting from random collisions of organic 
parts. The examples of creatures thus produced are rather fantastic hybrids, like the 
man-faced ox-progeny mentioned by Aristotle. The fragments do not rule out the 
possibility that these combinations might also have resulted in living beings like the 
ones that are alive now, such as for example ox-faced ox progenies. The reference to 
Empedocles we find in Aristotle’s defense of natural teleology fits the pattern of this 
second zoogony.  
Crucial for the understanding of this passage in Ph.II.8, 198b23-32 is the 
distinction of two levels of ‘incidental fitness’ mentioned in the second part of the 
                                                 
156 Cf. DK31B57, B59, B60, and B61.  
157 Cf. DK31B62 and Strasbourg fr.D. 
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analogy, set up to undermine Aristotle’s thesis of the goal-directedness of nature. At 
the first level, a materialist opponent such as Empedocles seems to think that 
material necessity alone can produce parts that by coincidence turn out to be fit (or 
have the potentials) for the performance of certain functions. At the second level, 
the materialist opponent thinks that material necessity could have produced whole 
beings that – if by coincidence they turned out to be composed in a fitting way – 
survived, and if not, they died.  
The first case of parts turning out to be fit for a certain function is not all 
that problematic to Aristotle. He, too, recognizes cases in nature where material 
necessity is the cause of the coming into being of parts or their constitutive material, 
which is then used by the formal nature of an animal (to be identified with its goal-
directed efficient cause, or soul) for the sake of something. These cases are 
teleological in Aristotle’s view, but not without qualification: the formal nature of the 
animal attributes a function (or use) to a part or to a flow of material after this part or 
material has already come to be. The formal nature is not properly speaking the 
cause of the coming to be of this part (rather, material necessity is), but it is the 
cause of its presence: the goal-directed actions of the formal nature of an individual 
animal explain the presence, structure, location, and the ultimate function of the 
part, because it is the cause of these. The kind of teleology involved is thus ‘indirect’ 
or ‘secondary’ to material necessity, as opposed to what I have called ‘primary’ 
teleology in which the formal nature is both the cause of the coming to be (through 
conditional necessity) and of the presence of a part. Parts and functions that are due 
to ‘direct’ or ‘primary’ teleology belong in general to the definition of the substantial 
being of the animal.  
A paradigmatic case of a part that comes to be due to secondary teleology 
is a complete set of teeth PA.III.2, 663b22-35:  
πῶς δὲ τῆς ἀναγκαίας φύσεως ἐχούσης τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον 
φύσις ἕνεκά του κατακέχρηται, λέγωμεν. (…) Τὴν γοῦν τοιούτου σώματος 
περισσωματικὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τοῖς μείζοσι τῶν ζῴων ὑπάρχουσαν ἐπὶ βοήθειαν καὶ τὸ 
συμφέρον καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις, καὶ τὴν ῥέουσαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰς τὸν ἄνω τόπον τοῖς μὲν 
εἰς ὀδόντας καὶ χαυλιόδοντας ἀπένειμε, τοῖς δ’ εἰς κέρατα. 
“But we must say what the character of the necessary nature is, and, how nature 
according to the account makes use of things present of necessity for the sake of 
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something. (…) For the residual surplus of this sort of body [i.e. earthen], being 
present in the larger of the animals, is used by nature for protection and advantage, 
and the surplus, which flows of necessity to the upper region, in some cases it 
distributes to teeth and tusks, in other cases to horns.” 
This passage bolsters the arguments originally put forward by Sauvé Meyer (1992) 
that the issue for Aristotle is not the fact that material necessity is picked out as the 
cause of the coming to be of a part; nor does Aristotle deny the possibility of events 
or parts on occasion turning out to have functional or beneficial outcomes by 
coincidence and due to their material nature. Rather, it is the fact that the outcomes 
of these processes turn out to be beneficial on a regular basis: if there are events or 
structures that have functional or beneficial results or features regularly, then these 
events must be due to the actions of a goal-directed nature and be for the sake of 
these outcomes, either on a primary or on a secondary level. For such regular 
beneficial outcomes cannot be due to accidental interactions of material elements 
alone, especially not to the kind of material necessity Empedocles advances. For in 
Aristotle, the movements of the material elements are – unless prevented – goal-
directed towards their natural places; in Empedocles, the elements do not have any 
definite natural movements, but instead their movements are completely random.158 
The teleology does not necessarily have to precede the process of becoming (that is, 
functions do not necessarily have to be part of the definition of the substantial being 
or formal nature); the formal nature that is realized also acts goal-directedly with 
regard to ‘materials’ or ‘potentials’ that are not part of (and therefore conditionally 
necessitated by) the original form.159 Functions, however, do not just follow from 
                                                 
158 That is, at least according to Aristotle’s interpretation of material necessity in Empedocles; see e.g. 
Ph.II.4, 196a17-24: “This is strange, whether they supposed that there is no such thing as luck or whether 
they thought there is but omitted to mention it – and that too when they sometimes used it, as 
Empedocles does when he says that the air is not always separated into the highest region, but as luck has 
it. At any rate he says in his cosmogony that it happened to run that way at that time, but it often ran 
otherwise. He tells us also that most of the parts of animals came to be by luck.” Cf. GC.II.6, 334a1-5. 
159 Aristotle’s criticism of Empedocles in PA.I.1, 640a22-26 discussed above (in 1.1.2.a) is different in this 
very aspect, because in this passage it is Empedocles’ failure to recognize a case of primary teleology, 
while in the Physica passage the causation involved is secondary teleology. However the criticism is similar 
to remarks Aristotle utters with regard to the account of teeth by Democritus (GA.V.8, 789b2-15): 
“Democritus, however, neglecting the final cause, refers back to necessity all the things that are used by 
nature. Now they are such [i.e. necessary], but yet they are for a final cause and for the sake of what is best 
in each case. Thus nothing prevents the teeth from being formed and being shed in this way; but it is not 
on account of these but on account of the end – and ‘these’ are causes in the sense of being the mover 
and the instruments and the material. (...) But to say that it are the causes of necessity is as much as if 
someone would think that the water has been drawn off from a dropsical patient on account of the lancet 
alone, not on account of health, for the sake of which the lancet made the incision.” 
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the material potentials (e.g. the function of ‘defense’ does not follow necessarily 
from a flow of material with hard and solid potentials) – it is because the formal 
nature puts them to a certain use and organization that these potentials actually and 
on a regular basis produce certain functions (e.g. the formal nature turns a flow of 
material with hard and solid potentials in some animals into teeth for the sake of 
cutting and in other in horns for the sake of defense).160 While the coming to be of 
teeth in a weak sense (that is, teeth qua their constitutive material with certain 
potentials) is due to material necessity, their presence and their regular beneficial 
characteristics can only be accounted for teleologically. 
 In this context, the terms Aristotle uses to indicate the ‘fitness’ of the 
organic parts are significant. ‘Useful’ (chrêsimos) is commonly used by Aristotle to 
indicate what one might call ‘emerging functions’, that is, the potentials for functions 
a particular part (that is, organs, but most often residues such as milk and sperm) has 
on account of its material constitution. This potential is often a result of material 
necessity; for Aristotle claims in these cases that the material referred to is not 
produced for the sake of having this particular potential or ‘usability’.161 With regard 
to milk, for example, Aristotle makes the following remark (GA.IV.8, 776a23-26): 
διὸ πρὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ μηνῶν ἄχρηστον τὸ γάλα ταῖς γυναιξί, τότε δ’ ἤδη γίγνεται χρήσιμον. 
εὐλόγως δὲ συμβαίνει καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰτίαν πεπεμμένον εἰς τοὺς τελευταίους 
χρόνους·  
“Hence in women the milk is useless before the seventh month and only then 
becomes useful. That it is only concocted at the last stages is what we should expect 
to happen also [i.e. in addition to being for the sake of something] as being due to a 
necessary cause.” 
The ‘usability’ a part has is thus due to the material potentials the part has, but the 
way that part is consequently ‘used’ and retained in the animal’s body, is determined 
by the formal nature of an animal, which puts the part to the best possible use for 
this particular animal. The same holds for the term ‘suitability for’ (epitêdeios), a term 
which may be used to designate foodstuffs, natural places, or even thoughts that 
have certain ‘favorable’ or ‘function-inducing’ characteristics, which they just happen 
                                                 
160 Cf. Pellegrin (2002), 310. 
161 A few paradigmatic examples of the use of chrêsimos are GA.I.15, 720b34-35; GA.I.18, 725a3-7; 
GA.II.6, 742a27-32; GA.III.3, 754b6-7; GA.III.10, 760b13-14; GA.V.2, 781b26-28; HA.II.1, 500a15; 
HA.VI.22, 576a14-16; IA.1, 704a4-5; PA.II.3, 650b11-13. 
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to have (again, they were not ‘produced’ for the sake of exhibiting these 
characteristics).162 As in the following example, Aristotle also uses the term to 
indicate material mixtures that possess a suitability for a particular function 
(PA.IV.10, 686a8-11):  
Ἐξέθετο δ’ ἡ φύσις ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐνίας διὰ τὸ σύμμετρον εἶναι τὴν τοῦ 
αἵματος κρᾶσιν καὶ ἐπιτηδείαν πρός τε τὴν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου ἀλέαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν 
αἰσθήσεων ἡσυχίαν καὶ ἀκρίβειαν.  
“And nature placed some of the modes of perception on the outside of it [i.e. the 
head] as well, on account of the blend of the blood being well proportioned and 
ensuring163 both the warmth of the brain and the quietness and accuracy of 
perception.”  
This usage comes close to what Empedocles might have meant when claiming that 
teeth have the fitness for a certain function, but not in virtue of being for the sake of 
that function, but in virtue of the (coincidentally generated) quantitative ratio of their 
elemental mixture.164 Aristotle does not deny that combinations of materials and 
their potentials have certain potentials for functions (in fact, the material potentials a 
part has are a necessary part of the explanation of the function that part performs), 
but the reason why the mixture is organized the way it is and is put to the use it is in 
a particular kind of animal needs further explanation in terms of an overarching 
goal-directed efficient cause in the form of the formal nature or soul of a living 
being.   
 
What is mainly problematic for Aristotle is to see how parts can be claimed to be fit 
for a certain function in isolation from the whole of which they are part: it is not clear 
how teeth as such can be said ‘to be for biting’ without making reference to the 
digestive system of which they are part and to the animal to which benefit they 
                                                 
162 For instance, Aristotle uses it with respect to a certain area in the sea which induces spawning 
(HA.VIII.13, 589b3-6): “They [fish] penetrate into this sea for the purpose of breeding; for there are 
regions there favorable for spawning, and the fresh and sweet water has an invigorating effect upon the 
spawn.” Other paradigmatic examples of the use of epitêdeios are HA.III.21, 522b22-23; HA.III.21, 523a3-
4; HA.V.13, 544b8-9; HA.X.5, 636b21-23; and MA.8, 702a17-19. 
163 Lennox (2001b; 97) translates epitêdeian pros somewhat misleadingly as ‘adapted for’ (it seems to me that 
the function here follows the potentials this mixture of blood already has, rather than that the mixture is 
made for the sake of this function). For this use of the term, see also Pol.VII.4, 1325b40-1326a4: “As the 
weaver or shipbuilder or any other artisan must have the material proper (epitêdeian) for his work – and in 
proportion as this is better prepared, so will the result of his art be nobler – so the statesman or legislator 
must also have the materials suited (epitêdeiôs) to him.” 
164 Cf. DK31B96. 
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operate (consequently, since Aristotle defines things functionally, it is not even clear 
that we can call teeth ‘teeth’ in any meaningful way without making reference to the 
larger whole of which they are part, and the same holds for ‘eyes’ or ‘hands’).  
This problem brings us to the second level of fitness. For what exactly does 
it mean for whole animals to come to be ‘composed in a fitting way’? Aristotle’s 
example of an Empedoclean animal that is not ‘composed in a fitting way’, the ‘man-
faced ox-progeny’, suggests a very literal interpretation of wholes that are put 
together out of homogeneous parts, as for example ox-faces combined with oxen, 
and man-faces with men. According to Empedocles, animals assembled from parts 
that belong to different kinds of animals (where ‘kinds’ are identified with respect to 
the present biological diversity of species), and are thus assembled ‘wrongly’, are 
non-matching wholes that will ultimately (if not immediately) die. ‘Fitting wholes’ are 
the non-hybrids, which ‘turn out’ to be the current species.165 For Aristotle, on the 
other hand, the well-adaptedness of each particular kind of animal comprises not 
only its internal well-functioning but also the relation between the animal and its 
environment: an animal is equipped to do well (enough) in its own particular niche. 
It is this notion of ‘fitness’ and the regularity of the generation of animals that prove 
to Aristotle that there is a prior and eternal form underlying their presence, and that 
there is a formal nature that always, unless prevented, acts for the sake of something 
and the best.  
These conclusions point again to what is at stake for Aristotle: while 
Empedocles explains whole animals from the bottom up, taking the material 
elements to be the only proper natural substances and explaining wholes (and their 
possible beneficial characteristics) as the coincidental outcomes of random 
combinations, Aristotle explains animals in a top-down manner,166 starting from the 
                                                 
165 For that matter, Empedocles’ notion of fitness is thus quite different from that of modern Darwinian 
theories, which Empedocles is supposed to foreshadow. To point out just two important differences: (i.) 
there is no selection for the fittest, but only for the fit; and ‘fitness’ does not refer to a relation between 
the animal and its environment, but presumably to an internal match of parts having the right 
proportions; (ii.) the concept of chance involved in Empedocles is one of non-purposive randomness, not 
one of statistical probability: all homogeneous hybrids survive, all heterogeneous hybrids die. The 
selection procedure that is implied is a purely negative force, eliminating creatures that have already been 
created by other means, until the actual range of present-day species is reached which will then be 
preserved until a new cycle begins. 
166 Cf. Furley (1996), 77. 
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animals’ form and working down to its specific parts and their material 
constitutions.167  
What Aristotle tries to establish here is not just the priority of form, but 
primarily the necessity of postulating goal-directed actions of formal natures to 
account for regular beneficial outcomes also in those cases where material necessity is 
the predominant cause in the coming to be of a part or structure. 
 
1.3.2.b The rainfall example and the scope of natural teleology 
We now have a clearer picture of the analogy between the rainfall example and the 
Empedoclean theory of generation: both ‘generations’ are claimed to be due to 
material necessity, and to have incidental beneficial outcomes, rather than involving 
a purposive agent (in the form of Zeus) making something for the sake of something. 
The materialist thus refutes the providential, external, and anthropocentric teleology 
of Zeus in favor of purely material causation; results – whether beneficial or 
detrimental – are incidental to the processes which bring about these results. At the 
same time it should be noted that Aristotle’s solution of the aporia is not directed 
against explanation in terms of material causes as such, nor is it likely to be have 
been developed to argue for the kind of providential and divine teleology 
presumably accepted by the common people. Aristotle’s argument will have the 
materialist accept the biological and immanent teleology of formal natures 
interacting with material nature in such a way that things ‘are made’ for the sake of 
something. This at least must be the implication of Aristotle’s statement that it is 
‘impossible for things to be that way’ (Ph.II.8, 198b34). We know for sure that in the 
case of the coming to be of animals and their parts Aristotle embraces whole-
heartedly the immanent teleology of nature, but – and this is the question we will 
have to address next – what is Aristotle’s view of rain?  
As indicated above, it is hard to make sense of Aristotle’s solution to the 
aporia if we refuse to attribute to Aristotle a teleological perception (and 
explanation) of winter-rain (and of summer-heat for that matter). Let me stress from 
the outset, however, that we do not need to attribute to Aristotle a primary 
                                                 
167 These levels of explanation and the interactions between form/function and material constitution will 
be discussed in more detail in the chapters two and three. 
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teleological view of winter-rain.168 Following the analogy with the case of teeth, a 
secondary teleological picture of winter-rain would suffice (Aristotle’s refutation of 
the materialist explanation of teeth amounts in practice to an argument in favor of 
secondary teleology; the alternative explanation for winter-rain therefore may well be 
one in terms of secondary teleology also). In other words, what we are looking for is 
a purpose of winter-rain that is secondary to the coming to be of rain and that thus 
need not be directly responsible or causative of the phenomenon in a strict sense 
(just as ‘biting’ is not the cause of the coming to be of teeth in a strict sense, but only 
the cause of the organization and presence of teeth). In other discussions of rain, 
Aristotle has already identified the sun and the obliquity of its orbit as the 
overarching cause responsible for the circularity of the seasons and the regularity of 
winter rainfall: the simple elements imitate this circular motion, and this is what 
intrinsically and non-accidentally (and regularly during the winter) causes rain by 
material necessity.169   
 One possible purpose of winter-rain has already been suggested in the text: 
winter rainfall could be for the sake of the growth of crops. This is the view that is 
rejected and ridiculed by Aristotle’s opponent as a legitimate explanation, but could 
it be accepted by Aristotle? Sedley has argued that this is indeed the case: winter 
rainfall is for the sake of man’s growing crops (human beings are the ‘that for the 
sake of which’ in the sense of beneficiary of a goal-directed process).170 If his reading 
is right, then Aristotle identifies a highly anthropocentric purpose for winter-rain: the 
purpose is not just the growth of plants, which is a natural purpose, but the growth 
of crops, which is an agricultural goal depending on human beings. Professedly, this 
interpretation is consistent with other passages in Aristotle that according to Sedley 
support an anthropocentric teleology.171 However, as Sedley admits,172 it does not 
                                                 
168 This is in fact impossible for reasons I will indicate below. Aristotle would agree with his materialist 
opponent that the phenomenon of winter rainfall itself is an accidental property of the water elements 
that regularly fall down to the earth in a particular time of the year. The primary teleology of the water 
elements pertains to their internal principle of change that tends towards the elements natural place; from 
this perspective, there is no difference between (regular) winter rainfall or (occasional) summer rainfall – 
in both cases the water elements reach their own natural place. 
169 Matthen (2007), 9 and 13; GC.II.10, 337a1-7; Mete.I.9, 346b35-36: “So we get a circular process that 
follows the course of the sun. For according as the sun moves to this side or that, the moisture in this 
process rises or falls.” 
170 Sedley (1991), 179 and passim. 
171 The other passages Sedley refers to as evidencing an anthropocentric interpretation of Aristotle’s 
teleology are Met.L.10, 1075a11-25 and Pol.I.8, 1256b10-22; I will discuss these passages below. 
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necessarily follow from Aristotle’s acceptance of a teleological view of winter-rain 
that he is also committed to the anthropocentric aspect of it, namely that winter-rain 
is ultimately for the benefit of human beings. This holds even less so for the 
religious-providential aspect of it: surely no one would want to attribute these 
qualities to Aristotle’s notion of natural teleology.  
Concerning the anthropocentric aspect, however, I see no problems in 
attributing the view to Aristotle that – in a secondary sense – winter rainfall is for the 
sake of making crops grow and therefore ultimately for the sake of the benefit of 
human beings. For this anthropocentric end is a secondary end, as it is only achieved 
through the intervention of human beings who perform the art of agriculture, and 
who thereby perfect the workings (and teleology) of nature.173 In other words, 
human beings imitate the goal-directed actions of the formal nature in generation in 
putting to some good use whatever is available of necessity,174 which is in this case 
the regular rainfall. Because water is what makes plants grow, the regular provision 
of water is what can be used to make the land produce plants more abundantly and 
to make it grow those plants which can serve as food for human beings. For 
Aristotle, human beings themselves instead of some god must act for the sake of 
something in order to ascertain beneficial outcomes from a necessary phenomenon 
such as seasonal rain.  
It therefore goes too far to claim that Aristotle’s teleology is essentially 
anthropocentric. Firstly, rain does not fall in the winter just because it is necessary 
for human survival, and winter-rain makes any plant grow, not just the seeds planted 
by human beings; therefore the growth of crops cannot be a proper, primary final 
cause of winter-rain.175 Secondly, I have found no evidence in Aristotle for 
attributing the view to him that ends in the sense of the beneficiary can ever be the 
intrinsic final causes of the becoming of the processes of which they are the 
beneficiary.176 Rather, the growth of crops is a secondary function following the 
                                                                                                               
172 Sedley (1991), 185. 
173 Matthen (2001, 183-184) seems to hint at a similar interpretation by explaining rain in winter as an 
instance of ‘instrumental teleology’. 
174 For art imitates nature: agriculture or the growth of crops takes place in winter because it rains in 
winter, not the other way around. 
175 This is rightly pointed out by Johnson (2005, 153-154). 
176 Pace Sedley (1991), 189. The passage Sedley uses as evidence to support his anthropocentric reading is 
Ph.II.2, 194a34-35 discussed above. Sedley argues that the construction of hôs plus the participle of 
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primary final cause of water elements realizing their own nature (rain, let alone 
winter-rain, does not have a nature, only water does).177 Aristotle thus endorses a 
teleological view of winter-rain to the extent that he believes that winter-rain, which 
comes to be regularly due to material necessity, has the potentials for making plants 
grow – potentials which can be used by human beings (through the application of 
the art of agriculture) to make crops grow. The growth of crops is a secondary 
function or use of winter-rain, which can only be realized regularly and systematically 
through the goal-directed actions of human beings (mimicking those of formal 
natures); the use to which winter-rain is put, is not intrinsic to winter-rain (or to the 
water that returns to its natural place during the winter-season) but is imposed on it 
in accordance with the material potentials rainfall has.178  
It is in this way in particular that winter-rain and teeth are analogous: their 
regular beneficial outcomes or functions (and not so much the occurrence of the 
phenomena themselves) require overarching goal-directed actions, either in the form 
of human beings performing some kind of art, or of formal natures acting like a 
craftsman adding purpose to things that are present of material necessity. Under this 
interpretation, we can attribute a teleological view of winter-rain to Aristotle, which 
is indirect and secondary to the coming to be of winter-rain and which is 
anthropocentric, but not in a significant way.179  
 
Granted that the rainfall-example does not necessarily have to be read in an 
essentially anthropocentric way, one might still argue (as Sedley does) that other 
                                                                                                               
huparcheô should be read as ‘on the ground that they exist’ rather than as ‘as if they exist’; however, 
according to Rijksbaron et.al. (2000; 100), constructions like these indicate a subjective reason, for which 
the narrator does not want to be held responsible (cf. Xenoph.An.IV.2.5). It is thus more likely that 
Aristotle makes a concession to a popular thought in claiming that we are in some sense (pôs should indeed 
be read in a conciliatory way) an end, too. 
177 Cf. Wardy (1993, 25) with regard to Aristotle’s notion of the polis: the polis is phusei, but being by nature 
does not entail that it has a phusis in its own right. See also Judson (2005, 348), who argues that Aristotle’s 
natural teleology applies “only to the generation, functioning, and parts of natural substances” and 
therefore not to the case of rain.  
178 In this respect, the example of the winter-rain is comparable to the example of the light shining 
through a lantern in APo.II.11, 94b27-37: the light shines the lantern by material necessity, but the lantern 
(being created for exactly this purpose by human art) also serves the purpose of helping people to avoid 
stumbling. This ‘use’ of the light is anthropological and secondary (because incidental) to the passing of 
light through the larger pores of the lantern. Cf. Byrne (2002), 43. 
179 Pace Sedley (1991), 196. Secondary functions of things – and especially of things that do not have a 
nature may be imposed externally, whereas primary functions may not; humans benefit from the growth 
of crops is external and supervening upon plants ‘benefiting’ from the realizing of their own nature, while 
water ‘benefits’ intrinsically from the realization of its nature by returning to its natural place. 
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passages in the Aristotelian corpus support the anthropocentric interpretation, and 
hence conclude that in the light of all this evidence Aristotle’s teleology must still be 
qualified as being essentially anthropocentric.  
 A crucial and notorious passage in this context is Aristotle’s description of 
how nature provides food for all living beings as part of an attempt to establish the 
naturalness of the art of acquisition and warfare in Pol.I.8, 1256b7-22:180  
ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κτῆσις ὑπ’ αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως διδομένη πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ κατὰ 
τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτω καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ 
μὲν συνεκτίκτει τῶν ζῴων τοσαύτην τροφὴν ὥσθ’ ἱκανὴν εἶναι μέχρις οὗ ἂν δύνηται 
αὐτὸ αὑτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἷον ὅσα σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ ᾠοτοκεῖ· ὅσα δὲ ζῳοτοκεῖ, 
τοῖς γεννωμένοις ἔχει τροφὴν ἐν αὑτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος 
φύσιν. ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰητέον τά τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκεν εἶναι 
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν 
τροφήν, τῶν δ’ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τά γε πλεῖστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας 
ἕνεκεν, ἵνα καὶ ἐσθὴς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μηθὲν μήτε 
ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν 
φύσιν. 
“Such property, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both when they are first 
born, and when they are grown up. For some animals generate at the moment of 
childbirth at the same time also sufficient nutriment to last until the offspring can 
supply itself – for example all the animals which produce larvae or lay eggs. And 
those which bear live young have up to a certain time nutriment within themselves 
for their offspring, namely the substance called milk. Hence it is equally clear that 
we should also suppose that, after they have come to be, plants exist for the sake of 
animals, and the other animals for the sake of men – domesticated animals for both 
use and food, and most if not all wild animals for food and for other assistance, as a source of 
clothing and other utilities. If, then, nature makes nothing incomplete or pointless, it is 
necessary that nature has made them all for the sake of men.”  
The conclusion of this passage concerning the teleological hierarchy between plants, 
animals, and human beings supposedly shows that Aristotle endorses the 
anthropocentric view that everything ultimately exists for the sake of human beings. 
Certainly Aristotle argues here for an instrumental relation between different kinds 
of living beings in which the lower are used by and are in that sense for the sake of 
                                                 
180 Miller (1995), 317-319. 
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the higher; at the end of the chain of users stands mankind. The teleology Aristotle 
defends here is unmistakably anthropocentric.181 However, the stress on the use of 
beings as food and of their general usability by others points out that the teleology 
Aristotle is discussing here is not direct teleology, but secondary teleology. The crux 
of the argument is the claim that nature provides food to all living beings, and does 
so often in the form of other living beings. The analogy drawn in Pol.I.10, 1258a21-
38 is telling:  
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτική, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται 
αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ <πρὸς> τροφὴν τὴν φύσιν δεῖ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι, 
(…) φύσεως γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον τροφὴν τῷ γεννηθέντι παρέχειν· παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, 
τροφὴ τὸ λειπόμενόν ἐστι. διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν 
καὶ τῶν ζῴων.  
 “For as political science does not make men, but takes them from nature and uses 
them, so too nature provides earth or sea or the like as a source of food. (…) For it 
is a task of nature to provide food to that which is born, and for each, that what 
remains over of that from which it comes to be is its food. That is why the art of 
getting wealth out of crops and animals is natural for all people.”182 
Just as nature produces human beings so that politics can make use of them, so too 
nature produces and provides nourishment – also in the form of living beings – for 
other living beings to use.183 The primary and intrinsic end of living beings is the 
realization of their own form, but they also have the potential to serve as food for 
other living beings that are in the process of realizing or maintaining their own form 
from the perspective of those living beings.184 This propensity or usability is incidental and 
secondary to their coming to be, but is of vital importance to other beings: the food-
chain imposes a hierarchy of conditional necessary relations between members of 
                                                 
181 Sedley (1991, 181) discusses various strategies adopted by those who would like to downplay the 
importance and anthropocentric focus of this passage, and points out rightly that Aristotle does not just 
assert the anthropocentric teleology, but argues for it, and that as part of a serious argument ultimately 
concerning the naturalness of the city. I agree with him that any interpretation of this passage needs to 
account for the anthropocentric teleology, rather than to reason it away. 
182 See also GA.II.6, 744b17-25 where nature is compared to a good housekeeper providing nourishment 
to everyone for the sake of their growth. 
183 Cf. Lloyd (1996), 191-192. 
184 Cf. Judson (2005, 356-357), who argues that the ‘for the sake of’-relations argued for in this text only 
hold from a certain viewpoint or perspective. 
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the present animal diversity, according to which the existence of the one is 
conditionally necessary for the coming to be and existence of the other.185  
Note, however, that in Aristotle’s view, the animal that comes to be is 
‘made’ in such a way by the formal nature of that animal so that it is able to use and 
digest the food that is available in the specific habitat to which the animal belongs, 
and not the other way around: a camel has the kind of tongue and the amount of 
stomachs it has to be able to digest the thorny bushes that are available in its habitat 
as a potential source of food. There are no examples of plants or animals in Aristotle 
that are claimed to be the way they are for the sake of being the nourishment of 
some other being: the thorny bushes are not the way they are (that is, bristly, woody, 
and fibrous) because there are camels in their neighborhood who can only eat such 
food.186 Just as in the case of winter-rain, plants and animals only have a potentiality 
for a secondary function from a certain perspective or relative to other beings higher up187 
in the food-chain: the art of agriculture and the goal-directed actions of human 
beings are necessary to turn a regular natural phenomena such as rain into a 
phenomena with regular beneficial outcomes for them, and in a similar way, the goal-
directed actions of the formal nature of plants and animals are necessary to ‘adapt’ 
these plants and animals in such a way that they are able to benefit from the other 
living beings in their habitat as a source of food. Animals are adapted to their 
environments and to the available food in that environment; however, nature does 
not adapt them to serve themselves as food for others in their environment188 – this 
is a use that is imposed on them from the perspective of other animals and their 
respective formal natures. Aristotelian teleology thus primarily takes the perspective 
of the individual living being in the form of the best possible realization of their 
internal structure and their overall well-being, and only secondary from other beings 
to whom these realizations of form might be usable and thus beneficial in some way. 
                                                 
185 Cf. Simpson (1998), 49. 
186 This point and the example are well brought out by Pellegrin (2002), 312. On the camel, see PA.III.14, 
674a28-674b18. 
187 And perhaps also to beings lower down in the food-chain; see PA.IV.13, 696b25-35, which will be 
discussed below. 
188 The presence of parts that Aristotle identifies as being for the sake of defense rather points to the 
opposite: the formal nature of each animal produces, if possible and the required material is available, 
parts that help the animal escape from its possible predators. 
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What it means for human beings to be on the top of this hierarchy is that they are 
proclaimed to be most successful in making use of what nature provides to all living 
beings because of their having mastered a wide diversity of arts, and thus of being able to 
imitate the indirect or secondary teleology of nature really well. In principle, all 
natural products are available to all living beings as a source of food; for instance, 
there is no intrinsic reason why camels could not eat fresh grass or fish; it is because 
there are no such things available in their particular habitat that nature has not 
sufficiently equipped them to be able to eat and digest other foodstuffs. Only 
humans move freely through different habitats and invent various devices to 
increase their success in using things for their own advantage. Nothing in Aristotle’s 
other treatises suggests, however, that this hierarchy is ordained by nature for the 
sake of man’s benefit.189 The order of causation works rather the other way around: 
nature has produced things, and the goal-directed actions of human beings are 
necessary to turn those things into something usable or beneficial for them (of 
course, while following the material potentials the natural products have).  
The closing sentence of the above cited passage, which invokes the 
principle that nature does nothing in vain and that therefore it must have made all 
other living beings for the sake of human beings, is thus not an argument for 
anthropocentric teleology without qualification, but for an indirect or secondary 
anthropocentric teleology. Nature has made the other living beings for sake of 
human beings to use them, eat them, or benefit from them, but, I submit, this is a 
secondary purpose of animals and plants (and which is thus not part of their own 
nature), and one that is imposed by human beings through the application of some 
kind of art.   
Relevant to this discussion of the hierarchy in the food-chain, and also 
more in general to the question of the scope of Aristotelian teleology, is the 
following text from PA.IV.13, 696b25-34:  
Τὰ μὲν γὰρ κατ’ ἀντικρὺ ἔχει τὸ στόμα καὶ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, τὰ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὑπτίοις, οἷον 
οἵ τε δελφῖνες καὶ τὰ σελαχώδη· καὶ ὕπτια στρεφόμενα λαμβάνει τὴν τροφήν. Φαίνεται 
δ’ ἡ φύσις οὐ μόνον σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν ποιῆσαι τοῦτο τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων (ἐν γὰρ τῇ 
στρέψει σῴζεται τἆλλα βραδυνόντων· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ζῳοφάγα ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ καὶ 
πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ λαιμαργίᾳ τῇ περὶ τὴν τροφήν· ῥᾷον γὰρ λαμβάνοντα 
                                                 
189 Cf. Hankinson (1998), 147. 
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διεφθείρετ’ ἂν διὰ τὴν πλήρωσιν ταχέως. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περιφερῆ καὶ λεπτὴν ἔχοντα 
τὴν τοῦ ῥύγχους φύσιν οὐχ οἷόν τ’ εὐδιαίρετον ἔχειν.   
“In some [fish] the mouth is placed straight across, and towards the front, but in 
others on the underside, e.g. in the dolphins and selachians; and they turn belly up 
to seize their nourishment. And nature appears to do this not only for the sake of the 
preservation of the other animals (for during the turn the other animals escape, 
because of the delay; for all such creatures are carnivorous), but also in order that 
they do not follow their gluttonous ways regarding nourishment; for if they could 
grasp it easily, they would be destroyed owing to being quickly sated. And in addition 
to these reasons, the nature of the snout, being curved and narrow, is unable to 
open widely.” 
Here Aristotle attributes a function to the placement of a part that actually serves 
other beings than the animal itself: the placement of the mouth helps potential 
victims escape from being turned into food. This, however, must again be taken as a 
secondary use of a part seen from the perspective of the formal natures of animals 
living in the habitat of dolphins and selachians. The primary causes (intrinsic to the 
dolphins and selachians itself) are stated next: the fact that dolphins and selachians 
are not able to eat much at a time is both for the sake of the best of those animals 
themselves (if not prevented by the specific location of the mouth, these animals 
would eat themselves to death), and results of necessity (the shape of the snout 
makes it impossible to open it widely).190 The hierarchy pertaining to the food-chain 
that was pointed out in the above mentioned text from the Politics is reversed in this 
case: ‘lower’ animals benefit from the location of the mouth in ‘higher’ animals. This 
points to the relativity of the hierarchy in that the enforcement of secondary uses to 
plants and animals is not restricted to higher organisms on lower ones, or to human 
beings on all other organisms. There is no absolute subordination of the good of 
one living being to that of another.191  
Some have taken this text as evidence, not for an anthropocentric 
interpretation of Aristotelian teleology, but for a cosmic teleology: the suggestion is 
that there is a tendency towards regularity and goodness in the cosmos as a whole 
(over and above the one inherent in the individual natures of living beings) which 
                                                 
190 See also Lennox’s commentary on this passage; Lennox (2001b), 341. 
191 There is thus no reason to suppose that mention of the secondary function of saving other animals is a 
‘sarcastic expression’, or ‘a polite correction of popular teleology’ as Balme thinks; Balme (1987b), 279; 
(1980), 9. 
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ensures the preservation of the cosmos as it is. Under this interpretation, the 
harmony and interaction between individual natural entities is derived from an 
overall nature, i.e. the cosmos, which has its own form. Admittedly, Aristotle 
sometimes does seem to think of nature or cosmos as a larger whole in which beings 
contribute to the existence and well-being of other beings.192 However, the evidence 
for a cosmic interpretation of teleology in Aristotle is not very strong, and scanty in 
comparison to the evidence we have for a ‘what is best for each substantial being’-
based teleology.193  
The key passage quoted in support of the cosmic reading is Met.XII.10, 
1075a11-25:194 
Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον 
κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν. ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ 
γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος· οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν 
ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν. πάντα δὲ συντέτακταί πως, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ 
καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτά· καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, 
ἀλλ’ ἔστι τι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις 
ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ 
ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν· τοιαύτη 
γὰρ ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν. λέγω δ’ οἷον εἴς γε τὸ διακριθῆναι ἀνάγκη 
ἅπασιν ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα οὕτως ἔστιν ὧν κοινωνεῖ ἅπαντα εἰς τὸ ὅλον. 
“We must also consider in which way the nature of the whole (hê tou holou phusis) 
contains the good and the best; whether as something separated and by itself, or as 
its arrangement [of its parts]. Or in both ways, as an army does; for the good [of an 
army] is partly in the order, and is also the general; but it is mostly the latter: for he 
is not due to the order but the order is due to him. All things are ordered together 
in some way, but not fish and birds and plants all in the same way; and [the order] is 
not such that there is no relation between one thing and another, there is one. For 
all things are ordered together towards one, but it is like a household, where the 
free persons have the least liberty to act at random, but all or most [of their actions] 
are arranged, while the slaves and animals can do little towards what is communal, 
but act as they chance: for that is the kind of principle that nature is of each of 
them. I mean, for example, that it is necessary that everything comes to be 
                                                 
192 Furley (2004), 83; Hankinson (1998), 147; Matthen (2007), 15. 
193 Cf. Lennox (2001a), 201n.5. 
194 Cf. also Matthen (2001), who argues for the existence of a cosmic nature on the basis of DC.I; 
however, I believe Bodnár (2005), 10-17 offers convincing arguments that undermine such a reading. 
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dissolved, and similarly there are other respects in which everything participates in 
the whole.” 
This passage forms the opening of a chapter in which Aristotle discusses the place of 
the good in ‘the whole’; first he gives his own view and then goes on to discuss and 
criticize a couple of views of his predecessors. What exactly Aristotle’s opinion is, is 
difficult to say, as the language he uses is full of metaphor and analogy. What is clear 
is that Aristotle likens the unmoved mover to the general of an army: just as the 
order (and the goodness) of the members of an army depends upon the general, so 
the natural order (and the goodness) of the whole (that is, of the heavenly bodies) 
depends upon the unmoved mover. Next, this order of the whole is likened to a 
household, in order to stress what seems to be the necessity involved in the 
movement of the stars and planets on the one hand, and the passing or 
deconstruction of bodies in the sublunary world on the other hand.195 It is also clear 
that the ‘the one’ towards which everything else is ordered, is the unmoved mover – 
he is the cause (the final cause) of the order of the whole. This explains the regularity 
of the motions of the heavenly bodies and the existence of motion in the sublunary 
world, but – although this ordering must certainly be teleological in some sense – it 
is not clear in what teleological sense exactly. The language is not overtly teleological 
and the whole-part causal relationships involved are not particularly well-known 
from other passages in the Aristotelian corpus (usually whole-part relationships do 
not extend beyond organic substances).196 It is also unclear to what extent this 
passage in fact establishes a notion of a global nature (the interpretation of the 
expression ‘the nature of the whole’ in Met.XII.10, 1075a11 is highly problematic),197 
or a ‘nature of the entire ecosystem’,198 which is supposedly responsible for the 
subservience of lower living beings to higher ones. For, as opponents of this cosmic 
interpretation have argued,199 Aristotle’s natural philosophy cannot give any 
substantial content to such a notion; only substances have a nature, and the whole 
cosmos cannot be qualified as such a substance – at least not without doing away 
                                                 
195 Cf. Balme (1987b), 278. 
196 Johnson (2005), 277. 
197 On the problems related to the interpretation of this notion, see Bodnár (2005), 18-21; he ultimately 
proposes to read the expression in the traditional way, as periphrastic for ‘the whole’. 
198 As Sedley (1991), 192 and Cooper (1982), 213 interpret the expression. 
199 Especially by Bodnár (2005), 17-28, Broadie (1990), 394-396 and Wardy (1993), 23-26. 
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with the ontological independence of ‘ordinary natural substances.200 On the other 
hand, in virtue of the reference to the presence of the unmoved mover as a ordering 
and regulating principle towards which all natural substances are oriented, it might 
not even be necessary to introduce such a global nature. 
All in all, due to the many interpretational difficulties involved in this 
passage, it cannot offer strong support for (and definitely does not prove)201 a 
cosmic interpretation of Aristotelian teleology. As this cosmic teleology is absent in 
virtually all other Aristotelian writings, and the anthropocentric perspective only 
obtains on a secondary level of teleology, the scope of Aristotle’s primary teleology 




In our discussion of the theory of causal explanation of the Physica, it has become 
clear that Aristotle’s theory of the four causes is essentially a theory about four types 
of causal explanations, in which causes are picked out under their causally 
appropriate description. Since according to Aristotle natural beings possess in 
themselves all the four causal factors needed to bring about their own realization, 
explanations in the philosophy of nature will pick out natures as either one of these 
four causes.  
This holds also for teleological explanations: these are explanations that 
pick out an item as the end for the sake of which something else is present or came 
to be. Unlike his predecessors, Aristotle attributes a specific causal role to ends, 
mostly in conjunction with the three other types of causes he distinguishes. 
Although Aristotle never offers a conceptual analysis of the ‘that for the sake of 
which’ or ‘end’, it turns out that the final causes picked out in explanations vary in 
kinds. There are three types of final causes: actual natural substances or artifacts; 
functions; and objects of desire. The first type figures in explanations of the coming 
to be of processes of generation; the second type figures in explanations of the 
presence and the material constitution of natural or artificial tools; and the third type 
figures in explanations of deliberative action. This third type is not very important 
                                                 
200 Broadie (1990), 395-396. 
201 Here I strongly agree with the conclusions of Wardy (1993), 24. 
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for Aristotle’s theory of natural teleology, because the teleology involved in agency is 
intentional in nature. It is my contention that the theory of natural teleology is 
primarily developed for the explanation of processes of generation. The key to the 
understanding of Aristotle’s teleology lies in the reproduction of form that is 
constitutive of both natural and artificial generation: the form that is realized and 
that in its full actuality constitutes the final cause already exists in potentiality and is 
transmitted by something that possess this form in actuality. Final causality thus 
involves no backwards causation, since it is this form that determines the outcome 
of the process of generation. The crucial difference between art and nature is that 
while in nature the formal, final, and efficient causes coincide, they are separate in 
art.  
 
My analysis of the three models of teleology showed that there are in fact three 
different causal patterns involved. The patterns are most similar in the case of 
natural generation and artistic production: the efficient and final causes are in both 
cases complementary to each other, while intentional states or deliberation play no 
role in either of these cases. These similarities form the basis of Aristotle frequently 
used analogy between art and nature. However, while the efficient cause actualizes 
form from the inside out in natural things, in artistic production it imposes form 
externally in the object in which the end is being realized. This gives evidence for the 
ontological priority of the goal-directedness of nature over that in art: art imitates 
nature, and is goal-directed because nature is.  
The model of deliberate action entails a goal-directedness which is 
modestly appealing for didactic purposes, but is not much like the unintentional 
goal-directedness exhibited by nature. Certainly, in both cases there is a causal 
relationship of one thing being for the sake of the other, but the efficient and final 
cause in the case of deliberative action are not as tightly bound to each other as is 
the case in natural generation (or artistic production, for that matter) – in the realm 
of actions, there are many ways to achieve ends. This gap between the two causes 
makes as it were room for luck to operate as an ‘incidental cause’: Aristotle says that 
something comes to be by luck in the case of things that could have come to be for 
the sake of something, but did not in this case, and the actual cause is 
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indeterminable, or when the action that was undertaken for the sake of something 
resulted in something else. In this sense, luck is among the things that are for the 
sake of something, although it is not itself a teleological cause; the same holds for 
spontaneity, which operates in the realm of nature where there is no deliberation or 
choice.   
In sum, because the causal patterns in the three models are different 
(although less so for the models of natural generation and artistic production), the 
explanations and kinds of ends invoked in those explanations will be different, too. 
The account of the Physica thus offers a general framework for three types of 
teleological explanations, which will be specified in the other treatises on natural 
philosophy. 
 
Aristotle devotes a major part of Ph.II to the defense of his theory of natural 
teleology. The difficulties in Aristotle’s argumentation in this part have induced (at 
least) three important problems in recent scholarship pertaining to the relation 
between teleology and necessity, the proper explanation of winter-rain, and, 
intimately related with this latter issue, the scope of natural teleology.  
Although a lot more will have to be said on the issue of the relation of 
teleology and necessity in the next chapters, for now I have argued that for Aristotle 
his theory of teleology is not meant as an alternative to explanation by reference to 
material necessity, and hence the issue should not be interpreted as being about 
whether or not final causation can be reduced to material/efficient causation. 
Rather, it is proposed as a theory that accounts for natural beings and functional 
natural wholes by reference to intrinsic causes, rather than doing away with them as 
being merely coincidental conglomeration of elements as the materialists did.  
Phenomena such as winter-rain, the coming to be of teeth, and the coming 
to be of well-functioning whole organisms need to be understood, and hence to be 
explained, in terms of an overarching final cause. Just as the materialist, Aristotle 
refers to material necessity in the explanation of the coming to be of winter-rain and 
teeth; but their functions (and in particular the fact that they have these functions 
regularly) – whether they are anthropocentric or natural – can only be explained 
through the hypothesis of the existence of efficient causes that act goal directedly. In 
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the case of natural (and primary) functions, this is the formal nature or the soul of 
the living being which acts as the internal efficient cause directed at the realization of 
the form inherent in those natures. In the case of anthropocentric (and secondary) 
functions, this is a human being who imposes from the outside a specific use on 
something, while following the material potentials this thing has, through the 
application of art.  
The distinction between primary teleology (where final causes account both 
for the coming into being and the presence of things) and secondary teleology 
(where something that is already present is used for the sake of something good, 
even though it did not come to be for this purpose) allows us – and Aristotle – to 
attribute an anthropocentric purpose to winter-rain (i.e. the growth of crops), 
without having to qualify his whole theory of natural teleology as anthropocentric. 
The notion of secondary teleology also helps us to gain understanding of those 
passages that suggest the workings of a global nature. I argue that instead of positing 
the existence of a global nature in Aristotle, we should interpret these references to 
‘nature’ as picking out the individual natures of substantial beings, who impose their 
own goals on other beings – beings for whom the achievement of these goals is only 
secondary and in some sense accidental to the achievement of their own goals. There 
is no convincing evidence for the interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology as being 
essentially cosmic. For all we can tell, the paradigm examples of Aristotle’s teleology 
are restricted to individual natures; surely the relation between parts and wholes is 
teleological too, but when those wholes do not have a nature of their own (like rain 
and the cosmos), their features cannot be explained in terms of their functionally 
defined form or natural function. These restrictions will subsequently limit the 
explanatory force of teleological explanations; whatever phenomenon extends 
beyond the individual nature or substance, will not be fully explainable through 
reference to final causes. Aristotle’s teleology will prove to be most successful with 
regard to individual natures, whose features, principles, and causes Aristotle has 











CHAPTER TWO:  
ARISTOTLE’S BIO-FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE SOUL 





Aristotle introduces his investigation of the soul (τὴν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστορίαν) in De 
Anima (DA) as being among the primary kinds of knowledge, both on account of its 
accuracy, and of its dealing with better and more wonderful things (DA.I.1, 402a1-
5). This praise of the study of the soul should come as no surprise, for Aristotle’s 
prime interest in natural philosophy is in living nature.1 For living nature represents 
Aristotle’s concept of nature in the fullest sense, and it is the primary candidate for 
substantial being. In addition, the soul is “as it were,2 the principle of living beings” 
(DA.I.1, 402a8: ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων). Moreover, it is because the soul is the 
principle of living beings that the investigation of the soul makes a great 
contribution to “in particular [the truth] about nature” (DA.I.1, 402a6-7: μάλιστα δὲ 
πρὸς τὴν φύσιν; cf. DA.I.1, 403a27-28).  
This conception of the soul as “that what makes a natural body alive” is 
common throughout antiquity,3 but the connection Aristotle makes with his 
philosophy of nature shows that his ‘biological’ view of the soul is more specific, in 
the sense that it makes the soul primarily part of the domain of the student of living 
nature (as opposed to, for instance, of metaphysics).4 From a didactic point of view, 
it puts the investigation of the soul at the very beginning of the study of living 
                                                 
1 Lennox (2005), 2. 
2 Aristotle’s qualification here of the soul being ‘as it were’ a principle of living beings might indicate that 
it remains to be seen in what sense the soul is a principle, i.e. that there are some senses in which the soul 
is a principle of living beings (i.e. in the sense of formal, efficient, and final cause), but that in others it is 
not (i.e. not in the sense of material cause); cf. DA.II.4, 415b8-10; Ross (1961), 176. Lennox (2006, 308) 
thinks that the qualification foreshadows Aristotle’s thesis that the soul is also a principle of plant life, a 
view that is perhaps not immediately shared with his contemporary readership.  
3 Hankinson (1998), 12-13. 
4 I believe that for Aristotle the study of the soul is predominantly, but not exclusively part of biology, in 
the sense that De Anima studies the principle of life (i.e. soul) and living beings under the aspect of being 
ensouled. See Cohen (1992), 58; Sorabji (1993), 164-5; cf. Van der Eijk (1997), 231-232 on the ‘biological 
status’ of DA.  
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beings.5 Hence DA is “among the primary things” (DA.I.1, 402a4: ἂν ἐν πρώτοις 
τιθείημεν) also in the sense of a preliminary to the completion of Aristotle’s general 
undertaking of the investigation of nature.6  
The issues Aristotle sets out to address in DA are “its nature and 
substantial being, and further attributes” (DA.I.1, 402a8-9: τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν 
οὐσίαν, εἶθ’ ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν), where the attributes are specified as being the 
“proper affections of the soul” (DA.I.1, 402a10-11: ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς 
εἶναι δοκεῖ) and “the affections that belong to the living beings also on account of 
the soul” (DA.I.1, 402a11: τὰ δὲ δι’ἐκείνην καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχειν). This leads 
Aristotle initially – after having discussed various methodological problems that 
relate to the study of the soul – into an analysis of his predecessors’ views of the 
soul, but soon also into investigations of the ontological status of the soul and 
specifically that of the intellect (i.e. the thinking soul), and into analyses of the 
various affections, activities, functions and capacities of the soul, of their relations to 
the body (i.e. of the question whether all psychological states are also bodily states), 
and of the causal conditions of movement. This brief overview of topics makes clear 
that the scope of DA is far wider than encompassing the investigation of the soul as 
a non-aggregative unity7 of teleologically organized functions that make the natural 
body in which they are realized alive, but it this with this bio-functional analysis8 of 
the soul within DA that the present chapter will be mostly concerned.9  
This chapter analyzes the structure, function, and explanatory force of the 
teleological explanations Aristotle employs in his account of the nature of the soul as 
a principle of life in general (in section 2.1), and in particular of the capacities of the 
                                                 
5 According to the cross-references within the different treatises – which may or may not be authentic – 
Aristotle’s biological investigation starts with DA, and continues with the so called Parva Naturalia (in the 
known order: Sens., Mem., Somn., Insomn., DS, Long., Juv. and finally Resp. with which “the discussion of life 
and death and kindred topics is practically complete”; Resp.480b20-21), and completes with HA, PA, IA, 
MA, and finally GA. For the cross-references, see Bonitz (1955), 95b-105a (the most telling passages are 
Sens.436a1-6, Sens.436b10-11, Mem.449b30-31, Somn.458a25-32, DS.464b17-18, Long.464b32-465a2, 
Resp.480b20-30, IA.704a4-9, MA.698a1-11, and GA.715a1-18). 
6 For an outline of Aristotle’s philosophy of nature, see Mete.I.1, 338a20-339a10.  
7 It is not entirely clear how Aristotle conceives of the unity of the soul as a whole; for relevant passages, 
see DA.II.3, 414b28-32 and DA.III.9, 432a22-b6. 
8 Rorty (1992, 7) calls this Aristotle’s ‘philosophical bio-psychology’. 
9 The problems relating to Aristotle’s notion of nous and to the workings of the capacity of thinking fall 
outside the scope of this chapter, as for Aristotle these aspects of the soul seem not themselves to involve 
capacities realized in bodily parts or physiological processes giving rise to functions (although they cannot 
operate without at least some parts being present or without some physiological processes taking place). 
Because I have limited my discussion to Aristotle’s biological investigation of soul (cf. PA.I.1, 641a33-
641b9 and Met.VI.1, 1026a4-6), this ‘metaphysical’ aspect of the soul will not be further discussed.   
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soul, which are the life-functions of the natural body in which they are realized (in 
section 2.2).  
Concerning Aristotle’s account of the nature of the soul, I will first show 
(in section 2.1.1) how Aristotle from the outset connects soul to teleological notions 
such as function and final cause, and analyzes the relation between soul and body in 
terms of conditional necessity. Aristotle’s further attempts to define the soul and to 
analyze its interaction with the natural body through the analogy between nature and 
art are set out to strengthen these preconceptions in a theoretical way. Next (in 
2.1.2), I will pick up on an issue raised by contemporary interpreters of Aristotle’s 
‘philosophy of mind’, concerning the relation between body and soul. This is the 
issue of whether or not Aristotle can be read as a modern functionalist, who 
endorses the view that the matter in which the soul-functions are being realized is 
compositionally plastic (i.e. is not essentially connected to the function for the sake 
of which it is present). Although this discussion may be somewhat outdated,10 I still 
think it is worth discussing (and refuting it!), because it will help to clarify some 
problematic aspects in Aristotle’s account of the relation between soul and body, 
and also highlights some important features of Aristotle’s explanatory project 
concerning living nature.  
Concerning the capacities of the soul, I will first (in 2.2.1) discuss how 
Aristotle connects different combinations of the capacities of the soul with different 
kinds of living beings. Next, I will determine the extent to which the relations of 
interdependency that exist between these capacities establish a teleological hierarchy. 
In addition, I will analyze the teleological explanations Aristotle offers to explain 
why the various kinds of living beings possess the kind of capacities or life-functions 
they possess, discussing both examples of necessary functions and of non-necessary 
functions. This will show that Aristotle believes that the fact that living beings have 
the life-functions they have is itself firmly grounded in the teleology of nature. 
Special attention will be devoted to Aristotle’s teleological model of animal 
                                                 
10 Although the functionalist interpretation has somewhat lost popularity in recent years, the debate over 
related issues such as multiply realizability and supervernience theory has not been settled yet; see Caston 
(2006), 320-322 (cf. also 320n.13 for an overview of the literature published in the last fifteen years on 
these issues). 
Chapter 2. Aristotle’s bio-functional account of the soul 
 88
 
locomotion and to the relation between teleology and the notions of self-motion and 
intentionality (in 2.2.2).  
The main purpose of the chapter will be to show, that in establishing such 
a bio-functional conception of the soul, Aristotle is laying the foundations for his 
biology.11 Note that I am not claiming that this is the main purpose of DA as a 
whole, which is more broadly concerned with determining to what extent the 
functions of the soul can be realized without a material substrate and with what 
ensouled beings have in common. My claim is rather that the results of the 
investigation of the soul and the accounts it gives of the various life-functions that 
for the most part need to be realized in natural bodies present the starting points for 
explanations in the biological works. For, if the soul is the first actuality and final 
cause of a natural body that potentially has life, then the various parts and features 
living beings have will be explainable in terms of the kind of soul (or capacities for 
the performance of life-functions) they possess.12 Soul is not only the principle of 
every natural body having life in an ontological sense, it is also the explanatory 
principle of all the features and parts living bodies have in an epistemological sense. 
 
2.1 Teleology in the analysis of the nature of the soul 
 
2.1.1 Soul, functions, and ends 
One of the main aims of De Anima is to give a characterization of the nature of the 
soul as something that all living beings possess. As I will show below, Aristotle’s 
                                                 
11 The biological dimension is visible most notably in the explanations of why certain animals do or do 
not possess certain capacities, which are similar to explanations found in the biological works in pointing 
out correlations between parts, functions, and lifestyle of animals (for instance the explanation of why fish 
do not have voice in DA.II.8, 421a3-6: “It is clear, too, why fish have no voice; for they have no throat. 
They do not have this part because they do not take in air or breathe in.”) or in the use of teleological 
principles in DA.III.9-13 (for instance in the explanation of  why the perceptive capacity cannot be 
responsible for the locomotive capacity in DA.III.9, 432b22-26: “If nature does nothing in vain and never 
leaves out any of the necessary [parts], except in those beings that are maimed and incomplete, while such 
living beings are complete and not maimed (…) – then they too would have instruments for 
locomotion.”). The connection with biology is also very clear in DA.III.12-13, where Aristotle explains 
the presence of the of the various soul-functions in those living beings that have it in terms of their 
necessity for or contribution to their preservation of life and reproduction; the language here is similar to 
that in, for instance, PA (Ross (1961), 573).  
12 Cf. Lloyd (1992), 149: “Do his particular psychological theories influence his zoological explanations, 
and if so how? Part of the answer to the first question is straightforward enough. Obviously, whenever he 
is dealing with an instrumental part that is directly concerned with one of the major faculties of the soul 
identified in De Anima, Aristotle cannot fail to bear in mind precisely that that is the function that the part 
serves, and he will indeed see the activities in question as the final causes of the parts.” 
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attempts to achieve this aim build – implicitly or explicitly – upon teleological 
preconceptions that permeate all of Aristotle’s natural investigations.13  
These preconceptions are, first, that efficient, formal, and final causes often 
‘run together’ (cf. Ph.II.7, 198a24-7), which is reflected in DA in the conception of 
the soul as not only as a source of movement and as a principle of organization of 
living beings, but also teleologically as some kind of unity of life-functions in virtue 
of which a natural body is to be called alive. Secondly, the idea that naturally 
organized wholes come to be through material-efficient processes that take place for 
the sake of realizing that whole and only on the condition that that whole is to be 
realized is reflected in DA in the conception of the relation between soul and living 
body as one that is established through conditional necessity. Finally, since it is the 
task of natural philosopher to study natural composites, the soul conceived as a form 
specifying the defining capacities for the performance of various life-functions that 
are realized in living bodies also belongs to the scientific domain of the natural 
philosopher.  
In this section, I will analyze the extent to which these preconceptions play 
a role in Aristotle’s preliminary account of the soul in DA.I.1, and are subsequently 
reflected and substantiated in his attempts to provide a ‘rough’ definition of soul in 
DA.II.1 and his characterization of the soul as the final cause of the living body in 
DA.II.4.  
 
2.1.1.a Teleological notions in the preliminary characterizations of the soul in DA.I.1 
Modern interpreters of Aristotle’s DA often disregard the first book of the treatise 
on the assumption that it is mainly a review of past theories on the soul and that it 
does not contain much original thought of Aristotle on the subject.14 Although this 
is largely true, I think that a close reading of at least the first chapter of book I, 
which is more methodological than historical in nature compared to the other 
chapters of the first book, might provide us with some preliminary indications on 
                                                 
13 Pace Code & Moravscik (1992), 134-5, who deny that teleological notions play any important 
(explanatory) role in Aristotle’s account of what it is to be alive in order to argue against a functionalist 
interpretation.   
14 Cf. Witt (1992), 169: “The fact that DA is frequently read and taught omitting book I suggests a 
widespread acceptance of the idea that it has nothing important to tell us about Aristotle’s views on the 
soul.” 
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Aristotle’s conception of the soul and how this conception is related to teleological 
notions. Moreover, many remarks are of programmatic interest,15 as they either open 
up the traditional conception of soul for Aristotle’s own view, or point forward to 
fuller discussions on the issue later on in DA. This holds, too, for Aristotle’s 
treatment of the three main preconceptions16 concerning the soul current among his 
predecessors in DA.I.2-5. These are the preconception of the soul being the source 
of movement, that of its being the cause of perception or cognition, and that of its 
supposed incorporeality and immortality. The dialectic discussion of these 
preconceptions “shape and direct the inquiry that follows.”17   
One of the most important remarks concerning the nature of the soul in 
the opening chapter of DA is that it is, “as it were, a principle of living beings” 
(DA.I.1, 402a8: ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων). As I said in the introduction, this 
makes Aristotle’s conception of the soul predominantly a biological one: the soul is 
that in virtue of which a natural body is alive. This preliminary definition of the soul, 
which is taken as a starting point without any further clarification (presumably 
because it was uncontroversial among Aristotle’s readership), has important 
implications for the way in which Aristotle further develops his view of the soul. In 
some sense, this biological conception of the soul already predetermines the 
outcomes of the methodological questions that follow about what kind of thing the 
soul is (DA.I.1, 402a24-402b8).18 For instance, it leads Aristotle to the conclusion 
that the notion of soul applies to living beings other than human beings, too. By 
making the soul a principle of all life, Aristotle makes the being-alive of all the 
different kinds of life-forms (e.g. those of plants and of animals) explainable by 
reference to the soul, and the differences in their life styles (e.g. perceiving and 
locomoting) explainable by reference to differences in the soul (DA.II.2, 413b32-
414a1):  
ἔτι δ’ ἐνίοις μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἅπανθ’ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, τισὶ δὲ τινὰ τούτων, ἑτέροις δὲ ἓν 
μόνον - τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ διαφορὰν τῶν ζῴων· 
                                                 
15 Menn (2002), 102-103. Cf. Rorty (1992, 7-8), who reads the chapter as setting the agenda of DA. 
16 DA.I.2, 405b12-31. 
17 See Witt (1992), 169. 
18 The questions are: (i.) the genus of soul (is the soul a tode ti and ousia or one of the categories); (ii.) the 
ontological status of the soul (is it in potentiality or is it rather a kind of actuality); (iii.) the structure of the 
soul (does the soul have parts or not; is every soul homoeidês or not; if it is homeidês, is the difference one of 
genus or species); (iv.) the definition of the soul (is there one definition only, or is there a definition for 
the soul of each separate kind of ensouled being). 
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“Moreover, some animals have all of these [functions of the soul], others have only 
some of them, and still others have only one – this causes a differentiation between 
living beings.”  
Different kinds of living are for Aristotle thus coextensive with different kinds of 
soul.19 For this reason, Aristotle includes the souls of all living beings, of human 
beings, animals, and even plants, into the present inquiry.  
In addition, this biological conception of the soul entails a biological 
orientation of the investigation of the whole of DA.20 Because life is analyzed in 
terms of the performance of the various vital and essential life-functions and 
affections of the ensouled being in question, much of the discussion on the soul will 
be devoted to the various functions and affections of the different species of living 
beings.21 In some sense, the soul just is the capacities for these functions and 
affections (with the understanding that these functions and affections ultimately 
belong to the composite of soul and body). This bio-functional22 conception of the 
soul is already visible in the methodological part of the first chapter of DA, where 
Aristotle discusses the question in which order the parts of the soul need to be 
studied (DA.I.1, 402b9-14).23 This question already presupposes a functional 
partitioning of the soul, because Aristotle exemplifies the different parts as different 
faculties or capacities for the performance of different functions of the soul: that 
which thinks (τὸν νοῦν) performs the function of thinking (τὸ νοεῖν), that which 
perceives (τὸ αἰσθητικόν) performs the function of perceiving (τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι), etc. 
The soul is presented as a unity of capacities for the performance of functions, in 
virtue of the possession of which a natural body can be said to be alive. This 
conception is teleological, for the soul is defined in terms of the different ‘works’ (τὰ 
ἔργα) or life-functions the natural body to which it belongs will be able to perform. 
It does so in a strong sense: these erga are not merely the activities the possession of 
                                                 
19 Cf. Everson (1997), 3-4; Sorabji (1993), 163-165. 
20 Lloyd (1992), 148. 
21 Aristotle names different life-functions in different places of DA, but usually he mentions at least a few 
of the following: self-nutrition, growth and decay, reproduction, appetite (or desire), sensation or 
perception, touch, self-motion, and thinking. Aristotle gives a wide range of examples of affections, such 
as being angry, being courageous, loving and hating, and other emotions, but also pleasure and pain, and 
other forms of the soul being affected. In the first book of DA it seems that Aristotle uses the term pathê 
rather loosely to refer to any of the soul’s forms of being affected, including functions (see e.g. DA.I.5, 
409b14-19). Cf. Hamlyn (2001), 79. 
22 Cf. Charlton (1993), 98-99. 
23 The question is whether we should study the parts (ta moria) first, or the soul as a whole; the parts first, 
or their functions (ta erga); the functions first, or the objects (ta antikeimena) of the functions.   
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soul regularly and in a non-accidental way gives rise to; the capacities for the 
performance of erga are what the soul essentially is.24 In short, the soul simply is the 
whole of capacities for the performance of such life-functions. 
 
The most important references to teleology in Aristotle’s preliminary sketch of the 
soul can be found in Aristotle’s discussion of a final problem concerning the 
affections of the soul (DA.I.1, 403a3-b19): are they all common also to that which 
has it, or is there also something particular to the soul itself? In resolving this 
problem concerning the relation between soul and living body, I take Aristotle to be 
emphasizing two important points deriving to some extent from his teleological 
conception of nature.  
First, Aristotle argues that the affections and functions of the soul involve 
the body, because both soul and body are affected. Although conceding that the 
question is hard to settle, and that perhaps the function of thinking could be 
particular to the soul itself (depending on the extent to which thinking needs to be 
seen as a form of imagination that involves the body) and therefore separable from 
the body, Aristotle thinks that there is clear empirical evidence for the conclusion 
that all the affections and most of the functions of the soul are always ‘with body’, 
and are therefore inseparable from the body (DA.I.1, 403a3-26; DA.I.1, 403a19: 
μηνύει; DA.I.1, 403a22-23: ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο φανερόν). From this conclusion 
Aristotle then derives a preliminary characterization of the affections of the soul: 
they are ‘enmattered structures’25 (DA.I.1, 403a25): δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί 
εἰσιν. This ‘definition’ could be taken as reflecting Aristotle’s theory of 
hylomorphism,26 according to which he analyzes artificial and natural compounds in 
terms of the matter and form from which they are constituted.27 However, it seems 
to me that the point Aristotle is making here is not just that the affections are forms 
                                                 
24 Cf. Mete.IV.12, 390a10-12: “everything is defined in respect of its function; for when something is 
capable to perform its function, it is truly that thing; an eye, for example, when it is able to see; but the 
one that is not capable [to perform its function] is homonymously [that thing]”. 
25 Caston (2006), 318. 
26 The core texts in which scholars see evidence for Aristotle’s supposed hylomorphic theory of the soul 
are DA.II.1-4 and DA.II.12; the idea is that Aristotle developed this hylomorphic theory in order to 
refute not only Plato’s dualistic account of the soul, but also his own earlier instrumentalist views 
(described in Parva Naturalia, De Somno, and Physics VIII), in which the natural body is characterized as the 
instrument of the soul. The two views are not mutually exclusive, and I indeed believe that both theories 
are at play in DA. On these issues, see Menn (1992), esp. 89-90.  
27 So Shields (1988) and (1993), passim.  
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that are realized in matter (note that Aristotle writes ‘logos’ here, not ‘eidos’),28 but that 
the affections of the soul are also, at the same time, affections of the body, and that 
they are so in a strong sense: affections take place in matter and therefore require the 
presence of a living body. Underlying this expression is, I believe, Aristotle’s notion 
of conditional necessity,29 which is the notion of particular materials having to be 
present first if a particular end is to be realized.30 
That for Aristotle the affections of the soul are not just realized in matter, 
but that matter is also constitutive and required for the being of the affections, 
becomes clear from the definition of anger that he offers immediately after giving 
this very general characterization of affections (DA.I.1, 403a26-27):  
τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα 
τοῦδε. 
“For example, being angry is a certain kind of change of a particular kind of body or 
part or faculty due to such a cause for the sake of that.”  
The idea is that because (DA.I.1, 403a26: ὥστε) affections are logoi enhuloi, their 
definition, such as that of anger, must include references to all four causes: anger is a 
certain kind of change, belonging to a particular kind of material substrate, due to 
some efficient cause, taking place for the sake of some final cause. Affections take 
place for the sake of something, and if this end is to be achieved, they have to take 
place in the appropriate kind of matter. Affections are therefore not just 
psychological states that have bodily concomitants, but the two states are 
functionally connected through conditional necessity: anger can only be realized in 
the right kind of material.  
 
                                                 
28 Although Ross (1961), 7 translates ‘logoi’ with “forms or notions”; Hamlyn (2001, 79) takes ‘logos’ to 
suggest the reading of ‘form’ (or eidos). The question is, of course, whether Aristotle is claiming that that 
the definitions of the affections need to include matter or whether these affections themselves need to be 
enmattered; I opt for the latter interpretation. On this issue, see Everson (1997), 234-236. 
29 It has been acknowledged that there is almost no technical vocabulary to be found in DA (see e.g. 
Hamlyn (2001), xvi), but I believe that there are clear resemblances between the language used in this 
treatise and the semi-technical language Aristotle uses elsewhere to explain the notion of conditional 
necessity. 
30 E.g. Ph.II.9, 200a10-15: “Thus on account of what is a saw like this? That this may be, and for this. It is 
impossible, however, that this thing which it is for should come to be, unless it is made of iron. It is 
necessary, then, that it should be made of iron, if there is to be a saw, and its work to be done. The 
necessary, then, is necessary on some condition, and not as an end: the necessary is in the matter, the ‘that 
for the sake of which’ in the account.”; see also PA.I.1, 639b20-30; PA.I.1, 640a1-9; PA.I.1, 640a33-b3; 
PA.I.1, 642a1-13; PA.I.1, 642a32-642b2. 
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The second point that Aristotle stresses in this chapter is that the study of the soul 
belongs to the tasks of the natural philosopher. Aristotle remarks that the fact that 
the affections of the soul involve body, immediately (ἤδη) makes the study of the 
soul (which is “either each soul or this kind of soul” – the latter being the soul that 
involves body), belong to the field of the natural philosopher (DA.I.1, 403a27-28: 
διὰ ταῦτα ἤδη φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης). That is, 
because the affections of the soul are affections of the body as well, they belong to 
the domain of the natural philosopher. Aristotle then sets out to describe the task of 
the natural philosopher (DA.I.1, 403a27-403b16). First Aristotle clarifies in what 
respect the definition of the natural philosopher31 will differ from that of the 
dialectician through the use of an example (DA.I.1, 403a29-b2):  
διαφερόντως δ’ ἂν ὁρίσαιντο ὁ φυσικὸς [τε] καὶ ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον 
ὀργὴ τί ἐστιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ 
καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ. τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ 
τὸν λόγον. 
“The natural philosopher and the dialectician would define each of these differently, 
for instance: what is anger? The one [i.e. the dialectician] will say that it is a ‘craving 
for revenge’ or something of that sort, while the other [i.e. the natural philosopher] 
will say it is ‘a boiling of blood and heat around the heart’. Of those, the one gives 
an account of the matter, the other of the form and the structure.” 
The account of the dialectician thus gives merely a formal account of what anger is, 
while the account of the natural philosopher states from what kind of matter the 
emotion is constituted (namely blood that is boiling) and the efficient cause of the 
emotion (namely heat). Aristotle is willing to concede that ‘a craving for revenge’ is 
the logos of the thing called anger, but he adds the following consideration (DA.I.1, 
403b3):  
ἀνάγκη δ’ εἶναι τοῦτον ἐν ὕλῃ τοιᾳδί, εἰ ἔσται· 
“It is necessary for that [i.e. anger] to be in a particular kind of material, if it is to 
be.”  
Apparently, for the account of what anger is to be complete, one should add the 
kind of material in which anger is realized as well. The being-in-a-particular-kind-of-
                                                 
31 Presumably, in this line ‘natural philosopher’ is understood in a somewhat narrower sense, as for 
Aristotle, ultimately, the natural philosopher will have to provide accounts in terms of all four causes for 
natural phenomena; cf. Ross (1961), 201. 
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matter is again, and this time more explicitly, characterized as a necessary condition 
for the existence of the affections of the soul: the affections cannot exist without a 
body, nor can they exist with a body with the wrong material constitution. The 
natural philosopher thus deals with properties of a body that are strictly speaking not 
separable from the matter,32 because it makes no sense according to Aristotle to 
speak about the affections and functions of the soul in a purely formal way, nor to 
speak in a purely material way about bodily structures in isolation of the functions 
for the performance of which they have come to be and are present.  
Note that the importance of this functional connection between the soul 
and the living body is reinforced in the concluding statement of chapter I.3 (DA.I.3, 
407b23-26):  
δοκεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἴδιον ἔχειν εἶδος καὶ μορφήν, παραπλήσιον δὲ λέγουσιν ὥσπερ εἴ 
τις φαίη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλοὺς ἐνδύεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς 
ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι. 
“For while each body seems to have its own proper shape and form, they talk as if 
one were to say that carpentry is to be clothed in flutes; but the art has to use tools and 
the soul has to use the body.”   
Aristotle here criticizes those predecessors who hold that the soul is set inside the 
body for not having further specified (prosdiorizousi) the body which receives the soul 
(DA.I.3, 407b20-23):  
οἱ δὲ μόνον ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν ποῖόν τι ἡ ψυχή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δεξομένου σώματος οὐθὲν 
ἔτι προσδιορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐνδεχόμενον κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς μύθους τὴν 
τυχοῦσαν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἐνδύεσθαι σῶμα. 
“But people put their effort into saying what sort of thing the soul is, while they 
determine nothing further about the body that receives it, just as though, in the 
manner of the Pythagorean myths, any random soul were to be clothed in any 
random body.”  
The meaning of the concluding statement is that just as each art needs its own proper 
and befitting instruments, so the soul needs its own proper and befitting body – proper 
and befitting, that is, for the functions it is to perform.33  
                                                 
32 Hamlyn (2001), 80; Ross (1961), 200. 
33 This is also how Hett (1936), 43 reads these lines. Aristotle makes a similar point in DA.II.2, 414a22-25: 
“For it [i.e. the soul] is not a body, but something which belongs to a body, and for this reason exists in a 
body, and in a body of such and such a kind. Not as our predecessors supposed, when they fitted it to a 
body without any further determination (prosdiorizontes) of what body and of what kind, although it is clear 
Chapter 2. Aristotle’s bio-functional account of the soul 
 96
 
To return to DA.I.1, there Aristotle’s illustration of the necessity of a thing’s being 
in appropriate matter if it is to be at all adds to this picture (DA.I.1, 403b3-7):  
ὥσπερ οἰκίας ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ὅτι σκέπασμα κωλυτικὸν φθορᾶς ὑπ’ ἀνέμων καὶ 
ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων, ὁ δὲ φήσει λίθους καὶ πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα, ἕτερος δ’ ἐν τούτοις τὸ 
εἶδος <οὗ> ἕνεκα τωνδί.  
“such is the account of a house: that it is a shelter that protects against destruction 
by wind, rain and heat; but another will say that it is stones, bricks, and timber; and 
another again will say that it is the form in those things [i.e. stones, bricks, and 
timber] for the sake of these other things [i.e. shelter].”  
Elsewhere Aristotle uses the relation between the materials of the house and the 
function the house serves as the stock example to illustrate his notion of conditional 
necessity.34 Here it is used to illustrate that the explanation of things such as the 
presence of a house includes both references to constitutive materials and to 
functions, and preferably in combination with each other. It is through this example 
that Aristotle brings home his second point. The natural philosopher, Aristotle 
makes clear, is the one who is concerned not just with the matter (this would be a 
craftsman according to Aristotle; cf. Ph.II.2, 194b1-5 where a technê poiêtikê is being 
distinguished from a technê chrômenê in that the first is concerned with matter, while 
latter deals with form), or just with forms in abstraction (this would be the 
mathematician), or with separable forms (this would be the first philosopher), but 
with the product of both matter and form, where form is functionally defined (e.g. the 
form of anger is a ‘craving for revenge’) and not just shape. The natural 
philosopher’s concern is with all the functions and affections of a particular kind of 
body realized in a particular kind of matter. Aristotle thus stresses that it is crucial 
for a natural philosopher to have a complete causal understanding of a 
phenomenon. For this reason the affections and functions of the soul need to be 
accounted for by the natural philosopher in terms of the four causes.  
At the end of the chapter, Aristotle returns to his original question 
concerning the separability of the affections of the soul from the body, and 
concludes (DA.I.1, 403b16-19):  
                                                                                                               
that one chance thing does not receive another.” In DA.II.2, 414a27 Aristotle refers to the notion of the 
proper matter (hê oikeia hulê) for the actualization of a potentiality. 
34 E.g. PA.I.1, 639b22-31 and Ph.II.9, 200a5-15. 
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ἐλέγομεν δὴ ὅτι τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζῴων, ᾗ γε 
τοιαῦθ’ ὑπάρχει <οἷα> θυμὸς καὶ φόβος, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον. 
“We said that the affections of the soul are inseparable from the natural matter of 
the living beings in which they occur, such as anger and fear, and they are not like 
the line or plane.”  
That is, although the form and matter of the affections of the soul are separable in a 
conceptual way, they are not separable ontologically and in definition because the 
‘natural matter’ of the living being is part of what the being essentially is. Anger and 
fear differ in this respect from mathematical figures, which although they always 
occur in matter, are not essentially connected to the matter in which they are realized 
(i.e. a line will still be a line, whether it is drawn in sand or on a piece of paper; anger, 
on the other hand, will only be anger if realized in boiling blood – otherwise it will 
not be anger). Because of this, form and matter are also not separable in the 
explanation of the affections of the soul: the connection between the two in nature 
is one of (conditional) necessity, where the matter is necessary in order to facilitate 
the realization of functions. What is more, the specific matter in which the form is 
realized plays an important role in the explanation of the variations and distributions 
of functions among different types of living beings.35 The understanding of a 
functioning natural whole thus implies knowledge of the specific material in which 
these soul-functions are realized.  
In sum, it is thus my contention that in this chapter it is not Aristotle’s 
main purpose to merely stress the being in matter of the formal structure of some 
living being, but rather to show the intrinsic functional connection between the 
affections and functions of soul and the living body in which they are realized, thus 
building upon his teleological notion of conditional necessity. Aristotle’s theoretical 
discussions of the soul in the remainder of DA should be read as attempts to further 
solidify and flesh out this teleological picture of the soul.36  
                                                 
35 Van der Eijk (1997), 233; see also chapter 3.2. 
36 If Aristotle analyzes the relation between the soul and the living body in terms of conditional necessity, 
then it poses serious restrictions on the possibility of a functionalist interpretation of Aristotle’s 
conception of the soul. I will discuss this issue of a functionalist interpretation of Aristotle more fully in 
the section dealing with Aristotelian teleology and modern functionalism (see below in 2.1.2), but for now 
it suffices to say that according to a functionalist reading of Aristotle’s conception of the soul, Aristotle 
leaves open the possibility that the functions of the soul can be realized in different kinds of material. On 
this interpretation, the affections and functions of the soul are for Aristotle compositionally plastic. It 
seems to me, however, that the conditionally necessary relation between form and function on the one 
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2.1.1.b Function in Aristotle’s account of the soul of a natural body in DA.II.1 
At the beginning of book II, Aristotle ends his dialectical discussion of the views of 
his predecessors and starts his own investigation (DA.II.1, 412a1-6). Aristotle 
describes his project as follows (DA.II.1, 412a3-6): 
πάλιν δ’ ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπανίωμεν, πειρώμενοι διορίσαι τί ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἂν εἴη 
κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς.  
“But let us go back and, as though from the beginning, try to distinguish what the 
soul is and what would be its most comprehensive definition.” 
In this subsection, I will concentrate on Aristotle’s analysis of the soul as a final 
cause of a natural body, first in his attempt to find the most comprehensive 
definition of the soul, and second in the analogies he draws to exemplify his 
definition of the soul; my argument will closely follow the order of Aristotle’s 
exposition in DA II.1. As indicated above, I believe that both these attempts should 
be interpreted in the light of Aristotle’s larger project to consolidate his bio-
functional conception of the soul.  
 
Aristotle’s definition of the soul progresses in different stages. Aristotle offers two 
intermediate definitions before stating – cautiously – his final (but still rudimentary) 
definition stating that the soul is the first actuality of a natural body that is organikon37 
(DA.II.1, 412b4-6). After having given this general definition of what soul is, 
Aristotle adds some clarifying remarks, which I have included in my discussion as 
well. As will become clear, the notion of function is the primary and most basic 
explanatory concept in Aristotle defining account of the soul.      
Aristotle works towards his first definition of soul mainly through an 
analysis of the genus of substantial being (DA.II.1, 412a6-21). First Aristotle 
distinguishes between three different kinds of substantial being: there is the category 
of matter that is potentiality; the category of shape and form that is actuality (in two 
ways); and, thirdly, the compound of the two (τὸ ἐκ τούτων). Next, Aristotle moves 
to a discussion of substantial being itself: people usually consider bodies to be 
among the substantial beings, and in particular natural bodies. Those natural bodies 
                                                                                                               
hand, and matter on the other, which suggests that forms need to be (and in fact are) enmattered in 
specific kinds of matter, renders this interpretation unlikely from the outset. 
37 The interpretation of this term is controversial; I will return to this issue in my discussion of Aristotle’s 
final definition. 
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that have life, i.e. that possess the capacities of self-nourishment, growth, and decay, 
are substantial beings of the compound type (DA.II.1, 412a11-16). Finally, by 
method of elimination, Aristotle is ‘forced’ to the following conclusion (DA.II.1, 
412a19-21): 
ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν 
ἔχοντος.  
“Hence the soul must be a substantial being in the sense of the form of a natural 
body which potentially has life.”  
At this stage, the soul is presented as that which brings life to a natural body: it 
provides a natural body with the internal efficient cause of the basic vital functions 
of self-nourishing, growing, and decaying. So while soul is understood in terms of 
life, life itself is understood in terms of the ability to perform certain functions. 
Ultimately, the soul is identified with the functions the natural body has in virtue of 
which we call a natural body alive; the soul is thus a special kind of combination of 
life-functions. 
The second definition is arrived at through two specifications of elements 
within the first definition (DA.II.1, 412a22-28). First, it is explained that substantial 
being in the first definition offered is actuality (entelecheia), which means that the soul 
must be the actuality of the natural body that has life potentially. Next, Aristotle 
points out that the soul is actuality in the sense of the actuality that corresponds to 
the possession of knowledge, which is a hexis or disposition (i.e. first actuality). The 
soul is not an actuality in the sense of the actuality that corresponds to the exercise 
of knowledge, which is an energeia or activity (i.e. second actuality). The distinction is 
one between possessing certain capacities, and exercising them: Aristotle’s claim is 
that a natural body does not need to exercise its capacities at all times in order to be 
called alive – it just needs to have them. Moreover, the possession of capacities is 
chronologically prior to the exercise of those capacities, and in that sense, too, soul 
is like a hexis or disposition. Aristotle’s comparison, however, between the hexis and 
the condition of sleep points out that the only time a natural body approximates the 
state of having life purely potentially or in first actuality is during sleep when most 
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functions are not being exercised; life in the fullest sense consists in the performance 
of the various life-functions.38 
Specified in this way, the second definition of the soul becomes the 
following (DA.II.1, 412a27-28):  
διὸ ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. 
“That is why the soul is the first actuality of a natural body which has life 
potentially.”  
The term actuality or entelecheia, coined by Aristotle,39 which is introduced into the 
definition of the soul here, is a teleological notion designating the completed state 
resulting from an internal movement towards this state.40 For a natural body to have 
soul, or, in other words, for a natural body to possess life in a completed way, it 
needs to possess all the relevant life-functions by way of a disposition, such that they 
can be exercised or activated at any given time. At the same time, by characterizing 
the soul as the first actuality of a natural body, Aristotle characterizes the soul as the 
end of this body. So, although it is not so much the concept of function that is at 
stake here (although entelecheia seems to be associated with energeia and therefore with 
functioning),41 in the background teleology still plays a role.  
Finally, Aristotle clarifies what he means by a natural body that has life 
potentially’ (DA.II.1, 412a28-b1):  
τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανικόν. 
“This will be any [body] in so far as it is instrumental.”  
As indicated above, this specification of the natural body as being organikon to the 
soul is controversial. The traditional reading of organikon of “having organs”42 or 
“being composed of organs” is unsatisfactory, as several scholars43 have pointed out 
that elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus organikon (a term coined by Aristotle)44 
always means ‘instrumental’, and that it is philologically unacceptable to propose a 
different reading exclusively for this definition of the soul. Reading organikon as 
instrumental, it means that Aristotle qualifies the natural body that has life 
                                                 
38 On these issues, see Freeland (1987), 404-406. 
39 Ritter (1932; 1934). 
40 Johnson (2005), 88-90.  
41 Johnson (2005), 90. 
42 For the traditional interpretation, see Ross (1961), 51 and 313; Hamlyn (2001), 85. 
43 Most notably by Bos (2001), 187; 190-192; (2003), passim; see also Everson (1997), 64-65; Kosman 
(1987), 376-7; 381-382; and Menn (2002), 108-117. 
44 Byl (1971), 132.  
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potentially as the instrument of the soul,45 presumably in the sense that the whole 
body is instrumental for life.46 It is not until in the biological context, that Aristotle 
fleshes out the instrumentality of the natural body for the soul into the 
instrumentality of the various parts of living beings for the performance of the 
various functions of the soul. Hence, part of the explanatory program of the 
biological treatises will be to demonstrate teleologically how the parts living beings 
have are instrumental for its user.47 In Aristotle’s attempt here in DA to give a 
comprehensive definition of the soul, the focus is on the instrumental – that is, 
teleological – relation between natural bodies that potentially have life and the souls, 
constituting their defining capacity.48   
In the next few lines, Aristotle exemplifies both how broad his conception 
of life is and what being ‘instrumental’ in practice boils down to (DA.II.1, 412b1-4):  
ὄργανα δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν μέρη, ἀλλὰ παντελῶς ἁπλᾶ, οἷον τὸ φύλλον περικαρπίου 
σκέπασμα, τὸ δὲ περικάρπιον καρποῦ· αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον· ἄμφω γὰρ 
ἕλκει τὴν τροφήν. 
“Instrumental are also the parts of plants, even if they are extremely simple, such as 
for example the leaf is a cover of the pod, and the pod of the fruit. And the roots 
are analogous to the mouth, for both take in nourishment.” 
Just as the natural body is instrumental to the soul, so too are the parts of the natural 
body instrumental to the functions of the soul: the parts are instrumental in virtue of 
the functions they perform. Through these clarifications Aristotle then arrives at the 
most common definition of soul he can possibly (or is willing to) give (DA.II.1, 
412b4-6): 
εἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ 
ὀργανικοῦ.  
                                                 
45 Cf. PA.I.1, 642a11-13: “So too, since the body is an instrument (ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον) – for each of the 
parts is for the sake of something, and likewise also the whole – it is therefore a necessity that it be of 
such a character and constituted from such things, if that is to be.” On this passage, see Lennox (2001b), 
149-150. See also DA.I.3, 407b25-26, quoted above in 2.1.1.a. 
46 This is how Kosman (1987; 376) and Lennox (2001b; 142) interpret it. However, this is not the only 
possible interpretation: Bos (2001, 188-190), argues that ‘the natural body that potentially has life’ and that 
is ‘instrumental to the soul’ must be one of the elemental bodies, namely pneuma (for animals and human 
beings; the instrumental body for plants is vital heat); Everson (1997; 63-69) argues that the natural body 
to which Aristotle refers is not the whole animal body, but rather a part of it, so that the animal would not 
have one soul, but as many souls as it has instrumental parts; this latter view is strongly criticized by 
Barnes (1999), 121.   
47 Cf. Menn (2002), 113. 
48 Cf. Everson (1997), 64. 
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“If it is necessary to state something common (cf. DA.II.1, 412b10: katholou) with 
regard to every soul, it will be the first actuality of a natural body that is 
instrumental.”  
Note, however, that according to Aristotle this definition, too, is nothing more than 
a “rough definition and a sketch” (DA.II.1, 413a9-10: τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ διωρίσθω 
καὶ ὑπογεγράφθω περὶ ψυχῆς). The definition necessarily remains vague, since it is 
supposed to cover every case of soul, and more specific definitions (including the 
characteristic activities of living beings) can only be offered at the specific level of 
the various kinds of living beings; what Aristotle adds to this rudimentary definition 
in the chapters to follow is mainly a specification of the types of activities the soul 
can be a capacity for and what its objects are. The final definition provided in 
DA.II.1 characterizes the soul emphatically in teleological terms: the soul is what 
completes a natural body so as to render it capable of performing its defining 
activities, while the natural body itself is for the sake of the performance of those 
defining activities; the natural body can only be completed by the soul by becoming 
its instrument. Ultimately, a living being not only possesses but also exercises its life 
(in the sense of second actuality) in virtue of having both soul and a natural body 
that is instrumental to the soul.  
After having indicated that this definition of the soul as the actuality of a 
natural body takes away the need to ask whether the soul and the body are one 
(DA.II.1, 412b6-9), Aristotle offers some further specifications of the concepts used 
in this general definition of soul (DA.II.1, 412b10-11):  
οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῳδὶ σώματι (...). 
“For it [i.e. the soul] is a substantial being according to the definition. And that is 
what it is to be for such a body (…).” 
At a first glance, Aristotle seems to switch here from the bio-functional language to 
talk about essences, but, as it turns out, essences and functions are closely related 
concepts for Aristotle. The functions that make a natural body a living body, also 
make that body the body it actually is: natural bodies are what they are in virtue of 
their abilities to perform their natural and non-accidental functions.49 Natural bodies 
or parts that are not able to perform their defining functions are no longer what they 
are, except homonymously (cf. PA.I.1, 640b35-641a4 and the discussion of 
                                                 
49 Cf. Lennox (2001b), 138; Wilkes (1992), 113. 
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homonymy below). Hence, the basic unity of self-nutrition, growth and decay, and 
touch, for example, make the natural body to be the plant it is. Further distinctions 
in functions make the plant to be the specific kind of plant it is. The unity of 
functions that constitutes the soul does not only make the natural body alive, it also 
specifies the essence of that living organism. Functions are as it were subsumed 
under the essences of living beings, and it is in this way that the soul is also the form 
of a living being. In short, Aristotle carefully weaves in the teleological notion of 
function into his definition of the soul. 
 Aristotle then explains this specification of the soul as that what it is to be 
for a natural body to be what it is through the use of an analogy (DA.II.1, 412b12-
17): 
Καθάπερ εἴ τι τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικὸν ἦν σῶμα, οἷον πέλεκυς· ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει 
εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο· χωρισθείσης δὲ ταύτης οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς ἦν, 
ἀλλ’ ἢ ὁμωνύμως, νῦν δ’ ἔστι πέλεκυς. οὐ γὰρ τοιούτου σώματος τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁ 
λόγος ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ τοιουδί, ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ. 
“It would be as if one of the instruments, for example an axe, were a natural body: 
for its substantial being would be its being an axe, and that would be its soul. If this 
were separated off from it, it would no longer be an axe, except in name, but now it 
is an axe. For the soul is not what it is for it to be what it is and an account of such 
a body, but of a particular kind of natural body, which has a principle of movement 
and rest within itself.” 
This analogy between an instrument from the arts and a natural body instrumental to 
the soul takes the form of a thought-experiment in which we are to take away the 
soul or what corresponds to the soul in case of the axe (DA.II.1, 412b13-15). The 
soul of the axe would be its substantial being or that what it is for an axe to be what 
it is: presumably, this would be its capacity to cut.50 Take away the axe’s capacity to 
cut, and what is left is only an axe homonymously. Thus the category of artistic 
instruments presents the most clear-cut cases of things of which the essences are 
identical with their functions, and Aristotle’s choice of an axe as an example to 
parallel natural bodies is therefore very significant.51 The implication is that in the 
case of natural bodies, too, their essences coincide with their ‘function’ (or, better, 
                                                 
50 Ross (1961), 316. 
51 See also Hamlyn (2001), 86: “Aristotle’s selection of a tool, an axe, to provide an analogy with the 
ensouled body reveals how close to the surface in this discussion is the notion of function.”.  
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with multiple life-functions; cf. NE.I.7, 1097b22-1098a17), which is their soul. If 
one takes away a natural body’s soul, you take away its essence and thereby its 
capacity to perform its defining functions or activities, and it will no longer be a 
particular kind of body, except in name.  
The analogy does not hold in every aspect, however, as Aristotle points out 
in the next few lines (DA.II.1, 412b15-17): the axe is just an axe, and not a natural 
body, and souls belong only to bodies that are natural and that therefore have in 
themselves a principle of movement and rest. What is defective in the notion of the 
soul as a function of non-natural tools is that these tools require an external source 
of movement in order to be able to perform their functions. In a strict sense, axes 
possess the capacity to cut as a first actuality, but can only realize that capacity in 
virtue of an external source in the form of a craftsman, who intends to use the axe in 
its proper way. That is, the movement from the first to the second actuality in tools 
requires an external source, unlike natural bodies that possess this source within 
themselves and are thus capable of actualizing their own capacities. The difference 
between tools and natural bodies is thus that the latter can actualize the functions for 
which they possess the capacity on their own.  
Next, Aristotle proposes to apply this theory to the parts of living bodies, 
and draws another analogy (DA.II.1, 412b17-22): 
θεωρεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν δεῖ τὸ λεχθέν. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῷον, ψυχὴ ἂν ἦν 
αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις· αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον (ὁ δ’ ὀφθαλμὸς ὕλη ὄψεως), 
ἧς ἀπολειπούσης οὐκέτ’ ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως, καθάπερ ὁ λίθινος καὶ ὁ 
γεγραμμένος. 
“It is necessary to investigate what we have said also with regard to the parts [of 
natural bodies]. For if the eye were a living being, then its soul would be sight. For 
that is the substantial being that is according to the definition of the eye (and the 
eye is the matter of sight), without which it would no longer be an eye, except in 
name, in the same way as one made from stone or painted.” 
The thought-experiment presented here encourages us to think of a part of a natural 
body that has life potentially as if it were a living being itself. In that case, its soul 
would be its defining function, and without the ability to perform this function, the 
part would be what it is in name only. In short, the eye is to the natural body as sight 
is to the soul. In this analogy, essence and function again coincide, and again the 
Establishing the starting points of teleological explanations in De Anima 
  105
implication is that the part (and, analogously, the living being) would no longer be 
what it is without this essence or function, except homonymously.   
At this point Aristotle brings home the analogy. That which applies to the 
part also applies to the whole body of the living being (DA.II.1, 412b22-25):  
δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἐφ’ ὅλου τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος· ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχει ὡς τὸ 
μέρος πρὸς τὸ μέρος, οὕτως ἡ ὅλη αἴσθησις πρὸς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ᾗ 
τοιοῦτον. 
“It is necessary to take that which applies to the part to the whole body of a living 
being: for just as there is an analogy from part to part, in the same way [there is an 
analogy] from the whole [function of] perception to the whole perceptive body, to 
the extent that it is such [i.e. perceptive].” 
This means that the function of perception is the soul of the living body insofar as 
this living body is a perceptive living body (perceiving is just one of the functions a 
body might have in addition to, for instance, self-nourishment, growth, and decay). 
As such, the living body is capable of perceiving by itself, because of its own internal 
efficient cause of motion and rest that is its soul. Here Aristotle stresses again that is 
the having of a soul that makes a natural body alive potentially (DA.II.1, 412b26-29).  
The conclusion Aristotle draws from these analogies at the end of this 
chapter (DA.II.1, 412b27-413a4) is set up emphatically in terms of both his notions 
of actuality and potentiality, and function and essence. The sense in which the soul is 
actuality is not that in which cutting and seeing are actual (i.e. as second actuality or 
as the performance of functions), but in the sense in which sight and the capacity of 
the artistic instrument are (i.e. as first actuality or as the capacity for the performance 
of functions). The body is in each case that which is something in potentiality:  
ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς ἡ κόρη καὶ ἡ ὄψις, κἀκεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ζῷον.  
“[Not as such], but in the way in which an eye is the pupil and sight, so here, too, is 
the living being the soul and the body.” 
Function and functional body are thus intrinsically connected to each other: together 
they constitute the substantial beings. As Aristotle pointed out earlier, the question 
of whether soul and body are separable thus makes no sense to the extent that the 
soul is the actuality of a body or a body part; the question only obtains if there are 
parts of the soul that are not the actuality of a body part (DA.II.1, 412a4-6). The 
soul is separable from the body only if the soul were the actuality of the body in the 
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sense that the sailor is the actuality of the boat (DA.II.1, 413a8-9); but this issue has 
not been settled yet and will have to be picked up in a later chapter.   
In sum, Aristotle analyzes soul his definition of the soul as the first actuality 
of a natural body that has organs in terms of the essence of beings, and essences in 
terms of function: an animal is what it is when it possess capacities for its 
characteristic functions, an internal principle through which it can actualize those 
functions (and be alive in second actuality), and a natural body with which it can 
perform those functions. The complete living beings will thus be explainable in 
terms of all its life-functions. 
   
2.1.1.c Aristotle’s conception of the soul as a final cause of natural bodies 
In section 1.1.1.a, we saw that Aristotle defines knowledge as knowledge of all four 
causes or types of explanations, and since DA sets out to gain knowledge about the 
soul, Aristotle also analyzes the soul in terms of the four causes. In this section, I will 
focus on Aristotle’s attempt to establish the soul as the final cause of natural bodies 
in DA.II.4. I will argue that in doing so Aristotle turns the soul into the starting 
point of explanation of natural bodies having life.  
In the middle of discussing the nutritive and generative faculty of the soul 
in the second book of DA (DA.II.4, 415b11-29), Aristotle returns to his 
qualification of the soul as the cause and first principle of the living body. 
Subsequently, he analyzes the soul in terms of three of his four causes, the formal, 
the efficient and the final cause. The conception of the soul as the final cause, or, in 
Aristotle’s own terms, as a telos and hou heneka, is explained through an analogy with 
the crafts-model52  (DA.II.4, 415b15-21): 
φανερὸν δ’ ὡς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκεν ἡ ψυχὴ αἰτία·  ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ, τὸν 
αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ φύσις, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν αὐτῆς τέλος. τοιοῦτον δ’ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἡ ψυχὴ 
κατὰ φύσιν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν ζῴων, 
οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν, ὡς ἕνεκα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα· διττῶς δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τό τε οὗ καὶ 
τὸ ᾧ. 
“It is clear that the soul is a cause also as that for the sake of which. For just as the 
intellect acts for the sake of something, in the same way, too, does nature, and that 
                                                 
52 There are numerous other passages throughout the Aristotelian corpus where Aristotle makes the same 
analogy. See, for example, Ph.II.8 (passim), GA.I.22, 730b9-23. For the relation between the craft analogy 
and Aristotle’s teleology, see Broadie (1990) and Matthen (2006); cf. also chapter 1.2.  
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is her end. That thing is among living beings the soul according to nature: for all 
natural bodies are instruments of the soul, just as the bodies of living beings, so too 
also the bodies of plants, because they are for the sake of soul. And that for the sake 
of which is double, there is the ‘of which’ and the ‘for which’.” 
The instrumentality of the nature of the natural body that potentially for the soul is 
here turned into a teleological relationship in which the natural body is for the sake 
of the soul: the soul is its final cause. This means that the soul could not do what it 
needs to do (for instance, perceive or locomote), if it were not realized in a natural 
body, but also that the natural bodies are the conditionally necessary prerequisites 
for a fully-functioning soul.53 Before discussing the wider ramifications of this 
account of the soul as the final cause of the natural body to which it belongs, let me 
first say a little more about Aristotle final remark about the doubleness of that for 
the sake of which (DA.II.4, 415b20-21). 
Some scholars ignore these lines as a mere parenthetic remark,54 but since 
the expression appears twice in this chapter (see also DA.II.4, 415b3), I believe it 
deserves at least some comments.55 There are two questions that need to be 
answered here, first, the interpretation of the doubleness itself, and second, its 
application to the soul as an end (i.e. if and in what sense the soul is an end in a 
double sense).  
 One possible line of interpretation is offered by Johnson, for whom this 
distinction between the two senses of to hou heneka is central to resolving ‘the 
problems of Aristotelian teleology.’ He characterizes the distinction as “a difference 
between the aim of something and the beneficiary of the achievement of that aim,” 
using for the latter the formula ‘for the sake of which for which beneficiary.’56 He 
takes to hou heneka – hou to refer to the end proper, while to hou heneka – hôi is taken 
to refer to the beneficiary of the (realization of the) end. Applying this distinction to 
the characterization of the soul as a final cause, Johnson explains that “The body 
                                                 
53 As the example of the mole makes clear, it is possible in some sense to have the organ of sight without 
having the actual capacity of sight, but it is absolutely impossible to have the capacity of sight without 
having the proper parts; DA.I.5, 411b24. 
54 See e.g. Hamlyn (2001), 95. 
55 Johnson (2005), 75. 
56 Johnson (2005), 65-67.  
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exists for the aim of the soul’s functioning, and the soul’s functioning exists for the 
benefit of the individual organism that lives through the soul and with the body.”57 
Despite the interesting parallels Johnson offers to illustrate his reading of to 
hou heneka hôi,58 I am not convinced that this is the most natural reading of the 
expression. The Greek seems to suggest that the ambiguity – that which is ditton or 
dittôs – lies in the kind of end picked out. Subsequently, the ‘to men, to de’-construction 
offers two possible readings of the kind of end referred to, or two ways in which to 
read ‘to hou heneka’, which are ‘that for the sake of which’ or the final cause, and ‘the 
for which’ or ‘the beneficiary of which’.59 The question is then whether or not 
Aristotle intends to qualify the soul as both a final cause and the beneficiary of the 
natural body.60 It seems to me, however, that Aristotle only points to the ambiguity 
in order to separate off the technical sense in which the soul is a ‘that for the sake of 
which’ of a natural body, namely in the sense of being an end for the sake of which 
the natural body has come to be and is present.61 The function of the statement is 
thus to limit the interpretation of the soul as a final cause, rather than to extend it.  
 
In identifying the soul with the formal, efficient, and final cause of the natural body 
that has life potentially, Aristotle conceives of the soul not only as the ontological 
principle of living beings (in the sense of its essence, internal origin of movement 
and rest, and internal orientation towards its complete realization through the ‘use’ 
of the natural body), but also as the epistemological principle facilitating an 
explanation of life. The soul as final cause seems to have explanatory priority, 
though, since it is in terms of its functioning that the essence of living beings is 
                                                 
57 In this interpretation Johnson (2005, 75n.22) follows Menn (2002), claiming that “the body is for the 
sake of the soul as to hôi, the to-benefit-whom, as an organon is for the sake of the art or the artisan.” 
However, Menn’s analogy misrepresents Aristotle’s analogy (that is, the analogy compares the following 
two domains: nous :: nature; axe :: natural bodies; cutting :: soul), in putting the soul at the same level as 
the artisan. Under this interpretation, the analogy should rather be construed as: ‘as the soul benefits from 
the body, so too does the cutting benefit from the axe.’ It is not clear how either the soul or the cutting 
could ‘benefit’ from their instruments, except in the sense that they cannot exist or operate without them 
(cf. DA.II.2, 414a19-21).   
58 Johnson (2005), 67n.8. 
59 This is also the way Kullman interprets the expression (1985), 172; cf. Judson (2005), 358. See also 
Ph.II.2, 194a34-b1: when Aristotle states that “we also are in a sense an end” he means that we are an end 
in the sense of the beneficiary, not in the sense of a final cause in a technical sense.  
60 Johnson (2005, 69), holds that both senses of ‘the for the sake of which’ are simultaneously operative 
and refers to the interpretations of Themistius, Simplicius, and Philoponus in favor of this interpretation; 
this does not settle the question for Aristotle though.  
61 This interpretation is suggested by Gotthelf (1987), 210. 
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determined and it is this defining function that explains why the natural body is 
present and is as it is (because it is conditionally necessitated that way). In the 
biology, this notion of soul as the final cause thus provides the starting point of 
teleological explanations of why animals have the instrumental bodies they have, 
since the bodies and their parts are present for the sake of the soul, i.e. for the sake of 
the realization of form of the body and next for the actualization of the capacities.  
The conception of the soul as the final cause of the natural body is also 
crucial for Aristotle to demonstrate that what a natural body for the most part does – 
its ergon in the non-technical sense of its characteristic activity – is in fact that body’s 
function, the ergon or telos in technical sense, which is the exercise of the animal’s 
capacities. These activities are the living beings’ proper functions in virtue of the 
kind of soul it has: natural bodies come to be exactly to perform such soul-
functions.62  
 Code and Moravcsik point out that Aristotle’s account of the soul in DA as 
a whole and in this section in particular does not amount to a teleological definition 
of the soul, or “much less [does it] define it in ‘functional terms’”.63 Indeed, the soul 
itself is not defined teleologically (its nature is not explained as being for the sake of 
something, nor is its presence demonstrated through the use of teleological 
principles), but rather it is posited as the starting point in virtue of which teleological 
explanations pertaining to living nature will be possible. The reference to the natural 
body and to parts of living beings as being the ‘instruments of the soul’, on the other 
hand, picks out the soul as a functional complex to which the natural body 
‘contributes’. This surely resembles a functional description of the compound of the 
body and soul in Cummins’ theory of function.64 According to Cummins, a function 
is the contribution that an aspect or a portion of a system makes towards the 
capacities of the larger system of which it is a part.65 Contrary to Code and 
Moravcsik, I do not see any problems of constructing a functionalist account for 
                                                 
62 In this regard, Aristotle’s notion of function differs significantly from the notion of function applied in 
etiological accounts in modern philosophy of biology. For Aristotle, function is predominantly a 
teleological notion (the function is the cause of the presence of the part which is for the sake of it), while 
for etiologists like Millikan (1999) and Neander (1999) function is generally a historical-pragmatic notion 
(the function of a part is that activity for which it was adapted or selected for over multiple generations – 
in other words, the function is what a part does and what it was selected for to do). 
63 Code & Moravcsik (1992), 134-135. 
64 Pace Klein (2002), 17, who thinks that Aristotle commits himself to Cummins functionalism. 
65 Cummins (1999), 57-83. 
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Aristotle if we follow Cummins, such that bodily parts are defined in terms of their 
contribution to the organism to which they belong. For instance, a Cummins 
account of the heart couched in Aristotelian terms would run like this. The heart is 
what heats the body, where heating is a usual effect of hearts incorporated in 
organisms, and organisms incorporating a heating heart in the usual way exhibit 
warmth; therefore, the organism exhibits warmth. Warmth sustains or increases the 
organism’s capacity of preserving itself and of reproducing its species. The soul is 
what on this account is constituted by the total of the capacities of the organism. 
The problem is, however, that for Cummins, this definition does not entail that the 
heart is present for the sake of warming the organism. Cummins’ concept of 
function is not teleological; in fact, it is emphatically designed against teleological 
accounts of function. For Aristotle, on the other hand, the fact that parts can be 
defined by reference to their contribution to the larger whole follows emphatically 
from his teleological worldview: it is because parts are for the sake of the whole that 
parts can be defined in terms of their contribution to the whole. So, although, again, 
Aristotle is not a functionalist in a modern sense, this does not preclude any role for 
teleology in his account of the soul. It is therefore not necessary to downplay the 
role of teleological elements in Aristotle’s account in order to disentangle him from 
modern functionalist accounts.66  
Aristotle’s conception of the soul as a final cause of the natural body 
provides the basis for teleological explanations of the natural body and its parts 
living beings actually have in the biological works. In this way, DA provides the 
theoretical framework for Aristotle’s explanatory project of the biology, which will 
be the subject of the next chapter.  
 
2.1.2 Aristotelian teleology versus modern functionalism 
 
2.1.2.a The problem of the unity of body and soul and modern functionalism 
In DA.II.1, 412b6-9 Aristotle makes clear that for him the third definition of the 
soul – that the soul is the first actuality of a natural body that is instrumental – 
                                                 
66 This seems to be the main strategy of Code & Moravscik (1992); see especially 132; 135; 138. 
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should suffice as an answer to the question of the relation between body and soul 
(DA.II.1, 412b6-9):  
διὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν εἰ ἓν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν κηρὸν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, 
οὐδ’ ὅλως τὴν ἑκάστου ὕλην καὶ τὸ οὗ ἡ ὕλη· τὸ γὰρ ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς 
λέγεται, τὸ κυρίως ἡ ἐντελέχειά ἐστιν.  
“For that reason there is also no need to ask whether the soul and body are one, in 
the same way [as there is no need to ask whether] the wax and the impression [are 
one], or in general [whether] the matter of each and that of which it is the matter 
[are one]. For ‘unity’ and ‘being’ – despite the fact that they are spoken of in many 
ways – are [said] most properly of actuality.”  
In arguing that the unity that obtains between the soul and the natural body in which 
the soul is realized is like the compound of wax and the impression, Aristotle 
possibly draws from his theory of hylomorphism,67 but the reference to actuality as 
that what unites the two also suggests a teleological link indicating the (first) state of 
completion of the living being and its direction towards activity.68 From this passage 
it becomes clear that the Aristotle believes the soul and natural body to be intimately 
connected to each other and indeed to be inseparable (that is, in so far as the soul is 
the actuality of parts of the body; in so far as the soul is not the actuality of a bodily 
part, the soul might be separable; DA.II.1, 413a4-8). This account, however, does 
not make clear how exactly body and soul are related to each other, and what the 
status of the natural body is. The analogies between the soul and functions of 
instruments discussed earlier suggest that the matter or body in which form or soul 
is realized is at least to some degree contingent.69 As Aristotle states repeatedly, axes 
can be made of different kinds of materials, such as bronze or iron, as long as the 
materials used have the right kind of material potentials.70 Are we to conclude that 
there is no essential relation between a particular type of body and a particular soul-
function, too?  
According to functionalist interpreters of Aristotle this is indeed the 
conclusion we should draw. Functionalists acknowledge that for Aristotle soul-
functions must be realized in some kind of functionally appropriate material, but 
                                                 
67 This is, for instance, how Caston (2006, 318) and Ross (1961, 314) interpret this passage. 
68 Menn (2002), 105.  
69 Cf. Cohen (1992), 58.  
70 See Burnyeat (1992a), 17. 
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claim that the particular functionally appropriate material in which soul-functions are 
enmattered is irrelevant. For instance, the question of whether perception is realized 
in hard eye-jelly, or in fluid eye-jelly, or even in perceptive sensors is irrelevant as 
long as the eyes are functionally equivalent. In claiming this, interpreters of Aristotle 
adopt the compositional plasticity thesis71 central to modern functionalism, which 
holds that mental states may be realized in completely different kinds of materials 
governed by heterogeneous laws of physics, because the particular material 
realization of a given function is not part of its essence.72 Although modern 
functionalists reserve this thesis exclusively for mind-body relations, interpreters of 
Aristotle (mainly Nussbaum, Putnam,73 and Cohen)74 have applied it freely to all the 
functions of the soul and their bodily realizations in animals and humans alike. By 
attributing the compositional plasticity thesis to Aristotle it is claimed that Aristotle’s 
conception of the soul can be read as a prototype of contemporary functionalism, as 
opposed to being a specimen of Platonic dualism or reductive materialism. Setting 
aside the issue of whether or not this application of a modern mind-body problem 
to Aristotle’s general psychology is legitimate, I will argue below that the 
functionalist reading of Aristotle is mistaken.75  
In the following subsections, I will show that the evidence that has been 
put forward in favor of the functionalist interpretation demonstrates that in theory 
Aristotle allows for some weak form of compositional plasticity even in natural 
substances, but that this ‘theoretical possibility’ has no meaning in Aristotle because 
                                                 
71 A concomitant to this thesis is the theory that every function or activity of the soul has to involve a 
bodily change – that is, that psychological events entail physiological processes. At least for the kind of 
functionalism Putnam is arguing for, it is not necessary to specify the material factors that are either 
necessary or sufficient for the occurrence of psychological events; all that is needed is there to be some 
physiological change that correlates with the occurrence of psychological events. For the scope of this 
dissertation, it will suffice to say that this latter view seems to be in accordance with Aristotle’s claims that 
the functions of the soul are realized in matter and that the body is affected in some sense.  
72 This definition is based on Cohen’s (1992, 58): “functionalism is the theory that mental states are 
defined in terms of their relations to causal inputs, behavioral outputs, and other mental states. It holds 
that the same mental state may be realized in several different physical states or processes [i.e. different in 
the sense of being governed by heterogeneous laws of physics; this is in fact what prevents psychological 
events to be reduced fully to physiological processes; for this addition, see Klein (2002), 3]. Mental states 
cannot, therefore, be reduced to physical states. They are, rather, functional states of the physical systems 
that realize them.” 
73 Nussbaum & Putnam (1992), 27-56.  
74 Cohen (1992), 57-73. 
75 See also Burnyeat (1992a, 15-26), Charles (1983), 227-234 and (1988), 41-42, and Everson (1997), 252-
258 for different lines of approach against functionalist interpreters of Aristotle. 
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in reality it never obtains.76 Moreover, I will argue that matter is relevant to Aristotle 
not only insofar as it enables a part to perform its proper function. For, although 
different materials might be functional equivalent, there are other factors, too, which 
are often connected to the essence of the being in question, that co-determine the 
kind of material used to realize a particular function in a particular kind of living 
being. By using the example of the realization of perception in eyes, it will be shown 
that the functionalist interpretation misrepresents both Aristotle’s notion of matter, 
and his goal in the teleological explanation of living beings as is set out in DA and 
the biological works. My main contention is that the functionalist reading of 
Aristotle stops at too general a level of analysis: Aristotle has no interest in functions 
in abstraction, but in the identification of the eternal and unchanging kinds of 
animals actually found in nature, with their own particular material realizations of 
their own characteristic functions. The supposition that these animals could have 
been realized differently contradicts Aristotle’s concept of the fixity of animal kinds 
and of the teleology of nature.77 Instead, I propose that the unity between body and 
soul should be explained teleologically. 
 
2.1.2.b Does matter matter? Functions and definitions 
Let me start by discussing the question of to what extent matter matters for Aristotle 
through an analysis of the ‘evidence’ that has been put forward by functionalist 
readers of Aristotle to show that Aristotle holds that (i.) functions of the soul are 
realized in matter; (ii.) functions of the soul must be realized in some suitable matter, 
but the particular matter in which the functions of the soul are realized is contingent 
and logically unrestricted (this is the strong compositional plasticity thesis).  
One argument that has been put forward by functionalist interpreters of 
Aristotle is that essences are functionally defined in Aristotle, and that matter is not a 
                                                 
76 With regard to artifacts, Aristotle obviously allows for compositional plasticity, but part of the point will 
be that artifacts and living beings are fundamentally different such that the compositional plasticity in the 
domain of the artifacts cannot be transferred to the domain of living beings. 
77 In this context Aristotle’s concept of natural possibilities is important, for it puts constraints on the 
possible realizations of functions in animals that share to a certain extent the same form. On the notion of 
natural possibility, cf. Met.V.22, 1022b21-23: “We speak of privation if something has not one of the 
attributes which a thing might naturally have, even if this thing itself would not naturally have it, e.g. a 
plant is said to be deprived of eyes.” On the teleological principle making use of this notion of natural 
possibilities, see 3.3.1.c.  
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part of the definition of what a thing is.78 Because the material constitution of 
something is not part of its essence, it follows that matter is thus contingent. In 
favor of this view, functionalist interpreters cite a passage from the Metaphysics 
(Met.VII.11, 1036a26-b32). In this chapter Aristotle is held to deny that matter is 
part of a definition, and to argue in favor of the compositional plasticity thesis.  
 The central aporia of Met.VII.11 concerns what sort of things can be part 
of the form or essence, and what things cannot be part of it according to Aristotle. 
Underlying this discussion seems to be an ambiguity about definition and essence 
itself.79 Usually, Aristotle identifies essences with the purely formal properties of 
something (such as soul; Met.VII.11, 1037a27-33) and holds that definitions should 
only pick out those universal, formal properties. At other times, Aristotle identifies 
essences with the concrete, composite natural being, and in that case he holds that 
the definition of that thing needs to pick out both the formal and the material 
properties in which the form – given the way the world is – is realized. As Aristotle 
makes clear in both in this chapter (Met.VII.11, 1037a12-17) and in DA, the latter 
type of definition seems to be the one that is especially appropriate in natural 
philosophy (DA.I.1, 403b7-8):80  
τίς οὖν ὁ φυσικὸς τούτων; πότερον ὁ περὶ τὴν ὕλην, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀγνοῶν, ἢ ὁ περὶ τὸν 
λόγον μόνον; ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν;  
“Which then of these [people giving definitions] is the natural philosopher? Is it the 
one who [states the definition] concerning to the matter, while ignoring the form, 
or the one who [states the definition] only concerning the form? It must rather be 
the one who [states the definition concerning] the compound of the two.” 
Contrary to the functionalist interpreters it thus seems to me that in natural 
philosophy, of which the investigation of the soul is part, definitions need to take 
matter into account, because the matter is part of the essence of living beings. Below 
I will discuss the key passages in Met.VII.11 to show that the functionalist 
interpretation is untenable.  
 
                                                 
78 Cohen (1992), 59-60; 72-73; Nussbaum & Putnam (1992), 45-46; Shields (1990), 22-23. 
79 Cf. Lloyd (1992), 159; Charles (2000), 277-278. 
80 On different types of definitions in Aristotle, see Bayer (1998), Bolton (2002) and Deslauriers (1990 and 
2007).  
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Aristotle introduces the aporia concerning the parts of a definition as follows 
(Met.VII.11, 1036a26-31):  
Ἀπορεῖται δὲ εἰκότως καὶ ποῖα τοῦ εἴδους μέρη καὶ ποῖα οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ συνειλημμένου. 
καίτοι τούτου μὴ δήλου ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι ἕκαστον· τοῦ γὰρ καθόλου καὶ τοῦ 
εἴδους ὁ ὁρισμός· ποῖα οὖν ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν ὡς ὕλη καὶ ποῖα οὔ, ἐὰν μὴ ᾖ φανερά, οὐδὲ 
ὁ λόγος ἔσται φανερὸς ὁ τοῦ πράγματος. 
“Naturally one might also be confused about what kinds of things are parts of the 
form, and what kinds are not, but are parts of the composite. And still without 
clarity about that it is not possible to give definitions of each thing separately. For 
the definition is of the universal and of the form. As long as it is not clear what kind 
of parts are like matter and what kinds are not, there will not be a clear definition of 
the states of affairs.” 
In setting out this aporia, Aristotle distinguishes form from matter, and claims that 
forms are part of the definition, while matter (being part of the composite, but not 
of the form) is not. Aristotle then discusses two types of beings. First, there are 
things like mathematical figures, which “are obviously brought into being in 
different kinds of material” (Met.VII.11, 1036a31-32: ὅσα μὲν οὖν φαίνεται 
ἐπιγιγνόμενα ἐφ’ ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει), such as the circle. For Aristotle it is clear that for 
mathematical figures the matter is not part of the essence, because the essence is 
separated from the matter (Met.VII.11, 1036a34: διὰ τὸ χωρίζεσθαι αὐτῶν). Second, 
there are things like natural, living beings such as man that are not observed to be 
separated from matter: what prevents these cases from being different from 
mathematical figures? The analogy Aristotle applies is this: even if circles always 
came to be in the same kind of material, say bronze, it would still not be the case 
that the bronze is part of the form of circles – even though “it would be difficult to 
subtract it in one’s thinking” (Met.VII.11, 1036a37-38: χαλεπὸν δὲ ἀφελεῖν τοῦτον τῇ 
διανοίᾳ). Similarly, even if “the form of a man always appears in flesh and bones and 
parts of that sort” (Met.VII.11, 1036a3-4: οἷον τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶδος ἀεὶ ἐν σαρξὶ 
φαίνεται καὶ ὀστοῖς καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέρεσιν), we do not have to conclude that they 
are also parts of a man’s definition. Rather, they are matter, and it is only because we 
always find man to come into being in such matter, that it is hard to separate the 
flesh and the bones from the form man in our minds.   
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Here Aristotle clearly endorses the view that definitions of the universal and the form – 
even of living beings – do not include matter. The interpretative crux seems to lie in 
the sentence connecting the cases of mathematical figures and living beings 
(Met.VII.11, 1036a35-b1):  
οὐδὲν μὲν κωλύει ὁμοίως ἔχειν τούτοις.  
“Nothing prevents them [things like man] from being similar to the others [i.e. 
things like circle].”  
The functionalist interpreters interpret ‘similar’ as entailing not only a similarity in 
respect of definition between the two domains (the definitions of living beings, just 
as those of things like circles, do not include matter), but also a similarity in respect 
of compositional plasticity: just as the matter in the case of circles is compositionally 
plastic, so too in the case of man (even if he has never been seen to come to be in 
matter other than flesh and bones). I think this interpretation is wrong, not in the 
least because it presses the meaning of ‘similar’ too much. The point Aristotle makes 
here is exactly that both when the form can be seen to be realized in different kinds 
of matter and when the form cannot be seen to be realized in different kinds of 
matter, the definition of the universal does not include the matter. Aristotle thus 
mentions human beings as an example of things that are not compositionally plastic, 
but are always realized in flesh and bones, and still have definitions of the universal 
without inclusion of the matter.  
In addition, the functionalist interpretation is in conflict with a later passage 
(Met.VII.11, 1036b21-32):81 
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν τὰ περὶ τοὺς ὁρισμούς, καὶ διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαν, εἴρηται· διὸ 
καὶ τὸ πάντα ἀνάγειν οὕτω καὶ ἀφαιρεῖν τὴν ὕλην περίεργον· ἔνια γὰρ ἴσως τόδ’ ἐν τῷδ’ 
ἐστὶν ἢ ὡδὶ ταδὶ ἔχοντα. καὶ ἡ παραβολὴ ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῴου, ἣν εἰώθει λέγειν Σωκράτης ὁ 
νεώτερος, οὐ καλῶς ἔχει· ἀπάγει γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, καὶ ποιεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν ὡς 
ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄνευ τῶν μερῶν, ὥσπερ ἄνευ τοῦ χαλκοῦ τὸν κύκλον. 
τὸ δ’ οὐχ ὅμοιον· αἰσθητὸν82 γάρ τι τὸ ζῷον, καὶ ἄνευ κινήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι, 
                                                 
81 Code & Moravcsik (1992), 134, argue against the compositional plasticity thesis as well, but from a 
wholly different angle: they take this passage not to be voicing Aristotle’s own view, since the passage is 
stated in the form of an aporia - therefore we cannot with certainty attribute to Aristotle the compositional 
plasticity thesis for the case of living beings. 
82 Here I follow the textual tradition (instead of the emendation made by Frede & Patzig (1988; 210-211), 
who read aisthêtikon for aitsthêton at Met.VII.11, 1036b28): Animals are perceptible things and therefore 
only realizable in perceptible matter, which is changeable, as opposed to the intelligible matter in which 
geometrical figures are embodied; on this issue, see Granger (2000), 415-423.  
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διὸ οὐδ’ ἄνευ τῶν μερῶν ἐχόντων πώς. οὐ γὰρ πάντως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος ἡ χείρ, 
ἀλλ’ ἢ δυναμένη τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖν, ὥστε ἔμψυχος οὖσα· μὴ ἔμψυχος δὲ οὐ μέρος.  
“That there is some problem concerning the definitions, and because of what 
reason, has been said. For that reason it is also futile to trace back everything in that 
way and to take away all the matter. For some things are perhaps such and such in 
such a thing or such things in such a state. And the comparison with regard to an 
animal, the one Socrates the Younger used to say, is not good: for it leads away 
from the truth, and it makes one assume that it is possible to be a human being 
without parts, in the same way the circle can be without bronze. But it is not the 
same: for a living being is something perceptible and something that cannot be 
defined without motion, and for that reason it cannot be without parts that are 
disposed in a particular way. For the hand is not in any state a part of a human 
being, but only the one that is capable of accomplishing its work, such that it is 
ensouled: what is not ensouled is not a part of it.” 
In this passage, Aristotle discusses definitions of the composite, and criticizes both the 
method of some of his (Pythagorean) predecessors who traced everything back to 
the form and took away the matter, as well as the analogy Socrates the Younger 
drew between human beings and circles. Here Aristotle argues that composite 
natural beings cannot be defined without taking their own principle of movement 
into account, and stresses that composite natural beings cannot be without their 
material parts being disposed in a particular way. The example of the hand shows 
that the material in which the function of the hand is realized is quite specific: it is 
not a hand of any sort (Met.VII.11, 1036b30: πάντως) that is part of a human being, 
but only the one that is ensouled83 – only in that way it is capable of performing its 
function.84 This is not an argument for compositional plasticity,85 but for the 
importance of taking the matter in which forms are realized (and not just any 
                                                 
83 Cf. Lennox (2005), 10: “It would be wrong to think that the connection between soul and body in a 
plant or animal is similar to that between circularity and (say) bronze. Once you say that to be an animal is 
to be capable of perception, you are at once saying that it is a being with instrumental parts capable of 
undergoing certain changes and performing certain functions. To be ensouled is to be a body capable of 
such functions.” 
84 Cohen (1992, 73) adopts a functionalist reading based on this passage. Cf. also Nussbaum & Putnam 
(1992), 32: “any account that properly gives the what-is-it of such a being must make mention of the 
presence of material composition – and, as our Z11 passage suggests, of the presence of a material 
composition that is in some way suitable or in the right state.” (the italics are in the original, the underlining is 
mine). However, it is not entirely clear whether Aristotle means a particular kind of material or a 
functionally suitable kind of material when he speaks about “parts that are disposed in a certain way 
(Met.VII.11, 1036b30: ἐχόντων πώς).” 
85 Cf. Bostock (1994), 164-165.  
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suitable matter) into account, also when giving definitions of composite beings. At 
the end of this chapter, Aristotle alludes to the distinction between definitions of the 
universal and definitions of the composite, while leaving open the possibility that the 
definition of the composite does include the matter in which the form is realized 
(Met.VII.11, 1037a21-b1; 1037a24-7): 
καὶ ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὰ οὕτω μόρια ὡς ὕλη οὐκ ἐνέσται—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν 
ἐκείνης μόρια τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ τῆς συνόλου, ταύτης δέ γ’ ἔστι πως λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν·  
“And that the parts in the sense of material are not in the definition of the 
substantial being – for they are parts not of that substantial being, but of the 
composite, and of the latter there is in a sense a definition and there is not.” 
The upshot of this chapter is that in the type of definition that is relevant in natural 
philosophy, namely the type of definition that is concerned with composites the 
matter in which the form is realized is part of the definition.  
The reason why the natural philosopher should state definitions that 
include the matter has to do with the kind of knowledge that he needs to provide 
(Met.XI.7, 1064a19-28):86  
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον ἑκάστῃ πως τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἰδέναι καὶ τούτῳ χρῆσθαι 
ἀρχῇ, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς ὁριστέον τῷ φυσικῷ καὶ πῶς ὁ τῆς οὐσίας λόγος ληπτέος, 
πότερον ὡς τὸ σιμὸν ἢ μᾶλλον ὡς τὸ κοῖλον. τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν τοῦ σιμοῦ λόγος μετὰ 
τῆς ὕλης λέγεται τῆς τοῦ πράγματος, ὁ δὲ τοῦ κοίλου χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης· ἡ γὰρ σιμότης ἐν 
ῥινὶ γίγνεται, διὸ καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς μετὰ ταύτης θεωρεῖται· τὸ σιμὸν γάρ ἐστι ῥὶς 
κοίλη. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ σαρκὸς καὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν μορίων μετὰ τῆς 
ὕλης ἀεὶ τὸν λόγον ἀποδοτέον.  
“Since it is necessary for each of the branches of knowledge to know in some way 
what something is and to use that as a starting point, it is necessary to not let it go 
unnoticed in what way one who studies nature should define and how he should get 
hold of the definition of the substantial being, whether it is like the snub or more 
like the concave. For among these the definition of the snub is said with the matter 
that belongs to that thing, and the one of the concave is said without the matter. 
                                                 
86 Cf. Aristotle’s discussion of the kind of knowledge that pertains to nature and the kinds of things that 
belong to this branch of study (Met.VI.1, 1025b30-1026a6): “There are among the things that are defined 
and among things that are essences some that are like the snub, and some that are like the concave. And 
these are different, because the snub is something that is grasped with its material (for the snub is a 
concave nose), while the concavity is without perceptible matter. If all natural things are said in the same 
way as the snub is, such as for instance nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, the whole animal, leaf, root, bark, the 
whole plant (for the definition of none of them is without motion, but always includes matter), then it is 
clear how it is necessary to search and define the essence in natural things, and also why it is also the task 
of the student of nature to investigate some parts of the soul, in so far as they are not without matter.”  
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For snubness comes about in a nose, and therefore also the definition of it is 
studied along with it [i.e. the matter], for the snub is a concave nose. Thus it is clear 
that also the definition of flesh and of eye and of the other parts always needs to be 
stated with the matter.” 
Again, Aristotle argues that the definition of the composite should include both the 
form and the matter in which the form is realized. What is at stake here is knowledge 
of natural beings: definitions that are supposed to yield knowledge of natural beings 
have to include the matter, because it is part of what it is for them to be what they 
are.87  
 
In sum, it seems that in the Metaphysica passages discussed above, Aristotle 
consistently argues for the inclusion of matter in the definition of composites, which 
is precisely the kind of definition the natural philosopher should state in order to 
attain knowledge of natural beings. If these passages give an accurate representation 
of Aristotle’s position, then the material constitution of living beings is part of their 
essence, and not just relevant to the extent in which it makes the realization of the 
psychological functions possible.  
 Additional evidence can be found in the biological work, where Aristotle 
occasionally refers to definitions of the substantial being of an animal that include 
features that are not primarily functional, such as being blooded or bloodless (which 
is a material factor concerning matter of the natural body),88 being partitioned into 
separate segments (which is the formal organization of insects), or having a certain 
size, length or thinness (which are the formal dimensions of living beings).89 
Interestingly, Gotthelf suggests that Aristotle might have thought that the ‘elemental 
blend’ of an animal is part of the definition of the substantial being of that animal as 
well. This suggestion is made on account of the animal’s preference for a certain 
                                                 
87 Aristotle is interested in this ‘causal’ type of definition of the composite also in DA; see DA.II.3, 
413a13-16): “For it is necessary that the defining account not only brings out the ‘what it is’, as most 
definitions do, but also includes and displays the explanation.” 
88 The example of being blooded or being bloodless as included in the definition of the substantial being 
of some being suggests most clearly that in the practice of natural investigations Aristotle uses definitions 
that include references to both form and matter; Lloyd (1996), 59. 
89 For references to properties included in the definition of the substantial beings see, e.g., PA.IV.5, 
678a26-34; PA.IV.12, 693b2-13; PA.IV.13, 695b17-25 (cf. PA.II.2, 648a20); PA.IV.6, 682b27-29; 
PA.IV.9, 685b12-15. On this issue, see also Gotthelf (1987), 190-192 and section 3.2.2 below. 
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kind of food, which Aristotle explains in terms of the elemental blend of an animal 
(where the elemental blend is used as a given feature of that animal).90  
All this evidence indicates that at least at the level of his actual biological 
explanations as part of his investigations of nature, Aristotle considers – in any 
number of cases – matter to be explanatorily basic91 and part of the explanatory 
definition of living being. In the explanation of living beings, matter matters for the 
natural philosopher.  
 
2.1.2.c The principle of homonymy 
In the analysis of soul above, I argued that Aristotle analyzes essences in terms of 
functions: a thing is what it is by virtue of what it non-accidentally, but intrinsically 
does and is for.92 The aforementioned analogy of the natural body with a tool such 
as an axe offers a good example: the essence of an axe is its capacity to cut in a 
particular way, and similarly, natural beings are defined by their particular soul-
functions. Functionalists derive from examples such as these the thesis that matter is 
relevant to Aristotle only insofar as it enables functions to be realized. A saw made of 
wool or wood will not work, but a saw made of bronze is just as much a saw as one 
made of iron, and the same will apply to the realization of natural beings. I will show 
that this thesis is wrong, first by looking at Aristotle’s use of the principle of 
homonymy and next, in the following subsection, by discussing his notion of 
conditional necessity.  
 
Aristotle’s homonymy principle holds that when you take away the essence or 
capacity for the performance of a certain function (i.e. if you ‘separate it off’) of 
something, then what is left is that thing only in name. The principle is thus a 
linguistic principle, referring to an inappropriate use of terms for things that are no 
longer what they essentially are. For instance, to use the term ‘body’ for what is no 
                                                 
90 Gotthelf (1987), 192. Cf. Lennox (2005), 12. 
91 I will provide more evidence for this in the next chapter (3.2.3). 
92 For a functional notion of essence, cf. GA.V.1, 778a29-35: “For whenever things are not the product of 
nature in general nor yet characteristic of each separate kind, then none of these things is such as it is or is 
so developed for the sake of anything. The eye for instance exists for a final cause, but it is not blue for a 
final cause unless this condition be characteristic of the kind of anima. In fact, in some case this condition 
has no connection with the definition of the substantial being of an animal (…). See also Lennox (2001a), 
112. 
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longer alive is inappropriate, for a dead body is a body in name only – the term does 
no longer capture the essence of its referent, because the latter has lots its defining 
capacities for function. The reason why this principle is important for the 
understanding of Aristotle’s philosophy of nature is that it reveals the intimate 
connection between the essence of a thing, its function, and its constitutive material, 
such as for example in the following passage from the Meteorologica (Mete.IV.12, 
390a10-13):  
ἅπαντα δ’ ἐστὶν ὡρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον 
ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ἕκαστον, οἷον ὀφθαλμὸς εἰ ὁρᾷ, τὸ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενον ὁμωνύμως, οἷον ὁ 
τεθνεὼς ἢ ὁ λίθινος· οὐδὲ γὰρ πρίων ὁ ξύλινος, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὡς εἰκών. 
“All things that are, are defined by their function: each thing is truly itself when it 
can perform its function; an eye, for instance, when it can see. When a thing is not 
capable of that, [it is that thing only] homonymously, like a dead [eye] or one made 
of stone: for a wooden saw is not a [saw], except in the same way as one in a picture 
is.”  
In this passage Aristotle gives two examples of ways in which a thing may not be 
able to perform its proper function (any longer) and thereby causes it to loose its 
essence: first, when a thing is dead, that is, when it is no longer ensouled,93 and 
second, when a thing is constituted of the wrong kind of material. Interestingly, in 
other passages where Aristotle refers to the homonymy principle, he explains the 
first case by analogy to the second. For example, flesh losing its soul is just like being 
constituted from the wrong kind of material (e.g. Mete.IV.12, 389b28-390a2; 
GA.II.1, 734b24-25: οὐ γάρ ἐστι πρόσωπον μὴ ἔχον ψυχὴν οὐδὲ σάρξ, ἀλλὰ φθαρέντα 
ὁμωνύμως λεχθήσεται...). The suggestion is that by loosing the soul, the body and its 
parts undergo some kind of (possibly material)94 change that makes them no longer 
‘fit’ to perform their functions, because they have lost their vital heat. A dead human 
body is therefore no longer a human body (to the extent that it cannot even be 
regarded as a dead human body), except homonymously, for they have nothing 
definitionally in common.95  
                                                 
93 Whiting (1992), 77. 
94 Cf. Lennox (2001b), 138: “That suggests that a corpse is not simply functionally unlike its former living 
self, but that it has also undergone a disabling material change, making it akin to a statue of a human.” 
(Italics are by Lennox.) 
95 On this use of the principle of homonymy, see Shields (1999), 131-154. 
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The importance of the matter being appropriate for the performance of the function 
of something is also something that is often stressed in the context of the 
application of the homonymy principle. In the following passage, for example, 
Aristotle criticizes Democritus and others who thought that a thing is what it is by 
virtue of its configuration or color, without taking matter into account (PA.I.1, 
640b33-641a5):  
Καίτοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματος μορφήν, ἀλλ’ ὅμως οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἄνθρωπος. Ἔτι δ’ ἀδύνατον εἶναι χεῖρα ὁπωσοῦν διακειμένην, οἷον χαλκῆν ἢ ξυλίνην, 
πλὴν ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ τὸν γεγραμμένον ἰατρόν. Οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται ποιεῖν τὸ ἑαυτῆς 
ἔργον, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ αὐλοὶ λίθινοι τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἔργον, οὐδ’ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἰατρός. Ὁμοίως 
δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν τοῦ τεθνηκότος μορίων οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστί, λέγω δ’οἷον 
ὀφθαλμός, χείρ. 
“And yet, also a dead [man] has the same shape or configuration, but still he is not a 
man. In addition, it is impossible that a hand is in just any disposition whatsoever, 
for example of bronze or wood, except homonymously, like the painted physician. 
For it will not be capable of performing its proper function, just as neither stone 
flutes, nor the painted physician, can perform their proper function either.”  
Natural and artificial compounds alike have to be constituted of matter that is in a 
certain disposition, if it is to perform its proper function. The idea is here that if we 
want to understand what something is, it is necessary to take the constitutive matter 
into account – precisely because matter is what enables functions to come about.  
Being constituted from the wrong kind of material thus means the 
following: in case of artifacts and natural bodies alike the wrong kind of material is 
that material that is not appropriate with regard to the function the thing has to 
perform – i.e. it does not have the right material potentials to enable it to perform its 
function or at any rate to perform it well. In case of natural bodies a second criterion 
needs to be met in order for the material to be appropriate for the function: the 
matter has to be alive – soul-functions can only be realized in bodies that are 
ensouled.96 Aristotle’s use of the homonymy-principle thus indicates a rather strong 
connection between soul-functions and the natural bodies in which they are 
realized.97 
                                                 
96 Cf. Code & Moravscik (1992), 134. 
97 Shields (1999, 150-151) argues in favor of a functionalist interpretation of Aristotle that Aristotle is not 
committed to the view that the natural body that is instrumental is the only potential basis for the 
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Here we touch upon an important difference between the material constituents of 
artifacts and of natural bodies. Surely, the body cannot be the matter of a living 
being in the same way as, say, the bronze is the matter of a statue: the distinction lies 
in the fact that the bronze persists when being turned into a statue, while there is no 
such analogue for a living being (a living being comes to be out of catamenia, eggs, 
or seeds, which do not persist as the matter of mature living beings). The living 
being thus is not made of the body as the statue is made of the bronze, but rather 
the living being is the body – it is constituted by the body.98 In addition, the material 
constituents of artifacts usually are what they are and have the characteristics they 
have no matter what artifact they constitute, also when they are not incorporated in 
some whole. This, however, is not true of the material constituents of living beings – 
these do not preserve their essence outside a living being or inside a being without 
soul,99 and what is more, sometimes only receive their specific material potentials 
when they are actually part of a living being.100 Again, we can see no analogue for a 
body lying around in an indeterminate, unorganized pile, in the way that bronze can 
(the pieces of a statue are just pieces of bronze, while there are no ‘body pieces’ 
outside the body, except in name). The upshot is that while the bricks of a house will 
still be bricks also after the house has been broken down, an eye will no longer be an 
eye anymore after the body of which it is part has died. As Furth argues, “this 
homonymy extends to the deepest of the underlying parts: the non-uniform organs 
are no longer organs, the intermediate bone(s) and vein(s), etc., no longer bone and 
vein, and the uniform blood and bile no longer blood or bile.”101  
Therefore, although the homonymy principle does not rule out the 
possibility of Aristotle allowing bodily parts to be realizable in different kinds of 
suitable material, it does rule out compositional plasticity in a strong sense. A hand 
made of iron will never be a real hand, even if it were constructed in a way that 
                                                                                                               
realization of soul-functions, because “non-organic bodies are potentially organic; they cannot be identical 
with organic bodies, but this does not preclude their coming to constitute them.” I believe this conclusion 
to be based on a false analogy between natural bodies and artifacts. 
98 Kosman (1987), 374; Freeland (1987), 392. 
99 Lloyd (1992), 165. 
100 Freeland (1987), 395. 
101 Furth (1987), 37. 
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would make it suitable for the function of grasping,102 simply because an iron hand 
does not have life potentially.103 Bodily parts are not just matter (hulê). 
 
2.1.2.d The conditionally necessary relation of function and matter 
The connection between function and matter is not only brought out at a linguistic 
level through the application of the principle of homonymy. Aristotle’s investigation 
of living beings in DA and the biological works shows that body and (soul-) 
functions are also intrinsically connected to each other in an ontological way: the 
teleological notion that underlies this ontological connection is that of conditional 
necessity.  
The notion of conditional necessity is introduced by Aristotle to explain 
the causal and ontological relationship between the material constitution of a thing 
and its function: the material constitution is present and has come to be for the sake 
of the function and is necessitated by that function. Among natural generated things, 
necessity operates on a condition: if some natural thing is to come to be for the 
performance of a certain function, it is necessary that certain materials with certain 
material potentials come to be first and are constitutive of the thing coming to be. 
Aristotle illustrates this notion by analogy with artistic production (PA.I.1, 642a7-
12):   
λέγομεν γὰρ τὴν τροφὴν ἀναγκαῖόν τι κατ’ οὐδέτερον τούτων τῶν τρόπων, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχ 
οἷόν τ’ ἄνευ ταύτης εἶναι. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπεὶ δεῖ 
σχίζειν τῷ πελέκει, ἀνάγκη σκληρὸν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ σκληρόν, χαλκοῦν ἢ σιδηροῦν, οὕτως 
καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον (ἕνεκά τινος γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ 
ὅλον), ἀνάγκη ἄρα τοιονδὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τοιωνδί, εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται.  
“For we say nourishment is something necessary according to neither of those two 
modes of necessity, but because it is not possible to be without it. And this is, as it 
were, conditionally necessary; for just as, since the axe must split, it is a necessity 
that it be hard, and if hard, then made of bronze or iron, so too since the body is an 
instrument (for each of the parts is for the sake of something, and likewise also the 
whole), it is therefore a necessity that it be of such a character and constituted from 
such things, if that is to be.”  
                                                 
102 Cf. GA.I.18, 722b33-723a1. 
103 Cf. Burnyeat (1992a), 26.  
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When a blacksmith wants to produce an axe, he first needs to buy the necessary and 
appropriate material; when nature produces natural bodies as instruments for the 
soul, she first has to produce the necessary and appropriate material with the right 
material potentials from which a properly functioning being arises. Soul and soul-
functions are thus not just realized in functionally appropriate materials; rather they 
conditionally necessitate the coming to be of these materials in the developing 
organism. For natural, living beings, soul-functions and body cannot be contingent 
in a strong ontological sense, for the functions conditionally necessitate the coming 
to be of the particular kind of matter in which they are realized.   
On a theoretical level, both the blacksmith and nature might have more 
than one kind of material available to them that has the right material potentials. A 
blacksmith can thus use either bronze or iron to produce an axe, because both these 
kinds of material have the right material potential for allowing the instrument to 
perform its proper function. Similarly, one could argue that nature could use either 
air or water to produce an eye, because both of these kinds of material have the right 
material potential (i.e. transparency) for sight. The function as such does not 
determine the specific type of material that is necessary for its performance, but 
rather the specific type of material potentials, like the primary contrary potentials of 
the elements such as hot and cold, moist and dry, or like the affections of the 
composite bodies such as heavy and light, rough and smooth, etc. In theory, this 
leaves some room for a weak form of compositional plasticity also in the case of 
living beings.  
In reality, however, the actual material realizations of soul-functions in each 
kind of animal are not essentially contingent.104 The reason for this is that the 
application of conditional necessity to generative processes works out differently for 
the works of nature as opposed to the works of art. For instance, in order for 
something to be a fully functioning axe, it has to meet the formal criterion of 
incorporating the axe-form in some material and the functional criterion of 
possessing the capacity to cut. This requires the artist to build the axe from a 
material that is hard enough to enable the blade to cut through materials such as 
                                                 
104 Cf. Everson (1997), 257. 
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wood. Exactly because the axe is only determined by this one function of cutting, the 
axe-maker has some freedom in design and in choice of materials.  
Organic body parts, and the natural body as a whole, on the other hand, are 
both materially and functionally interdependent. For instance, nature never produces 
an eye, but always an eye of a particular animal species. The integration of parts into 
the complete living being poses some significant limitations on the natural 
possibilities the formal nature of that animal has in generating the eye: the other 
parts an animal has, its bios (life-style and environment), and its activities all put extra 
requirements on the design of the part. This means that the more complex the soul 
of a particular kind of living beings is, the more restricted the constraints on the 
material constitution of the animal’s body and parts will be.105 In addition, parts may 
have to perform multiple functions, and require the presence of other parts or 
functions for their own functioning; all of this restricts the formal nature in realizing 
soul-functions in natural bodies. Moreover, while the artist may have a choice in 
using either iron or bronze, the formal nature usually does not have such 
unrestricted options: it is restricted by the material that is available within the 
elemental make-up of an animal and by whatever kinds and amounts of materials it 
can process from the incoming food.  
The reason why conditional necessity works out more stringently for the 
products of nature than it does for the products of art is thus both that soul-
functions themselves are highly complex, and that their realizations are 
interdependent and co-determined by many other factors.106 In addition, Aristotle’s 
teleological view of nature demands that the actual products of nature are the best 
among what is possible for each kind of animal: because only one kind of realization 
of a certain function will be best for this kind of animal, the possibility of 
compositional plasticity within individual animal kinds is thereby ruled out.107  
                                                 
105 Cf. Furth (1987), 27, 39; and Wilkes (1992), 112. 
106 Cf. Johansen (1998), 283: “This study, however, has given reasons for not taking variation in sense-
organs as evidence of compositional plasticity of the sort that the functionalists have in mind. It is true 
that Aristotle showed considerable interest in the variation in sense-organs. However, the reason why 
different animals had different sense-organs was that perception as the sense-organ’s goal was more 
complex than at first appeared.” 
107 Moreover, nature always operates in an economical way: it will make not only make the best use 
possible of the available materials to realize the functions of the soul, but also the most economical use; 
this also constrains the ways in which those soul-functions are realized; on the economy of nature and its 
relation to teleology, see below in 3.3.1.b. 
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I will conclude this subsection by discussing the material realization of sight to 
further exemplify the limited extent to which soul-functions are compositionally 
plastic according to Aristotle.  
Let me start with an account of the organ of sight. The function of sight is 
realized in the organ of the eye. As Aristotle points out in De Sensu both water and 
air share the right material potential, i.e. transparency, necessary for the eye being 
able to see (Sens.II, 438a12-16):108 
τὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ὄψιν εἶναι ὕδατος ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐ μέντοι συμβαίνει τὸ ὁρᾶν ᾗ ὕδωρ ἀλλ’ 
ᾗ διαφανές· ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀέρος κοινόν ἐστιν. ἀλλ’ εὐφυλακτότερον καὶ εὐπιλητότερον 
τὸ ὕδωρ τοῦ ἀέρος· διόπερ ἡ κόρη καὶ τὸ ὄμμα ὕδατός ἐστιν.  
“That the organ of sight is composed of water is true, but it is not true that seeing 
occurs in so far as it is water, but in so far as it is transparent – and that is common 
also to air. But water is more easily contained and more easily condensed than air: 
and for that reason the pupil and the eye are composed of water.” 
At first sight, this may suggest that Aristotle argues for the compositional plasticity 
of the eye, but as it turns out, the eye cannot be realized in both water and air. For 
Aristotle immediately goes on to explain why water, rather than air, must be the 
matter of the eye in virtue of the other functional properties water has,109 i.e. its being 
easy to contain and its density, both of which air lacks.110 Hence, to say that an eye 
can be realized in different transparent materials because these materials are 
functionally equal (in this one particular respect) would commit Aristotle only to a 
weak version of functionalism. This description still does not capture the point of 
the abovementioned discussion, which is to argue for the claim that eyes can only be 
realized in water (in virtue of its transparency and other functional properties), and 
not just that they are only realized in transparent matter.  
In another passage (GA.II.6, 744a5-29), Aristotle gives a description of the 
complex processes involved in the coming to be of the eye out of “purest part of the 
liquidity about the brain” (GA.II.6, 744a8-9: ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῆς περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον 
                                                 
108 This passage takes place in the middle of Aristotle’s criticism of Democritus’ theory of sight; on the 
significance of this debate for Aristotle’s own theory of sight, see Johansen (1998), 44-51. 
109 See Lloyd (1992), 165n.79.  
110 Moreover, transparency is a nomologically homogeneous property, such that all realizations of sight – 
be it in water or air – would be governed by similar laws of physics, which would therefore rule out any 
strong form of compositional plasticity; see Klein (2002), 8n.7. 
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ὑγρότητος ἀποκρίνεται τὸ καθαρώτατον), which is drained off.111 The matter of the 
eye is thus not ‘just some transparent water’, but the pure, fluid and cold water 
coming from the brain. This suggests that in case of the actual realization of eyes, all 
eyes will basically be constituted from a similar kind of matter (i.e. brain-water). This 
is also suggested in the section leading up to the discussion of the matter of the eye 
(GA.II.6, 743a21-26):  
αὕτη δὲ οὔτε ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖ σάρκα ἢ ὀστοῦν οὔθ’ ὅπου ἔτυχεν οὔθ’ ὁπότ’ ἔτυχεν, 
ἀλλὰ τὸ πεφυκὸς καὶ οὗ πέφυκε καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν ὑπὸ τοῦ μὴ 
τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντος κινητικοῦ ἔσται, οὔτε τὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχον ποιήσει ἐκ τοῦ 
τυχόντος, ὥσπερ οὔτε κιβωτὸν μὴ ἐκ ξύλου ὁ τέκτων ποιήσειεν  ἄν, οὔτ’ ἄνευ τούτου 
κιβωτὸς ἔσται ἐκ τῶν ξύλων.  
“But she [i.e. heat] does not make flesh or bone from whatever it runs into, or 
where it runs into it, or when it runs into it, but that which is by nature disposed for 
it, and where it is naturally fitted, when it is naturally fitted. For neither will that 
which exists potentially be made except by that moving agent which possesses the 
actuality, nor will that which possesses the actuality make anything out of anything 
whatever; just as the carpenter would not make a box except out of wood, and a 
box will not be made out of the wood without the carpenter.”  
Eyes are realized not in any random material, but in the naturally most fitting 
materials, which is the liquid from the brain.  
 
Moving on to the level of bodies of particular animal kinds in which actual eyes are 
enmattered, the following requirements have to be met at the outset. To begin with, 
the animal in which the eye comes to be has to be alive, that is, has to be ensouled. 
There is only one kind of body in which soul-functions can be realized, and that is, 
as we have said before, the body that has life potentially because it has a soul.  
Furthermore, the presence of other functions is presupposed. For example, 
the animal has to have the functions of growth and decline, of self-nutrition, and of 
touch: the function of sight is dependent on all of these ‘lower’ functions (that is, for 
the most part, you will not find animals that are able to see without being able to 
grow, feel, and reproduce). The possession of the capacity for self-nutrition is what 
distinguishes living beings from non-living beings, and it is a precondition for all the 
                                                 
111 For the process of the formation of the eyes, see Johansen (1998), 76. 
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other functions that constitute the living being. Touch is what makes a living being 
an animal rather than a plant, and is therefore an essential function of every animal. 
All these functions together co-determine the material disposition of the animal in 
question. The animal body in which the function of sight is to be locally realized is 
thus already determined to a certain extent by the other vital and essential functions 
the animal has to perform. In addition, the material realization of sight is negotiated 
by all the other functions that are typical for the particular kind of animal.112  
As we said, other factors play a role, too, such as the animal’s need for 
acuity of vision, the basic elemental make-up of the animal, the kind of food it 
processes, and the animal’s natural habitat. The particular material constitution in 
which the function of sight is realized may thus differ from species to species, but in 
each case the material differentiation is conditionally necessitated by the fine-tuning 
of the function of sight in the particular kind of animal.113 As I will discuss in more 
detail in the next chapter (3.2.4), Aristotle usually explains the material 
differentiations of parts that perform the same type of function by reference to the 
better. The material differentiation of parts are thus for the sake of the improvement 
of the performance of that function in that particular kind of animal. This principle 
(see e.g. PA.II.2, 647b29-31) is illustrated by Aristotle with reference to differences 
in the material constitution of eyes (PA.II.2, 648a14-19):  
(...) ὑποληπτέον ἔχειν τὴν διαφοράν, τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ 
ἔργα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζῴων, οἷον ἐχόντων ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀμφοτέρων τὰ μέν 
ἐστι σκληρόφθαλμα τὰ δ’ ὑγρόφθαλμα, καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει βλέφαρα τὰ δ’ ἔχει πρὸς τὸ 
τὴν ὄψιν ἀκριβεστέραν εἶναι. 
“They [i.e. parts] should be assumed to possess a differentiation, in some cases 
relative to what is better or worse, in other cases relative to each animal’s functions 
and substantial being. For instance, two animals may both have eyes. But in one 
these eyes are hard, while in the other they are of fluid consistency; and while the 
one does not have eyelids, the other has it – both are for the sake of a greater 
accuracy of vision.” 
                                                 
112 Cf. Lloyd (1992), 148 on the interdependence of soul and body. 
113 Cohen (1992), 59, might be right in claiming that “in general, there will be no essential connection 
between a psychological state and any particular material realization of it,” but there will still be a 
conditional necessary relation between the psychological state and its particular material realization of it. 
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Whether animals have hard or fluid eyes is largely functionally determined by the 
principle that the material differentiation is for the better, and is therefore non-
contingent for the animal in which sight is realized. 
Another chapter of the Parts of Animals shows how the application of this 
principle works out in the material realizations of eyes (PA.II.13, 657a30-b4; 
657b30-658a10; see figures one and two below). Here Aristotle discusses three types 
of realizations of eyes. First, there are animals with fluid eyes and eyelids; secondly, 
there are animals with hard eyes without eyelids but with mobility; and thirdly, there 
are animals with fluid eyes but without eyelids. The material realization of the eye 
and the (not) having of eyelids are causally correlated in the following way. Animals 
in need of clear vision such as man, birds, and quadrupeds, have fluid eyes, because 
the fluidity contributes to sight. Animals with fluid eyes need protection of those 
eyes, and eyelids are there for the sake of giving fluid eyes that protection. Animals 
such as insects and hard-skinned crustaceans – whose skin is too hard to form 
eyelids from – have hard eyes instead. These hard eyes blunt their vision of 
necessity. To make up for this lack of vision, nature endows these animals with 
mobility “so that, by turning to the light and receiving its beam, the eye may see 
more sharply (PA.II.13, 658a2-3: ὅπως ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ στρέφοντα πρὸς τὸ φῶς καὶ 
δεχόμενα τὴν αὐγήν).” Fish, which live in the water, also lack eyelids, but because the 
water contains less objects that could hit the eyes than air does, and because the 
water hinders sharp sight, they have eyes of fluid consistency. In the first group of 
animals with fluid eyes and eyelids, Aristotle makes a further distinction between the 
birds and the oviparous quadrupeds (PA.IV.11, 691a19-27). The latter have harder 
eyes than birds, because they do not really need much keen vision as they spent most 
of their lives in holes. Birds, on the other hand, need very sharp vision while flying 
through the air – sharpness of vision is more useful to their way of life. In these 
examples, both the material make-up of the animal and its bios fine-tune the animal’s 
function of sight.  
The differences in the material realization of eyes all come to be for the 
sake of an optimal functional performance of the eye within the particular animal 
species. The eye is realized in the best way possible within that animal species: the 
specific function the eye has to perform in a particular animal conditionally 
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necessitates the material constitution the eye has in that animal. In sum, while it may 
seem that among different kinds of animals, eyes can be found to be realized in 
somewhat different,114 kinds of material and material structures, the eye of a 
particular kind of animal could not have been realized in any other way than the way 
it is now without functionally impairing the animal. Because nature always does what 
is best for the substantial being of each kind of animal, the material realizations of 
functions are in each case highly necessitated and determined.  
 
Figure 1: Three Differentiations in Material Realizations of Sight 
 
Animal kind (I.) Man, Birds, and 
Quadrupeds 





Fluid eyes + Eyelids Hard eyes + mobility Fluid eyes 
Need of 
Vision 
High (fluidity of eyes 
contributes to sight) 
High (hardness of eyes 
prevents good vision, but 
their mobility makes up for 
this lack) 
High (fluidity of eyes 
contributes to sight; 





Protection (fluidity of eyes 
makes them vulnerable; 
therefore nature gives them 
eyelids) 
Protection (hardness of skin 
prevents nature from making 
eyelids; therefore nature 
produces hard eyes) 
Not much protection 
(fish live in the water 
which contains fewer 
objects than air) 
Material 
disposition 
Soft skin Hard skin Soft skin 
Habitat Air Air Water 
 
Figure 2: Further Differentiations in Material Realizations of Sight in Category I 
 
Animal kind Birds Oviparous quadrupeds 
Material Realization Fluid – relatively soft eyes Fluid – relatively hard eyes 
Need of Vision Relatively higher need for vision Relatively lower need for vision 
Habitat Fly often through the air Live in holes under the ground 
 
Because of this teleological dimension, I believe that Shields is wrong to conclude 
from Aristotle’s remark in DA.I.4, 408b21-22 (“if an old man were to receive an eye 
of the right sort, he would see just as a young man”; εἰ γὰρ λάβοι ὁ πρεσβύτης ὄμμα 
τοιονδί, βλέποι ἂν ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ νέος), that Aristotle “allows in principle that one could 
gradually replace bodily parts at will with others of the right sort, viz. ones capable of 
performing the functional role assigned to those parts, and still end up with a 
                                                 
114 Cf. DA.II.9, 421b26-422a4: “It seems that in man this sense-organ differs from that of the other 
animals, just as his eyes differ from those of the hard-eyed animals – for his eyes have eyelids, as a screen 
and sheath, as it were, and he cannot see without moving or raising them. But the hard-eyed animals have 
nothing of this sort, but see straightaway what takes place in the transparent.” 
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functioning human being.”115 Aristotle’s point here is that due to process of aging 
the material constitution of the eye deteriorates (just as in case of drunkenness or 
disease). Would the old man receive the eye of a young man, which is materially 
equivalent to the eye of the old man (this is what would constitute an eye of the right 
sort), except for the fact that it is in better shape (e.g. it is a little more moist), the old 
man would not merely be able to see, but be able to see well. Aristotle emphasizes 
here that the material constitution affects the quality of the functioning of a part, not 
that the material constitution is irrelevant to the realization of functions. 
In order to stress the importance of the material constitution of the parts in 
which the function is realized, I would like to discuss briefly the case of the mole. 
The mole is an animal that we expect to have – like all other viviparous animals that 
have feet – all the five senses, but is in fact deprived of sight. The mole has eyes, but 
they are hidden away under a layer of thick skin. Aristotle meticulously describes (in 
HA.I.9, 491b26-36; HA.IV.8, 532b33-533a15) all the material constitutive parts of 
the eye of the mole, which match the parts of ordinary eyes in every way (the black 
part, the part inside it called the pupil, and the fatty part surrounding it). The only 
difference with normally functioning eyes is that the eyes of the mole are too small 
to serve the function of sight.116 This is why Aristotle characterizes the mole as a 
mutilated or defective kind (HA.IV.8, 533a2: τι πεπήρωται γένος), which indicates 
the structural (as opposed to an accidental one) and therefore generic shortcoming 
of the mole. Accordingly, the blindness of the mole is described in terms of being “a 
deprivation according to itself (Met.V.22, 1022b24-26: Στέρησις (...) τὸ δὲ καθ’ 
αὑτό).” It thus seems to be part of the nature of the mole to be deprived of sight. 
Strictly speaking, the eyes of the mole are not for the sake of something as they do 
not perform the function for the sake of which they have come to be, but the fact 
that Aristotle still refers to these parts as eyes (be it in a very careful way because of 
the homonymy principle) is important (HA.I.9, 491b29-30): 
Τοῦτον δὲ τρόπον μέν τιν’ ἔχειν ἂν θείη τις, ὅλως δ’ οὐκ ἔχειν. 
                                                 
115 Shields (1990), 21. 
116 The reason why the mole has defective eyes is that the passing of fluid from the brain to the eyes 
through channels has been stunted; see Johansen (1998), 76.  
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“In some sense one could posit that it has [eyes], but it does not have [eyes] in the 
full sense.”117   
The material and structural resemblances between the functioning eyes and the eyes 
of the mole are close enough for Aristotle to say that the mole in some sense has 
eyes.118  
In sum, the goal of sight is not just to enable an animal to see without 
qualification, but to enable him to see given his elemental make-up, natural activities 
and habitat. Eyes are realized in the best and only way possible within each kind of 
animal. This means that functions are specified to the particular animal in which 
there are realized, and thus by conditional necessity, that the particular material 
potentials are specified as well. The material differentiation at the lowest level, say, 
between hard and fluid eye-jellies, is either necessary for the well-functioning of the 
particular animal kind, or the result of other basic explanatory factors such as the 
elemental make-up of the animal in question. In both cases the particular material 
realization matters, because it is typical for that kind of animal. In Aristotle’s 
teleological biology, eyes could not have been realized differently for each particular 
animal without functionally impairing that animal or without turning it into a 
different kind of animal. 
  
2.1.2.e Functional analogy 
This brings me to the final issue of what Aristotle calls the analogous parts. The 
existence of analogous parts has been brought in by functionalist readers of Aristotle 
as providing an example of functions that are structurally realized in different ways 
in different kinds of animals.119 Aristotle’s use of the term ‘analogous parts’ has thus 
been interpreted as an indication for his commitment to the compositional plasticity 
thesis, but, as I will argue, unrightfully so.  
                                                 
117 Cf. DA.III.1, 425a11-12. 
118 The suggestion seems to be that the eyes of a mole are more entitled to be called ‘eyes’ than the eyes of 
a dead human being. Both kinds of eyes are functionless (and thus lack their essence), but while the eye of 
a dead man might as well have been made of the wrong kind of material (as the eye undergoes some 
material change when the body dies and is no longer ensouled), the eyes of the mole at least meet some of 
the material requirements (such as being constituted of ensouled matter), unfinished and non-functional 
as they may be.  
119 Cohen (1992), 59; Nussbaum (1978), 83; and Shields (1990), 24. 
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Analogous parts are parts that belong to animals who do not share a common 
genus120 and that perform the same function (e.g. ‘protecting the body’), but are 
different both in form and in name (e.g. hairs, scales, and feathers).121 The question 
is of what nature the proclaimed functional identity of these parts is. If it is an 
identity pertaining to the type of function, and if functions are what define the 
essence of a thing, why does Aristotle not refer to them by the same name?122 The 
functionalist interpretation of Aristotle holds that whatever performs the function of 
the lung is a lung, but it seems that Aristotle rather prefers to distinguish the lung 
from its anonymous counterpart (the part is anonymous because of defaults of the 
natural language) which is functionally analogical to it but different in form (cf. 
PA.I.4, 644a12-22), and refrains from producing a new coinage (the situation is 
similar in the case of the blood and it anonymous counterpart). In the cases like that 
of the bones of men and fish-spines in fish Aristotle in fact uses different names to 
refer to analogous parts.123 If the functions the analogous parts perform (e.g. 
‘protecting the body’) are identical without qualification, then the widely varying 
material realizations of these parts among different kinds of animals (e.g. hairs in 
humans, scales in fish, and feathers in birds) demonstrate the compositional 
plasticity of soul-functions among different kinds of animals. However, by definition, the 
analogous parts are different in form and thus not identical without qualification. 
This means that, for instance, what it is for a body to be protected is different for 
different kinds of animals (e.g. ‘protection against water’ for fish, and ‘protection 
against air’ for birds); this limits the compositional plasticity of a soul-function to a 
particular kind of animal (e.g. ‘protection against water’ is perhaps realized 
differently for different kinds of fish, although they all have scales).  
                                                 
120 On this use of analogy, see Charles (2000), 242 and Lloyd (1996), 140-141. 
121 For a reference to analogous parts within DA, see DA.II.4, 416a5-6: “but as the heads are in animals, 
so are the roots in plants, if it is necessary to speak of organs as different or the same in virtue of their 
functions.” Cf. also PA.I.4, 644a16-22: “For those animals that differ by degree and the more and the less 
have been brought together under one kind, while those that are analogous have been kept apart (…).”; 
PA.I.5, 645b6-10: “for instance, some groups have lungs, other have no lung, but an organ analogous to a 
lung in its place; some have blood, others have no blood, but a fluid analogous to blood, and with the 
same office.” 
122 Cf. DA.II.4, 416b23-24: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἅπαντα προσαγορεύειν δίκαιον (“Since it is right to call 
all things after their end (…).”) 
123 See e.g. HA.I.1, 486b19-21: “there are some animals whose parts are neither identical in form nor 
differing in the way of excess or defect; but they are the same only in the way of analogy, as, for instance, 
bone is only analogous to fish-bone, nail to hoof, and to claw, and scale to heather; for what the feather is 
in a bird, the scale is in a fish.” and PA.644b11-12: “For their parts differ not by analogous likeness, as 
bone in mankind is related to fish-spine in fish (...).” 
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Aristotle offers a solution for how the concept of analogy should be used in biology 
in the Posterior Analytics (APo.II.14, 98a20-24):  
Ἔτι δ’ ἄλλος τρόπος ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἐκλέγειν. ἓν γὰρ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτό, 
ὃ δεῖ καλέσαι σήπιον καὶ ἄκανθαν καὶ ὀστοῦν· ἔσται δ’ ἑπόμενα καὶ τούτοις ὥσπερ μιᾶς 
τινος φύσεως τῆς τοιαύτης οὔσης 
“Again, another method is to select by analogy: you cannot take any one identical 
thing which pounce and spine and bone should be called; but there will be items 
which follow these features too, as though there were some single nature of this sort.”  
According to this passage, one is to think of analogous parts as performing some 
function that does not pick out any real ‘nature’, but from the assumption of which 
it will still be possible to identify the characteristics that follow from it. The common 
function performed by analogous parts is nothing but a formal description,124 
serving a heuristic function within the context of explanation and demonstration,125 
based on a mere abstraction from the different species of a function that are actually 
realized in different animals. This common function does not specify the material 
potentials necessary for the realization of it, because it only picks out an ‘as if 
nature’, and is not part of any real soul. This is in line with the way Aristotle 
generally speaks about soul-functions. Outside the context of DA, Aristotle never 
talks about ‘the’ function of sight being realized in ‘an’ eye, but rather about ‘the 
function of sight being realized in this particular kind of animal’.126 So although one 
could say that analogous parts such as hairs, scales and feathers are there for the sake 
of the performance of the ‘same’, common or general function, that is, to cover and 
protect the animal, the need to be covered is not the same, nor is the eidos of the 
function of covering in different kinds of animals. The problem Aristotle faces here 
is in fact how exactly analogous parts are connected if they do not share the same 
form.127 
My contention is that Aristotle thinks about a common definition of ‘the 
function of seeing’ in the same way as he thinks about a common definition of soul: 
                                                 
124 Barnes (1993), 251.  
125 Lloyd (1996), 145-146. 
126 As Charlton (1993), 198, points out, soul is always the soul of some being; the same holds for the soul’s 
functions or capacities – they are always the functions or capacities of some kind of living being. Cf. 
Aristotle’s concluding remark at DA.II.3, 415a13-14: “it is thus clear that the account of each of these 
[capacities] is the most appropriate also with regard to the soul.” 
127 On this problem, see Lloyd (1996), 145-57. 
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the common definitions are only marginally interesting, or even ridiculous (DA.II.3, 
414b25: geloion), as they pertain to no particular living thing and to no real nature128 
(DA.II.3, 414b20-29; DA.II.3, 414b32-33):  
ὥστε καθ’ ἕκαστον ζητητέον, τίς ἑκάστου ψυχή, οἷον τίς φυτοῦ καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπου ἢ 
θηρίου.  
“Therefore we must inquire in each separate case what the soul is of each, for 
instance, what of a plant, what of a human being, and what of a wild animal.”  
It is the particular functions of particular animals that Aristotle is interested in, and 
at this level there is no room for compositional plasticity.  
 
In conclusion, it seems that for Aristotle most natural bodies and parts are non-
multiply realizable. The hypothesis that “at some abstract level, the possibility [of 
compositional plasticity] is at least conceivable”129 to Aristotle, is therefore not so 
much wrong, as that it misrepresents Aristotle’s explanatory project. Aristotle’s 
concern to explain and uncover the kinds of material constitutions and the potentials 
of the material underlying the realization of psychological functions at the level of 
particular animal kinds reveals that Aristotle does not hold a functionalist attitude at 
all. We may grant the functionalist interpreters of Aristotle that he indeed commits 
to a weak sense of compositional plasticity also for natural beings, since in Aristotle’s 
view functions only determine (and conditionally necessitate) the suitable material 
potentials, and not the particular matter. I hope, however, to have shown that in 
reality the material constitution of a part is in fact highly determined and necessitated 
because of the (inter)dependency of functions and because of the other factors (such 
as bios) that specify the function within the animal kind; this is reflected in the 
practice of the actual explanations Aristotle gives of the realizations of psychological 
functions in particular animals. The different material realizations of soul-functions 
are the necessary result of the teleological procedure of nature: given all the other 
facts about an animal, the way a soul-function is realized, is the best and only way 
possible for that animal; Aristotelian functions are always optimal functions. 
Accordingly, soul-functions prove to be non-multiply realizable in the animal to 
                                                 
128 Klein (2002), 12. 
129 Cohen (1992), 59. Modern functionalism only requires commitment to the epistemic conceivability of 
compositional plasticity (in contrast to actual, ontological compositional plasticity) for someone to qualify 
as a functionalist, but to call Aristotle a functionalist in this sense is an empty claim.  
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which they belong. A functionalist may say that this is a contingent fact of this 
world, and that Aristotle still – in theory – allows for compositional plasticity, but 
my reply would be that it is this world, and, in particular, the living beings that 
occupy this world, that Aristotle endeavors to explain.  
Moreover, Aristotle’s form of functionalism is not topic-neutral.130 There 
are restrictions on the kinds of material that can perform bio-psychological 
functions: the material has to be natural or organic, which means that it has to have 
an internal source of motion and rest, and to be potentially alive, which means that it 
has to be endowed with soul. This implies, among other things, that according to 
Aristotle statues will never be able to experience the same psychological states as 
animals do, no matter how similar their internal organization will be to that of 
animals. On the other hand, Aristotle is not concerned with making computers 
think; he is concerned with the explanation of living beings that need specific 
material, or rather, bodily parts in order to perform their characteristic functions.131 
A functionalist reading of Aristotle does not represent Aristotle’s own account of 
the relation of body to soul, nor his primary interests in the teleological explanation 
of life. 
Aristotle uses functional concepts not as a result of his supposed 
functionalist conception of the soul, but as a result of his teleological conception of 
nature. 
 
2.2 Teleology in the analysis of the capacities of the soul 
 
2.2.1 Teleology and the general capacities of the soul 
In this section, I provide an analysis of the ways in which teleological notions play a 
role in Aristotle’s discussion of the various general capacities of the soul. Since soul 
is coextensive with life, and since life is one of those things that are “spoken of in 
many ways,” Aristotle sets out to distinguish the different ways or forms of life in 
                                                 
130 On topic neutrality, see Caston (2006), 321-322 and Smart (1959), 141-156. 
131 I essentially agree with Rorty (1992), 9: “Any and every psuchê is a logos enhulos realized in a physical body 
of a certain kind, rather than in matter as it might be described by a theoretical physicist. (…) [W]hile 
there are general resemblances or analogies between the psychological functions of distinctive types of 
animals, the full explanation of those functions essentially refers to the specific physiology of a certain type of animal.” (The 
italics are mine.) 
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DA by listing the functions that are in some way or another most characteristic of 
life.132 In this section, I will first outline the organization of the different life 
functions Aristotle distinguishes (largely in DA.II.2-4), and show how the 
ontological hierarchy of the life-functions laid out in DA (in which higher life-
functions do not occur without the lower ones being present too) gives rise to a 
more teleological colored hierarchy in the biology (in which the higher life-functions 
are present ‘for the sake of’ the lower ones). In the next subsection, I will analyze the 
teleological explanations Aristotle offers for the presence of various capacities of the 
soul. 
 
2.2.1.a The hierarchy of the capacities of the soul 
In DA.II.2-4, Aristotle distinguishes the living from the non-living broadly in terms 
of the presence of at least one life-function (DA.II.2, 413a20-23): 
λέγομεν οὖν, ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τῆς σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου τῷ ζῆν. 
πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, κἂν ἕν τι τούτων ἐνυπάρχῃ μόνον, ζῆν αὐτό φαμεν 
(...).  
“So we say, taking this as a starting point for the inquiry, that what is ensouled is 
distinguished from what is soulless by living. But living is said in more than one 
way, and if any one alone of the following is present in something, we say that it is 
alive (…).”133  
The specific listings of life-functions often vary in different texts in DA, but on the 
whole they seem to include a selection from the following seven:  
1) decay and growth (φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις); 
2) movement with respect to nutrition (κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφὴν);  
3) appetite (ὄρεξις);  
4) imagination (φαντασία);  
                                                 
132 The terminology Aristotle uses in his discussions might need some brief clarification. Aristotle speaks 
of the dunameis of the soul (e.g. DA.II.2, 413a22), which I translate as the capacities (or faculties) of the 
soul. Sometimes Aristotle calls them môria (parts) of the soul, but this should not be taken too literally 
(perhaps ‘aspects’ would be a better translation). The energeia or praxis (activity) of these dunameis (a dunamis 
is a capacity or potentiality for an activity) is what Aristotle equates with the performance of erga 
(functions). The individual functions are usually indicated by the use of the substantive form of the 
infinitive (to -ein; e.g. to noein), or with an action-noun (-sis; e.g. noêsis), while the adjectivum verbale (to –
ikon; e.g. to noêtikon) is used to indicate the capacities or faculties of the soul, but sometimes also that 
which has these capacities or faculties. The supinum (to –on; e.g. to noêton) is used to refer to the objects of 
the capacity. 
133 (Cf. DA.II.3, 414a29-32).  
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5) perception (αἴσθησις);  
6) locomotion or movement with respect to place and rest (κίνησις καὶ 
στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον);  
7) thinking (διανοία) or the possession of intellect (νοῦς).  
In other passages, Aristotle states that it is the presence of one particular function 
that singles out the living from the non-living. This is the function of nutrition, 
involving both self-nutrition (τὸ θρεπτικὸν) and reproduction (γεννήσις).134   
The two accounts Aristotle offers of what constitutes life do not contradict 
each other.135 First of all, it is the having of soul which truly and primarily makes 
something alive, and only secondarily the having of a particular soul- or life-function 
(cf. DA.II.2, 413a21-22). Since all the capacities for life-functions are ‘parts’ of the 
soul, the presence of either one of these functions in a natural body will be sufficient 
for it to qualify as being alive. Secondly, among perishable living beings, the presence 
of any one of the life functions presupposes ultimately the presence of the capacity 
of nutrition (I will return to the issue of the interdependence of the life functions 
below). If some being possesses the nutritive capacity, it meets the most basic 
functional requirement for being called alive. Thirdly, although Aristotle focuses 
mainly on the perishable living beings and their life functions in DA, his broader 
account of life leaves open the possibility for there being a divine kind of living, 
which is constituted only by the function of thinking.  
The series of life functions Aristotle puts forward is not organized 
randomly, but follows a strict ontological hierarchy in which the higher function can 
only exist if the lower one exists and is realized in the natural being, all the way down 
to the function of nutrition which the basic life-function.136 The function of 
nutrition is the only function that for its presence does not rely on the presence of 
other functions (DA.II.2, 413a31-32):  
χωρίζεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τῶν ἄλλων δυνατόν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα τούτου ἀδύνατον ἐν τοῖς 
θνητοῖς.  
“That one [i.e. the capacity of nutrition] can exist separately of the others, but the 
others cannot [exist separately] from that in mortal beings.”  
                                                 
134 See e.g. DA.II.2, 413b2-3 and DA.II.4, 415a22-25. 
135 Pace Matthews (1992), 185-193. 
136 Cf. Barnes (1971-72). 
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The fact that the capacity to absorb food, in virtue of which living beings have life, 
can exist separately or independently of the other capacities is clear in the case of 
plants: they have no other capacity of the soul except for the capacity of nutrition.137 
For this reason, the function of nutrition is both what makes something a living 
being in the most rudimentary form, and what constitutes the defining or essential 
function of plants, the lowest life-form.  
For animals, the next life-form, the defining function is the perceptive 
function of touch (ἁφή; DA.II.2, 413b2; b5; cf. DA.II.3, 414b1-4). Aristotle uses the 
function of perception as a collective term encompassing a number of perceptive 
functions for which an animal may or may not have to capacity; touch is the first and 
most basic one among them. Just as the capacity of nutrition can exist independently 
of the other capacities, in the same way touch can exist independently of the other 
perceptive capacities (DA.II.2, 413b5-7: ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι 
τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων; DA.II.3, 415a4-5).  
For human beings (and possibly for some other kind of being more 
honorable than humans), the highest life-forms, the essential function that marks 
their specific kind of living is thinking (DA.II.3, 414b18-19; 414b18: τὸ διανοητικόν 
τε καὶ νοῦς), which is the highest function.138 This gives evidence for the idea that 
function and essence are intrinsically connected for Aristotle: for the essential 
differences between different types of living beings (i.e. plant, animal, human being, 
god) are determined by the kinds of capacities for the performance of certain 
functions they have.139  
In describing the hierarchy among the different functions of the soul, 
Aristotle uses the verb chôrizesthai, indicating the independent existence of one 
psychic function from another in terms of its ‘ontological separability’.140 Aristotle 
explains this notion through an analogy between the capacities of the soul and 
complex rectilinear figures (DA.II.3, 414b28-32):  
                                                 
137 See DA.II.2, 413a33-b1; DA.II.3, 414a33-b1; DA.II.3, 415a2-3; and DA.II.4, 41523-26. 
138 In human beings, this function seems to be dependent on the capacity of imagination (DA.III.8, 
432a8-9), but perhaps in divine beings it need not be. 
139 DA.II.2, 414a1; cf. the case for the perceptive capacities: DA.II.2, 414a2-4; DA.II.3, 414a29-31. 
140 Broadie (1996), 163-164. 
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παραπλησίως δ’ ἔχει τῷ περὶ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ τὰ κατὰ ψυχήν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς 
ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον ἐπί τε τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, οἷον ἐν 
τετραγώνῳ μὲν τρίγωνον, ἐν αἰσθητικῷ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικόν.  
“What applies to the soul is almost the same as what applies to geometrical figures. 
For in both figures and things that are ensouled, that which is prior always exists 
potentially in that which follows in order, for instance, the triangle in the 
quadrilateral, and the nutritive capacity in the perceptive.”  
Just as more basic rectilinear figures are potentially contained in the ones that are 
next figure in order, in the same way the nutritive capacity of the soul is potentially 
contained in the next capacity in order, which is the perceptive capacity. The unity 
between the different capacities described here is one of order (taxis):141 just as in a 
sequence of numbers the number one can be without number five, number five 
cannot be without number one, because number one exists potentially in number 
five. In the lines following this analogy, Aristotle explains the interdependency of 
functions in the soul in terms of the higher capacity not being able to exist without 
the lower capacity, while the lower capacity can exist independently of the other 
capacities (DA.II.3, 415a2-3): 
ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦ δ’ αἰσθητικοῦ χωρίζεται τὸ 
θρεπτικὸν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. πάλιν δ’ ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία 
ὑπάρχει, ἁφὴ δ’ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει·  
“For without the nutritive capacity there is no perceptive capacity, but the nutritive 
capacity is present in separation of the perceptive capacity in plants. Again, without 
the sense of touch none of the other perceptive capacities are present, but touch is 
present without the others.” 
Here Aristotle contrasts the separability of the nutritive capacity (chôrizetai) and of 
the capacity of touch (aneu huparchei) with the not being able to exist of the 
perceptive capacity without the nutritive one (aneu ouk esti). The hierarchy thus 
sketched between the different capacities of the soul is a purely ontological one142  
but as Aristotle points out, this is not all that there is to it (DA.II.3, 414b33-415a1): 
                                                 
141 See Met.V.11, 1018b26-29. 
142 What the precise relations of ontologically independency and dependency are among the various 
capacities of the soul remains unclear in DA, especially with regard to the capacities associated with 
perception and desire: The capacity of perception seems to presuppose the presence of the faculties of 
imagination (phantasia) and appetite (orexis). Aristotle explains that where there is perception, there is also 
pain and pleasure: in DA.II.3, 414b4-6 Aristotle adds the pleasant (hêdu) and the painful (lupêron), and 
where there are pain and pleasure, there is also of necessity desire (epithumia; DA.II.2, 413b23-25). 
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διὰ τίνα δ’ αἰτίαν τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχουσι, σκεπτέον. 
 “For what reason they are in that state of arrangement, needs to be investigated.” 
This question will be answered teleologically at the end of DA (in particular in 
DA.III.12-13, discussed below). Based on the assumption that nature does nothing 
in vain, the ontological hierarchy is there interpreted as a ‘taxonomical’ hierarchy143 
in which the lower functions are seen as a precondition for the existence of the 
higher and where the higher functions are explained as contributory to the lower 
functions.  
In the biological context, the focus is thus no longer on the ontological 
status of functions, but rather on the conditional and non-symmetrical relation 
between the function in question and the other functions that coexist within a living 
being.144 The lower functions are explained as those functions that are of vital or 
essential necessity for the specific life-form: that is, without the realization of those 
functions, the animal would not be able to survive or to be the kind of animal it is 
supposed to be. The higher functions reflect an increasing complexity of the 
organism and its life-form, and their presence is usually explained as contributing to 
the goals pursued by the performance of the basic vital or essential functions (except 
for the function of thinking, which has a function of its own).145 The notion 
underlying the hierarchy and the combinations of soul-functions to be found in 
living beings laid out in this way is teleological, if only in a loose sense: even though 
the higher functions are not conditionally necessitated by the lower ones, their 
                                                                                                               
Sometimes Aristotle offers a somewhat different account: if there is perception, then there is also desire. 
Desire on its turn is characterized as a sub-capacity of appetite (it is the appetite for the pleasant; DA.II.3, 
414b6-7), where appetite consists of desire, passion (thumos), wishing (boulêsis) (DA.II.3, 414b2-3). Hunger 
(peina) and thirst (dipsa) are sub-capacities of desire (DA.II.3, 414b12-14). Tasting is a sub-capacity of the 
perceptive function of touch (DA.II.3, 414b7-12); in addition to the capacity of touch, the faculty of 
perception also encompasses the capacities of vision (opsis), hearing (akoês), and smell (osmê) (DA.II.3, 
415a5-6). The cases of imagination (DA.II.3, 414b17-18) and of theoretical thinking (theôrêtikon) are less 
clear cut; the latter “seems to be a different kind (genos) of soul (cf. DA.II.3, 415a12-13: peri de tou 
theôrêtikou nou heteros logos), which alone allows of existing independently [of the other capacities], exactly in 
the way the eternal exists independently of the perishable (DA.II.2, 413b26-27).”  
143 Cf. Caston (1996, 184-186) on the conception of chôristos as ‘taxonomical separability. 
144 On this notion of priority and posteriority, cf. Met.V.11, 1019a2-4: “Now some things are called prior 
and posterior in that way, but others in accordance with nature and substantial being, namely those things 
that are capable of being without other things (ὅσα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων), while those others are not 
capable of being without them, which is a distinction Plato used.” 
145 Pace Johnson (2005), 9, who holds that the simpler functions exist for the sake of the more complex 
ones. The hierarchy rather works the other way around: the more complex functions are for the better 
and exist therefore to a certain extent for the sake of the simpler functions, because they increase the 
animal’s ways of surviving and reproducing itself, which are the most basic and simple life-functions, but 
are also the most necessary ones. 
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presence would make no sense if the lower ones or some other related capacities 
were not present as well (e.g. the presence of the locomotive capacity would make 
no sense if the capacity for perception or for desire were not present too).146    
In sum, the hierarchy reflects a purely ontological organization which is 
then reinterpreted in teleological terms,147 thus providing the starting point for the 
explanation of the parts and features of living beings in the biological works. 
 
2.2.1.b The teleology of the capacities of the soul 
In DA, Aristotle does not only discuss the hierarchical relation between the different 
capacities of the soul, he also provides teleological explanations of why living beings 
have the capacities for the performance of the particular functions they have. The 
capacities are themselves defined in terms of the goal-directed activity (i.e. the 
function) they are the capacity for, but note that the goal that will be achieved by the 
actualization of the capacity differs from the goal identified in the teleological 
account explaining why living beings have the capacities they have. The first goal will 
be an answer to the question of what the actuality of a particular capacity of the soul 
amounts to (the proper ergon or final cause of the process), such as getting or 
digesting food. The second goal will be an answer to the question of why that 
capacity of the soul does what it does (the ultimate goal that is served by a well-
functioning part in the context of the living being to which it belongs), such as 
preserving life. I will first discuss the teleological explanations Aristotle offers for the 
necessary essential or vital functions, such as the nutritive function and the 
perceptive functions. Next, I will discuss an example Aristotle offers concerning a 
non-necessary function, namely voice.  
 
As discussed above, the capacity of nutrition, being that in virtue of which 
something has life, is common to all living beings, and the basic capacity on which 
all other soul-capacities build (DA.II.4, 415a23-25): 
                                                 
146 Cf. Hankinson (1998), 154. 
147 Aristotle does so without taking any resource to value-terms; pace Ross (1961), 337. The locus classicus 
for Aristotle’s concept of a value-laden scala naturae is HA.VIII.1, 588b4-22 (cf. PA.IV.5, 681a10-15; 
PA.II.10, 656a3-13), but even there, ‘higher’ seems to be functionally defined as ‘having a higher amount 
of life and of living well’, i.e. having more being in the form of having more life functions, and thus of 
having a greater organic complexity. Cf. Lennox (1999), 6-7 on PA.II.10, 656a3-13. 
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ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμίς ἐστι 
ψυχῆς, καθ’ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν. 
“For the nutritive soul belongs also to the others [i.e. living beings], and it is the 
first and most common capacity of the soul, by which life belongs to them all.” 
For this reason, Aristotle starts his investigation of the capacities of the soul in 
DA.II.4 with the discussion of what this capacity amounts to, i.e. its function and 
activity, and of why all living beings have this capacity. The function of the nutritive 
capacity is both to reproduce and to use food (DA.II.4, 415a25-26: ἧς ἐστὶν ἔργα 
γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρῆσθαι), and these two functions are claimed to be the most 
natural functions among living beings (DA.II.4, 415a27: φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων 
τοῖς ζῶσιν; cf. Pol.I.2, 1252a28-30). Aristotle explains reproduction as “the 
production of another like itself (DA.II.4, 415a28: τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό)”, the 
goal of which (that is, the reason why all living beings need to be able to reproduce) 
is this (DA.II.4, 415a29-b7): 
ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ᾗ δύνανται· πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, καὶ 
ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν (τὸ δ’ οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ δὲ 
ᾧ). ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν 
ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ταὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ᾗ δύναται μετέχειν ἕκαστον, 
κοινωνεῖ ταύτῃ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δ’ ἧττον, καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλ’ οἷον αὐτό, 
ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἕν, εἴδει δ’ ἕν. 
“To participate in the eternal and the divine for as far as they can. For everything 
desires this, and does everything it does in accordance with nature for the sake of 
this. (For ‘that for the sake of which’ is twofold: that of which and that for which.) 
Since, then, it is not possible to participate in the eternal and divine by continuous 
existence, because no perishable being is able to remain the same and one in 
number, each shares in it for as far as it can, it participates in it, the one more, the 
other less; and it remains not the same, but like itself, not one in number, but one in 
form.” 
By reproducing something like itself, that is, by reproducing something that has the 
same form as it has itself, and thereby preserving its particular kind of life-form, 
perishable beings can participate in the ‘eternal and divine’.148 This is, according to 
Aristotle, the ultimate goal for all action. The idea that generation is for the sake of 
sharing in the eternal and divine goes back to the principle that being is better than 
                                                 
148 Lennox (2001a), 137. 
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not being, and living better than not living (GA.II.1, 731b24-732a1; GC.II.11, 
338b6-19).149 A perishable individual will by nature not be able to hold on to life 
eternally, but its kind is capable of being eternal, if it is passed on to the individual’s 
offspring, and this will be its good. A man will reproduce himself and thereby 
preserve mankind because it is the only and best way possible for a man to participate 
in the eternal and the divine.150 It is important to note that it is the individual’s 
striving for participation in the eternal and the divine which is the true final cause of 
reproduction, not the preservation of the life-form as such. The individual does not 
reproduce itself for the sake of its form but for the sake of its own individual good 
from which the preservation of the life-form follows.151 The ultimate final cause that 
‘everything desires to participate in the eternal and the divine’ is taken as the self-
evident starting-point of the explanation of generation. The preservation of life 
which follows from this desire presents the starting point for the teleological 
explanations of all other life functions: ultimately all functions, parts and features of 
a living being must be accounted for in terms of their contribution to the 
preservation of this particular kind of living being – of what will either be necessary 
or for the better for the preservation of this kind of substantial being. Generation 
for the sake of the self-preservation of a particular kind of life is the most basic 
teleological explanation Aristotle offers.152 
 So far, Aristotle has only provided a teleological explanation for the 
generative function of the nutritive soul.153 Aristotle’s account of the nutritive 
functions in the sense of the use of food starts with a consideration of the nature of 
food, following the necessary methodological order of studying capacities as laid out 
at the beginning of the chapter (DA.II.4, 415a14-23). Next, Aristotle distinguishes 
the nutritive function from the capability of producing growth; it is in this context 
that Aristotle states the reason why a living being needs the nutritive function. By 
way of nourishing itself, the living being “saves its substantial being, and exists as 
long as it also feeds itself” (DA.II.4, 416b14-15: σώζει γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ μέχρι 
                                                 
149 Ultimately, the idea goes back to Pl.Symp.207c-208b. 
150 Cf. Lennox (2001a), 133-137. 
151 Balme (1987c, 279-280. 
152 Cf. Johnson (2005), 171-178. 
153 In fact, at the end of DA.II.4 Aristotle prefers to call the nutritive capacity the generative soul, 
apparently after its primary function (DA.II.4, 416b23-24). 
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τούτου ἔστιν ἕως ἂν τρέφηται). The nutritive function is the capacity that allows the 
animal to preserve itself, and that prepares the food for activity. Without food, a 
living being is not able to exist (DA.II.4, 416b17-20).  
While the generative function is thus in one sense for the sake of the 
preservation of the animal-kind as a whole, the nutritive function is primarily for the 
sake of the preservation and the functioning of the individual animal (which is of 
course a prerequisite if the animal is to reach sexual maturity and to reproduce itself). 
It is also clear now why it is that the nutritive soul is explanatorily basic for all the 
other capacities: without food the higher capacities simply cannot exist. The nutritive 
function is thus the most vital function of the animal (DA.III.12, 434a22-26):  
Τὴν μὲν οὖν θρεπτικὴν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἔχειν ὅτι περ ἂν ζῇ καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχῃ, ἀπὸ 
γενέσεως καὶ μέχρι φθορᾶς· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ γενόμενον αὔξησιν ἔχειν καὶ ἀκμὴν καὶ 
φθίσιν, ταῦτα δ’ ἄνευ τροφῆς ἀδύνατον· ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐνεῖναι τὴν θρεπτικὴν δύναμιν ἐν 
πᾶσι τοῖς φυομένοις καὶ φθίνουσιν· 
“Everything then that lives and has a soul must have the nutritive soul, from birth 
until death; for anything that has come to be must have growth, maturity, and 
decline, and these things are impossible without nourishment. The potentiality for 
nutrition must then be present in all things which grow and decline.”154  
The remark that the nutritive function is presupposed by the capacity of growth and 
decline shows how strong it is connected to the material processes going on in the 
living being’s body. The most basic level of life is constituted by the regulation of the 
flow of matter, without which there is no life and which, more importantly, 
distinguishes it from the non-living; the soul as the form of a living being provides 
the matter for the body “by processing matter through itself by way of metabolism, 
growth, and reproduction.”155  
 Aristotle does not provide any justification for why the nutritive and 
generative function are both functions of the same nutritive capacity, but maybe the 
similarity in the teleological explanations of the two functions offers somewhat of a 
justification. Both functions are for the sake of the preservation of the animal, the 
one qua individual to the life and well-being of which the individual itself can 
contribute by feeding itself, the other qua the animal belonging to a particular animal 
                                                 
154 Cf. PA.II.10, 655b30-2: “it is not possible to be or to grow without food.” 
155 Grene & Depew (2004), 31. 
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kind to the eternity of which the individual animal can contribute by reproducing 
itself. In sum, the nutritive capacity of the soul serves the preservation of life.  
The perceptive capacity of touch is not only an essential or defining156 
capacity of animals, it is also vital for the animal. Unsurprisingly, the presence of this 
capacity is explained teleologically as being ultimately necessary for the sake of self-
preservation (DA.III.12, 434b13-14): the body of the animal must have the capacity 
of touch – it is the one perceptive capacity an animal must have (DA.III.13, 435b19), 
if the animal is to survive. Touch is necessary for survival, because anything which 
touches something else without sensing or registering it (i.e. undergoing some kind 
of change by being affected by the object), will not be able to flee from some things 
(e.g. predators) or catch others (e.g. food); and “in that case, it will be impossible for 
the animal to survive” (DA.III.12, 434b16-18: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀδύνατον ἔσται σώζεσθαι 
τὸ ζῷον). By connecting touch to the appetitive capacities, Aristotle is able to explain 
the basic ‘flee and chase’-behavior of animals.157  
This ultimate function of the capacity of touch to preserve the animal 
through enabling it to seize (or to run from) things when they sense their presence 
also leads Aristotle to the conclusion that taste is a kind of touch (DA.III.12, 
434b18: διὸ καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἁφή τις). Taste is the touching – or the 
perceiving – of food, which is a tangible body, and without which the animal cannot 
be (DA.III.12, 434b22-24):  
αὗται μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖαι τῷ ζῴῳ, καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ ἁφῆς εἶναι ζῷον. 
“So these [i.e. touch and taste] are necessary for an animal, and it is clear that 
without touch it is impossible for an animal to be.”158 
The capacity of touch, then, and its sub-capacity of taste, both presuppose and 
contribute to the nutritive capacity, and as such are present for the sake of the 
preservation of the animal.  
The other perceptive capacities an animal has, Aristotle explains in the 
following way (DA.III.13, 435b20-25): 
                                                 
156 Cf. DA.III.13, 435b16-17. 
157 See Freeland (1992), 236-237; and 245: “This means that in the DA it is reasonable for Aristotle to 
attempt to explain animals’ possession of the sense of touch teleologically, as sort of adaptation or 
purposive suitability to the worlds as it is, namely a tangible world.” 
158 Cf. DA.III.13, 435b17-18. 
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οὐ τοῦ εἶναι ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὖ, οἷον ὄψιν, ἐπεὶ ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, ὅπως ὁρᾷ, ὅλως δ’ 
ἐπεὶ ἐν διαφανεῖ, γεῦσιν δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, ἵνα αἰσθάνηται τὸ ἐν τροφῇ καὶ 
ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ κινῆται, ἀκοὴν δὲ ὅπως σημαίνηταί τι αὐτῷ [γλῶτταν δὲ ὅπως σημαίνῃ τι 
ἑτέρῳ]. 
“[They] are not for the sake of its existence, but for its well-being, e.g. it has sight in 
order to see, because it lives in air and water, or, in general, because it lives in 
something transparent; and it has taste because of what is pleasant and painful, in 
order that it may perceive these in food and that it may feel desire and be set in 
motion; and hearing in order that something may be indicated to it [and a tongue in 
order that it may indicate something to another].”159  
The teleological account of the perceptive capacities as we find it here is the result of 
the application of the teleological principle (common in the biological works) 
positing that all the parts an animal has are either necessary parts – that is, necessary 
for the performance of a necessary vital or essential function, or for the sake of 
improving the performance of a function that is already primarily performed by 
another part.  
Strictly speaking, only the perceptive capacity of touch is both essentially 
and vitally necessary for animals, the other capacities mentioned in DA.III.12 
‘merely’ contribute to this first and basic capacity and thereby contribute to the 
general well-being of the animal. Note that this division of capacities (into those that 
are necessary, and into those that are ‘merely’ subsidiary or luxury parts)160 does not 
deny the fact that those latter parts significantly improve the functioning of the 
animal as a whole. It just means that because we can observe that not all animals 
have all the capacities listed, and are still able to preserve themselves and their 
animal-kind, these capacities cannot be necessary for animals in general.   
In DA.III.12 Aristotle singles out the ways in which the other capacities 
contribute to the well-being of the animal, which on its turn accounts for their 
presence. For instance, the presence of the capacity of sight is explained as being for 
the well-being of the animal, and being realizable because animals live in something 
transparent. Air and water both provide the materially necessary medium for sight, 
which is to ‘touch’ upon objects at a distance. This is a teleological explanation not 
                                                 
159 Cf. DA.III.12, 434b25: αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τοῦ τε εὖ ἕνεκα. 
160 See Sorabji (1980), 157-158. 
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only of why locomotive animals have sight (it significantly improves their ways of 
preserving themselves), but implicitly also of why locomotive animals have the kind 
of perceptive organs they have: the organs are made to perceive effects or changes in 
the transparent.161 The capacity of taste enables animals to be “perceptive of what is 
tangible and nutritive” (DA.III.12, 434b21-22: διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ 
αἴσθησιν εἶναι), and hence to perceive the foods that it should chase after. The 
capacity of hearing enables animals to detect food or predators at a distance by 
perceiving significant sounds, while the tongue is here attributed a secondary 
function (in addition to being the organ of taste) of communication.162 The presence 
of these perceptive capacities can ultimately be accounted for by reference to their 
contribution to the well-being of each kind of animal.   
 
Aristotle makes a special case, however, for the perceptive capacities, and especially 
for the capacity of sight,163 as being necessary for the survival of those animals that 
locomote, stating that (DA.III.12, 434b26-27):  
εἰ γὰρ μέλλει σώζεσθαι, οὐ μόνον δεῖ ἁπτόμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄποθεν. 
“If it is to survive, it is not only necessary for it to perceive while touching, but also 
from a distance.”  
The whole teleological argument leading up to this conclusion (DA.III.12, 434a31-
b8) is quite complicated. As often, Aristotle starts from the principle that nature 
does nothing in vain.  
In the biological works, this principle is used mostly to explain the absence 
of parts in a teleological way, by arguing that if the part were present it would be in 
vain, and by showing that the function for the performance of which this part for 
the most part would be necessary is realized in another way (e.g. snakes move 
forward by bending themselves instead of being equipped with feet), or is not 
missed too much (e.g. having outer ears would have been better for birds, but it is 
not absolutely necessary for their ability to hear; for the use of this principle, see 
                                                 
161 See Charles (2000), 122n.22. 
162 The presence of the tongue in this list and the absence of smell are somewhat remarkable; maybe the 
verb semainein makes Aristotle think of human beings more than of animals in general, and in humans the 
capacity of smell is poorly defined, while communication is one of its defining characteristics. 
163 Aristotle seems to have mainly sight in mind, as becomes clear from the concluding remarks in III.12, 
435a6-10, in which he rejects a theory of vision in which something issues from the eye as well as from 
the object of vision.  
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3.2.4 and 3.3.1.c). Here Aristotle uses it to explain the presence of a capacity in a 
teleological way, also by using a counterfactual reasoning. However, whereas in the 
biological work one is usually to imagine the presence of the part that is found to be 
absent (and then to conclude that its presence would have been in vain), here one is 
to imagine the absence of a capacity (and the instruments in which it is realized) in 
order to draw the conclusion that its presence serves a function. That is, Aristotle 
proposes to imagine what would happen if locomotive animals lacked the capacity of 
perception; then we would immediately realize that they would be able to reach their 
natural goal, but would die. Hence, the capacity of perception must be for the sake 
of something (DA.III.12, 434a27-b1):  
αἴσθησιν δ’ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ζῶσιν (...) τὸ δὲ ζῷον ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν 
ἔχειν, <οὐδὲ ἄνευ ταύτης οἷόν τε οὐθὲν εἶναι ζῷον,> εἰ μηθὲν μάτην ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις. 
ἕνεκά του γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχει τὰ φύσει, ἢ συμπτώματα ἔσται τῶν ἕνεκά του. εἰ οὖν πᾶν 
σῶμα πορευτικόν, μὴ ἔχον αἴσθησιν, φθείροιτο ἂν καὶ πᾶν σῶμα πορευτικόν, μὴ ἔχον 
αἴσθησιν, φθείροιτο ἂν καὶ εἰς τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἔλθοι, ὅ ἐστι φύσεως ἔργον. 
“Sense-perception is not necessary in all living things (…), but an animal needs to 
have perception, and without this it is not possible to be an animal, if nature does 
nothing in vain. For all things that are there by nature, are for the sake of 
something, or will be coincidental to the things that are for the sake of something. 
And if any body were such as to locomote, but did not have perception, it would be 
destroyed and would not reach the end which is the function of its nature.”  
As said above, the basic assumption of this argument is that, of course, nature does 
nothing in vain, and that therefore perception is present for the sake of something in 
locomotive animals. That purpose is stated immediately following the argument, in 
the form of a rhetorical question: “For how could it be nourished?” (DA.III.12, 
434b1-2: πῶς γὰρ θρέψεται). That perception is indeed necessary for the nourishment 
of locomotive animals is established first through an inverted analogy with stationary 
animals (DA.III.12, 434b2):  
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μονίμοις ὑπάρχει τοῦτο ὅθεν πεφύκασιν. 
“For stationary living things have food from that out of which they have been 
born.”  
Instead of adding something like “but this is not the case for locomotive animals, 
and therefore they have to find their own food by first perceiving it at a distance and 
then moving towards it to grab it,” Aristotle leaves the analogy unfinished. He 
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immediately switches to a reduction to the impossible, claiming that (DA.III.12, 
434b3-5): 
οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ σῶμα ἔχειν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν κριτικόν, αἴσθησιν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, μὴ 
μόνιμον ὄν, γενητὸν δέ—ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει; 
“It is not possible for a body to have a soul and an intellect that can distinguish 
things, but not have perception, if it is not stationary and has been generated – and 
even if it were not generated – for why would it not have it [i.e. perception]?”  
Aristotle only allows for this possibility (of a body having soul and intellect, but not 
perception) on the condition that being without perception would be better for 
either the soul or the body.  
In sum, Aristotle here inverts the more common use of the principle as we 
know it from the biological works. Usually the principle of something being ‘for the 
better’ is invoked to explain the presence of a part by showing its contribution to a 
necessary function that is performed primarily and properly by another part. Here it 
is used to explain the presence of a function – perception – by showing the 
implausibility of the body and soul being better off without this function, while at 
the same time being equipped with another function that presupposes the presence 
of the first. Apparently, the absence of a capacity is justified, if and only if the 
animal’s well-being benefits from this absence. Since this is not the case, however, 
no natural bodies that are not stationary have a soul without the perceptive capacity. 
The presence of the capacity of perception is thus established through ‘negative 
teleology’: the teleological reasoning is that if it is not better for the animal not to 
have a particular function (and especially if it would die without it), then it must have 
this function. The general assumption seems to be that since observation shows that 
all living beings are able to live, reproduce, and – in various degrees – to live-well, 
they must all have the capacities necessary to do so.   
On the whole, Aristotle tries to attribute as much ‘necessity’ to the 
perceptive capacities as possible: although they are not as necessary and basic as 
nutrition and reproduction, they nevertheless play a strongly supportive role without 
which animals would be far worse off. The presence of the perceptive capacities is 
thus ultimately explained by their contribution to the nutritive capacity, and thus to 
the preservation and survival of the animal, but also by their significant contribution 
to the well-being of the animal. 
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In addition to each perceptive capacity having its own proper function and 
ultimately contributing to the nutritive capacity, all five capacities also contribute to 
the perception of the common objects of perception (DA.III.1, 425b4-11):  
ζητήσειε δ’ ἄν τις τίνος ἕνεκα πλείους ἔχομεν αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλ’ οὐ μίαν μόνην. ἢ ὅπως 
ἧττον λανθάνῃ τὰ ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ κοινά, οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἀριθμός; εἰ 
γὰρ ἦν ἡ ὄψις μόνη, καὶ αὕτη λευκοῦ, ἐλάνθανεν ἂν μᾶλλον κἂν ἐδόκει ταὐτὸν εἶναι 
πάντα διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἅμα χρῶμα καὶ μέγεθος. νῦν δ’ ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ 
αἰσθητῷ τὰ κοινὰ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ποιεῖ ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν. 
“One might ask for the sake of what we have several senses and not one only. Is it 
perhaps in order that the common-objects which accompany [the special objects], 
e.g. movement, magnitude, and number, may less escape our notice? For if there 
were sight alone, and this was of white, they would be more likely to escape our 
notice and all things would seem to be the same because color and magnitude 
invariably accompany each other. But as things are, since the common-objects are 
present in the objects of another sense too, this makes it clear that each of them is 
distinct.”  
The teleological explanation on a secondary level of why (locomotive) animals have 
the five perceptive capacities they have instead of just one, is that they make it less 
likely that (the existence of) the common objects of perception escape our attention. 
If we were only able to see a white ball, it would be difficult to distinguish the 
whiteness in color from the magnitude in shape, because the two necessarily come 
together. Once we are also able to touch the ball, and feel a hard shape, we are able 
to recognize that the magnitude is something different from the color and from the 
hardness of the ball, and thereby get a clearer perception of its magnitude and of the 
nature of magnitude in general. The possession of five perceptive capacities is thus 
for the sake of perceiving the common objects. 
 
Secondary functions are ultimately all accounted for through their contribution to 
the well-being of the living beings. In DA.II.8, Aristotle gives an elaborate 
teleological explanation of voice, describing both the material and physiological 
prerequisites necessary for the realization of voice, and the function which it 
ultimately serves (DA.II.8, 420b13-22):  
φωνὴ δ’ ἐστὶ ζῴου ψόφος οὐ τῷ τυχόντι μορίῳ. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ πᾶν ψοφεῖ τύπτοντός τινος καί 
τι καὶ ἔν τινι, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἀήρ, εὐλόγως ἂν φωνοίη ταῦτα μόνα ὅσα δέχεται τὸν ἀέρα. 
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τῷ γὰρ ἤδη ἀναπνεομένῳ καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα—καθάπερ τῇ γλώττῃ ἐπί τε 
τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὧν ἡ μὲν γεῦσις ἀναγκαῖον (διὸ καὶ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχει), ἡ 
δ’ ἑρμηνεία ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ, οὕτω καὶ τῷ πνεύματι πρός τε τὴν θερμότητα τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς 
ἀναγκαῖον <ὄν> (τὸ δ’ αἴτιον ἐν ἑτέροις εἰρήσεται) καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ 
τὸ εὖ.  
“Voice is sound made by an animal and not with any chance part of his body. But 
since everything which makes a sound does so because something strikes something 
else in something else again, and this last is air, it is reasonable that the only 
creatures to have voice should be those which take in air. For nature then uses the 
air breathed in for two functions; just as it uses the tongue for both tasting and 
articulation, and of these tasting is necessary (and so is found in a greater number 
[of living beings]), while expression is for the sake of well-being, so also nature uses 
breath both to maintain the inner warmth, as something necessary (the reason will 
be stated elsewhere), and also to produce voice so that there may be well-being.”  
The emphasis on the body of the animal being of the right kind is important here: 
although the animal must have (parts in) the right material condition, nature does 
not cause the coming into being of parts which have the right material constitution 
especially or only for the performance of secondary functions.164 If the ‘right body’ 
is not present from the outset, then the animal will lack the subsidiary or luxury 
function. This is also the implication of the teleological explanation Aristotle sets out 
of why fish have no voice (DA.II.8, 421a3-6):  
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθύες ἄφωνοι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μόριον 
οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι οὐ δέχονται τὸν ἀέρα οὐδ’ ἀναπνέουσιν.  
“It is clear, too, why fish have no voice; for they have no throat. They do not have 
this part because they do not take in air or breathe in.”  
                                                 
164 In some cases, however, nature may produce a part to come to be in such a way that it is useful for the 
primary function, which turns out to be at the same time useful for a secondary function; e.g. PA.II.17, 
660a17-22: “Mankind has the most detached, softest and broadest tongue, so that it may be useful for 
both its activities – the soft and broad tongue being useful both for the perception of flavors (for man is 
the most keenly perceptive of animals, and his tongue is soft, for it is most tactile, and taste is a sort of 
touch); and for the articulation of words and speech.” Also, nature might “adapt” the part that has come 
to be in the way it has for the performance of a primary function to make it suitable for a secondary 
function (e.g. the case of human mammae in PA.IV.10, 688a19-25), but not always so (presumably 
because this is not always possible given the other facts about the animal), as becomes clear from the 
explanation Aristotle offers for the little amount of vocal articulation in the four-footed animals that are 
blooded and live-bearing (PA.II.17, 660a34-5): “This is because they have a tongue that is hard, 
undetached, and thick.” The tongues of these animals do not have the right material potentials to be 
usable for articulation in addition to their primary function of taste. 
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The structure of this explanation reflects a common pattern of explanation that 
Aristotle uses in the biological works. In an earlier passage, Aristotle has already 
presented us with a teleological explanation of the correlation of throats and lungs: 
the throat is the organ for breathing, and it exists for the sake of the lung (DA.II.8, 
420b21-24). Only animals that breathe air have throats. The primary function of 
throats is to contribute to the function of cooling which is primarily and properly 
performed by the lungs; the secondary function of the throat is communication. 
Now fish do not breath air (they cool themselves by water), and therefore do not 
have or need lungs; animals without lungs lack throats, and without a throat, the 
materially necessary condition for the production of voice is lacking, too. Fish lack 
the necessary physiological requirements to produce voice, because their primary 
essential and vital functions do not require the presence of those organs nature can 
use (and needs) for the realization of subsidiary, luxury functions. 
 The teleological explanation of voice is yet another instance of secondary 
teleology: the formal nature uses parts or things which are already present for the 
sake of the performance of necessary functions, such as the tongue (which is present 
for the sake of taste) or air (which is present in those animals that breathe air for the 
sake of cooling the body) also for the sake of the performance of a subsidiary 
function, such as voice or communication, which serves the well-being of the 
animal.  
 
In DA II and III, Aristotle describes the different capacities more extensively as 
affecting their own particular set of objects in a particular way under the proper 
(physiological) circumstances, while indicating that the capacities are always being 
exercised for the sake of something. Ultimately, the necessary functions of living 
beings are there for the sake of the life and preservation of the animal (and thereby 
its kind), while the non-necessary functions are for the better and contribute to the 
well-being of the animal. The picture one gets of living beings through these 
functional accounts of the capacities in which the different souls fall apart, is that of 
highly complex systems consisting of various hierarchically ordered functional sub-
systems. These combinations of functions deriving from different kinds of souls 
offer the starting points for the teleological explanations in the biological works, in 
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which Aristotle sets out to demonstrate how the different organs and features an 
animal has are there for the sake of these functions, or are contributory to these 
functions and to the well-being of the animal.  
 
2.2.2 Teleology in the explanation of animal locomotion  
In this section, I discuss Aristotle’s use of teleology in the account of the faculty and 
mechanics of locomotion in DA.III.9-11. At this point in DA, Aristotle has 
discussed the faculties of nutrition, perception, and thought, all of which are cardinal 
capacities of the soul (cf. DA.II.2, 413b12-13). However, one life-function has not 
been discussed yet, namely the capacity of living beings to initiate movement by 
themselves, or locomotion. This movement in respect of place that animals perform 
‘on their own accord’ should be distinguished from such ‘automatic’ motions as 
growth and decay, respiration and expiration, and sleep and wake, which animals 
perform on account of their having both a nutritive soul and a nature (which is their 
internal principle of motion and rest). I will first discuss Aristotle’s use of 
teleological notions in his account of what makes locomotion different from the 
motions initiated by the nutritive soul and the living being’s nature, and then, in an 
appendix to this section, turn to an analysis of the relation of teleology to the 
notions of self-motion and intentionality that seem to play a crucial role in Aristotle’s 
account of locomotion.  
The first question Aristotle addresses with regard to locomotion is what 
part or capacity of the soul it is that moves the animal in respect of place (DA.III.9, 
432a19-20; DA.III.9, 432b7-8: τί τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον τὸ ζῷόν ἐστιν). Before 
summarizing and analyzing Aristotle’s teleological arguments employed in this 
investigation, it is important to take notice first of what Aristotle takes to be the 
starting point of it. This is the preconception that ‘the progressive movement’ 
(DA.III.9, 432b14: τὴν πορευτικὴν κίνησιν) is always for the sake of something, and 
always involves imagination and desire. Aristotle justifies this preconception in the 
following way (DA.III.9, 432b16-17): 
 οὐθὲν γὰρ μὴ ὀρεγόμενον ἢ φεῦγον κινεῖται ἀλλ’ ἢ βίᾳ·  
“Nothing that is not desiring or avoiding [something] moves [with respect to place] 
unless by force.”  
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From the outset, locomotion is thus characterized as being both a (voluntary) 
movement according to nature, and a goal-directed movement.165 This teleological 
preconception of locomotion will be important for Aristotle in determining the 
capacity of the soul responsible for locomotion, as well as in explaining the 
constitutive factors and mechanics involved in locomotion.166 
 
The above mentioned concept of locomotion is used by Aristotle in the first place as 
a criterion for the elimination of the capacities of the soul that are not responsible for 
this type of movement.  
First Aristotle rules out the nutritive capacity – which is responsible for 
movement with respect to growth and decay – as being also responsible for 
locomotion, because it does not involve imagination or desire (DA.III.9, 432b14-
15). Besides, Aristotle adds, if the nutritive capacity were responsible for locomotion, 
plants would also have the capacity of locomotion, and then they would also have 
had the parts instrumental for this kind of movement (DA.III.9, 432b18-19). The 
underlying teleological principle at play here is that no being lacks the instruments 
for which it has the capacity; if a being lacks the instruments that are commonly 
associated with the performance of a particular function, then that being must lack 
that function.167 In the case of plants, it is the complete kind that lacks such 
instruments, and therefore the conclusion seems plausible that this kind of living 
being must lack locomotion altogether.   
A similar argument holds for Aristotle’s strategy in ruling out the perceptive 
function as being responsible for locomotion: many living beings have this capacity, 
but are stationary and unmoving throughout their lives (DA.III.9, 432b20-21). 
Again, the absence of the locomotive parts is used as the counterfactual evidence for 
                                                 
165 For this account of locomotion, cf. also MA.VI. 
166 See Hankinson (1990), 62n.28 for the thought that Aristotle could have made the same points in this 
chapter without teleology entering the picture. 
167 The inference Aristotle draws here from the absence of such instruments to the absence of functions is 
not always equally reliable. In some cases, the formal nature of an animal finds a unique way of realizing a 
certain function in a particular kind of living being without necessitating the coming to be of parts usually 
associated with (or demonstrated to intrinsically belong to) that function. For instance, snakes lack organs 
for locomotion, but are still able to move from place to place by bending themselves in virtue of 
possessing four points of movement. (On the snake, see IA.II, 704b12-18; IA.VIII, 708a9-20; cf. 
PA.IV.13, 696a10-15. The explanation of the footlessness of snakes is a paradigmatic example of 
teleological explanations of the absence of parts; it will be further discussed in chapters 3.1.3, 3.3.2, 4.2.1, 
and 4.2.2.b.) 
Establishing the starting points of teleological explanations in De Anima 
  157
the absence of the locomotive function, but this time Aristotle makes explicit use of 
the teleological principle that nature does nothing in vain. The argument runs as 
follows (DA.III.9, 432b22-26): 
εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μήτε ποιεῖ μάτην μηθὲν μήτε ἀπολείπει τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, πλὴν ἐν τοῖς 
πηρώμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀτελέσιν τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων τέλεια καὶ οὐ πηρώματά ἐστιν 
(σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι ἐστὶ γεννητικὰ καὶ ἀκμὴν ἔχει καὶ φθίσιν) – ὥστ’ εἶχεν ἂν καὶ τὰ 
ὀργανικὰ μέρη τῆς πορείας. 
“If nature does nothing in vain and never leaves out any of the necessary [parts], 
except in those beings that are maimed and incomplete, while such living beings are 
complete and not maimed (and a sign of this is that they are able to reproduce 
themselves and they have a peak and decline [of life]) – then they too would have 
instruments for locomotion.”  
The reasoning is that if the perceptive function is responsible for locomotion, and if 
this teleological principle holds, then living beings that have the perceptive function 
should also always have instruments for locomotion. As the latter is not the case (for 
there are some complete animal kinds that have perception but not locomotion), 
either the principle does not apply, or the perceptive function is not responsible for 
locomotion. Given that the principle applies for the most part, it is thus reasonable 
to suppose that the capacity for perception is cannot at the same time be the 
capacity for locomotion as well.  
Thirdly, Aristotle considers the intellective or calculative capacity. 
However, this capacity cannot be the mover either, for the following reason 
(DA.III.9, 432b27-28): 
ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν θεωρεῖ πρακτόν, οὐδὲ λέγει περὶ φευκτοῦ καὶ διωκτοῦ 
οὐθέν  
“For the intellective capacity thinks of nothing practical and it says nothing about 
what is to be avoided and pursued.”  
This rules the intellective capacity out as a candidate, because it is concerned with 
abstractions, while according to Aristotle locomotion is concerned with the 
avoidance or pursuit of something.168 Apparently, merely thinking about something 
that is to be avoided or pursued does not bring about the emotional state necessary 
                                                 
168 Cf. PA.I.1, 641a32-b12, where Aristotle argues that the natural philosopher need not speak about all 
soul, but only about those that are a source of movement; because intellect (which in this context 
presumably means the intellective capacity) is not a source of movement, the natural philosopher does not 
need to speak about it. See Lennox (2001b), 143-145. 
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for the initiation of locomotion. Even if the intellect were to tell the animal to avoid 
or pursue something, the animal would not be moved; instead, the animal acts 
according to desire (DA.III.9, 433a1-3). Aristotle uses an analogy with the art of 
healing to point out that having the intellective capacity is not sufficient as a cause of 
locomotion, because there is a difference between having knowledge and acting 
according to that knowledge. On the other hand, desire on its own can also not be 
the faculty of locomotion: the case of continent people shows that although they 
may have the cravings and the desire for things, “they do not do those things for 
which they have a desire, but follow reason” (DA.III.9, 433a7-8: οὐ πράττουσιν ὧν 
ἔχουσι τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἀλλ’ ἀκολουθοῦσι τῷ νῷ). Desire, as a single faculty, cannot 
account for locomotion. Consequently, Aristotle concludes that in order to be able 
to account for locomotion, the presence and collaboration of two capacities are 
necessary, the one intellective and the other non-intellective.  
Having started thus from the assumptions that the function of locomotion 
is coexistent with both the locomotive parts and the functions of imagination and 
desire, and that nature does nothing in vain, Aristotle has provided sufficient proof 
of why the nutritive and perceptive faculties are not the causes of locomotion, and 
why the intellective and appetitive functions in isolation are also not capable of 
moving the animal. Accordingly, where DA.III.9 builds upon the assumption that 
locomotion is always ‘with’ imagination and desire, DA.III.10 opens with the 
preliminary conclusion169 that imagination (given that imagination is some kind of 
thinking, and imagination is the only intellective capacity that human beings and 
animals have in common) and desire are the movers (DA.III.10, 433a10-11: 
Φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς) or “the producers of movement 
in respect to place” (DA.III.10, 433a13: κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον). 
Aristotle stresses that the capacities of the practical intellect and desire are 
teleologically similar to each other (DA.III.10, 433a15-17): in contrast with the 
theoretical intellect that finds its end in its own activity, the practical intellect and 
desire are both directed towards an end. They are also teleologically interrelated, for 
the practical intellects starts from the object of desire, which is the end of the 
capacity of desire, and the end in the process of reasoning of the practical intellect, 
                                                 
169 This is the force of phainetai in DA.III.10, 433a9; Ross (1961), 556. 
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results in action. The capacity of desire precedes and initiates the capacity of 
practical intellect:  practical reason only moves human beings once desire has found 
an object of desire. The same teleological interrelation holds also between desire and 
imagination/thought in animals: locomotion is for the sake of moving towards an 
object that is the animal’s object of desire; the object of desire initiates imagination 
which on its turn initiates locomotion. The true causes of locomotion are therefore 
desire and ultimately the object of desire170 (DA.III.10, 433b10-13):  
εἴδει μὲν ἓν ἂν εἴη τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ᾗ ὀρεκτικόν—πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ 
ὀρεκτόν· τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον, τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι—ἀριθμῷ δὲ 
πλείω τὰ κινοῦντα. 
“While generically the moving cause will be one, namely the capacity of desire, in so 
far as it desires, and first of all the object of desire, for that moves without being 
moved by being thought of or by being imagined, in number there is a plurality of 
movers.” 
In the remainder of DA.III.10, Aristotle addresses the question of how locomotion 
works, and explains that it basically involves three constituents (DA.III.10, 433b13-
31).  
The first constituent is the mover or the moving cause (DA.III.10, 433b13: 
ἓν μὲν τὸ κινοῦν). Aristotle explains that the moving cause is ‘double’: on the one 
hand there is the moving cause that is itself unmoved, on the other hand there is the 
moving cause that both moves and is moved (DA.III.10, 433b14-15: τὸ δὲ κινοῦν 
διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον). The unmoved moving cause is 
the practical good, which is the object of desire, external to the animal that 
locomotes. The moved moving cause is the capacity of desire, a part of the soul 
internal to the locomotive animal. Thus, the practical good, without being moved 
itself, initiates movement in the capacity of desire; the capacity of desire is thereby 
itself moved, and on its turn moves the animal.  
The second constituent is that with which the moving cause produces 
movement (DA.III.10, 433b14: δεύτερον δ’ ᾧ κινεῖ). This instrument has already 
been established as belonging to the body (these ‘bodily instruments’ are the 
different body parts that different animals employ to effect movement, such as feet, 
                                                 
170 This object of desire may be either the good or the apparent good (where good means the practical 
good, which is capable of being otherwise); DA.III.10, 433a28-31. 
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wings, and fins); for this reason “they must be investigated among the functions 
common to body and soul” (DA.III.10, 433b19-21: διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ 
ψυχῆς ἔργοις θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ). The latter is presumably is a reference to treatise 
now known as De Motu Animalium. Here Aristotle just presents the headlines 
concerning the mechanisms that are operative in locomotion: instruments for 
locomotion are found at places in the body where the beginning and the end are the 
same (like in the case of ball-and-socket joints), and movement itself consists of 
pushing and pulling (DA.III.10, 433b25-26: πάντα γὰρ ὤσει καὶ ἕλξει κινεῖται).  
The third and last constituent involved in locomotion is that which is 
moved (DA.III.10, 433b14: ἔτι τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον), the animal or human being 
endowed with the capacity of locomotion. 
 Again, the notion of goal-directedness plays a central role in this analysis of 
the constituents of locomotion. Aristotle starts by identifying the final cause(s) of 
locomotion, then moves to the bodily instruments conditionally necessary to effect 
the movement towards the end, and lastly identifies the kinds of subjects that are 
moved towards an end. For Aristotle, the goal-directedness is essential for a 
movement to be an instance of locomotion. Throughout both the analyses of the 
cause and constituents of locomotion, the underlying idea is that the actualization of 
the capacity of locomotion cannot just be the activity of locomotion (of moving in 
just any direction; Aristotle defines motion in general also as a end-directed process), 
but instead must be the activity of locomotion towards a particular end. This also 
seems to be the reason why the locomotive capacity does not turn out to be a 
different part of the soul, which is in charge of its own function (that is to say, the 
capacity of locomotion cannot be actualized by ‘its’ objects in the way that the 
passive capacity of hearing is actualized by something sounding). As Aristotle makes 
clear by way of a conclusion at the end of the chapter, the locomotive capacity is 
rather a capacity that is concomitant to the capacity of desire (DA.III.10, 433b27-28: 
“in so far as an animal is capable of desire, so far is it capable of moving itself”; ᾗ 
ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ αὑτοῦ κινητικόν), with the restriction that in order for an 
animal to be capable of desire, it must be “with imagination” (DA.III.10, 433b28-29: 
ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας), either of the intellective or of the perceptive type. 
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The distinction is made to include both animals and human beings. The capacity to 
locomote emerges as it were from the capacities of desire and of imagination.  
 The capacities of desire and imagination are intrinsically related to the 
capacity of locomotion, exactly in order to ensure the goal-directedness of the 
motion initiated in the animal. This becomes clear from DA.III.11, where Aristotle 
discusses the question of what the cause of movement is in the ‘imperfect’ animals 
that only have the perceptive capacity of touch, and of whether they can have 
imagination and appetite, too. Aristotle takes the question of whether or not these 
animals feel pain and pleasure to be the determinant of whether or not they have 
appetite; and it appears that they do indeed feel pain and pleasure. But because these 
animals only have imagination or appetite in a very rudimentary form,171 their 
movements will be – not a case of locomotion, but – ‘indeterminate’ (DA.III.11, 
434a4-5: κινεῖται ἀορίστως). This is because there will be no object of desire 
identifiable to the animal that will initiate the movement towards that object, and 
nothing to direct the movement of the animal towards that object by focusing the 
animal upon that object as something desirable.172 Instead, the motions of these 
animals will be random (and accordingly, they will eat only when they happen to 
touch upon something edible): the capacity of desire is necessary for the 
identification of the goal of goal-directed locomotion, and the capacity of 
imagination is necessary to direct the capacity of desire towards that goal. Animals 
that do not have these capacities do not move at all. Animals that do have these 
capacities move towards a perceived object of desire, thought of as being good for 
the animal in question. 
 
The model of locomotion that is presented in DA is thus intrinsically teleological: it 
takes the object of desire as the starting point of the explanation in the sense of a 
final cause, and the faculties of desire, imagination, and perhaps also perception as 
the origins of movement in the sense of efficient causes. It is significant that the 
notion of locomotion that Aristotle offers applies to both animals and human 
beings; locomotion arises from some kind of cognitive faculty, but not necessarily 
from a human one.  
                                                 
171 Cf. Schofield (1992), 272n.55. 
172 Frede (1992), 290; Richardson (1992), 384. 
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However, in DA.III.11, 434a12, while emphasizing that it is practical reason that is 
involved in locomotion, Aristotle also hints at a different kind of explanatory model 
of action, applying primarily to human beings. This is the model of what has come 
to be known as ‘practical inferences’ or ‘practical syllogisms’ (Aristotle himself does 
not use these terms).173 Under this model, Aristotle presents explanations of actions 
in the form of a syllogism,174 the conclusion of which is an action (ἡ πρᾶξις)175 rather 
than a theoretical proposition (MA.7, 701a10-11: ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖ μὲν θεώρημα τὸ τέλος). 
The purpose of these syllogisms is controversial,176 and unfortunately to large and 
difficult a subject to do justice here. Let it suffice to say that, in my opinion, the 
syllogism is set out to elucidate the causal and conceptual relationships among 
desire, belief, and action.177 It thus offers a reconstruction of the rational structure of 
actions taken; Aristotle does not imply that every practical action involves the 
actualization of a practical syllogism.178 It also needs to be stressed that the 
difference between the two models is one of perspective only (the difference is 
between a realistic and a psychological perspective); they both imply the same 
underlying causal (i.e. teleological) structure. 
Aristotle never develops a systematic discussion of practical inferences, so 
all we have are a few examples and some remarks about how the premises effect and 
explain motion or action.179 According to these ‘guidelines’, the action is posited as 
the starting point or explanandum of the syllogism, and is therefore posited as the 
conclusion. The premises – either of the good or of the possible (MA.7, 701a23-25) 
– posit the preceding steps believed to be necessary for this action to come about 
                                                 
173 Natali (2001), 61-67 an overview of the problems related to this notion. 
174 Presumably in the sense of a deductive reasoning process, rather than of ‘syllogism’ in a strict logical 
sense; on the meaning of the term syllogismos, see Barnes (1981), 21-27. 
175 See Charles (1984), 89-96 for the view that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is not an action, 
but becomes an action; the conclusion is a proposition, which – when accepted – by the activity of desire 
explains the action as an efficient cause. 
176 Natali (2001), 64; for different views, compare Charles (1984); Cooper (1975); Hardie (1968); and 
Nussbaum (1978).  
177 Nussbaum (1978), 189. 
178 Nor do I believe that Aristotle intends the practical syllogism to demonstrate some truth; pace 
Anagnostopoulos (1994), 74-75. 
179 See Santas (1969), 163-5 for examples. 
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right away (MA.7, 701a10). Accordingly, we may construct the following pattern 
underlying180 the practical syllogism of action for human beings: 
Premise 1:  A human being desires a certain goal (and this goal is a good or 
an apparent good);181 
Premise 2: The human being reasons or calculates that if the goal is to be 
achieved, a certain action or certain actions will have to come 
about first; 
Conclusion: At once the human being performs the action or actions for the 
sake of achieving the goal (and consequently, the goal may be 
achieved, or not, and the goal may turn out to be an actual 
good for the human being, or not). 
According to this pattern, the explanatory middle term (found through deliberation) 
picks out the efficient causes (the actions) that are believed – at least for the most 
part – to bring about the desired goal most efficiently. Extra premises might be 
added to specify the goal in such a way that it becomes clearer how this goal could 
be achieved (i.e. such that it is easier to identify the efficient cause of the desired 
goal), and to direct the desire to a concrete situation. This specification involves 
either the recognition that a particular available thing (e.g. this slice of bread) belongs 
to the wider class of desired goods (e.g. dry foods; cf. NE.VII.3, 1147a1-9), or a 
more concrete description or partial definition of the desired good (e.g. being 
healthy) that focuses on an immediately practicable aspect of it (e.g. having one’s 
body in a uniform state; cf. Meta.VII.7, 1032b6-10; b18-21). The conclusion consists 
of the performance of those actions believed to cause the achievement of the desired 
goal; the desired goal itself is not an intrinsic part of the conclusion, because the 
action performed may or may not actually lead to the achievement of that goal. 
Animals lack practical reason, but are nevertheless capable of highly 
complex activities necessary for their nutrition, reproduction, and their survival in 
general. Because animals do not deliberate about which course of action would lead 
best to their desired goal (cf. Ph.II.8, 199a21-31), their perception of the goal and 
their focus on it through the use of the faculty of imagination immediately initiates 
                                                 
180 The examples of practical syllogisms given by Aristotle come in many different forms; the pattern I 
offer is an attempt to cover for these cases in the most general way. For a recent discussion, to which my 
analysis is much indebted, see Natali (2001), 63-109. 
181 The question of whether an animal or human being desires some goal because it perceives it as 
something good, or because it is objectively good, will be addressed below. 
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the movement towards that goal. In addition, the desired goal is always something 
concrete in the direct vicinity or neighborhood of the animal, such that a further 
specification of the desired goal is not required.182 The following two psychological 
stages need to be distinguished in an explanation of the action or locomotion of 
animals.  
Stage 1: An animal desires a particular goal (and this goal is a good or 
an apparent good); 
Stage 2: An animal actively focuses on the desired goal through the 
capacity of imagination.183 
This psychological process will immediately issue the action or locomotion of the 
animal towards the desired goal.  
 
The fact that Aristotle makes use of syllogisms to explain the actions and 
locomotions of humans does not imply that Aristotle envisages actions and 
locomotions to be scientifically demonstrable. The syllogisms are meant to 
illuminate the necessary psychological states involved in action and locomotion, and 
maybe to provide a rationale and justification to humans for their actions and 
locomotions by pointing out the main features of the practical reasoning involved. 
Moreover, in the case of human action, what is demonstrated seems to be the 
practicability of the achievement of a particular end, which is not the same as to 
provide a science of action.184  
In sum, teleology lies at the heart of both models of locomotion set out or 
hinted at in DA.III.9-11. The goal of the capacity of locomotion is not just the 
activity of walking, but the activity of walking towards an object (e.g. food, an animal 
of the other sex with which to mate, a hiding place for predators), the achievement 
of which will result in the survival and well-being of the animal. Both the faculties of 
desire and of imagination or practical reasoning serve as sources for locomotion, 
although it is ultimately the faculty of desire whose objects set the faculty of 
imagination or practical reasoning in motion, which on their turn will set the organs 
of movement in motion.  
                                                 
182 Natali (2001), 78-79. 
183 For the argument that even the lower animals are able to have imagination in this way, see Hankinson 
(1990), 50-51. 
184 Natali (2001), 95-100. 
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Appendix: Two types of teleological explanations of locomotion 
The explanation of locomotion by the use of the practical syllogisms raises two 
questions with regard to how precisely Aristotle perceives the nature of animal and 
human action and locomotion.185 First, the syllogisms present the action taken as the 
necessary conclusion from the two premises that refer to a desire and a cognitive act; 
the causal sequence expressed is predominantly one of efficient causation. For 
example, it seems that once something is perceived as something good, locomotion 
towards this thing will occur straightaway, automatically, and even necessarily so. 
Secondly, the syllogisms are ambiguous with regard to the question whether causal 
priority should be attributed to the desire or to the object of desire that is some good 
or apparent good.186 It is not clear whether the desire of a living being for an object 
as good is crucial to the account, or rather incidental to the having of a desire, which 
is always aimed at some good. The first question pertains to the issue of whether or 
not animals or humans can be viewed as self-movers in a true sense; the second 
question to issue of whether intentionality is a necessary part of the teleological 
account of action and locomotion.  
These questions are only tangentially related to the main question of the 
role of teleology in Aristotle’s analysis of the capacities of the soul, but I believe that 
they are nevertheless important both for our understanding of Aristotle’s 
explanation of locomotion and for our understanding of Aristotle’s use teleology as 
an explanatory principle in general. For one of the main problems I see in the 
existing scholarly literature on Aristotle’s teleology is the tendency to unify the 
various uses of teleology in explanations under one common pattern, while in fact 
different types of teleological explanations explain different (aspects of) natural 
phenomena. As I will argue in this appendix, the complete phenomenon of 
locomotion can only be understood completely by considering both Aristotle’s 
‘objective’ teleological account, and his ‘subjective’ teleological account. 
 
In DA.III.10, 433b28 Aristotle refers to animals as self-movers (αὑτοῦ κινητικόν), 
and thereby to locomotion as a form of self-movement that is distinct from other 
                                                 
185 A third question pertaining to the relationship between practical syllogisms and Aristotle’s theory of 
weakness of will or akrasia will not be addressed in this dissertation.  
186 See Richardson (1992), 381-2. 
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forms of movement that cannot be initiated by the mover himself. Aristotle’s notion 
of self-motion has been the subject of much discussion,187 and has implications not 
only for Aristotle’s psychology and natural philosophy, but also for his ethics and 
metaphysics. This section focuses on the concept of self-motion only insofar as it is 
directly related to the issue of the nature of action and locomotion of humans and 
animals.  
Let me first give a short description of the Aristotelian concept of self-
motion. According to Aristotle, having a nature is not sufficient to qualify as a self-
mover, even though all things that have a nature possess an internal source of 
change and rest. Aristotle confines the qualification of being a self-mover to things 
that have souls: to move oneself is a capacity of life (Ph.VIII.4, 255a5-10). Natural 
bodies have a capacity of being acted upon, rather than of causing movement or 
action themselves. Ensouled bodies, on the other hand, have both a ‘part’ that 
causes movement or action without itself being moved or acted upon (this to avoid 
an explanatory regress of these motions), and a ‘part’ that is moved or acted upon. 
The part that moves without being moved is of course the soul;188 the part that is 
moved is the animal as a whole. In the case of animals and humans, there are in 
addition bodily parts by which the animal moves, which are the organs (instruments) 
of movement. 
However, this is not the whole story. As Furley pointed out in his classic 
paper,189 Aristotle seems to deny in some accounts (the crucial texts are Ph.VIII.2, 
253a11-21; Ph.VIII.6, 259b1-16; and MA.6-8) that animals and humans can initiate 
motion completely by themselves. Instead, the self-movement of animals and human 
beings is ultimately dependent on and caused by an external, previous motion in the 
environment of the animal or human (Aristotle supposedly needs this modification 
in order to avoid the claim that motions can start ex nihilo). Now, if the actual cause 
of the movement of these beings lies in their environment and is outside of their 
control (cf. Ph.VIII.6, 259b6-8), to what extent can they still truly be called self-
movers? Another, but related problem – already noted above with regard to the 
practical syllogism – arises from the causal determinism by efficient causes, which 
                                                 
187 See most notably Gill & Lennox (1995). 
188 The only way in which the soul moves is in an incidental way as being part of the moving animal.  
189 Furley (1994). 
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seems to underlie Aristotle’s explanation of self-movement. Locomotion can be 
explained (as, for example, in DA.III.10, 433a17-20) as a sequence of efficient 
causes. On this account, the object of desire is the first mover in the sequence of 
movers: the object of desire moves perception; perception moves the faculty of 
desire; desire moves the faculty of imagination; and imagination initiates the motion 
and rest of the living being as a whole. Once the goal of the movement has been 
identified, action seems to be reducible to mechanical movements.190 The response 
to these problems will have important repercussions not only for the extent of the 
goal-directedness of actions and locomotions, but also for Aristotle’s ethics. Only if 
human beings are self-movers in a genuine sense, they (or their character) can be 
held morally responsible for the actions they take.191  
 
Various attempts have been made to ‘rescue’ the possibility of self-movement for 
ensouled beings within Aristotle’s natural philosophy. Here I will limit my discussion 
to two types of accounts that pertain most to the question of the relation between 
locomotion and teleology.   
On one type of account, the so called ‘intentionality-escape’,192 Aristotle’s 
teleological explanation of locomotion is read as involving a subjective or intentional 
type of teleology. Because the object of desire is an intentional object, and because 
an external object can only become an object of desire if it is perceived by the animal 
as something desirable or good, the source of motion can be said to be ‘internal’ to 
the animal. Furley, for example, holds that it is crucial for self-movers that objects in 
the external world are “perceived under certain descriptions.”193 Accordingly, actions 
can only be explained in terms of what the goal of action means for the living being 
in question. The importance of the faculty of imagination as a special kind of 
discriminative awareness in this process of perceiving something as good has been 
defended most extensively by Nussbaum.194 In Nussbaum’s view, what is central in 
the teleological explanation of locomotion is not just that animals tend to locomote 
towards goals that are a component of the definition of their substantial being, but 
                                                 
190 Furley (1994), 8. 
191 Furley (1994), 10-12. 
192 Coined by Freeland (1995), 37. 
193 Furley (1994), 12. 
194 Nussbaum (1978), Essay 1, 85-88; Essay 5, 221-269. 
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that they tend to locomote towards goals that they perceive as their objects of desire. 
The intentionality and subjectivity of locomotion that are brought in through the 
faculty of imagination offer a solution to the determination-problem: it is the 
animal’s beliefs and desires that ultimately determine whether or not locomotion 
takes place and that determine in which direction it will take place. In sum, it is not 
simply the perception of an object that automatically will initiate movement, but the 
perception of an object as desirable or as good.  
Another type of account, presented by Freeland as the ‘final cause 
escape’,195 focuses on the objectivity of the goal-directedness of animal locomotions. 
Freeland presents her ‘final cause-escape’ as a “unified model of Aristotle’s 
teleology” designed to replace the ‘intentionality escape’ such as has been defended 
by Furley and Nussbaum.196 The bottom-line of this defense is this. The real 
problem Aristotle faces concerns the compatibility of final causation and efficient 
causation. Now, what is crucial to self-motion according to Freeland is its goal-
directedness, not the intentionality of animal perception or their desires (it is not 
their existence that is denied, but their centrality to the account of self-motion).197 
This goal-directedness is objective rather than subjective. The object of desire is not 
good or desirable because it is perceived as such, but because it is the good of the 
species to which the animal belongs. What is good for a particular species is 
grounded in the definition of the substantial being of that particular of species. 
Ultimately, Freeland hopes that under this model, explanations of why particular 
animals move can be subsumed under the general explanation of why all animals 
move. Rendered schematically, Freeland’s teleological account of the locomotion of 
animals looks as follows:  
“Animal kind K has the capacity for locomotion for the sake of survival or living 
well = Animal kind K has the capacity for locomotion because locomotion 
promotes finding food, avoiding enemies, attracting and discovering mates, etc., and 
these are either necessary or improve the quality of life of animals of kind K.”198  
 
                                                 
195 Freeland (1995), 37. 
196 Freeland (1995), 37. 
197 Freeland (1995), 40-41; 51. 
198 Freeland (1995), 47; Freeland adapted the schema from Woodfield (1976). 
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In my view, both models are right (and wrong) in some sense, because they in fact 
address different explananda. As I will argue below, the intentionality-escape provides a 
better explanation of why animals actually locomote, while the final cause-escape 
provides a better explanation of why (some) animals have the capacity of 
locomotion.199 This distinction also applies to the role of the notion of the good: 
whether or not the pursued good turns out to be an actual good or not, is incidental 
to the explanation of why this particular instance of locomotion took place; 
however, the existence of objective goods for each kind of animal outside the limits 
of their own body is crucial to the explanation of why there is such thing as 
locomotion.  
 Let me start with the final cause escape. I agree with Freeland that it is 
‘built into’200 the nature of animals to pursue goals that are ‘objectively good’ for 
them. The substantial being of each particular species determines and limits, for 
instance, what kinds of food and what way of reproduction constitute the good for 
that particular species, and what kinds of foods, objects or animals in the 
environment constitute the bad for it. However, I do not think that it is ultimately 
the objective good that is crucial to Aristotle’s account of locomotion, because it is 
not what initiates the movement of particular animals (nor what actualizes the 
capacity of locomotion). Freeland’s teleological model of locomotion accounts 
perfectly for why animals in general locomote or why they have this capacity: 
locomotion is present in the animals that have it because it is for the better. 
Locomotion contributes to the function of nourishment and thus contributes 
significantly to the well-being of these animals. The presence of objective goods is 
basic to the explanation of why the capacity of locomotion is present in animals; and 
surely, locomotion takes place for the sake of acquiring these objective goods.  
 
                                                 
199 That this is Freeland’s actual concern is clear in (1994), 47. 
200 I do not think that these goods are actually part of the definition of the substantial being of each kind 
of animal, but rather that these goods ‘follow’ from this definition, presumably through principles such as 
‘like by like’. For example, good foods are those things that are constituted from materials that more or 
less match the basic elemental make-up of animals and can therefore be processed by these animals, 
turned into blood, and used for the growth and maintenance of their body. Generally speaking, ‘good 
animals’ may be those that share the same substantial being, or are that have lifestyles and forms that are 
“not very distant” (cf. PA.I.4, 644b1-7) such that they can live peacefully and side-by-side. 
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When we try to account for this movement of this particular animal at this moment, 
on the other hand, Freeland’s model falls short because it only applies to the most 
general level of explanation. This is problematic, because Aristotle shows much 
more interest in individual and particular motions than Freeland’s model allows for. 
By reducing the actions of individual animals to the goal-directed actions of the 
species as a whole,201 Freeland moves away from what is the most important 
explanandum, i.e. the particular instance of locomotion. If locomotion is to support 
the capacities of nourishment and reproduction, and, if, in addition, nourishment 
and reproduction serve primarily the individual animal (by letting it share in the 
eternity of form),202 then Aristotle’s account of locomotion must in the first place be 
concerned with the locomotions of individual animals.  
Now, the fact that some pursued good is actually the objective good of that 
animal does not play a primary explanatory role in the explanation of why actual 
locomotions take place. This is to some extend visible in the way Aristotle talks 
about ‘the good or the apparent good,’ as for example in DA.II.10, 433a26-28 when 
Aristotle states that thought is always right, while desire and imagination may be 
either right or wrong. He concludes that (DA.II.10, 433a28-30): 
διὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· οὐ 
πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. πρακτὸν δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. 
“Therefore, it is always the object of desire which produces movement, but this 
may either be the good or the apparent good; and not every [good], but the practical 
good. Practical is that which can also be otherwise.”  
In this account, Aristotle does not distinguish between the good and the apparent 
good: both are goals that impart movement.203 In fact, on one occasion (i.e. in 
Top.VI.8, 146b36-147a11) Aristotle criticizes Platonists for not taking the apparent 
good into account in their explanation of ends. The reason why seems to be that 
                                                 
201 Freeland (1995), 48: “Actions of individual animals exemplify the goal-directedness belonging to the 
species as a whole: if a particular wolf chases a rabbit, it is because smelling and then chasing rabbits 
serves a good end for wolves – nourishment and survival.” 
202 See the section above on the teleology of the capacities of the soul; cf. also Lennox (2001a), 134. 
203 Ph.II.3, 195a24-26 (= Meta.D.2, 1013b26-28): “That for the sake of which means that which is the best, 
that is the goal of the things that lead up to it. And it makes no difference whether we say the good or the 
apparent good.” Cf. MA.6, 700b23-29 
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wishing and desiring are only explainable in intentional terms and not reducible to 
efficient causation (Rhet.I.10, 1369a2-4):204 
ἔστιν δ’ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅταν οἰηθῇ εἶναι 
ἀγαθόν). 
“Rational desire is wishing, and wishing is a desire for good – nobody wishes for 
anything unless he thinks it good.” 205  
However, the main reason is that it is not the existence of, say, a banana in that tree 
that sets this monkey in motion (even though that banana fulfills the requirements of 
what constitutes an objective good for monkeys), but the perception of that object 
as being something (namely, a banana) that looks like the objective good of the 
monkey-species. The occurrence of locomotion requires the perception of a 
particular object being the good sought for to actually initiate desire. It are the 
animal’s beliefs or interpretations of an object (rudimentary and wrong as they may 
be) that ‘turn’ the perceived object into a goal properly speaking. In addition, it is 
only in virtue of the animal’s perception of something as good and turning it into a 
final cause that this object is an efficient cause of locomotion.206 Not all objects in 
the vicinity of an animal initiate movement, even if they are all objectively speaking 
good for that animal. The animal’s perceptive and imaginative capacities single out 
one thing (a process that will be constrained or even guided207 by what constitutes 
the objective good of the animal) which will become object of desire and thereby the 
final cause of locomotion if and only if that object is perceived as good. The external 
objects need to be identified as means to realize the internal and objective goal, and 
this is where intentionality comes in. Intentionality is necessary for the perception of 
external objects as goals or ends, and this is what actualizes the capacity of 
                                                 
204 Cf. Charles (1988), 1-2: “Desire’s directedness on to the good explains the nature of these inferential 
connexions in practical reasoning in a way not available if one restricts oneself solely to necessitating 
efficient connexions between the relevant physical, or psychological, states.”; and ibidem, 39-40. For the 
claim that psychological states cannot be reduced to physical states in Aristotle, see Charles (1984), 227-
242. 
205 On the good and the apparent good, see also Rhet.I.10, 1369b18, Meta.XII.7, 1072a27-28 and EN.III.4, 
1113a15-b1. 
206 See Judson, (1994), 165: “Note also that in this type of case, there is a sense in which the object of 
desire is a final cause primarily, and an efficient cause only in virtue of being a final one. This is because it 
can only act as an efficient cause in the way it does (that is, by being perceived to be good) if it also acts as 
a final cause; whereas it could in principle act as a final cause in the way it does (by being the object of a 
desire) without being the efficient cause of the desire.” 
207 The intentional character of the faculty of imagination is reflected well in the use of the verb 
stochazesthai in HA.V.8, 542a30-2 to describe the teleological orientation of animal mating; see Richardson 
(1992), 385.  
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locomotion from within and what is thus crucial for animals to be genuine self-
movers.208 Intentionality here cannot be seen independently from the internal goal-
directedness of living beings.209   
In sum, a complete teleological account of the locomotion of a particular 
animal includes the following two complementary explanations: 
1) Particular kinds of animals locomote towards an object, because its 
capacity to locomote is given with the kind of soul it has and because the object 
constitutes the objective good of this kind of animal, this actualizes the capacity into 
the activity of locomotion. (Locomotive animals have the capacity of walking 
because it contributes to the nutritive function, which on its turn is necessary for the 
animal’s survival and reproduction.)  
2) This individual animal moves towards an object now, because this animal 
perceives this particular object as something that fulfills the requirements of 
constituting what is objectively good for it. Because the object is perceived as a 
good, it consequently becomes the object of desire, which initiates the locomotion 
towards the object through desire and the imagination. 
 
To conclude, the intentionality escape is more crucial because without intentional 
states of animals no objects could ever be ‘identified’ as the goods of those animals, 
and the capacity of locomotion could never be realized. Because in Aristotle’s 
biology animals do not have capacities that they cannot use, the subjective good is 
more fundamental than the objective good, and hence the subjective teleological 
account of locomotion is more fundamental than the objective one. Both 
explanations need to be given, however, in order for the phenomenon of 





Following the didactic order of the natural treatises of Aristotle, we have shifted 
from Aristotle’s defense of the teleology of nature in the Physica to Aristotle’s 
teleological analysis of living nature in De Anima, where life is identified with the 
                                                 
208 Cf. Freeland’s views on this point; Freeland (1995), 51. 
209 Cf. Richardson (1992), 394. 
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possession of soul. The teleological framework that is set out in the Physica as an 
argument to the best explanation of natural phenomena seems to be presupposed in 
the explanatory strategies of De Anima: in order to gain knowledge about the soul, its 
nature and attributes, Aristotle analyzes it in terms of his theory of four causes; in 
order to gain better understanding of its operation on and interaction with the body, 
Aristotle analyzes it in terms of his analogy between nature and art.  
From the very outset, Aristotle’s analysis of the soul is teleological in 
nature: the soul is not itself for the sake of something, but rather is that for the sake 
of which the bodily aspects of the living being are as its instruments. The soul 
constitutes a unity of capacities for the performance of functions in virtue of which 
a natural body that is instrumental has life; the complete body with its parts and 
features is conditionally necessitated by (and therefore explainable by reference to) 
these life-functions. The realization of functions in these bodies is not 
compositionally plastic, but is highly determined by factors such as the functional 
needs of an animal in light of the environment in which it lives, the elemental build-
up of the animal, and also by the general goal-directedness and ‘economy’ of nature. 
Functions are realized in the best way possible for each individual kind of animal by 
conditional necessity, and all the life-functions or capacities of the soul together 
constitute the living being’s form and being: body and soul are for Aristotle both 
causally and essentially connected to each other. Therefore, natural philosophers 
need to take matter into account when giving explanatory definitions of natural 
bodies. 
In his discussions, Aristotle’s bases his arguments upon the teleology of 
nature in order to consolidate his bio-functional account of the soul. In this way, 
Aristotle lays out the foundations for his explanatory project in the biological works: 
by identifying soul with life, it becomes possible to explain various basic forms of 
life (such as plants, animals, and human beings) by reference to different 
combinations of interdependent soul-functions, and to explain specific forms of life 
(such as birds or even crooked-taloned birds) by reference to specific combinations 
of soul-functions. The classification and hierarchy of capacities or life-functions 
Aristotle offers help thus first of all to single out ‘kinds of animals’ sharing a 
distinctive way of performing some or all of these necessary life-functions, and 
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secondly to ground the teleological explanations relating differences in parts and 
features to differences in life-functions. The relevant type of soul serves, among 
others, as the final cause that explains why a living being has the features it has; 
while De Anima provides – among other things – these final causes, the goal of the 
other biological works is to provide the explanations for why certain functions 
belong to the kinds of living beings they do.  
The different capacities of the soul are themselves teleologically grounded 
as well: their presence is necessary given that the living being has to live or live well. 
In addition, Aristotle offers a specification of the causal framework underlying the 
teleological model of deliberate action, used in the Physica for didactic purposes. This 
specification is embedded in an analysis of locomotion, which is the goal-directed 
movement towards an object of desire, caused by this object of desire as a final 
cause, and the faculties of desire, imagination, and perception as efficient causes. 
Crucial in these accounts of locomotion and deliberate action is the recognition that 
these actions themselves are due to objective teleology, that is, they belong to the 
animals that have these capacities for the sake of the survival and well-being of these 
animals, while in the explanation of particular locomotions and actions the 
intentions of the individual animal are causally primary and thus occur due to 
subjective teleology. Animals and human beings are self-movers, and they move 
themselves in virtue of perceiving something as good.  
On Aristotle’s account, the soul is the ontological starting point of life, but 
also the epistemological starting point of the teleological explanation of life-forms. 
The teleological explanations Aristotle offers in the biological works, which will be 




CHAPTER THREE:  
EXPLAINING PARTS OF ANIMALS 




This chapter investigates Aristotle’s use of teleology as a principle of explanation in 
his biological treatises. Although the argument will mainly focus on explanations in 
De Partibus Animalium (PA), explanations from other biological treatises are also 
considered where appropriate or necessary. 
 As has been pointed out in chapters one and two, Aristotle’s theory of 
natural teleology applies in particular to phenomena in the realm of living natural 
substances, that is, to their existence and coming to be, to their change and 
development, and to their differentiations. Biological phenomena, like all other 
natural phenomena, therefore can and must be explained in terms of teleology as an 
internal tendency of nature. In PA, Aristotle attempts specifically to answer the 
question why certain parts come to be and are present, absent, or differentiated in 
the way they are in all and only those animals that have those parts. As may be 
expected, Aristotle answers these questions primarily by reference to teleological 
factors (both final causes and teleological principles).  
For the understanding of Aristotle’s use of teleology in biology, it will in 
the first place be crucial to make a distinction between ‘necessary functions’ and 
‘non-necessary functions’ on the one hand, and between explanations of the 
presence of parts and differentiations and of their coming to be on the other hand. 
For, although Aristotle generally accounts for the presence of parts and their 
differentiations by reference to their function, the explanation of the coming to be of 
those parts and their differentiations will be dependent on the ‘status’ of their 
function. Let me give a very rough indication here of what I believe these 
distinctions amount to. First, the necessary functions are those life-functions that are 
necessary for the survival and the essential being of each kind of animal, and that are 
as such part of the form or essence or definition of the substantial being of the 
animal. Broadly speaking, the presence of the necessary parts and of necessary 
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differentiations will be explained by reference to those vital and essential functions; 
their coming to be will be explained by reference to conditional necessity: given that the 
animal has to realize its form, it has to have such and such parts, and such and such 
differentiations of parts. Secondly, there are also parts that are not necessary for the 
performance of necessary functions, but that rather contribute to these functions. 
Aristotle explains their presence also by reference to the vital and essential functions 
to the performance of which they contribute, while he explains their coming to be as 
being secondary (i.e. dependent upon and later in generation) to that of the 
necessary parts. Thirdly, the non-necessary functions are those life-functions that are 
not necessary for a kind of animal in terms of its survival or essential being, but are 
‘merely’ for the better; these functions are not part of the form or essence of the 
animal. Aristotle refers to non-necessary functions to explain the presence of non-
necessary parts, while he explains their coming to be by reference to material 
necessity: because the materials that have come to be by material necessity have 
certain potentials, they may then be used for the sake of something. The overall 
framework of explanation will turn out to be a little more complicated than this, but 
let this suffice by way of introduction.  
In the second place, concerning Aristotle’s use of teleological principles, I 
will argue that they are used, not as (extra) premises in the explanation, but rather in 
order to provide a framework within which the explanation can take place: these 
teleological explanations hold if and only if nature is truly goal-directed and works 
within the ‘natural boundaries’ that are posited.  
In the third place, contrary to much recent scholarship on Aristotle, I take 
the material constraints and the influence of material necessity on the goal-directed 
actions of the formal nature of an animal to be relatively strong. Animals are what 
they are also and strongly so because of the material and their potentials that are 
available to them during the process of generation and their later life. This is not a 
negative claim: the goal-directed actions of the formal nature of an animal often 
(although not always) turn to a good use those materials that have come to be due to 
material necessity, and thereby equip living beings with features that are perhaps not 
immediately necessary for its survival, but contribute to its well-being. 
The practice of teleological explanations in Aristotle’s biology 
 177
In the next four sections, I will argue for these three claims more extensively. In 
section one (3.1), I introduce the larger scientific context within which Aristotle’s use 
of teleological explanations takes place. I sketch the demonstrative character of 
biology as a science, and outline Aristotle’s specific explanatory project in PA, while 
focusing in particular on his methodology and heuristic strategies. The general 
picture of Aristotle’s explanatory project that follows from these considerations will 
be elaborated upon in the subsequent sections.  
In section two (3.2), I will discuss the three basic types of explanations and 
their main subdivisions that Aristotle employs in his PA. These three basic types of 
explanations are categorized on the basis of which kind of cause – i.e. formal, 
material, or final – Aristotle picks out first in the order of explanation (that is, the cause 
picked out first has explanatory priority, but not necessarily also causal priority). 
Since for Aristotle knowledge involves knowledge of all four causes, his explanations 
of biological phenomena often pick out more than one cause; the categorization 
reflects the order of explanatory priority among different causes in different kinds of 
explanations of biological phenomena. In the analysis of these types of explanations, 
I will devote special attention to the issue of causal priority versus explanatory or 
epistemological priority, since the kind of cause that is picked out first is not 
necessarily causally basic, and vice versa.  
 In section three (3.3), I discuss three types of teleological principles that are 
used in Aristotle’s biology, and argue for their scientific status as suppositions or 
hypotheses. I will also show how they are used as a framework for explanation 
especially in those cases where the final cause cannot immediately be grasped by 
observation or where a non-necessary function is involved. It is thus my contention 
that teleological principles are used as heuristics in those cases where teleology is not 
readily discernable.   
 In section four (3.4), I discuss the relation between teleology and four 
different types of necessity (conditional necessity, unqualified necessity, material 
necessity or natural necessity, and enforced necessity). First, I will analyze passages 
in the Aristotelian corpus in which Aristotle discusses the relation between teleology 
and necessity on a theoretical level; PA.I.1 will thereby serve as a point of reference. 
Contrary to what has been often argued, I will show that Aristotle does not deny any 
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causal role for material necessity in the sublunary realm, but instead attributes 
unqualified necessity in a modal sense to all eternal and cyclical processes. Cyclical 
natural processes such as the evaporation cycle, for instance, come to be always, 
without exception, while rectilinear natural processes such as the generation of 
offspring come to be only for the most part. Secondly, I will lay out the different 
ways in which Aristotle speaks of necessity in his actual explanations of biological 
phenomena (in PA.II-IV). In addition, I offer a more elaborate picture of the 
interplay between teleology and necessity in those explanations Aristotle offers in 
those books, which will complement and exemplify the general framework of types 
of explanations set out in the earlier sections. 
 
3.1 Aristotle’s biological method 
 
3.1.1 Biology as a demonstrative science 
The relation between Aristotle’s theory of scientific demonstration and inquiry as 
outlined in the APo. and his practice in the physical and biological works has been 
the subject of much discussion in recent years among scholars of Aristotle,1 and I do 
not wish to elaborate too much on this issue yet (this will be discussed in chapter 
five). Instead, I would like to draw attention to two observations from the biological 
works that indicate to my mind quite clearly that Aristotle himself envisioned 
applying the demonstrative ideal on the study of living beings. These observations 
pertain in the first place to Aristotle’s concern for following the appropriate 
methodology, and secondly to his concern for providing demonstrations in biology. 
Based on these observations, and on the fruits of recent scholarship on Aristotle,2 I 
                                                 
1 See among others Barnes (1981); Gotthelf (1987); Kullmann (1990); Lennox (2001a); Lloyd (1990; 
1996). 
2 See in particular Gotthelf (1987) and Lennox (1987; 2001a; 2001b; 2004; 2006). Contrary to Gotthelf 
and Lennox who focus on the similarities between Aristotle’s theory of science and his practice, and argue 
that the two domains are more or less in agreement, Lloyd (1990; especially 29-34) argues that the 
differences between Aristotle’s theory and practice are far more predominant, and denies the applicability 
of the theory of APo. to the biology. My reasons for following the approach of Gotthelf and Lennox, 
rather than Lloyd’s, are twofold. First, I believe a positive approach to the issue to be both more 
charitable and more fruitful: the purpose is not to unify Aristotle’s theory and practice as far as possible 
against all evidence (Detel (1997), for instance, goes in my opinion too far in trying to put explanations 
taken from Aristotle’s practice into syllogistic form), but to use the theoretical framework from APo. to 
make sense of Aristotle’s actual scientific practice, and vice versa. Secondly, I do not believe that 
Aristotle’s theory of science as set out in APo. is as formal and rigid as Lloyd makes us think (see chapter 
five for a more flexible and comprehensive interpretation of the theory of scientific demonstration in 
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will rely on the working hypothesis that Aristotle’s biological works are presented as 
a science that in many ways conforms to the ‘guidelines’ of the APo.  
Aristotle’s concern for setting out the right methodology to be followed in 
biological investigations is clear from the whole of the first book of PA, which is 
devoted to the solution of methodological dilemmas pertaining to natural science 
(PA.I.1, 640a2: phusikê epistêmê), of which the study of animals is part.3 In this book, 
Aristotle aims at providing standards from which one will be able to judge the 
‘manner of the things brought to light’ (τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων) in the natural 
sciences (PA.I.1, 639a12-15). Aristotle provides such standards by addressing a wide 
range of topics, such as the different kinds of causes referred to in biological 
explanations and the priority relations that hold among them (Aristotle argues for 
the priority of teleology over necessity, but without denying explanatory force to the 
latter); the relation between form and matter in animals (Aristotle explains that the 
two are complementary, and that therefore both need to be studied by the biologist); 
and the place of soul in the study of nature (Aristotle explains that the capacity of 
thinking does not belong to the study of nature). Aristotle also offers a revision of 
the Platonic method of division and definition. This latter critique of dichotomous 
division leads among other things to the establishment of what exactly constitutes an 
animal kind: animal kinds share a commonness of nature, and a ‘form that is not too 
distant’ (PA.I.4, 644b3). That is, animals that belong to one kind are different only in 
degree (‘by the more and less’ or ‘by bodily affections’), while animals that differ in 
kind are similar to each other only by analogy (PA.I.4, 644a16-22; 644b12).  
However, the most striking feature of this first book of PA is that in it 
Aristotle not only follows but also seems to enrich and to complement the Analytics’ 
conception of science in order to make it applicable to the special and distinct study 
of living beings. As Lennox has pointed out on several occasions,4 the Analytics are 
devoid of the matter and form distinction and also of the concept of conditional 
                                                                                                               
APo.), nor that Aristotle was not aware of the differences between demonstration in the theoretical 
sciences and the natural ones. The methodological remarks Aristotle makes in, for instance, PA.I.1 show 
this awareness, and – pace Lloyd – demonstrate that Aristotle was consciously revising the scientific ideal 
as presented in APo. to make it fit to the natural sciences in which a different type of necessity applies and 
in which the order of a causal sequence matters for the structure of the explanation. 
3 For an outline of the first book of PA and for the connections of the methodological issues discussed 
with the APo., see Lennox (2001a), 100-104. 
4 Lennox (2001a), xxii, 102, and passim. 
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necessity. Both are crucial to the study of (living) nature and are therefore introduced 
– consistently with and with reference to the concepts and distinctions that are used 
in the Analytics – in the first book of PA. This, I believe, gives evidence for that the 
fact that Aristotle self-consciously attempts to integrate these notions into the 
scientific framework supplied by the Analytics.   
 
Aristotle’s concern for providing demonstrations in the case of biological 
phenomena is visible in a few (but very well known) methodological statements in 
the biological works.5 The clearest and least controversial text concerning the 
demonstrative nature of biology is stated in HA. I.6, 491a7-13:  
Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἴρηται νῦν ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, γεύματος χάριν περὶ ὅσων 
καὶ ὅσα θεωρητέον· δι’ἀκριβείας δ’ ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἵνα πρῶτον τὰς ὑπαρχούσας 
διαφορὰς καὶ τὰ συρβεβηκότα πᾶσι λαμβάνωμεν. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὰς αἰτίας τούτων 
πειρατέον εὑρεῖν. Οὕτω γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον, ὑπαρχούσης τῆς 
ἱστορίας τῆς περὶ ἕκαστον· περὶ ὧν τε γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἐκ τούτων 
γίνεται φανερόν. 
“These things, then, have been put forward in a general way, as a kind of foretaste 
of the things that we have to investigate and what is about them [that we have to 
investigate]. Later we shall discuss these matters in greater detail, in order that we 
may first gain understanding of the differences and the attributes belonging to all. 
After this we shall try to discover the causal explanations. For it is the natural 
method to do this after having started with the investigation of the details 
concerning each thing; for from these it becomes apparent both about which things 
the demonstration must be, and through what things it must proceed.”6 
The zoological research program sketched in this passage starts with a ‘factual’ 
investigation (reflected in HA). This investigation consists of assembling the basic 
facts to be explained, and is mainly carried out through (Aristotelian) divisions of the 
differences between animals. Aristotle thus first establishes a complete overview of 
the biological diversity, concerning in the first place the attributes and differences of 
animals (the differentiae are differences with respect to the animals’ modes of life, their 
activities, their characters, and their parts), and in the second place the kinds and 
classes and groupings of animals that exist. Within the HA, Aristotle discusses these 
                                                 
5 In this section I draw heavily on Lennox (2004 and 2006). 
6 Cf. PA.I.1, 639a12-15; PA. I.1, 640a1-9; GA. II.6, 742b23-36. 
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features and differences in correlation to the animals that have them. For example, 
in the following text Aristotle discusses similarities and differences between animals 
concerning the possession of hair (HA II.1 498b16-18): 
Πάντα δ’ ὅσα τετράποδα καὶ ζῳοτόκα, δασέα ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐστι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος ὀλιγότριχον καὶ μικρότριχον πλὴν τῆς κεφαλῆς, τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν δασύτατον 
τῶν ζῴων.  
“All viviparous quadrupeds are hair-covered, so to speak, and they are not like man 
who is sparsely haired and short-haired except on the head; with regard to the head 
he is the hairiest among animals.”  
The two correlations that are noted in this section concern ‘hairiness’ and ‘being a 
viviparous quadruped’, and ‘having a head with (relatively) the most hair of all 
animals’ and ‘being a human being’. Conform the demonstrative ideal as set out in 
APo., Aristotle collects in HA the facts or items in the world of biology that always 
or for the most part go together, and thus form possible candidates for being picked 
out as either the predicate or as the subject terms in explanations (which in addition 
pick out the cause why these biological phenomena always or for the most part go 
together). These facts or items are the ‘about which’ of demonstrations. In the above 
quoted example, ‘having a heavy haired head’ will be picked out by the predicate 
term in an explanation, and ‘being a human being’ will be picked out by the subject 
term. The explanatory middle term will have to pick out a feature that holds of all 
human beings, and one that correlates exclusively with the amount of hair and the 
location of the growth of hair.  
Ultimately, Aristotle also hopes that because of this investigation we will be 
in a better position to single out those features and differentiae that are causally 
primary from the ones that will have to be explained through these causally primary 
features and differentiae. The investigation of the HA is intended to lead up to the 
identification of those features and differentiae that will be the ‘through which’ 
demonstrations come about; Aristotle thinks that through investigating and 
describing all the relations and correlations between biological phenomena, we will 
ultimately discover the causes of those phenomena. The factual investigation is thus 
a preliminary to the next, demonstrative stage. In this second stage, Aristotle 
proceeds to the identification of causes (predominantly material and final causes in 
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PA and efficient causes in GA),7 and discusses the ways in which these causes 
explain why an animal has the features and differentiae it has, and why those features 
and differentiae are present in all and only those animals that have them. Thus, in 
the PA, Aristotle picks up on the correlations and co-extensive features already 
collected and organized systematically in his ‘big book of data’ (i.e. HA), and tries to 
provide an explanation (PA.II.1, 646a8-11):  
Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν μορίων καὶ πόσων συνέστηκεν ἕκαστον τῶν ζῴων, ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις 
ταῖς περὶ αὐτῶν δεδήλωται σαφέστερον· δι’ ἃς δ’ αἰτίας ἕκαστον τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν 
τρόπον, ἐπισκεπτέον νῦν, χωρίσαντας καθ’ αὑτὰ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις εἰρημένων. 
“From which parts and from how many parts each of the animals is constituted has 
been exhibited more clearly in the inquiries about them; it must now be examined 
through which causes each animal has this character, by separating [those causes] to 
stand on their own from what was said in those inquiries.”8 
This is precisely what Aristotle does in the subsequent chapters. For instance, in 
PA.II.14, 658b2-10 Aristotle returns to the observation of human beings having the 
most hairy head of all animals, and provides a dual explanation:  
Τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τῶν ζῴων δασύτατον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑγρότητα 
τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου καὶ διὰ τὰς ῥαφάς (ὅπου γὰρ ὑγρὸν καὶ θερμὸν πλεῖστον, ἐνταῦθ’ 
ἀναγκαῖον πλείστην εἶναι τὴν ἔκφυσιν), ἕνεκεν δὲ βοηθείας, ὅπως σκεπάζωσι 
φυλάττουσαι τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τοῦ τε ψύχους καὶ τῆς ἀλέας. Πλεῖστος δ’ ὢν καὶ 
ὑγρότατος ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐγκέφαλος πλείστης καὶ τῆς φυλακῆς δεῖται· τὸ γὰρ 
ὑγρότατον καὶ ζεῖ καὶ ψύχεται μάλιστα, τὸ δ’ ἐναντίως ἔχον ἀπαθέστερόν ἐστιν. 
“With respect to the head, human beings are the most hairy of animals, from 
necessity, on account of the moistness of the brain and on account of the sutures 
(for where there is much moisture and heat there must be much growth), and for 
the sake of protection, so that it may provide covering, warding off the extremes of 
both cold and heat. And since the human brain is the most moist, it is also most in 
need of this protection; for what is moist boils and freezes most easily, while what is 
in the opposite state is less easily affected.” 
The observation of two correlations may have led to the discovery of the cause of 
why human beings have the most hairy head of all animals. On the one hand, the 
                                                 
7 GA.I.1, 715a1-17. 
8 Cf. IA.I.1, 740b7-10: “Clearly there needs to be study of all these questions about animal locomotion 
and any others of the same kind; for that these things are so is clear from our inquiries into nature; the 
reason why must now be investigated.”  
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amount of moistness present in a body part seems to correlate with the amount of 
the growth of hair: the more moistness, the more hair there is, and due to presence 
of the brain in the human head, it is this place that is the moistest. On the other 
hand, the amount of protection needed correlates with the amount of protection 
provided by nature: due to the moistness the human head is in a lot of need of 
protection, and hence nature has provided it with a lot of hair for the sake of this 
(the causal mechanism underlying this explanation is conditional necessity; I will 
return to the structure of explanations like these below). Both the moistness and the 
need of protection are more present in the head of human beings than they are in 
other animals: this explains why human beings have more hair on their heads than 
any other animal.   
 
Aristotle acknowledges that the demonstrations in the natural sciences will be 
different from those in the theoretical sciences.9 The conclusions of biological 
demonstrations do not hold always, nor of necessity in the strict sense; they rather 
hold ‘for the most part’ (epi to polu), and the demonstrations as a whole incorporate a 
kind of necessity that is conditional upon the end for the sake of which the animal 
or its features come to be. The structure of demonstrations in the natural sciences 
will be discussed more extensively in chapter five, but for now, it may suffice to 
point out that Aristotle is at least trying to follow and adapt the demonstrative ideal 
of science as set out in his APo. In the next sections, I will therefore work from the 
hypothesis (formulated and defended most prominently by Lennox)10 that Aristotle’s 
philosophy of biology specifies and builds upon the ideal of the APo. Hence I will 
employ the conceptual framework of the Analytics as a tool to analyze and evaluate 
Aristotle’s use of teleology within this ‘scientific’ biological context. 
 
3.1.2 A preliminary picture of Aristotle’s explanatory project in PA 
In the course of setting out the methodology of natural investigations, Aristotle also 
provides standards for how to construe explanations or demonstrations of biological 
phenomena. Here I will give a schematic characterization of Aristotle’s explanatory 
project as a whole, and a crude sketch of the types of explanations introduced in 
                                                 
9 See especially PA.I.1, 640a1-9; PA.I.1, 640a33-b3; PA.I.1, 642a32-b2; see also chapter 5. 
10 E.g. in Lennox (2001a), 104. 
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PA.I. In each case, I will also outline the way Aristotle applies these explanations in 
the practice of explaining animal parts in PA.II-IV. In the course of doing so, I will 
introduce and explain the following key notions: nature (formal nature vs. material 
nature), animal parts (necessary parts vs. non-necessary parts), teleology (primary 
teleology vs. secondary teleology), teleological explanations (explanations through 
final causes vs. explanations through teleological principles), and necessity (material 
necessity vs. conditional necessity). The distinctions I draw within these notions are 
not all made this explicitly by Aristotle himself, but they will help me to clarify the 
various explanatory strategies Aristotle employs in his biological works. The 
preliminary picture that will thus arise in this section of Aristotle’s explanatory 
project in PA will be discussed in more detail in the sections to come.  
 
Let me start by quoting an image that Aristotle draws of the ‘economical’ workings 
of nature in the production of parts. This image illustrates two aspects that I believe 
are crucial for the understanding of Aristotle’s explanatory project in the biological 
works (GA.II.6, 744b11-27): 
Τῶν δ’ ἄλλων γίγνεται μορίων ἕκαστον ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς, τὰ μὲν τιμιώτατα καὶ 
μετειληφότα τῆς κυριωτάτης ἀρχῆς ἐκ τῆς πεπεμμένης καὶ καθαρωτάτης καὶ πρώτης 
τροφῆς, τὰ δ’ ἀναγκαῖα μόρια καὶ τούτων ἕνεκεν ἐκ τῆς χείρονος καὶ τῶν ὑπολειμμάτων 
καὶ περιττωμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἰκονόμος ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ἀποβάλλειν εἴωθεν 
ἐξ ὧν ἔστι ποιῆσαί τι χρηστόν. ἐν δὲ ταῖς οἰκονομίαις τῆς γιγνομένης τροφῆς ἡ μὲν 
βελτίστη τέτακται τοῖς ἐλευθέροις, ἡ δὲ χείρων καὶ τὸ περίττωμα ταύτης <τοῖς> 
οἰκέταις, τὰ δὲ χείριστα καὶ τοῖς συντρεφομένοις διδόασι ζῴοις. καθάπερ οὖν εἰς τὴν 
αὔξησιν ὁ †θύραθεν ταῦτα ποιεῖ νοῦς οὕτως ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὐτοῖς ἡ φύσις ἐκ μὲν 
τῆς καθαρωτάτης ὕλης σάρκας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητηρίων τὰ σώματα συνίστησιν, ἐκ 
δὲ τῶν περιττωμάτων ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τρίχας, ἔτι δ’ ὄνυχας καὶ ὁπλὰς καὶ πάντα τὰ 
τοιαῦτα· διὸ τελευταῖα ταῦτα λαμβάνει τὴν σύστασιν ὅταν ἤδη γίγνηται περίττωμα τῆς 
φύσεως.  
“Each of the other [i.e. necessary parts, with the exception of the eye that has been 
discussed previously in GA.II.6, 743b32-744b11] parts is formed out of the 
nutriment, (1) the parts that are the noblest and that partake in the most important 
principle [i.e. the essence of the animal; cf. GA.II.6, 742b32] are formed from the 
nutriment which is concocted first and purest; (2) those parts which are only 
necessary for the sake of the former parts are formed from the inferior nutriment 
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and the residues and leftovers. For just like a good housekeeper, so also nature is 
not in the habit of throwing away anything from which it is possible to make 
anything useful. Now in a household (a) the best part of the food that comes in is 
set apart for the free people, (b) the inferior and the residue [of the best food] for 
the slaves, and (c), the worst is given to the animals that live with them. Just as the 
intellect acts thus from outside with a view to the growth of the persons concerned, 
so nature forms (1) from the purest material the flesh and the body of the other 
sense-organs, and (2a) from the residues thereof bones, sinews, hair; and in 
addition, (2b) also nails and hoofs and the like; for this reason these are the last to 
assume their formation, for they have to wait till the time when nature has some 
residue to spare.” 
What is crucial in this image for the understanding of Aristotle explanatory project in 
the biological works is first the description of nature as a good housekeeper, who 
produces the different parts from the kinds of material available. This image is 
representative of the way Aristotle picks out nature in his explanations: nature is 
always personified as an agent, and portrayed as acting for the sake of something, 
while following a certain logos or formula. Lennox descibes this as the ‘formal nature’ 
of an animal:11 the formal nature of an animal acts as a goal-directed agent according 
to the animal’s form.12 The concept of formal nature thus incorporates nature as an 
efficient, final, and formal cause. In this way, formal nature also coincides with soul 
(PA.I.1, 641a23-28): 13 
καὶ τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον, καὶ περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων κατὰ τὴν 
τοιαύτην αὐτῆς οὐσίαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς φύσεως διχῶς λεγομένης καὶ οὔσης τῆς μὲν ὡς 
ὕλης τῆς δ’ ὡς οὐσίας. Καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη καὶ ὡς ἡ κινοῦσα καὶ ὡς τὸ τέλος. Τοιοῦτον δὲ 
τοῦ ζῴου ἤτοι πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς.  
“And [the natural philosopher will state] what the soul, or what that very part of it 
is, and speak about the attributes it has in virtue of the sort of substantial being it is, 
especially since the nature of something is spoken of and is in two ways: as matter 
and as substantial being. And nature as substantial being is both nature as mover 
and nature as end. And it is the soul – either all of it or some part of it – that is such 
in the animal’s case.” 
                                                 
11 Lennox (2001a), 183. 
12 PA.I.1, 641b23-37. 
13 DA.II.1, 412a19-21; cf. Lennox (2001a), 185. 
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We saw in chapter two that the soul of an animal, in the sense of its formal cause, is 
the complex of capacities for the performance of life-functions (such as the 
nutritive, the appetitive, the sensory, the locomotive functions), but that it was also 
identified as the efficient and final cause of the living body.14 Through the soul an 
animal possesses the internal source of motion necessary to realize its own internal 
form that is also soul, and thereby reach its goal, which is to be a living and well-
functioning animal. Contrasted with this formal nature is the animal’s ‘material 
nature’: this is the animal’s body with its uniform and non-uniform parts, but it also 
comprises the animal’s basic elemental make-up, and the kinds and amounts of food 
it can process. In the generation of living beings, these ‘two natures’ are in constant 
interaction. In most cases the formal nature will – by conditional necessity – be 
responsible for the production of the materials that are to be used for the formation 
of parts (here, the actions of the formal nature are limited by the possibilities 
inherent in the material nature of the animal). However, given that these processes 
of part-formation ‘directed’ by the formal nature take place, necessarily there will 
also be some leftovers or some materials coming to be due to material necessity. 
These materials may then be used by the formal nature for the sake of the good: 
“because as a good housekeeper, she is not in the habit of throwing things away 
which might be usable.” This may involve some regulating and structuring activities 
of the formal nature, but sometimes it just means allowing parts to come to be by 
material necessity alone because that will serve some good, as for instance in the case 
of eyebrows and eyelashes (PA.II.15, 658b14-25):  
Αἱ δ’ ὀφρύες καὶ αἱ βλεφαρίδες ἀμφότεραι βοηθείας χάριν εἰσίν (...). αἱ δὲ 
 βλεφαρίδες ἐπὶ πέρατι φλεβίων· ᾗ γὰρ τὸ δέρμα περαίνει, καὶ τὰ φλέβια πέρας ἔχει τοῦ 
μήκους. Ὥστ’ ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὴν ἀπιοῦσαν ἰκμάδα σωματικὴν οὖσαν, ἂν μή τι τῆς 
φύσεως ἔργον ἐμποδίσῃ πρὸς ἄλλην χρῆσιν, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν 
τοῖς τόποις τούτοις γίνεσθαι τρίχας. 
“The eyebrows and eyelashes are both for the sake of protection. (...) The eyelids  
 are at the ends of small blood vessels; for where the skin terminates, the small blood 
vessels also reach their limit. So because the moist secretions oozing are bodily, it is 
necessary that – unless some function of nature stops it with a view to another use 
                                                 
14 DA.II.1-4. 
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– even owing to a cause such as this, hair from necessity comes to be in these 
locations.”15 
Aristotle’s explanations will reflect the interactions and the causal interrelations 
between these two natures.16  
 
The second significant aspect of the imagery of the household involves the 
‘hierarchical relations’ between parts that Aristotle sketches, reflecting to a large 
extent the order in which they come to be.17 Roughly speaking, the more necessary a 
part will be for the animal as a whole and for the process of generation, the earlier it 
will be produced in the development of the embryo, and the finer the material will 
be from which it will be produced.  
First, there are parts which (as Aristotle calls it) ‘partake’ in the essence of 
an animal: these are produced first (starting with the heart18 and the bloodvessels out 
of which all the other parts are formed, first the internal, then the external parts; first 
the upper, then the lower parts) and are made from the best materials available.  
Secondly, there are parts that contribute to the essential parts, as slaves do 
to the free people: these are produced only after the first ones have come to be, and 
are made from the next best materials available or from the immediate leftovers 
from the first category of parts (cf. GA.II.6, 742b5-8: “all those parts which are for 
                                                 
15 Lennox translates the section concerning the action of the formal nature in Lennox (2001b), 42 as 
“unless some function of nature redirects it to another use” and concludes in (2001a), 192 that the 
necessity involved must be conditional. However, the Greek shows that nature is not doing anything yet, 
but may intervene to stop the flow with a view to another use; this suggests the operation of secondary 
teleology and material necessity. Cf. the actions of the formal nature in GA.I.8, 718b16-28 and GA.I.11, 
719a14-15, where they consist in not hindering the processes that take place of material necessity. 
16 See e.g. PA.III.2, 663b22-24: “We must say what the character of the necessary nature is, and, how 
nature according to the account has made use of things present of necessity for the sake of something.” 
(πῶς δὲ τῆς ἀναγκαίας φύσεως ἐχούσης τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον φύσις ἕνεκά του 
κατακέχρηται, λέγωμεν). 
17 The whole of GA.II.6 is devoted to a discussion of the order of the generation of parts, differentiating 
between ends which have to be realized first (i.e. the parts that contain a source of movement and that 
partake of the essence), and which later (i.e. the parts that are for the sake of the latter); cf. GA.II.6, 
742a18-19: τῶν γὰρ μορίων ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πέφυκεν ἕτερον ἑτέρου πρότερον (“it is with the parts 
as with other things: one naturally exists prior to another”) and GA.II.6, 742b10-12: καίτοι κατὰ ταύτην 
τὴν μέθοδον δεῖ ζητεῖν τί γίγνεται μετὰ τί· τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἐνίων μὲν ὕστερον ἐνίων δὲ πρότερον (“and yet it is 
in accordance with this method that we must inquire what comes into being after what: for the end is later 
than some parts and earlier than others”). Aristotle also discusses the exceptions to these rules, such as 
the development of the eye, which comes to completion relatively late (GA.II.6, 743b33-744b10). 
18 On the primacy of the heart, see Lloyd (1987), 58. Cf. PA.III.666a18-21: “That it appears to be this way 
not only accords with our account, but with perception as well; for of the parts in the embryos, the heart 
is straight away manifestly in motion, as if it were an animal – like an origin of nature in the blooded 
animals.” 
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the sake of something else but are not of the nature of beginnings must come into 
being later”).  
The fact that Aristotle also mentions a third category of beings to be fed in 
a household, suggests that there is also a third category of parts, which could 
perhaps be categorized as a subcategory of the second category. This third category 
consists of those parts that are neither included in the essence of an animal, nor 
contribute immediatly to the parts that are included in the essence of an animal. 
Rather, they make some other kind of contribution, or are just present without doing 
any harm, just as the animals do within a household, and they are made from a 
second group of leftovers, corresponding to the worst of foods that is given to the 
animals. I submit that parts like nails and hoofs belong to this third category.  
 
This hierarchy of parts is intimately connected to a corresponding typology of 
explanations. The basic picture, which I will elaborate below, is the following: 
 The first stage of animal generation (i.e. of the growth of the embryo) 
pertains to the necessary parts: the parts that partake in the form of the animal come 
to be first. The presence of these parts is explained by reference to primary 
teleology, and their coming to be by reference to conditional necessity. Because 
necessary parts are those parts whose function is included in the definition of the 
substantial being of the animal (i.e. the essence of each animal comprises the 
necessary functions to be realized), their presence can be accounted for as the 
realizations of those functions. The formal nature of the animal is also responsible 
for the coming to be of the materials used for the formation of the part, for the type 
of necessity involved in the coming to be of these parts is conditional. If this part is 
to come to be and to perform this function (and this part necessarily has to come to 
be, given the substantial being of the animal), then these materials have to be 
produced first; and the formal nature always uses the best material. Because the 
function is part of the form of the animal, and because the function is in that sense 
causally and chronologically prior to the generation of the part, I call the type of 
teleology involved ‘primary teleology’.  
 The second stage of animal generation pertains to non-necessary, subsidiary 
parts. The presence of these parts is also explained by reference to primary teleology, 
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but only on a secondary level. Subsidiary parts are parts that are not necessary for 
the performance of a necessary function, but that contribute to the necessary 
functions performed by other, necessary parts. It is only on account of the presence 
of those necessary parts that perform necessary functions, that the presence of the 
subsidiary parts is a good for the animal. Because the function these parts perform is 
included in the definition of the substantial being of the animal and is thus prior to 
the coming to be of the part, the teleology involved is primary. The necessity 
involved in the coming to be of the subsidiary parts is again conditional, but 
conditional on two levels. If the necessary part that performs a necessary function is 
present (i.e. has already come to be in the development of the embryo), and if the 
performance of this function can be enhanced by the presence of another, subsidiary 
part, certain materials will have to be present for the formation of the subsidiary 
parts. The formal nature of the animal uses the next best material available or 
producible, which is sometimes identified as the seminal residue (cf. GA.II.6, 
744b29-30: ἐκ τῆς σπερματικῆς περιττώσεως). 
 The third and last stage of animal generation pertains to non-necessary, 
mostly ‘luxurious’19 or ‘tool-like’ parts. The presence of these parts is explained by 
reference to secondary teleology, while their coming to be is due to material 
necessity. These parts are not necessary for the being or survival of the animal, nor 
are their functions included in the definition of the substantial being of the animal.20 
Rather, the formal nature of an animal produces these parts because there is still 
some material left over in the form of residues, and this material has the right 
potentials to be used for something that contributes to the well-being of the animal, 
without being necessary for it.  
The residues that are used for these parts are the leftovers from “the 
nutriment that is taken in later and that is concerned with growth, which is acquired 
from the mother and from the outer world” (GA.II.6, 745a3: ἐκ τῆς ἐπικτήτου 
τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξητικῆς, ἥν τε παρὰ τοῦ θήλεος ἐπικτᾶται καὶ [τῆς] θύραθεν). This 
also explains why the growth of these parts often continues throughout the life of 
                                                 
19 Note that Sorabji (1980, 157-158) uses the term ‘luxurious’ with regard to all non-necessary parts, while 
I use it in a more restricted manner to refer only to those non-necessary parts whose presence is not 
conditionally necessitated and that do not contribute to a necessary function.  
20 Cf. GA.V.1, 778a29-35. 
Chapter 3. Explaining parts of animals 
 190
the animal. This category of parts mainly consists of parts that are used for the sake 
of defense and protection, such as for example horns and spurs.21 Note that these 
parts are always uniform parts, and that they are not complex enough to perform 
complex functions. Aristotle calls them tool-like: they have to be moved ‘from the 
outside’ and therefore are only produced in animals that are able to use them (cf. 
PA.III.1, 661b28-30). In most of these cases, material necessity is responsible for the 
coming to be of the constitutive materials of these parts, and sometimes also for 
their coming to be as such, while the formal nature is responsible for their function 
and presence: following the material potentials available, the formal nature puts the 
material to some good use. The explanation of the presence of these parts is 
teleological in Aristotle’s view,22 but it is not so without qualification: the formal 
nature of the animal attributes a function to a part or to a flow of material, but only 
after this part or material has already come to be.23 The coming to be of the part is 
not conditional upon the function the part ultimately performs; instead, the function 
is secondary to the coming to be of the part and imposed on it by the formal nature. 
The formal nature is the cause of the part’s presence, and of its structure, location, 
and function. The teleology involved is thus secondary teleology. If the material 
available cannot be put to any good use, the formal nature expels it from the 
animal’s body.  
 
The examples of explanations that Aristotle offers in PA.I, which are supposed to 
set the standards for biological investigations, are directly connected with these three 
general scenario’s.  
The first type of explanation that Aristotle mentions explicitly is the type of 
explanation that proceeds through an essence that comprises functions (PA.I.1, 
639b13-19):  
Φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη, ἣν λέγομεν ἕνεκά τινος· λόγος γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δ’ ὁ λόγος ὁμοίως 
ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν. Ἢ γὰρ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τῇ αἰσθήσει 
                                                 
21 In Aristotle’s biology ‘defense’ is a luxury-function: given that species are eternal and that nature, as a 
good housekeeper, provides food for each kind of animal, there is no ‘struggle for existence’ and thus no 
‘vital’ need for ways of protection. 
22 See PA.II.9, 655b15-20: here Aristotle emphasizes that also in the case of non-necessary parts it is 
necessary to know them from their functions and thus to provide teleological explanations for them. 
23 Cf. also Mete.IV.12, 390b2-9, where Aristotle explains how uniform parts such as flesh, bone, hair, and 
sinew can come to be by heat and coldness alone, whereas non-uniform parts can only be produced by 
‘art’. 
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ὁρισάμενος ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν, ὁ δ’ οἰκοδόμος τὴν οἰκίαν, ἀποδιδόασι τοὺς 
λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας οὗ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστου, καὶ διότι ποιητέον οὕτως. 
“Now it is apparent that the first [explanation]24 is the one we describe as being for 
the sake of something. For that is an account, and an account is a principle alike in 
things that are composed according to art and in those composed by nature. For 
after having defined by thought or perception – the physician [having defined] 
health, and the house-builder [having defined] the house – they [i.e. the physician 
and the house-builder] provide the accounts and the explanations of that which 
each of them produces, and the reason why they have to be produced in that way.”  
These lines are usually taken as a defense of the priority of final causality over 
efficient causality,25 but I believe that the argument rather applies to the priority of 
teleological explanation over efficient cause explanations. However, the explanans in 
the examples of explanations Aristotle offers is not a goal or function as such (which 
one would expect in the case of a teleological explanation), but, in the case of art, a 
functionally defined essence. In the case of nature, it is an essence that may or may 
not comprise functions. In either case, the final cause – if there is one – is as it were 
subsumed under a formal cause. The house-builder provides an explanation of the 
house he builds (namely of why he builds it and why he builds it in the way he does) 
by defining the house: what is produced and the way it is produced are explained by 
reference to the definition of the end product that contains the function of that 
product (i.e. ‘shelter’). This defining account of an end product26 in art translates for 
natural cases into the definition of the substantial being of something, which 
contains among others references to the functions to be realized.27 The definition of 
health as, for instance, the not floating of food at the entrance of the stomach, 
points to the necessary condition to be realized if the physician is to make someone 
healthy and explains his actions. Aristotle’s argument is that, because definitions are 
primary, so too are explanations that proceed through such definitions. A few lines 
                                                 
24 Here the term ‘aitia’ cannot be translated with ‘cause’, for the final cause is not itself for the sake of 
something, rather the type of causation picked out by a teleological explanation is.  
25 E.g. in Lennox (2001b), 124-126. 
26 Cf. Ph.II.9, 200a14: “necessity is in the matter, while that for the sake of which is in the definition 
(logos).” 
27 Cf. GA.I.1, 715a4-6: “There are four causes underlying [everything]: namely, that for the sake of which 
as an end, and the definition of the substantial being – and these two we may regard pretty much as one 
and the same; (…).”  
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later, Aristotle explains how such an explanation would work in the natural sciences 
(PA.I.1, 640a33-35):  
Διὸ μάλιστα μὲν λεκτέον ὡς ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ’ ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτ’ ἔχει· οὐ 
γὰρ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ τῶν μορίων τούτων. 
“Therefore one should state in particular that since that is what it is to be a human 
being, on account of that it has these things: for it is not possible to be without 
those parts.”28 
In cases like this one, the definition of the substantial being of human being 
provides the explanans for the presence of certain parts: if a human being is to be 
what he is, then he cannot be without certain parts; therefore these parts are present 
in human beings. I take it that for Aristotle, all and only those parts whose functions 
are included in the definition of the substantial being of the animal can and will be 
explained in this way. These are parts whose presence is, as we stated above, 
(immediately) necessary for the animal: they are either of vital or of essential 
importance to the animal (without them, the animal could not survive or would not 
be the animal it is). This category of features comprises features that are actually 
given in the definition of the substantial being of the animal (e.g. wings and being 
blooded are kath’hauta features of birds; PA.IV.12, 693ab10-14), as well as features 
that follow directly from the features that are part of the definition (e.g. being two-
footed is a kath’hauta sumbebêkos feature of birds; PA.IV.12, 693ab5).29  
In the example Aristotle provides, the explanation takes the definition of 
the substantial being of man as a starting point, and deduces from there a man’s 
essential features, such as for example being blooded or having a heart, lungs, and 
two feet. All these features are according to Aristotle part of the substantial being of 
man,30 and are necessary for his being and existence. What in effect is being 
explained is why one of the necessary conditions of some animal being the kind of 
animal it is (namely that it has certain parts) is such a necessary condition (e.g. in the 
case of man, what is explained is that he is essentially two-footed). For this reason, I 
will refer to this type of explanations as formal cause explanations (rather than as 
teleological explanations, which I reserve for explanations that pick out final causes 
                                                 
28 Cf. PA.I.1, 641ab23-25. 
29 Code (1997), 139. 
30 Cf. the examples of parts and features that belong to the substantial being of animals in Gotthelf 
(1987), 190-191. 
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or functions directly): they establish what being a certain kind of animal is. Once it 
has been established what parts are necessary for a certain kind of being (or, in other 
words, what functions necessarily have to be realized given the substantial being of 
an animal), the presence of such parts can be explained by reference to primary 
teleology and their coming to be can be explained by reference to conditional 
necessity.31  
 
Aristotle offers two alternatives if this type of explanation does not apply (PA.I.1, 
640a35-b4):  
Εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτου, καὶ ἢ ὅλως (ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἄλλως) ἢ καλῶς γε οὕτως. 
Ταῦτα δ’ ἕπεται. Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τὴν γένεσιν ὡδὶ καὶ τοιαύτην συμβαίνειν 
ἀναγκαῖον. Διὸ γίνεται πρῶτον τῶν μορίων τόδε, εἶτα τόδε. Καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον 
ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν φύσει συνισταμένων. 
 “If one cannot say this, one should say the nearest thing, namely that it is thus 
either in general (because it cannot be otherwise), or that it is in a good way thus. 
And these things follow. And since it is such, its generation necessarily happens in 
this way and is such as it is. This is why this one of the parts comes to be first, then 
that one. And similarly in this way with regard to all the things that are constituted 
by nature.” 
Again, Aristotle’s words are elliptical here, but I take it that in cases where (i.) the 
function the part will perform is not part of the definition of the substantial being of 
the animal; and (ii.) the part is not necessary for the being or survival of the animal, 
the explanations (as presented in PA.I.1, 640a35-b1), the explanations will have to 
refer to material necessity and/or the good, where the good indicates secondary or 
subsidiary teleological relations.32 As Aristotle points out, the types of explanations 
                                                 
31 This explains why Aristotle’s predecessors did not arrive at providing explanations in terms of forms 
and functions for biological phenomena “because there was no ‘what it is to be’ and no ‘defining of the 
substantial being” (PA.I.1, 642a25-26: ὅτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὁρίσασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἦν); they lacked a 
proper starting point from which to determine functional parts and a means to connect them with the 
essential being of an animal.  
32 I take the necessity and the good mentioned in these explanations to refer to the cause of the coming to 
be and/or the presence of parts in an animal, and not to the relation between the part and the animal as 
such. The latter interpretation is defended by Code (1997), 139-42. Code distinguishes the following three 
groupings of parts: (i) parts that follow from the definition of the animal; (ii) parts that are necessary, but 
do not follow from the definition; (iii) parts that are not necessary, but are present in the animal because it 
is good. Under this scheme, the second category only comprises parts like the spleen (in fact, it is the only 
part Code mentions as an example), which seems a bit of a stretch to me. The spleen is an exceptional 
case in Aristotle’s biology (the spleen does not have a proper function, and its presence rather derives 
from a symmetry-principle; PA.III.6, 669b25-31 – the necessity involved in the coming to be is material, 
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offered as an alternative correspond to different stages in the order of generation. 
The parts whose functions are part of the essence of an animal are first in the order 
of generation; the parts that contribute to the performance of necessary functions, 
or whose functions are not necessary, are second in order of generation. We have 
already discussed some of the possible patterns of explanation here, pertaining to 
either non-necessary, subsidiary parts, which are explained by reference to primary 
teleology and conditional necessity on a secondary level, or to non-necessary, 
luxurious parts, which are explained by reference to secondary teleology and material 
necessity. In each case, the explanation pertains to non-necessary parts,33 and the 
‘good’ they contribute to the overall functioning or well-being of the animal forms 
an important part of the explanation.  
However, the reference to material necessity also suggests another pattern 
of explanation – a pattern in which teleology is completely absent. This type of 
explanation pertains to some residues or parts like the spleen,34 which do not 
perform any function of their own, nor contribute to the performance of the 
function of another part. Their coming to be and presence is explained fully in terms 
of material necessity, that is, of material elements acting according to their natures; 
the material structures are not expelled by the body because they do no harm, or 
because perhaps at some point they might be usable for some other good. Parts like 
these are not included in the definition of the substantial being of the animal, but 
rather follow from the animal’s material nature: given the elemental make-up of an 
animal and the kinds and amounts of food it can process, the presence of these 
material structures necessarily follows (or “cannot be otherwise”). The phrase “and 
these things follow” in PA.I.1, 640b2 is so elliptical that it is hard to make sense of.35 
Perhaps it just means that the latter kind of parts (that is, those parts whose presence 
and coming to be are explained by reference to material necessity and/or the good, 
                                                                                                               
the necessity involved between the part and the animal that has is accidental; PA.III.7, 670a31-32), and it 
is odd that Aristotle would refer to such exceptional cases in laying out the larger explanatory framework 
for his biological investigations. I also disagree with Gotthelf (1987), 189, who takes the second category 
of parts to refer to the case in which a part is “necessary given an essential function because it makes 
some necessary contribution to the performance of that function.” For Aristotle contributions are never 
necessary; if they were, parts who contribute to the performance of necessary functions could never be 
absent, and observation shows that they sometimes are (GA.I.4, 717a11-21); moreover, Aristotle explicitly 
states with regard to parts like these that they are not present of necessity (PA.III.7, 670b23-27).  
33 Pace Balme (1972), 87 and Gotthelf (1987), 189. 
34 For the spleen, see PA.III.7, 669b27-670a30. 
35 See Lennox (2001b), 135 for an overview of possible interpretations offered by scholars of Aristotle. 
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but are not included in the definition of the substantial being of the animal), comes 
to be after the first kind of (necessary) parts and ‘follow’ in a temporal sense. This 
reading is consistent with Aristotle’s focus on the order of generation in the next few 
lines: because the animal’s nature is the way it is, its generation necessarily takes 
place in the way it does – some parts (i.e. the ones that are necessary) come to be 
first, others (i.e. the ones that are non-necessary) next.  
 
The importance of providing both teleological explanations and explanations that 
refer to necessity for natural phenomena is emphasized several times in the first 
book of the PA.36  
In general, the final causes referred to in the teleological explanations in PA 
will be the functions performed by the animal’s parts. In the case of primary 
teleology, “the parts will be for the sake of the functions in relation to which each of 
them has naturally developed (PA.I.5, 645b18-20).” In the case of secondary 
teleology, the parts will be present for the sake of the function to which the formal 
nature has put it, while it will have come to be as a result of material necessity.  
Functions are not only invoked to explain the presence of parts, but also to 
explain their differentiations. As will become clear, Aristotle uses references to 
functions to explain why a certain part is materially, structurally, or topographically 
differentiated the way it is in this particular kind of being, relative to other parts with 
the same name and approximately the same function in other living beings. Roughly 
speaking, if the differentiation is necessary, its presence will be explained by 
reference to primary teleology, while its coming to be will be explained by reference 
to conditional necessity. If the differentiation is not necessary, but ‘merely’ for the 
better, its presence will be explained by reference to secondary teleology, and its 
coming to be by reference to material necessity.  
                                                 
36 In PA.I.1, 642a1-15, Aristotle recapitulates that there are two types of explanations or causes (i.e. 
teleology and necessity), explains the type of necessity that predominates in things that partake of 
generation (i.e. conditional necessity), and urges the natural philosopher to state both kinds of 
explanations, or “at least try to state both.” In PA.I.1, 642a32-b2, Aristotle integrates teleological 
explanations with explanations referring to material necessity in his explanation of breathing, and claims 
that this is the way in which one should explain or demonstrate things (PA.I.1, 642a32: Δεικτέον δ’ οὕτως). 
In PA.I.5, 645a22-25 argues for the pervasiveness of teleology in the works of nature, and introduces the 
good as that for the sake of which eahc animals has come to be. In PA.I.5, 645b15-36, Aristotle discusses 
a variety of teleological relationships between body and soul, parts and functions, and different activities, 
but also indicates that “there are things that are necessarily present because others are” (PA.I.5, 645b32-
b33: ὧν ὄντων ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν). 
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In the practice of explaining biological phenomena, Aristotle also employs another 
type of teleological explanation that does not refer to final causes as such, but rather 
relies on general principles of teleology. These principles entail generalizations over 
the goal-directed actions of formal natures, explicating what they ‘always’ or ‘never’ 
do when they are said to produce living beings and their parts. They also indicate the 
scope of nature’s goal-directedness. As I will show below, these principles function 
as limits: they provide a framework (established inductively through observation) 
within which the explanation of a particular phenomenon must take place. These 
two ‘kinds’ of teleological explanations will be analyzed and assessed in separate 
sections.  
 
3.1.3 General outline of Aristotle’s methodology in PA 
Before turning to an analysis of the actual explanations Aristotle offers in PA.II-IV, 
a few more words need to be said about the methods Aristotle follows in order to 
arrive at these explanations.  
One important characteristic of PA that one should be aware of from the 
outset is that, although PA is part of Aristotle’s investigation of animals, its main 
focus is not on animals as such, but – as the title suggests – on their parts. This 
focus on parts guides both the overall-organization of PA, and the organization of 
the explanations offered with regard to each part. The explanatory project in the PA 
is not concerned with gaining knowledge about say, a chicken and its nature, parts, 
and affections; hence we will not find an unified entry on chickens or other animals 
in the PA, nor will we get a complete picture of all the different animals that were 
known to Aristotle. Rather, Aristotle is trying to gain understanding about parts and 
their interrelationships. PA thus does contain an entry on, say, beaks (PA.III.1, 
662a34-b17). He wants to know which animals have a beak; and why all and only 
those animals have it (and why they have a beak, and not a mouth with teeth, and 
lips etc.); and why those animals who have a beak have the kind of beak they have 
(that is, why the beak is differentiated the way it is in different animals that have it). 
Again, Aristotle will not enumerate all the different kinds of animals that have beaks, 
but rather name the (clusters of) differentiae with which the having of beaks for the 
most part correlates. Because Aristotle leaves the extension of the correlation open, 
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this may prompt the question why some animals are lacking a certain part when its 
presence could reasonably be expected based on the presence of the other 
differentiae with which that part for the most part correlates. Individual animal kinds 
are only singled out in the discussion when a part is differentiated in this animal kind 
in a way that is distinctively different from its realization in other animals or because 
it has other anomalous features (note that there are relatively few animal species that 
are named in PA).37  
This does not mean that the animals to which the parts belong are 
unimportant: parts are only truly (and not merely homonymously) parts when they 
belong to a living being and when they are able to act and function for the sake of 
that living being. The being and presence of parts is dependent on the being of the 
animal as a whole, and the presence of parts is therefore explained first and foremost 
in terms of the functional contribution it makes to the animal as a whole. In sum, 
the various animal parts form the starting points for the investigation conducted in 
PA, while the identification of the animal kinds to which those parts belong is the 
starting point of the explanation, but is only on a secondary level important for the 
organization of PA.   
 
The extent to which Aristotle focuses on parts within PA will easily be illustrated by 
a brief outline of PA.II-IV. We will see two principles of organization at work: first, 
following the teleological hierarchy between parts, Aristotle discusses – part by part 
– first the uniform parts, and next the non-uniform parts. Secondly, the discussion 
of the non-uniform parts takes human physiology as a starting point, and works 
from top to bottom: separating the blooded animals from the bloodless, Aristotle 
first covers all the parts located on the head, next the parts located around the heart, 
and finally the limbs.  
 The organization of PA.II-IV runs as follows. Aristotle opens the second 
book of the PA with an elaborate and general discussion of the uniform parts 
(PA.II.1-9), focusing on their teleological relationships to other parts, their 
distinctions (into soft and moist, and dry and solid parts), their role in the animal’s 
body, and their influence on the animal’s character. He then moves on to a 
                                                 
37 For instance, the Indian ass and the Oryx are singled out for having only one horn, while the majority 
of animals have two (PA.III.2, 663a21-23). Cf. Balme (1987), 9 and 88 on the famous case of the mole. 
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discussion of the external, non-uniform parts. First (in PA.II.10-III.2), Aristotle 
discusses the non-uniform parts that are located on the head of blooded animals, 
such as the organs of sense perception, kinds of eye-protection (eyelids, eyelashes, 
and eyebrows), and the mouth. Next (in PA.III.3-VI.4), moving down from the 
neck, Aristotle turns to a discussion of all the internal, non-uniform parts located 
around the heart, such as the viscera, heart and blood-vessels, lungs, and liver. At this 
point, Aristotle moves to a discussion of the external and internal non-uniform parts of 
bloodless animals (mainly the crustaceans and insects; PA.VI.5-9), limiting his 
discussion to the things that are different in the bloodless animals in comparison to 
the blooded animals. Having discussed the bloodless animals, Aristotle returns to his 
discussion of the remaining external, non-uniform parts of blooded animals (PA.VI.9-13). 
Here Aristotle’s organization of his discussion of parts is more intrinsically 
connected to the kinds of animals that have those parts: he first discusses the parts 
left unexplained in the live-bearing animals, then in the egg-laying animals, and 
finally in birds and fish. Aristotle ends his explanation of parts by a brief discussion 
of animals that dualize between two natures, such as dolphins, whales, seals, bats, 
and the Libyan ostrich (PA.IV.13-14). In conclusion, Aristotle sums up the general 
aims of his investigation in PA and refers forward to the De Generatione Animalium 
(PA.IV.14, 697b26-29):  
Περὶ μὲν οὖν μορίων, διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαν ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις, εἴρηται περὶ 
 πάντων τῶν ζῴων καθ’ ἕκαστον. Τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων ἐφεξῆς ἐστι τὰ περὶ τὰς 
γενέσεις αὐτῶν διελθεῖν. 
“About the parts, then, the cause owing to which each is present in the animals has 
been stated, of each of the animals in turn; these things having been determined, 
the next step is to go through the facts about their generation.” 
Within this larger organizational structure, the method Aristotle employs to arrive at 
explanations of particular parts of animals runs – schematically, and in a somewhat 
generalized form – as follows:38 
1. Take part P; 
2. Find the widest kind of subjects (S1-n) to which P belongs; 
                                                 
38 For explicit statements about Aristotle’s explanatory projects, see PA.II.1, 646a8-12; PA.II.3, 650b8-12; 
PA.II.5, 651b18-19; PA.II.6, 652a20-23; PA.II.7, 653b9-18; PA.III.4, 667b12-14; PA.III.10, 673a32-b4; 
PA.IV.14, 697b27-30; all but a few of these references are taken from Lennox (2001a), 5. 
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3. Explain why P belongs to each S that has P, by identifying the cause 
for the presence of P in S;  
4. (Explain why P is absent in those animals in which the presence of P 
could be expected;) 
5. Take the differentiations of P (∆P); 
6. Find the widest kind of subjects (S1-n) to which ∆P belongs; 
7. Explain why P is differentiated the way it is in each S that has P, by 
identifying the cause for the differentiation of P (∆P). 
By way of illustrating this somewhat abstracted ‘seven-step method’, I will briefly go 
through Aristotle’s discussion of the lung. The discussion of the lung takes place in 
the context of the larger discussion of the viscera, which Aristotle starts in PA.III.4, 
665a27-31: 
Καὶ περὶ μὲν αὐχένος τε καὶ οἰσοφάγου καὶ ἀρτηρίας εἴρηται, ἑπόμενον δ’ ἐστὶ περὶ 
σπλάγχνων εἰπεῖν. Ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ἴδια τῶν ἐναίμων, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἅπανθ’ ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δ’ 
οὐχ ὑπάρχει. Τῶν δ’ ἀναίμων οὐδὲν ἔχει σπλάγχνον. 
“Having spoken about the neck, esophagus, and windpipe, the next things to speak 
about are the viscera. These are distinctive to the blooded animals, and while all the 
viscera are present in some of them, in others they are not. None of the blooded 
animals has a visceral part.” 
Aristotle works his way down from the parts related to the head and the neck, to the 
parts that are near the heart; the parts that come up next in following this route over 
the human body are the viscera. Thus having introduced the parts that will be 
explained now, Aristotle first identifies the animals to which the viscera belong: 
these are the blooded animals. Note that Aristotle does not enumerate all the 
different kinds of animals that have viscera, but instead picks out a differentia shared 
by all and only those animals that have viscera (the widest kinds of subject of the 
explanation are, as it were, differentia-bearers rather than ‘cats’ or ‘dogs’). In this 
case, he correlating differentia is being blooded; none of the bloodless animals has 
viscera, because, as Aristotle later explains, they do not have blood, which is the 
constitutive material of the viscera. Before explaining the presence of the individual 
viscera in the blooded animals, Aristotle mentions that the viscera are different in 
different animals (PA.III.4, 665b1-9), thus introducing a discussion of why the 
viscera are differentiated the way they are in the animals that have them. Then 
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Aristotle moves on to a discussion of the presence (PA.III.4, 665b10-11) and 
differentiation of the heart (PA.III.4, 666b21-23), of the parts related to the heart, 
and then finally Aristotle introduces the lung (PA.III.5, 668b30-III.6, 668b33): 
Καὶ περὶ μὲν φλεβῶν καὶ καρδίας εἰρήσθω, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων σπλάγχνων σκεπτέον 
κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον. Πλεύμονα μὲν οὖν ἔχει διὰ τὸ πεζὸν εἶναί τι γένος τῶν ζῴων.  
“We may take it that the blood vessels and heart have been discussed; we need to 
 examine the other viscera according to the same method. A certain kind of animal 
has a lung because it is a land-dweller.” 
Here the same method is applied all over again: Aristotle identifies those blooded 
animals that have lungs (i.e. those animals that are land-dwellers), and identifies the 
cause for the sake of which all animals that have a lung have it (i.e. breathing; 
PA.III.6, 669a14). Next, he brings up the question of the differentiation of lungs 
(PA.III.6, 669a24-25: “the lung differs in many ways in animals”), connects the 
different kinds of lungs to the animals that have those kinds of lungs, and states the 
causes of this distribution. After this, Aristotle picks up his discussion of the other 
viscera, and again tries to answer the same set of questions. So, although Aristotle 
may vary in the order in which the questions are answered, and perhaps employs a 
somewhat associative manner of connecting the discussions of animal parts to each 
other, his basic ‘format’ is the same: take P, find S1-n to which P belongs, explain why 
P belongs to each S that has it (or why it is absent in others); take ∆P, find S1-n to 
which each particular ∆P belongs, explain why ∆P belongs to each S that has it. 
 
In describing this basic format, I have focused on Aristotle’s explanations of the 
presence and the differentiation of parts. However, Aristotle is also interested in 
providing explanations for why a certain part is absent in a certain kind of animal.  
There are two cases in which the question why a certain part is absent 
seems reasonable and appropriate (in the way that asking for an explanation of the 
absence of horns in pigs is, and of wings in cows is not). This question is reasonable 
and appropriate in the first place in cases where the observations of all the other 
kinds of animals belonging to the same wider class as that to which the animal in 
question belongs show that these other animals all have that part. A famous example 
is the snake. All blooded land-dwellers possess feet, except for snakes; the footless-
ness of snakes thus needs to be explained. In the second place, the question arises in 
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those cases where an analogy based on the correlations of parts within other kinds of 
animals suggests that the animal-kind in question also could have used the part 
commonly possessed by the other kinds. Take the example of the presence of outer 
ears in human beings and four-footed vivipara and ovipara, but their absence in 
birds. All these animals are blooded, and given that birds do have auditory channels, 
one might expect birds to have outer ears also. Since they are absent, this fact needs 
to be explained. In short, it is through the comparison of observations of other 
related or ‘similar’ animals having a certain part (a comparison which thus establishes 
inductively a natural set of parts possibly owned by certain kinds of animals) that the 
question why that part is lacking in this particular kind of animal becomes 
reasonable. (The heuristics employed in discovering ‘significant’ absence of parts will 
be discussed more explicitly below.) 
One could argue that in each case where a lack of a certain part is observed 
in an animal kind (and where this lack is surprising considering the fact that other 
related or similar animals do have that part), the part in question can no longer be 
considered as a genus-specific differentia of the wider kind of animals to which the 
animal lacking the part belongs. If Aristotle uses as an explanatory rule the fact that 
all blooded land-dwellers have four feet, and the snake, which is also a blooded land-
dweller, is observed not to have feet, doesn’t that mean that having four feet is only 
incidental to blooded land-dwellers, or at least that snakes are not really blooded 
land-dwellers? There are two reasons why Aristotle considers cases like these merely 
as exceptions to the rule (which need to be explained, of course) and not as 
refutations of it. On the one hand, it is exactly because Aristotle holds that natural 
processes happen ‘for the most part’ and not ‘always’ (in an unqualified sense), that 
he – to some extent – allows for exceptions and variations among genus-specific 
differentia.39 On the other hand, if the explanatory network based on the assumption 
of the existence of animal-kinds or wider classes sharing specific and discriminatory 
natures, parts and features still holds for the parts the animal in question does have, 
then there is no reason for Aristotle to drop the whole network. A snake, for 
instance, might be lacking feet, but its other main parts and features can be 
accounted for by reference to its being blooded or being a land-dweller, and thus 
                                                 
39 Cf. PA.III.2, 663b27-29: “And one should study nature with a view to the many; for it is what happens 
either in every case or for the most part that is in accordance with nature.” 
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Aristotle opts to explain the lacking part.40 This is not an ad-hoc solution, for 
Aristotle in fact provides explanations for why things are for the most part: if there 
is an exception in nature, then there is an explanation for it. It also shows the 
comprehensiveness of Aristotle’s explanatory project. 
 
3.1.4 Aristotle’s heuristic strategies in PA 
The systematic way in which Aristotle presents his explanations of parts of animals 
reveals that he is in fact offering us his conclusions of an investigation that he has 
already carried out (although perhaps not entirely finished yet).  
On the other hand, it is also clear that the structure of PA still reflects to 
some extent Aristotle’s explanatory project and strategies of the Posterior Analytics.41 
For instance, Aristotle follows a teleological ordering in first discussing the uniform 
parts that are for the sake of the non-uniform parts, which are discussed next; he 
also discusses the parts of the bloodless animals by analogy to the parts of blooded 
animals that (presumably) are better known. Less clear from Aristotle’s exposition is 
how he deals with the transitions in his explanations from (differentiations of) parts 
to animals that have those (differentiations of) parts, and from there to the 
explanation of (the differentiation of) parts in those animals. For, how does one go 
about in finding all and only those animals that have a particular part or a particular 
differentiation of a part? And next, how does one go about finding the explanation 
of why a particular part or a particular differentiation of a part belongs to a particular 
subset of animals?  
Here I will sketch briefly two heuristic strategies Aristotle uses to find all 
and only those animals to which a part belongs: the identification of the widest class 
to which a part belongs, and the identification and grouping of the relevant 
differentiae. These two heuristic patterns largely coincide with what Lennox has 
labeled A-type explanations and B-type explanations.42 The distinction I make by 
discussing these explanatory strategies under ‘heuristics’ rather than under 
‘explanations’ is one of accent, but I believe it is nevertheless an important one. The 
                                                 
40 The being without horns of the camel, however, remains a problem in this respect; see Lennox (2001a), 
280-1. 
41 See Gotthelf (1987), 175-178, who mentions five features (I only mention the two of them that are 
most relevant in this context) that reveal an axiomatic structure in the organization of PA.II-IV. 
42 Lennox (1987a), 92-114. 
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full explanation of the presence, absence, or differentiation of a part is usually more 
complicated, and the heuristics, as I will show below, ‘merely’ point the way to 
causal explanations, without being themselves fully fledged causal explanations yet. 
One should also note that part of the reason why these heuristics remain implicit in 
Aristotle’s explanations of parts of animals is because in many cases Aristotle draws 
from his conclusions already laid down in HA. 43 
 
3.1.4.a Heuristic pattern I: identification of widest class 
In those cases where a part is known to belong to a particular kind of animal, or is 
known to belong to animals that (at first sight) seem very distinctive, Aristotle 
searches ‘vertically’ for the wider classes of those animals that all have that part, until 
he touches upon the widest class44 to which that part belongs primitively.  
Take for instance the viscera. These can be seen to belong to a wide range 
of animal kinds (i.e. to man, viviparous quadrupeds, oviparous quadrupeds, birds, 
fish, and cetaceans), but right at the beginning of his discussion of the viscera 
Aristotle points out that having viscera is distinctive (ἴδια) of blooded animals, while 
none of the bloodless have viscera (οὐδὲν ἔχει) (PA.III.4, 665a27-31). The widest 
class to which viscera belong primitively is thus the class of blooded animals. 
Another example derives from Aristotle’s discussion of the presence of wings in 
different animals: some insects have wings (PA.IV.6, 682b5-11), but so do all birds 
(PA.IV.12, 693b5-14). In both cases, Aristotle points to the widest class of animals 
to which wings belong primitively, that is, to the class of fliers.  
By subsuming species under the widest classes that have a certain part, 
Aristotle does not immediately explain the presence of that part, but rather unifies 
animals that have the same part under a common denominator, which may point to 
the relevant correlations or differentiae. In both the examples mentioned the 
identification of the widest class points the way to causal explanations, but along 
different lines. In the case of the viscera, the fact that viscera are distinctive of all 
blooded animals points to a material explanation of the presence of viscera in those 
                                                 
43 Cf. Lennox (2006), 9-10. 
44 These classes can consist of the ‘major genera’ (i.e. man, viviparous quadrupeds, oviparous quadrupeds, 
birds, fish, cetaceans, cephalopods, crustaceans, testaceans and insects), but also of other genera such as 
blooded/bloodless, terrestrial/aquatic/flying/stationary, footless/biped/quadruped/polypod. 
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animals: the viscera are made from blood, and since blood (i.e. red blood) is lacking 
in all the bloodless animals, they do not have viscera. In the case of animals with 
wings, the case is a bit more complicated. For birds, being a flyer is part of the 
definition of the substantial being of birds (cf. PA.IV.12, 693b5-14):  
τῶν γὰρ ἐναίμων ἡ τοῦ ὄρνιθος οὐσία, ἅμα δὲ καὶ πτερυγωτός. (...) τῷ δ’ ὄρνιθι ἐν τῇ 
οὐσίᾳ τὸ πτητικόν ἐστιν. 
“For the substantial being of the bird is that of the blooded animals, but at the same 
time that of the winged animals (...); and the ability to fly is in the substantial being 
of the bird” 
Therefore, the explanation of the presence of wings in birds will have to refer to the 
form of birds, which includes the form of being a flyer (all birds are essentially 
fliers). For insects, on the other hand, being a flyer correlates with a differentia that 
is causally more basic, namely the having of only six feet: those insects that have 
only six feet are fliers, and they have wings because they are fliers (PA.IV.6, 682b5-6: 
those insects that have fewer feet are fliers in consequence of the deficiency of 
feet).45 Here, the explanation will refer to the form of fliers, but not to the form of 
insects. The structure of explanations like these will be discussed in more detail 
below, for now the two examples must suffice to illustrate the way in which Aristotle 
seems to have used this heuristic. 
 
In the case of ‘dualizers’, that is, of animals that seem to share in two natures 
without actually having either one or both natures completely,46 the heuristic also 
functions at a more basic level, namely at the level of the discovery of parts whose 
presence or absence needs to be explained. Dualizers have some parts that fall under 
one of the widest classes, while they have other parts that fall under another. Taking 
these two widest classes as a starting point, Aristotle deduces what parts should be 
present in the animal if it were a member of both of them, and matches these with 
the parts actually present. This procedure mainly points to the absence of parts, 
                                                 
45 Apparently, Aristotle also includes such animals as spiders, ticks, and millipedes in the insect-family. 
46 Balme (1987; 85-86) defines ‘dualizers’ (the expression in Greek is: ἐπαμφοτερίζει τὴν φύσιν) as animals 
that ‘tend to both sides of a division’ and therefore escape precise grouping.  
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which requires an explanation, and sometimes also towards the explanation of the 
parts that are present by reference to the form possessed by the widest kind.47   
Take the examples of apes.48 Aristotle has first discussed the ‘posterior 
parts and the parts around the legs’ in human beings, which are distinctive of them 
when compared to the four-footed animals (PA.IV.10, 689b1-31). For all four-
footed animals have tails, no buttocks, and fleshless legs, while all human beings 
have buttocks, no tails and fleshy legs; Aristotle explains why each kind of animal 
has the parts it has, and then turns to the ape (PA.IV.10, 689b31-34):  
Ὁ δὲ πίθηκος διὰ τὸ τὴν μορφὴν ἐπαμφοτερίζειν καὶ μηδετέρων τ’ εἶναι καὶ 
ἀμφοτέρων, διὰ τοῦτ’ οὔτε οὐρὰν ἔχει οὔτ’ ἰσχία, ὡς μὲν δίπους ὢν οὐράν, ὡς δὲ 
τετράπους ἰσχία.  
“But the ape, because its shape tends in both directions [towards two-footed and 
towards four-footed] and because it is neither one and also both, has neither a tail 
nor buttocks – as two-footed, no tail, as four-footed, no buttocks.”  
The absence of the tail and buttocks in apes is only significant from the perspective 
of its dual nature: we could reasonably have expected these parts to be present, but 
since they are lacking, this fact needs to be explained.49 The explanation to which 
Aristotle points for the absence of these parts involves referring alternately to the 
forms of the two widest classes to which apes (in virtue of the parts that they have) 
belong. Apes do not have a tail, because in this respect, they are like two-footed 
human beings; apes do not have buttocks, because in this respect, they are like four-
footed animals. However, the complete explanation of why apes are like two-footed 
human beings in one respect, and like four-footed animals in another will have to 
refer to other, causally more basic factors, pertaining e.g. to the ape’s life and to what 
parts would be useful or harmful to the ape’s kind of life. What is important for now 
is to note that it is only through comparison with the animals that belong to the two 
widest classes towards which the nature of dualizers tend that the absence of 
particular parts becomes evident. 
                                                 
47 For instance, in PA.III.6, 668b32-669a14, Aristotle uses the fact that dualizers such as whales and 
dolphins also have lungs to discover the widest kind of breathers, the form of which explains the presence 
of lungs in both blooded land-dwellers as in some blooded water-dwellers. 
48 For the example, see Lennox (1987a), 108. 
49 Cf. the case of seals and bats in PA.IV.13, 697b1-13, and the case of the river crocodile in PA.IV.11, 
690b19-24; in all these cases, Aristotle employs the identification of widest classes mainly to detect and 
start to explain the absence of parts. 
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3.1.4.b Heuristic pattern II: identification and grouping of correlating differentiae 
In other cases, where a part or its differentiation seems to be distinctive of a 
particular kind or sub-kind of animal, Aristotle searches ‘horizontally’ within that kind 
itself in order to identify and group together all the correlating differentiae (i.e. the 
other parts an animal possesses, the animal’s bios, its activities, or its character) that 
might be causative of the presence or the differentiation of that part. The heuristic 
strategy is thus to look for simultaneous occurrences of the presence (or absence or 
differentiation) of a part and other features that are characteristic of this animal, not 
by focusing on the wider class of animals to which the animal kind that has the part 
belongs, but on the particular nature of that animal kind. One of these features could 
be (the link to) the cause of the presence (or absence or differentiation) of that part. 
Instead of, so to speak, moving further away from the animal itself in order to find 
the widest class of animals that possesses the part per se, Aristotle stays at the level 
of the particular kind of animal that owns the particular part, in order to find 
something in its immediate nature responsible for it. In these cases, too, the 
identification and grouping of differentiae that correlate with the part to be 
explained precede the actual explanation, because not all of the differentiae found 
need to be causally basic.  
Take the example of the presence of tails (PA.IV.10, 689b1-31). The widest 
kind to which all animals that have tails belong is that of the viviparous animals. 
However, the identification of this widest kind does not give us any conclusive 
indications about the explanation of the presence of tails in all animals that have 
them, because having a tail and being a viviparous animal are not entirely 
coextensive (PA.IV.10, 689b2-3: “almost all of them have a tail”; κέρκον δ’ ἔχει 
πάντα σχεδόν). The implication only works in one direction: all animals that have 
tails are viviparous, but ‘merely’ most viviparous animals have tails. Hence Aristotle 
looks for differentiae that are distinctive to tailed animals, and finds it in the fact that 
they have four feet. Because all animals that have tails have four feet and all animals 
that have four feet have tails this differentia may well be causally relevant for the 
explanation of the presence of tails. The having of four feet points indeed to the 
teleological explanation of the presence of tails. For four-footed animals are dwarf-
like, and hence lack the buttocks that in two-footed, upright beings protect the outlet 
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for residue; therefore “so that the part serving as the residual outlet may be guarded 
and sheltered, nature has provided to them the so-called tail-end and tail (PA.IV.10, 
689b29-31)” – tails are present for the protection of the residual outlet. I have not 
found any examples in the biological works in which the identification of a 
differentia that correlates with the presence of a part is also the cause of the presence 
of that part; my hypothesis is that what Lennox calls B-type explanations in biology 
only pertain to the differentiations of parts, and not to their presence (or absence) as 
such.50 
  
This heuristic pattern seems to work most successfully, however, in the case of 
(necessary) differentiations of parts that functionally optimize the part for each 
individual kind of animal that has it. By grouping together all the differentiae and 
features that are characteristic of the animal kind within which a part is differentiated 
in a particular way, it becomes quite easy to pick out the one feature that 
immediately necessitates this particular differentiation.  
 A clear example derives from Aristotle’s discussion of the differentiations 
between the beaks of birds. These differentiations cannot be accounted for by trying 
to find the widest class of animals to which animals with beaks belong: beaks are 
distinctive of birds.51 Because beaks are distinctive of birds, there must be something 
in the particular nature of each kind of bird that is responsible for the particular 
differentiation of its beak. Aristotle finds the differentia which points to the 
explanation of the differentiation of beaks in the bird’s way of life (bios; PA.IV.12, 
693a10):  
 Διαφορὰν δ’ ἔχει καὶ τὰ ῥύγχη κατὰ τοὺς βίους. 
 “Τheir beaks also differ in accordance with their way of life.”  
Cf. PA.III.1, 662b5-16:  
 Τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸν βίον χρήσιμόν ἐστι τὸ ῥύγχος, 
 “In each of the other birds the beak is useful for its way of life.” 
                                                 
50 Lennox (2001a), 9-15; 22; 24-29. 
51 The presence of beaks in birds can be explained by reference to the definition of the substantial being 
of bird, although having a beak is not itself part of this definition (rather it is a necessary consequence of 
being two-footed and winged, which are part of the definition of the substantial being of bird; see 
PA.II.16, 659b4-13). 
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Different types of beaks correlate with different types of environment and the ways 
birds employ to acquire food in their own specific environments. Aristotle thus 
concludes (PA.IV.12, 693a15-17): 
Ὅσων δὲ ὁ βίος ἕλειος καὶ ποηφάγος, πλατὺ τὸ ῥύγχος ἔχουσιν· πρός τε γὰρ τὴν 
ὄρυξιν χρήσιμον τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς τροφῆς σπάσιν καὶ κουράν. 
“All birds whose way of life includes swamp-dwelling and plant-eating have a flat 
beak; for such a beak is useful both for digging up and cropping off their 
nourishment.”  
We will look at the structure of these explanations more closely below, but for now, 
it may suffice to state the following. Given that for Aristotle differentiations of parts 
are for the sake of the functional optimization of that part within a particular kind of 
animal, differentiations and the animal’s differentiae must be intimately connected 
(see Aristotle’s explicit statements about this relation in PA.II.2, 648a14-19 and 
PA.II.13, 657b22-29).52 In order to explain these differentiations, one will have to 
identify that aspect of an animal that makes it require such a functional optimization; 
next one will need to show how this functional optimization follows from the 
material differentiation of the part. 
 
As teleological explanations will be the main focus in this chapter, I would like to say 
a few more words about how Aristotle goes about to find the final cause of a 
particular part or its differentiation, before finally turning to Aristotle’s actual 
explanations.  
Aristotle seems to use two basic methods for the ‘discovery’ functions. In 
the first place, as we have seen already, functions that belong to the definition of the 
substantial being of an animal can be identified kata ton logon. Once the full and real 
(as opposed to the nominal) definition of an animal has been established through 
division, the per se parts and functions follow from that definition.53 For example, 
‘animal’ is defined by its perceptive capacity and from this, it follows that it 
necessarily has a heart, the primary perceiver,54 and flesh, the organ of the primary 
                                                 
52 Lennox (2001b), 331, calls this type of explanation ‘adaptation explanations’. 
53 Cf. PA.I.1, 639b16-19; GA.I.18, 724a14-16. 
54 PA.III.4, 666a34-5. 
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mode of perception.55 Moreover, when an animal has been defined as being a flyer, 
we may expect to find parts that are for the sake of flying.  
Where this definition has not been established yet, functions may also 
‘simply’ be detected by observation; Aristotle indicates on occasion that the causal 
relation between a part or feature and its function are apparent to perception.56 In 
most cases, the parts and features of which the causal relations are discussed in PA 
are recorded as facts in HA;57 this latter treatise may have included reports of 
dissections, which also provided visual aids in the discovery of causal relations and 
hence of functions.58 
Thus having set out Aristotle’s biological method, I will now turn to his 
actual explanations.  
 
3.2 Explanations in biology: references to form, matter, and function 
 
3.2.1 Three ways of classifying explanations in PA 
The explanations Aristotle offers in PA can be classified in different ways.  
First, taking the three most common types of questions in PA as a point of 
reference, one might say that there are three types of explanations: (1) explanations 
that answer the question why a part is present in the animals that have it; (2) 
explanations that answer the question why a part is absent in the animals that could 
reasonably be expected to have that part; and finally (3) explanations that answer the 
question why a part is differentiated the way it is in each kind of animal that has it.  
Second, taking the types of parts whose presence, absence, or 
differentiation need to be explained as a point of reference, one might distinguish 
the following four types of explanations: (a) explanations that answer questions 
concerning necessary (essential or vital) parts; (b) explanations that answer questions 
concerning non-necessary, subsidiary parts; (c) explanations that answer questions 
                                                 
55 PA.II.8, 653b22-23. 
56 See, for example, PA.II.8, 653b30-31: “It is apparent to perception (kata tên aisthêsin phaneron) that all the 
other uniform parts are for the sake of flesh (…),” and PA.III.14, 674a12-13: “and the cause owing to 
which each of the animals has these parts is apparent to everyone.” Cf. GA.II.4, 740a5-6. 
57 PA.IV.5, 679b35-680a3, IA.I, 704b8-10. 
58 See PA.IV.5, 679b35-680a3: “The manner in which each of them has these parts should be studied with 
the help of the inquiries about animals and of the dissections. For some of these things need to be 
clarified by an account (tôi logôi), others rather by visual inspection (pros tên opsin).” Cf. PA.III.5, 668b27-
30. 
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concerning non-necessary, luxurious parts; and finally perhaps (d) explanations that 
concern functionless parts.  
A third way of categorizing Aristotle’s explanations in PA is to differentiate 
them according to the first cause that is picked out in the explanation.59 This is 
sometimes the only cause picked out in the whole explanation, but sometimes one of 
several. In the latter case, the cause picked out first by Aristotle does not have to be 
the cause that is causally basic or prior in the explanation; it may instead be 
epistemologically prior – i.e. once this cause is grasped, it is easier to find the other 
causes involved in the phenomenon to be explained. Thus there are (i) explanations 
that refer first to formal causes; (ii) explanations that refer first to material causes; 
and finally (iii) explanations that refer first to final causes.60 Since our interest here is 
in the role of final causes in explanations, I will use this latter categorization based 
on the three causes as the primary organizational format for this section. The 
categorization based on the three types of questions (1-3) will be used to organize 
the subsections (starting, as Aristotle does, with the explanation of the presence, 
then the absence, and finally the differentiation of parts); where relevant I will point 
out which type of part (a-d) is at stake.  
It needs to be noted from the outset, that a separate discussion of the 
different types and sub-types of explanations is in a sense artificial, for Aristotle 
usually explains the presence, absence or differentiation of different kinds of parts 
by complicated sets of different (sub)-types of explanations, and he often does so in 
the context of explaining another part. My objective here is to isolate the various 
explanatory patterns Aristotle employs in order to determine exactly what role final 
causes play in Aristotle’s biology; a more integrated account will be offered in 





                                                 
59 This categorization thus lends support for the view that not “all individual strings of explanatory 
necessitation have as their starting point an instance of hypothetical necessity” (Charles (1988), 5) and that 
therefore there can be material and efficient causation independent of final causation in biology. 
60 Aristotle offers explanations that refer first to efficient causes in the treatise in which he attempts to 
account for the generation of animals (GA). 
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3.2.2 Explanation by reference to formal causes  
 
Pattern F1:  Explanation of the presence of necessary parts by reference to essential features 
included in the definition of the substantial being of an animal 
 
As we saw in 3.1, Aristotle explains the presence of necessary parts by reference to 
the definition of the substantial being of the animal. In these cases, the animal’s 
essence or form is picked out as the cause of why the animal has the part whose 
presence needs to be explained.  
Take for instance fins: these are present in all fish. Aristotle explains the 
presence of fins in fish in the following way (PA.IV.13, 695b16-24):  
Οὐκ ἔχουσι δὲ ἀπηρτημένα κῶλα οἱ ἰχθύες, διὰ τὸ νευστικὴν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν 
κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον, ἐπεὶ οὔτε περίεργον οὐδὲν οὔτε μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ. Ἐπεὶ 
δ’ ἔναιμά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, διὰ μὲν τὸ νευστικὰ εἶναι πτερύγια ἔχει (…). 
“Fish do not have distinct limbs, owing to the fact that the nature of fish, according 
to the account of their substantial being, is to be able to swim, and since nature 
makes nothing either superfluous or pointless. And since they are blooded in virtue 
of their substantial being, it is on account of being swimmers that they have fins 
(…).” 
Given that fish are blooded animals, one would expect the presence of ‘distinct 
limbs’, but instead fish have fins. Fish do not have distinct limbs, because nature 
does nothing in vain, and having distinct limbs would be in vain for fish. Fish have 
fins, however, because being a swimmer is part of the definition of the substantial 
being of fish (just as being blooded is): the possession of fins is thus a necessary 
condition of being a fish, and the presence of fins is conditionally necessitated by the 
function of swimming that is subsumed in the essence of fish as swimmers.  
As I stated before, explanations like these61 pertain not only to parts whose 
functions are included in the definition of the substantial being of an animal, but also 
to parts that derive from the necessary features which are included in the definition 
(i.e. parts that belong to the animal kath’ hauta sumbebêkos). For instance, having a 
                                                 
61 For examples of parts whose presence is explained by reference to the definition of the substantial 
being, see Code (1997), 139-140 and Gotthelf (1987), 190-191. 
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heart and liver is a necessary consequence of being a blooded animal (PA.III.7, 
670a23-27): 
Καρδία μὲν οὖν καὶ ἧπαρ πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖα τοῖς ζῴοις (…). Πάντα δὲ δεῖται τὰ ἔναιμα 
δυοῖν τούτοιν, διόπερ ἔχει πάντα τὰ ἔναιμα δύο τὰ σπλάγχνα ταῦτα μόνον· ὅσα δ’ 
ἀναπνεῖ, καὶ πλεύμονα τρίτον. 
“Now the heart and liver are necessary to all animals (...). All blooded animals must 
have both of these, which is why these two viscera alone are possessed by all 
blooded animals, while those that breathe have a third, the lung.”  
Being blooded (or not) is part of the definition of the substantial being of an animal 
(PA.IV.5, 678a31-35):  
Ἐξ οὗ γὰρ συνέστηκεν ἡ τῶν σπλάγχνων φύσις, οὐδὲν τούτων ἔχει αἷμα διὰ τὸ τῆς 
οὐσίας αὐτῶν εἶναί τι τοιοῦτον πάθος αὐτῆς· ὅτι γάρ ἐστι τὰ μὲν ἔναιμα τὰ δ’ ἄναιμα, 
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐνυπάρξει τῷ ὁρίζοντι τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν.   
“For none of these animals has blood, out of which the nature of the viscera is 
constituted because some such affection of it is constitutive of their being; for that 
some animals are blooded while some are bloodless will belong in the account 
defining their substantial being.” 
In these cases, being blooded or not, which is part of the form or essence of an 
animal, is explanatorily basic (because the form or essence is causally primary), while 
the presence of the heart and the liver are necessary consequences of this basic 
feature. Although the parts (or their function) are not given in the definition, their 
presence can immediately be derived from it. In the example of birds discussed in 
3.1.4, Aristotle deduces in a similar way the presence of two feet in birds (PA.IV.12, 
693b5-14): on account of being essentially blooded, birds possess a maximum of 
four points of movement; on account of being essentially fliers, birds have two 
wings (which take up two of the total of four points of movement). Hence, “it 
remains for them [i.e. birds] to be, of necessity, two-footed (PA.IV.12, 693b13-14).” 
The necessity involved is that of a ‘per se incidental’ predication, which pertains to 
the proper attributes belonging necessarily to all the members of a kind qua that 
kind. Being two-footed is not itself part of the definition of the substantial being of 
birds, but two-footedness can immediately be derived from the two features that are 
part of that definition and is therefore a proper attribute of birds.62 
                                                 
62 Cf. Bayer (1998), 501-502. 
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It is important to note with regard to this type of explanation, that Aristotle 
distinguishes three kinds of parts that are present in all animals because they follow 
from the definition of animal, or, in other words, from that what it is to be an 
animal. These parts are: a) the heart (and its analogue; including a life-sustaining 
liquid), b) parts for nutrition (the mouth or its analogous part; a stomach, and a part 
for the outlet of waste matter), and c) parts for (at least a minimal form of) 
perception (that is, at least the organ for tactile perception, which is flesh or its 
analogue).63 The explanations of the presence of these parts all refer to the form (or 
the vital and essential functions subsumed in the form) shared by all animals. 
In some cases, Aristotle does not refer to the definition of the substantial 
being of the animal itself in explaining the presence of its necessary parts, but rather 
to the definition of the substantial being of the widest kind of animals of which the 
animal in question is a sub-species. The reasoning is that because a particular part 
belongs necessarily and per se to a particular kind of animals, all animals that belong 
to this kind will also necessarily (and per se incidentally) have this particular part. For 
example, the ostrich is two-footed because it tends towards the nature of birds. 
Two-footedness is a proper attribute of birds, and because ostriches are in this respect 
like birds (i.e. they belong in this respect to the wider kind of birds), they are two-
footed as well (PA.IV.14, 697b13-27):  
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ στρουθὸς ὁ Λιβυκός· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄρνιθος ἔχει, τὰ δὲ ζῴου 
τετράποδος. (...) καὶ δίπους μέν ἐστιν ὡς ὄρνις, διχαλὸς δ’ ὡς τετράπους·  
“In the same way too is the Libyan ostrich; in some respects it has the manner of a 
bird, in others that of a four-footed animal. (...) and while two-footed like a bird, it 
is hoofed, as though four-footed.”  
In order to make this explanation complete, however, one would need to refer to 
other differentiae in order to account for the fact that the ostrich tends in this 
respect towards birds, rather than towards four-footed animals. 
In all the above mentioned examples of explanations of the presence of 
parts, some feature in the form or essence of the animal is explanatorily basic: an 
animal has a part either per se (it is part of the definition of its substantial being in 
virtue of being part of the substantial being of the widest kind to which the animal 
                                                 
63 PA.II.8, 653b19-29, PA.III.4, 666a34-5, PA.IV.5, 678b1-6. 
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belongs), or it belongs to it per se incidentally (the part follows from the definition 
of the animal’s substantial being).   
 
Pattern F2:  Explanation of the necessary differentiation of necessary and non-necessary 
parts by reference to the ways of life (bioi) and dimensions included in the 
definition of the substantial being of an animal 
 
Aristotle often picks out formal causes included in the definitions of substantial 
beings as the primary causes for the differentiation of parts. 
From the outset it is important to note that Aristotle does not refer to the 
part of the essence or definition that picks out the genus of the animal in question to 
explain differentiations of parts, since the genus rather explains the similarities of the 
parts possessed by the animals belonging to the same kind.   
Aristotle unifies animals under one kind if they differ from each other by 
the more and the less or by degree,64 while keeping the animals that differ from each 
other by analogy apart (PA.I.4, 644a16-22): 
Ὅσα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τῶν γενῶν καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, ταῦτα 
ὑπέζευκται ἑνὶ γένει, ὅσα δ’ ἔχει τὸ ἀνάλογον, χωρίς· λέγω δ’ οἷον ὄρνις ὄρνιθος 
διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ καθ’ ὑπεροχήν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ μακρόπτερον τὸ δὲ βραχύπτερον), 
ἰχθύες δ’ ὄρνιθος τῷ ἀνάλογον (ὃ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ πτερόν, θατέρῳ λεπίς). 
“For those animals that differ by degree and the more and the less have been 
brought together under one kind, while those that are analogous have been kept 
apart. I mean, for example, that bird differs from bird by the more or by degree (for 
some has long feathers, another short feathers), while fish differs from bird by 
analogy (for what is feather in the one is scale in the other).” 
Animals that belong to one kind all have the same nature,65 have more or less the 
same form (or forms that are not too far apart; PA.I.4, 644b4-5: καὶ ἔχει τε μίαν 
φύσιν κοινὴν καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὐτῷ μὴ πολὺ διεστῶτα), and possess the same parts (with the 
same primary function, name, and form); their parts differ only with respect to their 
bodily affections (PA.I.4, 644b7-15): 
Σχεδὸν δὲ τοῖς σχήμασι τῶν μορίων καὶ τοῦ σώματος ὅλου, ἐὰν ὁμοιότητα ἔχωσιν, 
ὥρισται τὰ γένη, οἷον τὸ τῶν ὀρνίθων γένος πρὸς αὐτὰ πέπονθε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ 
                                                 
64 On the principle of the more and the less, see Lennox (2001a), 160-181. 
65 For what it means for animals within one genus to have a common nature, see Charles (2000), 316-326. 
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τὰ μαλάκιά τε καὶ τὰ ὄστρεια. Τὰ γὰρ μόρια διαφέρουσι τούτων οὐ τῇ ἀνάλογον 
ὁμοιότητι, οἷον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἰχθύϊ πέπονθεν ὀστοῦν πρὸς ἄκανθαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον 
τοῖς σωματικοῖς πάθεσιν, οἷον μεγέθει μικρότητι, μαλακότητι σκληρότητι, λειότητι 
τραχύτητι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅλως δὲ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. 
“Roughly speaking, it is by the shapes of the parts and of the whole body, when 
they bear a likeness, that kinds have been defined. For instance members of the bird 
kind are so related to each other, as are those of the fish kind, the soft-bodied 
animals, and the hard-shelled animals. For their parts differ not by analogous 
likeness, as bone in mankind is related to fish-spine in fish, but rather by bodily 
affections, e.g. by large/small, soft/hard, smooth/rough, and the like – speaking 
generally, by the more and the less.” 
The differentiations of parts thus pertain to the differences in the material 
constitutions, locations, and morphology of these parts between members of one 
kind. By definition, these differentiations cannot be caused by the form of the widest 
kind, since this form is shared by all members of the kind (i.e. the functions that 
conditionally necessitate the coming to be of the necessary parts are included in the 
definitions of the substantial being shared by all animals within one kind). 
Differences between parts that are due to the form of the genus are parts possessed 
by animals belonging to different widest kinds. Rather, it seems that in most cases 
differentiations between parts are caused by the way of life that is distinctive of each 
species.  
 For instance, the fact that elephants have a nose can be accounted for by 
reference to the widest kind of which they are part: having a nose is a ‘per se 
incidental’-feature of all (blooded) breathers of air, and since elephants are (blooded) 
breathers of air, they necessarily have a nose, too. However, the fact that elephants 
have an extraordinary long nose – the elephants’ trunk – (which is a material, and 
not a formal, differentiation of noses) cannot be explained by reference to the form 
of the widest kind of which elephants are part; for the long nose is distinctive to the 
elephant (PA.II.16, 658b33-35): 
Ὁ δ’ ἐλέφας ἰδιαίτατον ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων· τό τε γὰρ μέγεθος καὶ 
τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει περιττή. 
“In the elephant, however, this part is most distinctive compared with the rest of 
the animals – it is extraordinary in both size and potency.”  
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The explanation of why elephants have such a long nose is quite complicated,66 but 
in addition to basic features such as being blooded and having a large size (on 
dimensions being included in the definition of the substantial being of each kind of 
animal, see below) the specific combination of the ways of life the elephant has by 
nature establishes the need for such a long nostril (PA.II.16, 659a2-12): 
Τὴν γὰρ φύσιν ἑλῶδες ἅμα τὸ ζῷόν ἐστι καὶ πεζόν, ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐξ ὑγροῦ 
συνέβαινεν ἔχειν, ἀναπνεῖν δ’ ἀναγκαῖον πεζὸν ὂν καὶ ἔναιμον, καὶ μὴ ταχεῖαν ποιεῖσθαι 
τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὑγροῦ πρὸς τὸ ξηρόν, καθάπερ ἔνια τῶν ζῳοτόκων καὶ ἐναίμων 
καὶ ἀναπνεόντων, τὸ γὰρ μέγεθος ὂν ὑπερβάλλον, ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἦν χρῆσθαι τῷ 
ὑγρῷ ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ γῇ. Οἷον οὖν τοῖς κολυμβηταῖς ἔνιοι πρὸς τὴν ἀναπνοὴν ὄργανα 
πορίζονται, ἵνα πολὺν χρόνον ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ μένοντες ἕλκωσιν ἔξωθεν τοῦ ὑγροῦ διὰ 
τοῦ ὀργάνου τὸν ἀέρα, τοιοῦτον ἡ φύσις τὸ τοῦ μυκτῆρος μέγεθος ἐποίησε τοῖς 
ἐλέφασιν.  
“This animal is at once a swamp-dweller and a land-dweller by nature. So, since  on 
occasion it gets its nourishment from water, and, being a blooded land-dweller, 
must breathe, and, on account of its size, is unable to make the transition from 
moist to dry environments as quickly as some of the live-bearing, blooded animals 
do, it necessarily uses the water as it does the land. Thus as some divers equip 
themselves with instruments for breathing, in order that they can inhale air through 
this instrument from outside their moist environment while remaining in the sea for 
an extended time, nature makes the length of the nostril such an instrument for 
elephants.” 
The elephants’ natural ways of life, combined with other essential features, 
conditionally necessitate the length of the nose.  
 However, Aristotle does not in all cases pick out the animal’s specific way 
of life as the primary cause for the differentiation of a particular part, but only in 
those cases where the differentiation is necessary, and not ‘merely’ for the better 
(this distinction will be discussed in more detail below). In the case of the 
webbedness of the feet of ducks, Aristotle refers primarily to the material necessity 
causative of the coming to be of the material from which the webs are made, and to 
the use nature subsequently has made of those materials. So, although the 
differentiation for which the material is used is determined by reference to what is 
                                                 
66 For Aristotle’s explanation of why an elephant has the kind of nose it has, see Gotthelf’s detailed 
analysis; Gotthelf (1997), 85-95. 
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better in view of the specific way of life of ducks, the differentiation is not necessary 
for ducks (PA.IV.12, 694b6-10):  
ὡς δὲ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον ἔχουσι τοιούτους τοὺς πόδας τοῦ βίου χάριν, ἵνα ζῶντες ἐν ὑγρῷ 
καὶ τῶν πτερῶν ἀχρείων ὄντων τοὺς πόδας χρησίμους ἔχωσι πρὸς τὴν νεῦσιν. Γίνονται 
γὰρ ὥσπερ κῶπαι εἰσπλέουσι τὰ πτερύγια τοῖς ἰχθύσιν· 
“And it is on account of the better that they have such [i.e. webbed] feet, for the 
sake of their way of life – in order that, since they live in water where wings are 
useless, they will have feet that are useful for swimming. For they become oars for 
sailing just as do the fins of fish.” 
Having webbed feet is not necessary for ducks, but it is for the better that they have 
such feet: it contributes to their way of life.67 I will return to this type of ‘for the 
better’ explanations for (non-necessary) differentiations of parts below, but for now 
it suffices to note that a particular species’ way of life is not always picked out as the 
formal cause of the differentiations of parts within a larger kind. 
In addition to differentiae, there is another aspect of the definition of the 
substantial being of each individual kind of animal which Aristotle picks out as being 
(at least partly) responsible for the differentiations between parts within a widest 
kind. This is the inclusion of the dimensions of the animal in the definition of its 
substantial being.68 For instance, among the octopuses, there is one kind that is 
longer and thinner compared to the other kinds of octopuses. As Aristotle points 
out, these dimensions are included in the definition of the substantial being of this 
kind of octopus, and it is these dimensions that account for the differentiation (or 
perhaps rather the absence of a second row of suckers in one kind of octopuses 
because of lack of space) in the distribution of rows of suckers among different 
kinds of octopuses (PA.IV.9, 685b12-16): 
Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα δικότυλά ἐστι, γένος δέ τι πολυπόδων μονοκότυλον. Αἴτιον δὲ τὸ 
μῆκος καὶ ἡ λεπτότης τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν· μονοκότυλον γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ στενόν. 
Οὐκ οὖν ὡς βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον τῆς οὐσίας. 
                                                 
67 It is thus questionable whether being a water-dweller is part of the definition of the substantial being of 
ducks; it seems that if that were the case, the function of swimming would have conditionally necessitated 
the coming to be of organs for swimming in ducks, such as fins, which ducks obviously lack. 
68 On the inclusion of dimensions in the definition of the substantial being of animals, see Gotthelf 
(1985), 41; 44-45. At 53n.22 Gotthelf cites a passage (GA.II.6, 745a5-6: ἔστι γάρ τι πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις πέρας 
τοῦ μεγέθους; “for all animals there is a limit to their size”) that suggests that dimensions are always part 
of the definition of the substantial being.   
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“Now while the other octopuses have two rows of suckers, one kind of octopus has 
a single row. This is because of the length and thinness of their nature; for it is 
necessary that the narrow tentacle should have a single row of suckers. It is not, 
then, because it is best that they have this feature, but because it is necessary owing 
to the distinctive account of their substantial being.” 
The octopuses that are long and thin on account of the definition of their substantial 
being necessarily only have one row of suckers. There is only one other instance in 
the Aristotelian corpus where Aristotle explicitly refers to dimensional properties 
being included in the definition of the substantial being of an animal (namely to the 
disproportionate length of the snake in IA.8, 708a9-20), but there is evidence that on 
occasion Aristotle takes such properties as size and length as explanatorily basic. (An 
example of the latter is Aristotle’s account of the nostril of the elephant. Part of the 
explanation of the extraordinary size and and potency of the elephant’s trunk is the 
extraordinary size of the elephant (PA.II.16, 659a7: τὸ γὰρ μέγεθος ὂν ὑπερβάλλον); 
the elephant’s being extraordinary large is taken as a given that is not further 
explained by reference to other features.) However, a passage in DA suggests that 
form is, among other things, precisely that which limits and determines size and 
natural growth of substantial beings, and that these limits belong to the definition 
(presumably, the definition of substantial natures; DA.II.4, 416a15-18):   
ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πυρὸς αὔξησις εἰς ἄπειρον, ἕως ἂν ᾖ τὸ καυστόν, τῶν δὲ φύσει 
συνισταμένων πάντων ἔστι πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως· ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῆς, 
ἀλλ’ οὐ πυρός, καὶ λόγου μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης.  
“While the growth of fire goes on without limit so long as there is a supply of fuel, 
in the case of all complex wholes formed in the course of nature there is a limit or 
ratio which determines their size and increase, and limit and ratio are marks of soul 
but not of fire, and belong to the side of definition rather than that of matter.” 
The definition of the substantial being of each kind of animal includes the limits and 
ratios of that kind of animal and thus includes its dimensions. These dimensions 
determine the differentiations of parts in regard to their size: larger animals within 
one widest kind will have larger parts than the smaller animals within that kind. (For 
instance, part of why the elephant’s trunk is exceptionally large is because the 
elephant itself is exceptionally large.) 
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Note that Aristotle never refers to formal causes as the causes of the absence of 
parts, as privative differentiae are not part of the definition of the substantial being 
of animals.  
 The only exception seems to be bloodlessness (see PA.IV.5, 678a31-35 
quoted above), a seemingly privative feature which Aristotle claims is part of the 
definition of the substantial being of certain kinds of animals. However, ‘bloodless’ 
means nothing more than ‘not having red blood, but something analogous to red 
blood’; ‘bloodlessness’ indicates not that the animal lacks a part completely, but 
rather that he lacks the better known part, red blood, and has the analogous part 
with the same potential as red blood instead (cf. PA.I.1, 654b9-10).  
 In the case of dualizers, Aristotle sometimes explains the absence of a part 
that belongs to one of the substantial beings towards which it tends by reference to 
the other substantial being to which the animal tends. Here, the one substantial 
being seems to account for the absence of parts that are normally present on 
account of the other substantial being. Bats, for example, tend in their nature both 
towards fliers and towards land-dwellers, and “on this account they parttake of both 
and neither” (PA.IV.13, 697b3: διὰ τοῦτο ἀμφοτέρων τε μετέχουσι, καὶ οὐδετέρων). 
Now, fliers have two feet, wings and a rump, while land-dwellers usually have four 
feet and a tail; bats on the other hand (PA.IV.13, 697b7-9):  
ὡς μὲν πτηνὰ ἔχουσι πόδας, ὡς δὲ τετράποδα οὐκ ἔχουσι, καὶ οὔτε κέρκον ἔχουσιν 
οὔτ’ οὐροπύγιον, διὰ μὲν τὸ πτηνὰ εἶναι κέρκον· διὰ δὲ τὸ πεζὰ οὐροπύγιον.  
“As fliers have feet, but as four-footed they do not; and they have neither tail nor 
rump – no tail owing to being a flyer, no rump owing to being a land-dweller.” 
However, as Aristotle makes clear in the following lines, there are other, causally 
more basic differentiae belonging to bats that account for the absence of the rump 
and tail (PA.IV.13, 697b10-13):  
Συμβέβηκε δ’ αὐταῖς τοῦτ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· εἰσὶ γὰρ δερμόπτεροι, οὐδὲν δ’ ἔχει 
οὐροπύγιον μὴ σχιζόπτερον· ἐκ τοιούτου γὰρ πτεροῦ γίνεται τὸ οὐροπύγιον. Ἡ δὲ 
κέρκος καὶ ἐμπόδιος ἂν ἦν ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τοῖς πτεροῖς. 
“And this happens to them of necessity: for they are skin-winged, and nothing has a 
rump unless it is winged with split-feathers. For the rump arises from such a 
feather. And a tail would also be an impediment if it were present among the 
feathers.”  
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Bats having membranous wings and feathers makes the presence of a rump and a tail 
impossible and in vain, and these are the primary causes of the absence of these 
parts, not the tendency of the bat towards two natures; that is, it is not because 
‘tailless’ is part of the definition of the substantial being of fliers that bats have no 
tail, but because it would be an impediment to have one. This example makes clear 
how the concept of a dualizer helps Aristotle to find the explananda, in this case the 
absence of the rump and tail (i.e. how it is a successful part of his heuristics). The 
explanation of the absence of parts is to be found in features outside the two 
definitions of substantial beings which to a certain extent apply to the animal in 
question. Formal causes are thus never the primary cause of the absence of parts. 
 
In sum, formal causes (F) are picked out first in: 
(1) the explanation of the presence of parts; formal causes are picked out in 
the explanation of necessary parts whose functions are included in the definition of 
the substantial being, and also of parts that follow directly and necessarily from the 
necessary parts; and in: 
(2) the explanation of differentiations of parts in regard to differentiations 
in size; the dimensions of an animal are included in the definition of its substantial 
being.  
The formal causes picked out in these explanations are the (partial) 
definitions of substantial beings, which include both essential features and functions 
as the dimensions of a particular kind of animal. 
 
3.2.3 Explanation by reference to material causes 
 
Pattern M1:  Explanation of the coming to be of non-necessary, tool-like parts by reference 
to material necessity 
 
As outlined above (see 3.1.2), Aristotle explains the coming to be of non-necessary, 
tool-like or luxurious parts by reference to material necessity. As for Aristotle parts 
are either necessary or for the better, the presence of these non-necessary parts is 
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explained by reference to the function these parts are assigned to perform by the 
formal nature of the animal and to their contribution to the well-being of the animal.  
Take for instance the omentum. Aristotle explains the coming to be of this 
membrane completely in terms of materially necessitated processes, while 
accounting for its presence by referring to the use nature makes of it in concocting 
food (PA.IV.3, 677b22-32): 
Ἡ μὲν οὖν γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τοιαύτη τοῦ μορίου τούτου· ξηροῦ γὰρ καὶ 
ὑγροῦ μίγματος θερμαινομένου τὸ ἔσχατον ἀεὶ δερματῶδες γίνεται καὶ ὑμενῶδες, ὁ δὲ 
τόπος οὗτος τοιαύτης πλήρης ἐστὶ τροφῆς. (...) Ἡ μὲν οὖν γένεσις τοῦ ἐπιπλόου 
συμβαίνει κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, καταχρῆται δ’ ἡ φύσις αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν εὐπεψίαν τῆς 
τροφῆς, ὅπως ῥᾷον πέττῃ καὶ θᾶττον τὰ ζῷα τὴν τροφήν· 
“The generation of this part occurs of necessity in the following way; when a 
mixture of dry and moist is heated, the surface always becomes skin-like and 
membranous, and this location is full of such nutrient. (...) The generation of the 
omentum, then, occurs according to this account, and nature makes use of it for the 
proper concoction of the nutrient, in order that the animals may concoct their 
nutrient easily and quickly.” 
The interactions between the material elements explain the coming to be of the 
omentum, which is not conditionally necessitated in any way. It is also the material 
potential of the omentum (i.e. its being hot) that explains its contribution to 
nourishment; the function the part performs is attributed to it, because of the 
material potentials present in the available material. The teleology operative in these 
cases is thus secondary teleology. 
 
In a small number of cases, Aristotle refers solely to material necessity to account for 
the presence of parts or other features, which are not necessary for the performance 
of necessary functions and also do not immediately contribute to the main function 
performed by the other parts with which they are associated. The processes that take 
place because of material necessity and accidentally produce a part are not affected 
by the actions of the formal nature of an animal (that is, they are not cast out of the 
body, nor are they actively put to any good use). Ultimately these parts, such as the 
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spleen69 and the esophagus,70  or features such as the color of eyes or the curliness 
of hair (GA.V.1, 778a18-20), seem to be present of necessity in an incidental way.  
 
Pattern M2. Explanation of the absence of parts by reference to the lack of constitutive 
material 
 
This type of explanation appeals to the material make-up of the animal, by simply 
pointing out that the animal lacks the material necessary for the constitution of a 
certain part; hence the animal must by necessity lack the part.71 For instance, the 
absence of (red) blood in the bloodless animals explains why they do not have any 
                                                 
69 The explanation of the coming to be and of the presence of the spleen is complicated, as Aristotle 
refers to different types of necessity in the account. For instance, in PA.II.647b3-4 Aristotle compares the 
generation of the viscera with the coming to be of mud banks, which are deposited by a running stream 
(the viscera are deposits of the current of blood); this indicates that all the viscera come to be of material 
necessity. In PA.III.7, 669b27-670a2 Aristotle states that there are animals that have a spleen of necessity, 
while others that do not have it from necessity still have it as a token (for the use of sêmeion here, see Preus 
(1975), 128-9). Its presence is then accounted for by reference to the principle of optimal balance and 
bilateral symmetry: “And it is on account of the liver being positioned more on the right that the nature 
of the spleen has developed; so that while in a way it is necessary, it is not exceedingly necessary [on this 
reading, see Lennox (2001b), 346 ad 670a2] in all the animals.” The presence of the spleen is necessary for 
the sake of a symmetrical ordering of the internal organs, but it is not necessary for the sake of some 
proper function. Next Aristotle claims that “the spleen is present in those that have one of necessity in an 
incidental way (kata sumbebêkos ex anagkês), just as the residues are, both the one in the stomach and the 
one in the bladder” (PA.III.7, 670a31-33), and that, although it does not have a proper function, it is not 
completely useless: “For the spleen draws off the residual fluids from the stomach and because it is 
blood-like it can assist in the concoction (dunatai sumpettein) of them” (PA.III.7, 670b4-6). 
On the whole it seems that the spleen is not teleologically necessitated in any way (pace 
Lennox (2001b), 270), and that both its coming to be and its presence are due to some form of material 
necessity (the more residue is available, the bigger the spleen, unless the residue is directed to feed other 
parts; the spleen thus seems to take shape when the formal nature does not interact with the natural flow 
of the residue). Because the presence of the spleen does not harm the animal, but rather, if it becomes big 
enough, the spleen helps the concoction of food and adds to the symmetry of the body, it is not 
discharged by the formal nature of those animals in which a spleen ‘happens’ to come to be.  
70 Aristotle’s explanation of the esophagus is even less explicit with regard to both the causes of its 
coming to be and of its presence (PA.III.3, 664a22-24):  
Ὁ δ’ οἰσοφάγος ἐστὶ δι’ οὗ ἡ τροφὴ πορεύεται εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν· ὥσθ’ ὅσα μὴ ἔχει αὐχένα, οὐδ’ 
οἰσοφάγον ἐπιδήλως ἔχουσιν. Οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δ’ ἔχειν τὸν οἰσοφάγον τῆς τροφῆς ἕνεκεν· οὐθὲν 
γὰρ παρασκευάζει πρὸς αὐτήν.  
“The esophagus is that through which nourishment proceeds to the gut; so that all those 
without necks manifestly do not have an esophagus. But it is not necessary to have the 
esophagus for the sake of nutrition; for it prepares nothing for nutrition.” 
The presence of the esophagus seems to be a necessary consequence of the respiratory organ having 
length, but as Aristotle points out it is not a necessary organ: the mouth could have been placed next to 
the stomach (PA.III.3, 664a24-31; PA.III.3, 664a29-31: “And since the organ connected with breathing 
from necessity has length, it is necessary for there to be the esophagus between the mouth and the 
stomach”). Aristotle denies that the esophagus performs any proper function: it does not concoct food 
itself, nor does it contribute anything to nourishment other than letting food pass through (see Lennox 
(2001b), 252). In this case, again, some derived form of necessity seems to be the cause of the presence of 
the part. 
71 On this pattern of material explanation, see Lennox (2001b), 228. 
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viscera (PA.IV.5, 678a27-34; discussed in 3.1.4) or fat (PA.II.5, 651a26-27), as both 
are made from blood. Similarly, birds and oviparous quadrupeds lack the outer ears 
that are present in the other blooded animals (with the exception of fish who lack 
clear organs of hearing altogether; PA.II.10, 656a33-37), because “they do not have 
the sort of matter from which ears may be formed” (PA.II.12, 657a18-24; PA.II.12, 
657a19-20: οὐκ οὖν ἔχει τοιαύτην ὕλην ἐξ ἧς ἂν ἔπλασε τὰ ὦτα). Or, to take yet 
another example, among the animals with a windpipe, the hard-scaled and feathered 
animals lack an epiglottis because they have dry flesh and a hard skin, instead of the 
moist flesh and soft skin that are required for the production of a well-functioning 
epiglottis (they do have a larynx, which performs the same function as the epiglottis; 
PA.III.3, 664b20-665a9). These animals lack the materials they lack because they are 
not part of their material nature.72 
In other animals, the required material is present, but there is not enough 
of it. Aristotle explains that the reason why the material needed to make the part in 
question is absent in these animals is because it has already been used up for the 
constitution of some other part. For instance, it is (partly) for this reason that human 
beings lack a tail (PA.IV.10, 689b21-24: “for the nourishment which is conveyed 
there is used up on these parts”), or that horned animals generally lack upper 
incisors (PA.III.2, 664a1-3):  
ἀφελοῦσα γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ φύσις τοῖς κέρασι προσέθηκε, καὶ ἡ διδομένη τροφὴ εἰς τοὺς 
ὀδόντας τούτους εἰς τὴν τῶν κεράτων αὔξησιν ἀναλίσκεται. 
“For nature takes from there and adds to the horns, that is, the nourishment 
assigned to the upper front teeth is expended in the growth of the horns.”  
The reason why the limited material is distributed to the one part instead of to the 
other, e.g. to horns rather than to upper incisors, is because in this case the formal 
                                                 
72 Cf. PA.II.13, 657b13-15; b36. A variation of this type of explanation for the absence of parts by 
reference to lack of constitutive material is the explanation that refers to the lack of the ‘proper location’ 
of a part: the part is absent because the proper location for it is absent. For example, snakes do not have a 
penis because they lack feet, and the proper place of the penis is between the lower feet (GA.I.5, 717b14-
19; cf. GA.I.7, 718a18):  
Ἔτι δὲ τὸ ὄργανον τὸ πρὸς τὸν συνδυασμὸν τὰ μὲν τετράποδα ἔχει· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς 
ἔχειν—τοῖς δ’ ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς ἄποσιν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται διὰ τὸ τῶν μὲν τὰ σκέλη ὑπὸ μέσην εἶναι τὴν 
γαστέρα, τὰ δ’ ὅλως ἀσκελῆ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ αἰδοίου φύσιν ἠρτῆσθαι ἐντεῦθεν καὶ τῇ θέσει 
κεῖσθαι ἐνταῦθα.  
“Further, whereas the four-footed animals have the organ for coition, since it is possible for 
them to have it, birds and footless animals cannot have it because the former have their legs 
up by the middle of the belly and the latter have no legs at all, while the nature of the penis is 
connected with the legs and its position is there”. 
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nature assigns priority to the formation of parts for the sake of defense over the 
formation of a complete set of teeth, which, if realized, would have contributed 
more to the function of nourishment than an incomplete set of teeth does.73 Because 
the two kinds of parts are both non-necessary (for horns do not serve a necessary 
function, and teeth contribute to the function of nourishment but are not necessary 
for it),74 the formal nature of an animal distributes the material present in different 
ways in each kind of animal, according to what is best for each kind of animal. Here 
the formal nature distributes the available material according to the function that 
receives priority in this particular kind of animal after all the necessary parts 
performing necessary functions have already been formed.   
In all the above cases, the formal nature of the animal is constrained in its 
possibilities to produce parts that could contribute to the animal’s well-being by the 
availability of the right kind of material. The explanation proceeds in two steps: first, 
Aristotle identifies the kind of material necessary for the production of the part in 
question in the animals that have it, and secondly, claims that this kind of material is 
absent in the animals that do not have the part in question. 
 
Pattern M3. Explanation of non-necessary differentiations of parts by reference to material 
necessity (and ‘the better’)   
 
Aristotle explains non-necessary differentiations by reference to material necessity 
and by reference to the principle that these differentiations are for the better (this 
principle will be discussed in more detail in 3.3). Non-necessary differentiations are 
differentiations of parts that contribute to the animal’s well-being, but are not 
necessary for the animal’s vital and essential functions and do not constitute a 
functional optimization of a part technically speaking (i.e. their presence is not 
necessary on account of – for instance – the animal’s way of life to such an extent 
that the material differentiation is conditionally necessitated by this need). The 
teleology at stake in these explanations of the differentiation of parts is again 
                                                 
73 On this ‘principle of functional priority’, see Lennox (2001a), 192-3. 
74 Horns are not part of the form of horned animals. When Aristotle claims in PA.III.2, 664a3-8 that 
female deer are of the same nature as male deer are, i.e. horn-bearing (αἴτιον τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φύσιν 
ἀμφοῖν καὶ κερατοφόρον), Aristotle refers to the material or necessary nature of the animal not to its 
formal nature. 
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secondary: the material differentiations of a part that occur of necessity are retained 
(and sometimes adapted) by the formal nature of an animal, which then turn out to 
be for the best.75  
We have already seen an example of this type of explanation in discussing 
the cause of why ducks have webbed feet (see above in 3.2.2). Having webbed feet is 
a necessary consequence of the earthen effluence occurring of material necessity in 
the body of birds (PA.IV.12, 694a22-694b1), but it is also for the better, as such feet 
contribute to their aquatic way of life. The contribution this differentiation makes to 
the specific animal’s way of life explains why the feet of ducks are the way they are, 
but not why the material necessary to make this differentiation came to be; the 
coming to be of the material constituting this differentiation is due to material 
necessity. A similar ‘double’ explanation holds for the fatness of the kidneys. Among 
all the viscera these organs are the fattest, both because of necessity, and for the 
better (PA.III.9, 672a1-21): 
Ἔχουσι δ’ οἱ νεφροὶ μάλιστα τῶν σπλάγχνων πιμελήν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν διὰ τὸ 
διηθεῖσθαι τὸ περίττωμα διὰ τῶν νεφρῶν· (...) Ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν οὖν πιμελώδεις γίνονται 
διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῖς ἔχουσι νεφρούς, ἕνεκα δὲ 
σωτηρίας καὶ τοῦ θερμὴν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν νεφρῶν. (...)  
“The kidneys have the most fat of all the viscera. On the one hand, this is out of 
necessity, because the residue is filtered through the kidneys. (...) So on the one 
hand it is of necessity – this is the cause owing to which the kidneys come to be 
fatty, a consequence of what happens of necessity in animals with kidneys; on the 
other hand, they are also [fatty] for the sake of the preservation of the hot nature of 
the kidneys. (...).” 
The fat that makes the kidneys the fattest among all viscera comes to be of material 
necessity, i.e. as a result of the material processes that take place in the kidneys 
themselves;76 however, the formal nature of the animals that have kidneys does not 
                                                 
75 Cf. Aristotle’s account of the differences between tails in PA.IV.10, 690a1-4. Note that these 
explanations are different from the ones Aristotle offers with regard to the differentiations of parts that 
are functional optimizations in a technical sense: those differentiations are explained solely by reference to 
the best, while the type of necessity at stake is conditional; the need for a functional optimization 
conditionally necessitates the material differentiation.  
76 Here I disagree with Lennox (2001a), 106-108, who argues that (2001a, 107) “we are told that kidney fat 
arises for the sake of the contribution it makes to preserving the (hot) nature of the kidneys. This makes it 
crystal clear that goals are causes, and that in explanation they take priority.” I take the function to follow 
the material potentials present in the material produced by material necessity, and thus to be secondary to 
the material causes involved. As Lennox points out (2001a, 108) even if there was no good use to which 
Chapter 3. Explaining parts of animals 
 226
expel this fat because it serves a good purpose, i.e. it helps the kidneys to preserve 
their heat.77  
 
In sum, material causes (M) are picked out first in:  
(1) the explanation of the coming to be of non-necessary, tool-like parts. 
These parts are made by the formal nature of an animal from the material that is 
present of material necessity; the function is attributed to the part in accordance with 
it material potentials; 
(2) the explanation of the absence of parts. The material necessary for the 
constitution of a particular part is altogether lacking in a particular kind of animal or 
has been used up to produce a part that has functional priority; it is outside the 
potential of the formal nature of the animal to necessitate the coming to be of – 
more of – this material;  
(3) the explanation of the differentiation of parts that contribute to the 
animal’s well-being; the parts are differentiated the way they are because of the 
material present due to material necessity, while the formal nature does not expel 
this material because the differentiation of the part also serves a good purpose.  
The material causes picked out in these explanations are the materials that 
come to be of material necessity; due to their material potentials they serve (or can 
be put to serve) some good use. 
 
3.2.4 Explanation by reference to final causes 
 
Pattern T1:  Explanation of the presence of all kinds of parts by reference to the function 
these parts perform 
 
                                                                                                               
the fat around the kidneys could be put, the fat would nevertheless be present due to the material 
processes described; this indicates that the necessity involved is not conditional upon the end served by 
the fat.  
77 Another clear example is the explanation Aristotle offers for the ability of snakes to turn their head to 
the rear while the rest of the body is at rest, which is a distinctive feature of snakes (PA.IV.11, 692a2-7): 
the capacity to coil is a necessary consequence of snakes having a cartilaginous backbone; the function of 
coiling follows from the material potentials present in the backbone. This capacity is also for the better, as 
it allows snakes to protect themselves better and thus contributes to their well-being. 
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With a few exceptions, Aristotle ultimately explains the presence of parts by 
reference to the function they perform within the animal. For instance, the larynx is 
present in the animals that have it for the sake of breathing (PA.III.3, 664a17-20):  
Ὁ μὲν οὖν φάρυγξ τοῦ πνεύματος ἕνεκεν πέφυκεν· διὰ τούτου γὰρ εἰσάγεται τὸ πνεῦμα 
τὰ ζῷα καὶ ἐκπέμπει ἀναπνέοντα καὶ ἐκπνέοντα. 
“The larynx is present by nature for the sake of breath; for through this part 
animals draw in and expel breath when they inhale and exhale.”  
Animals for which breathing air is a necessary function all have a larynx; the function 
of breathing conditionally necessitates the presence of the larynx. The teleology 
involved is thus primary teleology. However, the need for the function that the 
larynx is to perform follows from the essence of the animal as being a breather: what 
is thus causally primary in this explanation is the animal’s being a breather78 (which is 
a formal cause),79 while the function that explains the presence of the part follows 
from this essence.  
 Another example is Aristotle’s explanation of the presence of eyebrows and 
eyelashes (PA.II.15, 658b14-25):  
Αἱ δ’ ὀφρύες καὶ αἱ βλεφαρίδες ἀμφότεραι βοηθείας χάριν εἰσίν (...). αἱ δὲ βλεφαρίδες 
ἐπὶ πέρατι φλεβίων· ᾗ γὰρ τὸ δέρμα περαίνει, καὶ τὰ φλέβια πέρας ἔχει τοῦ μήκους. 
Ὥστ’ ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὴν ἀπιοῦσαν ἰκμάδα σωματικὴν οὖσαν, ἂν μή τι τῆς φύσεως 
ἔργον ἐμποδίσῃ πρὸς ἄλλην χρῆσιν, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν τοῖς 
τόποις τούτοις γίνεσθαι τρίχας.  
“The eyebrows and eyelashes are both for the sake of protection. (...) The eyelids  
 are at the ends of small blood vessels; for where the skin terminates, the small blood 
vessels also reach their limit. So because the moist secretions oozing are bodily, it is 
necessary that – unless some function of nature stops it with a view to another use 
– even owing to a cause such as this, hair from necessity comes to be in these 
locations.” 
Eyebrows and eyelashes are both for the sake of protection, and it is this function 
that explains the presence of these parts. However, what is causally prior in this 
explanation is the materially necessitated coming to be of the materials forming the 
eyebrows and eyelashes. The function eyebrows and eyelashes perform is non-
necessary (but rather contributes to the animal’s well-being) and is posterior to the 
                                                 
78 Cf. Lennox (2001b), 251. 
79 Cf. Charles (1997), 30: “The favoured mode of explanation applicable to biological natural kinds is 
teleological, and the Form of the kind is the explanatorily basic feature.” 
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coming to be of the materials constituting the parts. The function these parts 
perform explains why nature has not redirected this flow of material to another place 
or why it has not used it for something else.  
 In both examples, the function explains the presence of a part, but the role 
of the final cause in the explanation is very different in each case: in the first example 
by being subsumed in the definition of the substantial being of an animal it precedes 
(and conditionally necessitates) the coming to be of the parts, while in the second 
example it follows from the presence of materially necessitated parts. In both 
examples there are other causes at play that turn out to be causally prior to the final 
causes: final causes are thus picked out first in these examples, but they are not 
explanatorily basic. The functions parts play and for which they are present are 
either contained in an animal’s essence, or are attributed to a part because of the 
material potentials present.  
 
In addition, Aristotle explains the presence of parts not only by reference to one 
function, but to a plurality of functions performed by the part.  
For instance, this is how Aristotle explains the presence of teeth (PA.II.9, 
655b8-11):  
Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τῷ γένει καὶ ἡ τῶν ὀδόντων ἐστὶ φύσις, τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσα πρὸς ἓν ἔργον 
τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἐργασίαν, τοῖς δὲ πρός τε τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς ἀλκήν, οἷον τοῖς 
καρχαρόδουσι καὶ χαυλιόδουσι πᾶσιν. 
“The nature of teeth is also in this kind [i.e. in parts that have been devised for the 
sake of protection], in some cases present for a single function, the preparation of 
nourishment, in other cases present both for this and for defense, e.g. in all those 
with saw-like teeth or with tusks.” 
In some animals, teeth are both present for the sake of nourishment (which is the 
function for which teeth are present in all animals that have teeth) and for the sake 
of defense. In those animals that have teeth for both functions, the teeth are 
differentiated in such a way to accommodate for this second function; as Aristotle 
points out, their teeth are saw-like or they have tusks. A comparison with Aristotle’s 
account of lips in human beings might be helpful here. According to this account, 
lips are present in those animals that have them for the sake of protecting their teeth, 
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but in human beings they serve the second function of speech (PA.II.16, 659b30-
660a2):   
οἱ δ’ ἄνθρωποι μαλακὰ καὶ σαρκώδη καὶ δυνάμενα χωρίζεσθαι, φυλακῆς τε ἕνεκα τῶν 
ὀδόντων ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι διὰ τὸ εὖ· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ 
καὶ ταῦτα. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὴν γλῶτταν οὐχ ὁμοίαν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐποίησεν ἡ φύσις, πρὸς 
ἐργασίας δύο καταχρησαμένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ποιεῖν αὐτὴν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, τὴν μὲν 
γλῶτταν τῶν τε χυμῶν ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ λόγου, τὰ δὲ χείλη τούτου τε ἕνεκεν καὶ τῆς τῶν 
ὀδόντων φυλακῆς. 
“But human beings have lips which are soft, fleshy, and capable of separation, both 
for the sake of protecting the teeth (as the others do), and even more on account of 
the good; for these can also be used for speech. For just as nature made the human 
tongue unlike the tongues of other animals, using it for two operations, as we say it 
does in many cases, so it does with the lips – it makes use of the tongue for the sake 
of both flavors and speech, while it makes use of the lips for the sake of both 
speech and the protection of teeth.” 
What this latter example makes especially clear is that the reference to the second 
function a part performs does not so much explain the presence of that part, but 
rather its material differentiation relative to similar parts in other animals where this 
second function is missing (for this type of explanation, see below).80 The second 
function is presumably lower in the functional hierarchy than the first and primary 
function,81 which conditionally necessitates the coming to be of the part in question.  
 Regardless of the cause(s) of the coming to be of a part, its presence is 
always accounted for by reference to its function within the animal kind to which it 
belongs. 
 
Pattern T2:  Explanation of the presence of non-necessary, subsidiary parts by reference to 
the function to which these parts contribute 
 
                                                 
80  Cf. Aristotle’s remarks on the material adaptations of the tongue and lips required for the 
accommodation of the second function in PA.II.16, 660a4-6: “For vocal speech is composed out of 
articulate sounds; and if the tongue were not such as it is, nor the lips moist, most of these articulate 
sounds could not be spoken, since some result from pressing of the tongue, other from pursing of the 
lips.” 
81 For instance, because the first is present in all animals and the second is not; or because the first is 
more necessary for the survival and overall well-being of the animal than the second function is. 
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Aristotle explains the presence of non-necessary, subsidiary parts by reference to the 
function (primarily and properly performed by another part) to which these parts 
contribute. The parts to be explained are either (i) a container or protective device of 
other parts, or, most commonly, (ii) ‘for the good’ or ‘for the better’, where ‘better’ 
means a better performance of the function that belongs primarily and properly to 
another part (the expression is part of a principle that will be discussed below in 3.3). 
As was indicated before (see above in 3.1.2), Aristotle endorses a hierarchy between 
parts, where some are necessary, others are non-necessary but subsidiary to other 
parts, and still other non-necessary but performing ‘luxurious’ functions, thus 
contributing to the well-being of an animal. This type of explanation pertains to the 
second category of parts that are in a sense supervening on the presence of other 
parts. 
Take the examples of the head and the kidneys. Aristotle explains the 
presence of the head by referring to its function as being for the sake of the brain 
(PA.IV.10, 686a5-6): 
 Ἔστι δ’ ἡ μὲν κεφαλὴ μάλιστα τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου χάριν· 
“The head is present above all for the sake of the brain.” 
The function of the head is to be a container82 for the brain, which is itself a 
necessary part in blooded animals.  
The presence of the kidneys is explained as being for the better. The 
function of the kidneys is to ‘assist’ another part, in this case the bladder, which 
performs a function on its own (PA.III.7, 670b23-27):  
Οἱ δὲ νεφροὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ἕνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν· 
τῆς γὰρ περιττώσεως χάριν τῆς εἰς τὴν κύστιν ἀθροιζομένης εἰσὶ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν, 
ἐν ὅσοις πλεῖον ὑπόστημα γίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὅπως βέλτιον ἀποδιδῷ ἡ κύστις τὸ 
αὑτῆς ἔργον.  
“The kidneys are present in those that have them not of necessity but for the sake 
of the good and doing well. That is, they are present, in accordance with their 
distinctive nature, for the sake of the residue which collects in the bladder in those 
animals in which a greater amount of such excrement comes about, in order that 
the bladder may perform its function better.” 
                                                 
82 Cf. the ‘container-function’ of the neck in PA.III.3, 664a15-18 “for not all animals have this part, but 
only those with the parts for the sake of which the neck is naturally present, and these are the larynx and 
the part called the esophagus.” 
The practice of teleological explanations in Aristotle’s biology 
 231
Aristotle claims that kidneys are not necessary parts, but rather are parts that 
contribute to the well-being of animals – they are for the good. Kidneys contribute 
to the function performed by the bladder (which is the collection of residue) by 
providing extra storage-room for residue; the function could be performed without 
the presence of the kidneys, but their presence adds to the performance of the 
function and therefore to the well-being of the animal.  
Subsidiary parts are thus parts that are present in order to contribute to 
functions properly and primarily performed by other parts. 
 
Pattern T3: Explanation of the absence of all kinds of parts by reference to their 
(presumed) presence being functionless 
 
Aristotle explains the absence of parts mostly by pointing out that if they had been 
present, they would not have had a function (or they would have functioned badly), 
and that because ‘nature does nothing in vain’, nature does not create such parts. In 
these explanations, Aristotle introduces a principle concerning “what nature always 
or regularly does” into the explanatory framework, namely that the principle that 
‘nature does nothing in vain, but always, given the possibilities, what is best for the 
substantial being of each kind of animal’. The nature and explanatory force of this 
principle will be further discussed below (see 3.3), but for now it may suffice to 
outline its basic use as defended by Lennox.83 All the explanations that make use of 
this principle build upon the counterfactual argument that had the part been present 
in the animal in question, the part would have been in vain (matên) or superfluous 
(periergon), and since nature does nothing in vain or superfluously, there is no such 
part. Aristotle uses as it were a kind of thought-experiment: imagine the part would 
have been present in the animal, and then think of the consequences. If the 
consequences are bad, then that is why the part is not present in reality. 
There are four reasons why Aristotle considers parts or features to be 
without a function. In the first place, a part is considered to have no function in a 
particular kind of animal because the animal in question already possesses another 
part performing that function. Because nature does not allow for functionally 
                                                 
83 Lennox (2001a), 205-23. 
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equivalent or redundant parts, the ‘second’ part is not produced. For this reason, no 
animal has both gills and lungs, because (Resp.10, 476a11-15):  
ἓν δ’ ἐφ’ ἓν χρήσιμον ὄργανον, καὶ μία κατάψυξις ἱκανὴ πᾶσιν, ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ μάτην οὐδὲν 
ὁρῶμεν ποιοῦσαν τὴν φύσιν, δυοῖν δ’ ὄντοιν θάτερον ἂν ἦν μάτην, διὰ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν 
ἔχει βράγχια τὰ δὲ πνεύμονα, ἄμφω δ’ οὐδέν. 
“One organ is useful for one thing, and in every case one mode of cooling is 
sufficient. So, since we see that nature does nothing in vain, and that if there were 
there two [organs for cooling] one would be in vain, for this reason some have gills, 
some have a lung, but none has both.” 
It is thus not because the part itself is without a function entirely, but rather that it is 
without a function in the context of the whole animal to which it would belong. The 
presence of lungs is very much required in all blooded animals that breathe air, and 
because these animals do indeed have lungs that perform the function of cooling the 
body, they do not need a second part performing that same function. In some sense, 
it is the presence of another part performing a particular function, which makes the 
presence of the part in question in vain. For this reason there are no heavy birds 
with both spurs and talons, since having only one of those parts is sufficient for the 
protection of the bird (PA.IV.12, 694a13-20). Moreover, spurs could not be used by 
taloned and powerful fliers – a fact which makes spurs double useless (PA.IV.12, 
694a16: ἄχρηστα) in these kinds of birds.  
In the second place, Aristotle thus also considers a part to be in vain or 
superfluous when the animal in question is not able to use the part – either at all or 
to use it properly. For instance, Aristotle explains the absence of horizontal jaw 
motion in fish, birds, and egg-laying, four-footed animals by their lack of having 
teeth suitable for the grinding of food, which would make the presence of a 
horizontal jaw motion superfluous (PA.IV.11, 691b1-5): 
Τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἔχουσι γομφίους χρήσιμος ἡ εἰς τὸ πλάγιον κίνησις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἔχουσιν 
οὐδὲν χρήσιμος, διόπερ ἀφῄρηται πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ περίεργον ἡ 
φύσις.  
“Therefore for those that have grinding teeth, sideways motion is useful, but for 
those that do not, it is not useful at all, which is why they have been taken away 
from all such animals; for nature produces nothing superfluous.” 
Aristotle’s description of the action of the formal nature within this ‘thought-
experiment’ is striking: parts or features that could reasonably be expected to have 
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been present in the ‘design’ of a particular kind of animal, are ‘taken away’ by nature 
if they are not functional given the other parts and features the animal has. 
In the third place, Aristotle explains the absence of a part not only by its 
functional redundancy, but also by its potential harmfullness had it been present in 
the animal. This is for instance how Aristotle explains the absence of crooked claws 
in heavy birds (PA.IV.12, 694a16-18):  
διὸ ὑπάρχει ἐνίοις τῶν βαρέων. Τούτοις δ’ οὐ μόνον ἄχρηστοι ἀλλὰ καὶ βλαβεροὶ οἱ 
γαμψοὶ ὄνυχες τῷ ἐμπήγνυσθαι ὑπεναντίοι πρὸς τὴν πορείαν ὄντες.  
“That is why [spurs] belong to the heavy [birds], while in these birds crooked claws 
would not only be useless but actually harmful, being, by getting stuck in the 
ground, contrary to walking.” 
Similarly, in the case of serpentine fish, having fins would be in vain, because 
moving by only four points would make the serpentine fish (just as snake on land) 
move in a bad way (PA.IV.13, 696a10-15; PA.IV.13, 696a12: Ἢ γὰρ κακῶς ἂν 
ἐκινοῦντο).  
In the fourth and last place, Aristotle considers parts to be in vain or 
functionless in the case where the animal does not need the function performed by 
the part.84 This is the explanation Aristotle offers for the absence of eyelids in fish 
(an absence which is remarkable, since all other kinds of animals with moist eyes 
have eyelids for the sake of protection). Because fish live in a habitat where there are 
not many things that strike them from without, their eyes do not need any extra 
protection – eye-protection would be in vain (PA.II.13, 658a6-10):  
ἐκείνοις δ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς μὲν τὸ ὀξὺ βλέπειν ἐναντίον, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ πολλὰ τὰ 
προσκρούσματα πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ὥσπερ ὁ ἀήρ, διὰ μὲν τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἔχει βλέφαρον (οὐδὲν 
γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ μάτην), πρὸς δὲ τὴν παχύτητα τοῦ ὕδατος ὑγρόφθαλμοί εἰσιν. 
                                                 
84 In a small number of cases, Aristotle connects the notion of kairos, the right moment, to the principle 
that nature does nothing in vain; the implication is that nature does not make parts before, nor after an 
animal needs the part (which explains the absence of a part before or after the kairos). This connection 
can be used to explain the moment of generation of a part. This is how Aristotle explains the moment of 
the separation of the two eyelids (GA.II.6, 744a35-b1; cf. GA.V.8, 788b20-789a2 concerning teeth):  
τοιοῦτον δ’ ἐστὶ μόριον τὸ βλέφαρον. ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐθὲν ποιεῖ περίεργον οὐδὲ μάτην ἡ φύσις δῆλον ὡς 
οὐδ’ ὕστερον οὐδὲ πρότερον· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἢ μάτην ἢ περίεργον. ὥσθ’ ἅμ’ ἀνάγκη τὰ 
βλέφαρα διαχωρίζεσθαί τε καὶ δύνασθαι κινεῖν.  
“Now the eyelid is such a part. But since nature makes nothing superfluous nor in vain, it is 
clear also that she makes nothing too late or too soon, for if she did the result would be either 
in vain or superfluous. Hence it is necessary that the eyelids should be separated at the same 
time as [the heart] is able to move them.”  
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“But for those [i.e. fish], since water has the opposite effect on sharp vision, but 
there are not as many obstacles to vision than with air – for this reason fish on the 
one hand do not have eyelids (for nature does nothing in vain), and on the other 
have moist eyes in consequence of the density of the water.” 
If the items that are responsible for causing a specific need for a particular kind of 
animal are absent in a related or similar group of animals, then the part that fulfills 
this need in the first group of animals must also be absent in the second group of 
animals.  
  
Pattern T4: Explanation of non-necessary and necessary differentiations of parts by 
reference to ‘the better’ 
 
As we saw above in 3.2.3, Aristotle frequently explains differentiations of parts by 
reference to ‘the better’, and does so often in conjunction with references to 
necessity.  
 Here the distinction between two types of differentiations between parts 
becomes important. On the one hand there are non-necessary differentiations that 
are due to materials and material changes that have come to be of material necessity 
and that are preserved within the part because they contribute to the well-being of 
the animal. The teleology at stake is secondary, and the necessity is material. On the 
other hand, there are differentiations that are necessary for the sake of the functional 
optimalization of a part within a specific kind of animal. For instance, all animals 
have eyes, but the specific kind of eye (moist or hard, with or without eyelids, etc.) 
they have depends on their particular way of life (the cause of the differentiation is 
generally a factor belonging to one of the four kinds of differentiae). The need for a 
specific kind of animal to perform a function in a certain way determines by 
conditional necessity the particular material constitution of the part that performs 
that function within that kind of animal. ‘For the better’ here means not just what 
contributes to the well-being of the animal in question, but specifically what is best 
for the substantial being of this kind of animal given the possibilities; the particular 
material differentiation of a part is for the sake of a better performance of the 
function for the sake of which the part has come to be in this particular kind of 
animal. The teleology at stake is thus primary, and the necessity is conditional. Note 
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that Aristotle explains necessary differentiations only by reference to the functional 
optimalizations these differentiations provide. 
 Aristotle formulates the difference between the two types of 
differentiations as follows (PA.II.2, 647b29-648a15):  
Αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων αἱ διαφοραὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῦ βελτίονος ἕνεκέν εἰσιν, οἷον τῶν τε 
ἄλλων καὶ αἵματος πρὸς αἷμα· (...) Διὸ καὶ τὰ ἄνω μόρια πρὸς τὰ κάτω ταύτην ἔχει τὴν 
διαφοράν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ αὖ τὸ ἄρρεν, καὶ τὰ δεξιὰ πρὸς τὰ ἀριστερὰ τοῦ σώματος. 
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων μορίων καὶ τῶν ἀνομιομερῶν 
ὑποληπτέον ἔχειν τὴν διαφοράν, τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἔργα 
καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζῴων, οἷον ἐχόντων ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀμφοτέρων τὰ μέν ἐστι 
σκληρόφθαλμα τὰ δ’ ὑγρόφθαλμα, καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει βλέφαρα τὰ δ’ ἔχει πρὸς τὸ τὴν 
ὄψιν ἀκριβεστέραν εἶναι. 
“The relative differences between things of the same kind are for the sake of the 
better – that is, the differences both of other parts and of blood from blood. (...) It 
is for this reason too that the upper parts differ in this way compared with the 
lower parts, and again the male compared to the female, and the right side of the 
body with the left. And likewise with the other parts, both the parts such as these 
and the non-uniform parts: they should be assumed to possess a difference in some 
cases relative to what is better or worse, in other cases relative to each animal’s 
functions and substantial being – for example, among those two kinds with eyes, 
some are hard-eyed, and others are moist-eyed, and some do not have eyelids, while 
others do with a view to a greater accuracy of sight.” 
I take the example of the differentiation of eyes to be an example of differentiations 
that are necessary for each animal’s functions and substantial being (and that are 
therefore conditionally necessitated). The differentiation pertains to a modification 
of a part that performs an essential function, while the modification allows for a 
better performance of this function in those animals that need it; this functional 
optimalization of the part is necessary for all animals that have it given their way of 
life (and/or given other basic features). All eyes are present for the sake of sight, 
while the differentiations between the eyes in different kinds of animals are for the 
sake of the better, i.e. for the sake of enhancing the accuracy of sight in those 
animals that need a greater accuracy of sight relative to other animals that have 
vision. The differentiations that are for the better or the worse I take to be 
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differentiations that are not necessary for the animal’s performance of essential and 
vital functions, or for its substantial being, but rather contribute to its well-being. 
We have already discussed a few examples of non-necessary differentiations 
that Aristotle explains by reference to the better and to material necessity: ducks 
having webbed feet (PA.IV.12, 694a22-694b10); human beings having the most 
hairy heads of all animals with hair (PA.II.14, 658b2-8); kidneys being the fattest of 
all viscera (PA.III.9, 672a1-21). The material constitution of these parts are 
differentiated the way they are both on account of the flow of material that is 
present of material necessity, and on account of the formal nature of the animal 
being able to use this extra material in adapting the part in such a way that it is for 
the better for the animal that has the part.85  
 Let me now give an example of a necessary differentiation of a part that 
Aristotle explains by reference to how it is for the sake of the functional 
optimalization of that part: the case of the birds’ wings. Aristotle explains the 
differentiation of the birds’ wings by reference to how this differentiation is useful 
for the way of life of each particular kind of bird (PA.IV.12, 693b28-693a9): 
Ἔτι τῶν ὀρνίθων οἱ μὲν πτητικοὶ καὶ τὰς πτέρυγας ἔχουσι μεγάλας καὶ ἰσχυράς, οἷον οἱ 
γαμψώνυχες καὶ οἱ ὠμοφάγοι· ἀνάγκη γὰρ πτητικοῖς εἶναι διὰ τὸν βίον, ὥσθ’ ἕνεκα 
τούτου καὶ πλῆθος ἔχουσι πτερῶν καὶ τὰς πτέρυγας μεγάλας. Ἔστι δ’ οὐ μόνον τὰ 
γαμψώνυχα ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα γένη ὀρνίθων πτητικά, ὅσοις ἡ σωτηρία ἐν τῇ ταχυτῆτι τῆς 
πτήσεως ἢ ἐκτοπιστικά. Ἔνια δ’ οὐ πτητικὰ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ βαρέα, οἷς ὁ βίος 
ἐπίγειος καὶ ἔστι καρποφάγα ἢ πλωτὰ καὶ περὶ ὕδωρ βιοτεύουσιν. Ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν τῶν 
γαμψωνύχων σώματα μικρὰ ἄνευ τῶν πτερύγων διὰ τὸ εἰς ταύτας ἀναλίσκεσθαι τὴν 
τροφὴν εἰς τὰ ὅπλα καὶ τὴν οήθειαν· τοῖς δὲ μὴ πτητικοῖς τοὐναντίον τὰ σώματα 
ὀγκώδη, διὸ βαρέα ἐστίν. 
“Further, some of the birds are able to fly and have large, strong wings, e.g. those 
 with talons, and the flesh-eaters; it is a necessity for them to be able to fly on 
                                                 
85 In addition, there are differentiations that concern the location of a part within an animal’s body relative 
to the location the part usually has in other related or similar animals, rather than its material constitution. 
Aristotle explains these too by reference to the better, but here ‘the better’ means the most valuable 
location, which is as far as possible to the right, to the front, and in the upper part of the body. For 
example, Aristotle answers the question why human beings have more hair on their underbellies than on 
their backs (while other four-footed animals have more hair on their backs) by reference to the better 
(PA.II.14, 658a16-24; 658a22-24):  
τοῖς τιμιωτέροις ὑπέγραψεν ἡ φύσις τὴν βοήθειαν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων αἰτία τοῦ βελτίονός 
ἐστιν. 
“Therefore nature adds this protection to the more valuable parts, because it is always a cause 
of the better among the possibilities.” 
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account of their way of life, so for the sake of this they have both many feathers 
and large wings. It is not, however, only the taloned birds, but other kinds of birds 
as well that are able to fly, namely all those for whom self-preservation lies in the 
quickness of their flight or that are migratory. But some birds are not able to fly, but 
are heavy – those whose way of life is earthbound and that are fruit-eaters or are 
swimmers and spend their life around water.” 
Wings are differentiated in the way they are in the birds that have them according to 
their ways of life. For those birds for which it is necessary to be able to fly – or more 
specifically, for which it is necessary to fly fast or for long distances – the wings are 
made large and strong, with many feathers. For those birds for which it is not 
necessary to fly, because they find their food on the ground or in and around the 
water, the wings are heavy. Wings have to perform the function of flying in different 
ways in different kinds of birds; the way in which the function has to be performed 
in a particular kind of bird is determined by the animal’s way of life (or another 
factor among the differentiae). Thus, in explanations like these, the differentiae will 
have causal priority: the differentia (e.g. being migratory) specifies the function a part 
has to perform within a particular kind of animal (e.g. flying long distances); this 
functional specification conditionally necessitates the material differentiation of the 
part (e.g. large, strong wings); and the material differentiation of the part facilitates 
the functional optimization of the part within this animal.  
In sum, through picking out the differentiae that specify the function parts 
have to play within particular kinds of animal, Aristotle shows how a material 
differentiation of a part is for the sake of the functional optimization of that part. 
We find again that the function is the first cause picked out in this type of 
explanation (differentiations are for the sake of functional optimizations), but it is 
not explanatorily basic; the functional specification a part will have to play is 
determined by some other basic factor, such as the animal’s way of life. I will return 
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Pattern T5: Explanation of the differentiation of parts by reference to a second function the 
part needs to perform 
 
As we saw above, Aristotle on occasion refers to two or more functions to explain 
the presence of a part in the animals that have it. In these explanations, only the first 
and primary function explains properly the presence of the part. The secondary and 
lower functions (i.e. the functions that are lower in the functional hierarchy, e.g. 
because they are less necessary) explain the extra differentiations of the part among 
those animals in which the part has to fulfill a multiplicity of functions (these 
differentiations are extra because they come on top of the differentiations that are 
already present for the sake of the better performance of the first function in each 
specific kind of animal).86 The differentiations are explained as being necessary for 
the accommodation of the second function that needs to be performed by the part, 
in addition to its first and proper function.  
The two following examples will make clear how these two different types 
of explanations are used together to account for both the presence and the 
differentiation of a part. The first concerns the presence and the differentiation of 
mammae in human beings. The common function of mammae in human beings is 
the protection of the region around the heart (and it is this function that account for 
the presence of mammae in human beings), but in females, the mammae also 
perform a second function (PA.IV.10, 688a19-25): 
τοῖς δ’ ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν καὶ τὸ σκεπάζεσθαι δεῖν τὰ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, διὰ 
τοῦτο ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ τόπου σαρκώδους οἱ μαστοὶ διήρθρωνται, σαρκώδεις ὄντες τοῖς 
μὲν ἄρρεσι διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θηλειῶν παρακέχρηται καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον 
ἔργον ἡ φύσις, ὅπερ φαμὲν αὐτὴν πολλάκις ποιεῖν· ἀποτίθεται γὰρ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς 
γεννωμένοις τροφήν. 
“In human beings, however, because of the wide expanse of the breast and the need 
to shelter the parts around the heart, and since the location is fleshy, the mammae 
have been differentiated. In males they are fleshy owing to the aforementioned 
cause, while in females nature has turned them to an additional function as well, 
which we claim it often does; for it stores nourishment there for the offspring.” 
                                                 
86 For the two ‘layers’ of differentiations, see Lennox (2001b), 245. 
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Aristotle introduces the storage of milk or lactating as an addition function of the 
mammae, and this explains the material differences between male and female 
breasts.87  
A similar explanation holds for the differentiations between teeth (PA.III.1, 
661a36-b6):  
Τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἡ τῶν ὀδόντων φύσις κοινὴ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἐργασίαν 
ὑπάρχει, χωρὶς δὲ κατὰ γένη τοῖς μὲν ἀλκῆς χάριν, καὶ ταύτης διῃρημένης, ἐπί τε τὸ 
ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ μὴ πάσχειν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ἕνεκεν ἔχει, καὶ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν καὶ τοῦ 
ποιεῖν, οἷον ὅσα σαρκοφάγα τῶν ἀγρίων τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ βοηθείας χάριν, ὥσπερ 
πολλὰ τῶν ἀγρίων καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων.  
“In animals other than mankind, the nature of the teeth is present in common88 for 
the preparation of nutrition, yet distinctively according to kinds. In some it is 
present for the sake of strength, which in turn has been divided into strength to 
attack and strength to avoid attack; for some animals have teeth for the sake of both 
of avoiding attack and of attacking, e.g. those wild animals which are carnivorous in 
nature; while others have them for the sake of protection, as many of the wild and 
tame animals do.”  
According to this passage, the common function of teeth is the preparation of 
nutrition, which means that in all animals that have teeth, the teeth are present for 
the sake preparing nutrition. On top of this, teeth are ‘differentiated according to 
kinds’, that is, according to the second function teeth have to perform in the 
different kinds of animals that have teeth. In some animals, teeth are also for the 
sake of strength, which is subdivided into the functions of strength to attack and 
strength to avoid attack. Now, according to Aristotle some animals have teeth (for 
the sake of the preparation of nutrition and) for the sake of both the strength to 
attack and to avoid attack, such as wild carnivorous animals do. Other animals have 
teeth (for the sake of the preparation of nutrition and) for the sake of avoiding 
attack or protection only, such as many of the wild and tame animals do. In the 
                                                 
87 Here Lennox (2001b, 322) notes a problem regarding this explanation of mammae in human beings: if 
lactating is the secondary, and not the primary function, for which breasts are present, how come males 
have nipples? There might not be a satisfactory answer to this problem, but perhaps Aristotle could have 
replied that having mammae is a distinctive feature of all animals that bear live young internally (cf. 
PA.IV.11, 692a8-15). Now since both male and female share the same formal nature, i.e. they are both 
live-bearing even though only the females bear young, and since the nipples are harmless in males (unlike 
horns in hoofed females, see PA.III.2, 664a), they are present in males, too. Usually, it are the females, 
instead of the males, who ‘have less’ of the necessary parts (PA.III.1, 661b34-662a1). 
88 Cf. PA.III.1, 661b7: koinê chrêsis. 
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remainder of the chapter, Aristotle connects this division of animals based on the 
multiplicity and hierarchy of functions their teeth have to perform to the material 
differentiations of teeth. For instance, male pigs have tusks (for the sake of nutrition 
and protection in the form of spearing), while the female pigs have sharp, 
interlocking teeth (i.e. they are saw-toothed for the sake of nutrition and protection 
in the form of biting). Aristotle summarizes his explanation of the differentiation of 
parts where a multiplicity of functions is at stake as follows (PA.III.1, 662a22-24; 
this is near the end of the chapter, where Aristotle discusses the differentiation of 
the mouth):  
Ἡ δὲ φύσις ἅπαντα συνήγαγεν εἰς ἕν, ποιοῦσα διαφορὰν αὐτοῦ τοῦ μορίου πρὸς τὰς 
τῆς ἐργασίας διαφοράς. 
“But nature has collected all these uses together in one, producing a differentiation 
of this part for the differences of its operation.”  
In sum, the first and common function of a part explains primarily its presence and 
secondarily and in a general way its material constitution and location in the animal’s 
body. The secondary and specific functions of that part (which are different in all the 
animals that have that part) explain primarily and in a very specific way its material 
constitutions and only secondarily its presence. The exact differentiation a part has 
within a specific kind of animal is thus determined by all the functions that part has 
to perform within that animal (and also by restrictions on the way these functions 
have to be performed); with each addition of another function the dispositional 
properties of the part get more determined.  
 
In sum, final causes (T) are picked out first in: 
(1) the explanation of the presence of all kinds of parts by reference to the 
function(s) these parts need to perform in the kinds of animals that have those parts; 
the function explains the presence and coming to be of necessary parts; the function 
explains the presence of non-necessary parts;  
(2) the explanation of the presence of non-necessary, subsidiary parts by 
reference to the function to which these parts contribute; subsidiary parts are for the 
sake of enhancing the performance of a function that is primarily performed by 
other parts;  
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(3) the explanation of the absence of all kinds of parts by reference to their 
presence being functionless; here Aristotle employs the principle that ‘nature does 
nothing in vain’ (on this principle, see more below in 3.3.1.c);  
(4) the explanation of non-necessary and necessary differentiations of parts 
by reference to ‘the better’ (non-necessary differentiations are of necessity and for 
the better, i.e. their contribution to the well-being of the animal; necessary 
differentiations are for the sake of the functional optimization of the part within the 
specific animal that has it);  
(5) the explanation of the differentiation of parts by reference to a second 
function the part needs to perform; both the primary and secondary functions cause 
material differentiations of the part, but it is in particular the secondary function that 
explains the differentiations of a part relative to other animals in which this part only 
performs the primary function.  
The final causes picked out in these explanations are the functions of parts, which 
are either primary or secondary in the functional hierarchy of all functions that an 
animal needs to perform, and the result of either primary or secondary teleology. 
 
Aristotle’s PA is very rich in its explanatory strategies. Depending on whether it is 
the presence, absence, or differentiation of a part that needs to be explained, and 
depending on the status of the part involved (i.e. either necessary or ‘for the better’, 
where for the better points to a subsidiary or luxurious function), Aristotle employs 
different kinds of explanations.  
In almost every type of explanation, we find some reference to teleology. 
Functions are included in essences and the latter figure as the causes of the presence 
of necessary parts; non-necessary, luxurious parts are explained by reference to 
secondary teleology, where the formal nature of the animal follows the potentials of 
the material present due to material necessity in forming a functional part. 
Differentiations of parts, whether or not they come to be of necessity, and whether 
or not they are necessary or non-necessary for the animals that have them, are always 
‘for the better’: they enhance the performance of the function of a part for which the 
part is present and thereby contribute to the animal’s survival or well-being.  
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However, in all these explanations, it is either the form (i.e. the definition of the 
substantial being of the animal), a differentia (i.e. the animal’s way of life, its 
activities, character, and the parts it possess), or matter (or, more specifically, 
material potentials) that turns out to be causally basic, while the functions parts 
perform and for the sake of which they are present follow from these causally basic 
factors. Final causes seem to be most pervasive and often picked out first in the 
explanations Aristotle provides of biological phenomena, but they are not primary in 
a causal way. Final causes rather seem to be primary in an epistemological or in a 
heuristic way, for they are primary in understanding and explanation. I will return to 
this observation at the end of section 3.4, after having discussed the use and 
explanatory force of teleological principles in 3.3 and the relation between teleology 
and necessity in 3.4.  
In any case, what should be clear by now is that Aristotle does not take one 
basic, defining feature of the animal as the starting point for the explanations of all 
the other features belonging to (or missing in) the animal in question.89 The essence 
or form of an animal is an important explanatory feature, but only of all the 
necessary parts the animal actually has; other (missing) features are explained by 
reference to other explanatorily basic facts, such as life style and the material 
potentials available to the animal during generation. Moreover, the analysis of 
different types of explanations above suggests that essences are complexes of 
explanatorily basic facts (minimally including all the necessary life-functions, all the 
distinctive essential functions, the animal’s dimensions, and perhaps also the ratio of 
the elemental materials of which the animal is constituted), rather than exhibiting 
one, simple, and unifying feature from which all the other features can be derived.  
  
3.3 Teleological principles of explanation 
 
3.3.1 The use and function of principles in Aristotle’s biology 
In the examples of explanations discussed above, we sometimes found Aristotle 
drawing inferences from universal statements concerning what the formal nature of 
an animal – simply referred to as ‘nature’ – always or never does or make when it is 
                                                 
89 On this conclusion, cf. Charles (1997), 33. 
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said to generate the animal. These universal statements are principles positing the 
goal-directedness of the actions of the formal nature.90  
I distinguish three teleological principles (formulated variously) that are 
operative in Aristotle’s biology. First, there is the principle of ‘balanced distribution’, 
pertaining to the goals formal natures pursue in distributing the parts over the 
animal’s body. Secondly, there is the principle of ‘economical assignment’, pertaining 
to the goals formal natures pursue in assigning functions to parts. Thirdly, there is 
the principle of ‘optimal production’, pertaining to the goals formal natures pursue 
in producing parts (and their material differentiations) for the sake of functions in 
animals. All three principles boil down to what seems to be the most basic principle 
in Aristotle’s biology, namely that nature does what is necessary for the substantial 
being of each kind of animal, or does what is best for it. Nature always places parts 
in the most honorable places, never wastes what is available, and always produces 
parts for the sake of some good (unless prevented from doing so, of course).  
Note that ‘nature’ in these statements is used ‘trans-specifically’: ‘nature’ 
refers to a generalized conception of the particular formal natures found in 
animals.91 It is important to realize that this way of speaking about nature does not 
give evidence for some kind of cosmic or demiurgic conception of nature that is 
supposed to exist over and above the particular formal natures of animals (the 
viability of such an interpretation has already been challenged in 1.3).92 The universal 
statements are generalizations pertaining to the ‘observed’ actions of actual and 
particular formal natures,93 not descriptions of one unified and universal nature. It is 
my contention that the verbs of agency ascribed to formal natures are more than 
mere metaphors, or reflections of the analogy between art and nature. As I will show 
below, the different actions attributed to formal natures reflect different causal 
                                                 
90 The principles stand out from other sentences describing the actions of the formal nature of an animal 
by their appeal to universality or their appeal to the ‘for the most part-character’ of the actions described. 
In many cases, Aristotle states the principle first, and then shows how the current fact can be explained in 
the light of it (see e.g. PA.II.16, 659a20-22: ὑπάρξαντος οὖν τοιούτου τοῦ μυκτῆρος, ἡ φύσις 
παρακαταχρῆται, καθάπερ εἴωθεν, ἐπὶ πλείονα τοῖς αὐτοῖς μορίοις, ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν προσθίων ποδῶν χρείας; 
“And since the trunk is present, nature, as usual, turns the same part to more than one use, [here] using 
the trunk in place of the front feet.”). 
91 Lennox (2001a), 190. 
92 Against such interpretations, Lennox (2001a), 182-204 has provided convincing arguments. 
93 Cf. Lennox (2001a), 184 and 220n.3. 
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patterns underlying the generation of an animal and all the parts that it has and does 
not have.  
In this section, I will discuss Aristotle’s use of these teleological principles 
in the explanations of biological phenomena offered in chiefly PA. In particular, I 
will argue that these teleological hypotheses are not used as premises in the 
explanations (for the status of the teleological principles as hypotheses, see below in 
3.3.2).94 Propositional principles of explanation, 95 such as Aristotle’s teleological 
principles, function as the framework within which the explanation needs to take 
place: they both limit the amount and kinds of explanations possible, and license the 
explanations actually given. Outside the framework set up by these kinds of 
principles, explanations lose their explanatory force and fail to make sense 
altogether. The teleological principles establish a causal framework within which, 
first, that which is necessary for an animal can be shown to be necessarily present. 
For instance, organs for perception are necessary for all animals on account of their 
being animals, and they come to be due to primary teleology and conditional 
necessity on account of the potential for perception being part of the substantial 
being of each kind of animal. Secondly, also that which is functionally best can be 
shown to be necessarily present, but on a secondary or subsidiary level: for instance, 
                                                 
94 Pace Charles (2000, 72n.20) and Lennox (2001a, 209) who take APo.I.10, 76b36 (ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσιν 
αἱ ὑποθέσεις; “hypotheses belong to the propositions”) to mean that the hypotheses are among the premises 
of demonstrations, and Gotthelf (1987b, 185-194), who uses the terms ‘principle’ and ‘premise’ 
interchangeably for all of the three types of principles he distinguishes in Aristotle. (Gotthelf distinguishes 
between three types of principles, which all figure as premises in explanations; these principles are: (1) 
principles about the nature and the potentials of elements of which animals are composed (cf. PA.II.2, 
648a19-24; 23: Πολλῶν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀνάγεται πρὸς ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς – “for the nature of many things is 
referred back to these principles”); (2) principles asserting the existence of the various formal natures of 
animals and their status as ends (teleological principles are subsumed under this category); and (3) 
principles consisting of the definitions of those animal forms.) Goldin (1996, 54 and 54n.26), on the other 
hand, argues that in APo.I.10, 76b36 ‘hypotheses’ means ‘premise’, and that accordingly the claim is that 
“premises belong to the propositions.” I can think of no internal argument within APo.I.10 that would 
favor one reading over the other; however, in APo.I.2, where Aristotle introduces his notions of axioms, 
hypotheses, and definitions, ‘protasis’ means proposition (Barnes; 1993, 97-98), and therefore I prefer to 
take it that way also in APo.I.10.  
My argument that hypotheses are not used as premises in demonstrations is based on 
Aristotle’s use of teleological hypotheses in the biological practice, and the question of whether or not 
Aristotle’s theory and practice are in perfect harmony in this particular case, will have to be addressed on 
another occasion. Cf. on this issue also Detel (2006, 255-256), who argues that hypotheses never show up 
as part of the demonstrations, but that only definitions do. 
95 For the distinction between elemental and propositional principles, see Irwin (1988), 4. Aristotle 
discusses propositional principles in APo.I.2 (these are the hypotheses and the axioms); he discusses 
elemental principles in APo.I.10, 76a31-36 (these include all causally basic and non-demonstrable facts or 
features, such as for example material causes in the form of material potentials, or formal causes in the 
form of essences whose existence has to be posited). 
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the feet of ducks are necessarily webbed due to material necessity and because this 
use of the material is best given the ducks specific way of life.  
Although the goal-directedness of nature is assumed in all the explanations 
Aristotle gives for biological phenomena, the principles are invoked explicitly only in 
those cases where this goal-directedness is not immediately evident. The principles 
are used as a heuristic tool: given that nature acts goal-directedly, we must look for a 
biological good in these cases, too. I will first give a description of the three 
principles describing different kinds of actions of the formal nature, and explain 
their specific usage; next, I will discuss their scientific status and their usage from a 
more general methodological perspective.   
 
3.3.1.a Principles of ‘balanced distribution’ 
The principles of ‘balanced distribution’ I call those principles that concern the goal-
directed actions of the formal natures in distributing the animal’s parts over its body. 
Aristotle posits that formal natures always or for the most part co-ordinate the 
distribution of the bodily parts over the animal body, in such a way that (i) each part 
is located at the most valuable position possible for it (in accordance with its own 
value), while at the same time safeguarding the balance or symmetry between the 
two halves of the body (along three dimensions), such that (ii) each part is has a 
counterpart. The actions that the formal nature is said always to perform according 
to these principles are mainly described in terms of ‘placing’, ‘positioning’, and 
‘ordering’. The animal that results from these actions has its parts distributed over its 
body in the best possible way. 
One such principle is that where nothing prevents it, nature places the 
parts in the most valuable locations, that is, in the upper, right, and front parts of the 
body. Aristotle uses this principle for instance to explain the position of the heart 
(PA.III.4, 665b18-21):  
Ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ θέσις αὐτῆς ἀρχικὴν χώραν· περὶ μέσον γάρ, μᾶλλον δ’ ἐν τῷ ἄνω ἢ 
κάτω καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἢ ὄπισθεν· ἐν τοῖς γὰρ τιμιωτέροις τὸ τιμιώτερον καθίδρυκεν 
ἡ φύσις, οὗ μή τι κωλύει μεῖζον.  
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“Moreover, its position is at an originative place; for it is near the middle, and more 
above than below, and more in front than in the rear; for nature places the more 
valuable things in the more valuable locations, where nothing greater prevents it.”96  
The heart is the most valuable part and thus is located at the most valuable place in 
the whole animal body.97 On the other hand, when a part is not found to be at the 
most honorable place possible in the animal, this calls for an explanation in terms of 
‘something greater that prevented it’. Such an explanation is given for the ‘deviating’ 
distribution of hair in four-footed blooded animals as compared to human beings 
(PA.II.14, 658a18-24):  
Σκέπης γὰρ χάριν αἱ τρίχες ὑπάρχουσι τοῖς ἔχουσιν· τοῖς μὲν οὖν τετράποσι τὰ πρανῆ 
δεῖται μᾶλλον τῆς σκέπης, τὰ δὲ πρόσθια τιμιώτερα μέν, ἀλλ’ ἀλεάζει διὰ τὴν κάμψιν· 
τοῖς δ’ ἀνθρώποις ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἴσου διὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὰ πρόσθια τοῖς ὀπισθίοις, τοῖς 
τιμιωτέροις ὑπέγραψεν ἡ φύσις τὴν βοήθειαν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων αἰτία τοῦ 
βελτίονός ἐστιν. 
 “Hair is present in those that have it for the sake of covering. Now in four-footed 
animals the backs have a greater need for covering, and though their fronts are more 
valuable, they are nevertheless hairless because they are bent over. But in human 
beings, since on account of their upright posture their fronts and backs are on equal 
terms, nature adds this protection to the more valuable parts; for it is always a cause 
of the better among the possibilities.”  
Here the greater functional need of hair at another location in the four-footed 
blooded animals prevents nature from placing the part at the most valuable location; 
here ‘for the better’ means ‘the most valuable location’.  
 Aristotle does not decide randomly what is to be the most valuable 
position, nor do the notion of the ‘valuable’ express ethical or esthetic prejudice. 
Instead, Aristotle derives the positions that are the most valuable in an animal’s body 
empirically from those locations where the origins of the most important and 
necessary functions can be found; the valuable is thus intrinsically connected to 
function (see IA.IV, 705a31-32: διείληπται δ’ ἔργῳ; “this distinction is one of 
                                                 
96 Cf. PA.III.3, 665a23-26: “And generally, where nothing greater impedes, what is better and more 
valuable is always, in the case of above and below, present more in things that are above; in the case of 
front and rear, more in things in front; and in the case of right and left, more in things on the right.” 
97 Cf. also Aristotle’s explanations of the locations of parts in PA.III.10, 672b19-24; GA.I.8, 718b25-b29; 
GA.I.11, 719a13-15; and GA.II.1, 732a3-8. 
The practice of teleological explanations in Aristotle’s biology 
 247
function”).98 The place where the function of sight originates, Aristotle calls the 
front; the place where the function of nourishment originates, is the up; and the 
place where the function of locomotion originates, is the right; because these three 
functions originate in these locations, the three dimensions that follow from them 
are the most honorable.99 The up, the right, and the front, together with the down, 
the left, and the back constitute the six dimensions of the body, which are 
themselves explicitly posited as principles by Aristotle (IA.II, 704b18-22): 
ἔτι τὰς διαστάσεις τοῦ μεγέθους, πόσαι καὶ ποῖαι ποίοις ὑπάρχουσι, δεῖ λαβεῖν. εἰσὶ γὰρ 
διαστάσεις μὲν ἕξ, συζυγίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μὲν τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω, δευτέρα δὲ τὸ 
ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τὸ ὄπισθεν, τρίτη δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν.  
 “Further, we must posit [as a principle that we are accustomed constantly to use for 
our scientific investigation of nature; see 704b11-12] the dimensions of magnitude 
in the size and quality in which they are present in various objects. For there are six 
dimensions grouped in three pairs: the first being the upper and the lower; the 
second the front and the back; and the third the right and the left.”100 
These dimensions divide the body up in two parts along three different dimensions, 
and nature follows these divisions in distributing the different parts of the animal, 
being careful not to disturb the balance between the two halves.101  
A second principle of this category refers explicitly to the preservation of 
balance. Aristotle uses it, for instance, to explain the location and doubleness of the 
sense organs (PA.II.10, 656b27-657a12):  
Τέτακται δὲ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον τὰ αἰσθητήρια τῇ φύσει καλῶς, (...). Διπλοῦν μὲν γάρ 
ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων διὰ τὸ διπλοῦν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα, τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν τὸ δ’ 
ἀριστερόν.  
“As to the position of the sense-organs, all the organs of sense have been ordered 
by nature in a good way (…). For because the body is double, one part the right, the 
other the left, each of the organs of sense is double (…).”102  
                                                 
98 Balme (1987), 277; Cf. Lennox (2001a, 266-272) on this type of principles and its ties to biological 
functions. 
99 PA.II.10, 656b22-25; PA.III.3, 665a13-15; PA.IV.7, 683b19-24; IA.IV, 705a29-b5, IA.IV, 706a21-25, 
IA.V, 706b12-16. 
100 PA.III.7, 669b19-20; cf. Cael.II.2, 284b10; Cael.II.2, 285a11; Cael.III.4, 303b2: “shapes must have 
principles.” 
101 PA.III.7, 669b18-26, PA.III.7, 670a5, PA.IV.11, 691a28-b4. 
102 Aristotle uses similar explanations for the viscera (PA.III.7, 670a4-7: “So a cause of the nature of the 
viscera being double is, as we said, the duality of the right and the left”) and for the presence of the spleen 
(PA.III.7, 669b36-670a1: “and it is on account of the liver being positioned more on the right that the 
nature of the spleen has developed” – the ‘function’ of the spleen is to counterbalance the liver). Cf. also 
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In sum, by positing that in distributing parts over the animal body nature always, 
unless something greater prevents it, follows the natural divisions of the body and 
chooses the most valuable location possible (where the valuable coincides with the 
places where the functions of sight, nourishment, and locomotion originate), 
Aristotle is able to give a rationale for the distribution of parts actually found. Parts 
are generally placed as close to the valuable locations as possible, unless something 
greater prevents it. Aristotle’s explanatory strategy in these cases is to establish the 
biological optimality of a certain location for the placement of a part relative to this 
part’s functional importance; the principle helps him to do so.  
   
3.3.1.b Principles of ‘economical assignment’ 
The principles of ‘economical assignment’ I call those principles that concern the 
number of parts assigned to an animal, given what is both necessary and sufficient 
for its functioning. Aristotle posits that formal natures (like a good housekeeper) 
always or for the most part assign functions to parts and parts to animals in an 
‘economical’ way: if possible, animals have one part for the performance of each 
function (and not more), while they only receive those parts that they are able to use, 
and never get more than is sufficient for them. The actions the formal nature is said 
to perform according to these principles are mainly described in terms of ‘giving’ 
and ‘providing’. The principles that belong to this category are closely related to the 
principle that ‘nature does nothing in vain’, which will be discussed more extensively 
below in 3.3.1.c. For here it suffices to say that whatever is ‘too much’, ‘wasteful’, or 
‘unusable’ is biologically speaking ‘in vain’ for Aristotle. The teleology of nature 
causes animals to be adapted to their environment and to be able to survive in an 
optimal way: nature does what is best, given the possibilities, and nothing less or 
more.   
 The most economical assignment of functions to parts and parts to animals 
seems to be to assign one part for the performance of each function. Nature never 
assigns more parts to an animal for the sake of the performance of one function, but 
where necessary and possible will use one part for the sake of multiple functions. 
                                                                                                               
PA.II.7, 652a30-33 and PA.IV.12, 695a9-13 (695a12: ὅπως ἰσορρόπου ὄντος τοῦ βάρους ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν; 
“with an equal distribution of weight on either side”). 
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Nature thus never saves on functions, but only on parts. Aristotle explains the 
principle of ‘economical assignment’ in an illuminating simile (PA.IV.6, 683a19-25):  
Βέλτιον δ’ ἐνδεχομένου μὴ ταὐτὸ ὄργανον ἐπὶ ἀνομοίας ἔχειν χρήσεις, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν 
ἀμυντικὸν ὀξύτατον, τὸ δὲ γλωττικὸν σομφὸν καὶ σπαστικὸν τῆς τροφῆς. Ὅπου γὰρ 
ἐνδέχεται χρῆσθαι δυσὶν ἐπὶ δύ’ ἔργα καὶ μὴ ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐδὲν ἡ φύσις 
εἴωθε ποιεῖν ὥσπερ ἡ χαλκευτικὴ πρὸς εὐτέλειαν ὀβελισκολύχνιον. Ἀλλ’ ὅπου μὴ 
ἐνδέχεται, καταχρῆται τῷ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ πλείω ἔργα.  
“And it is better, where possible, not to have the same instrument for dissimilar 
uses, but the one that is defensive most sharp, and the one that is to be a tongue 
spongy and able to draw in nourishment. For where it is possible for two things to 
be used for two functions without impeding each other, nature is unaccustomed to 
making things as does the coppersmith who, to economize, makes a spit-and-
lampstand; but where this is not possible, nature makes use of the same thing for 
multiple functions.”103  
While two-winged insects on account of their weakness and smallness only have one 
part for the sake of drawing in nourishment and for the sake of defence, insects with 
many wings have both stings and tongues. Aristotle’s claim is here that while it is 
certainly possible for nature to ‘cut down’ the number of parts assigned to many-
winged insects, this is not its custom. Nature usually makes one part for the sake of 
one function,104 and only if this is not possible, and only if this second function will 
not negatively affect the performance of the first and principal function, will it use 
one part for the sake of multiple functions. This principle is also in the background 
of Aristotle’s explanation of the differentiations of some of the common parts 
(PA.III.1, 662a18-24):  
Ἡ γὰρ φύσις αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτήν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, τοῖς κοινοῖς πάντων μορίοις εἰς πολλὰ 
τῶν ἰδίων καταχρῆται, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ στόματος ἡ μὲν τροφὴ πάντων κοινόν, ἡ δ’ 
ἀλκή τινων ἴδιον καὶ ὁ λόγος ἑτέρων, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἀναπνεῖν οὐ πάντων κοινόν. Ἡ δὲ φύσις 
ἅπαντα συνήγαγεν εἰς ἕν, ποιοῦσα διαφορὰν αὐτοῦ τοῦ μορίου πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἐργασίας 
διαφοράς.  
“For nature, in virtue of itself, as we said, puts the parts common to all animals to 
many distinctive uses; for example, in the case of the mouth nourishment is 
                                                 
103 Cf. PA.II.16, 659a20-22; GA.I.1, 716a24-27. 
104 Parts such as eyes, ears, lungs, and kidneys are no exception to this rule: these parts are one in form, 
but double in structure because of the doubleness of the body. See PA.II.10, 656b32-657a10; Lennox 
(2001b), 227. 
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common to all, while strength is distinctive to some and speech to others, and again 
breathing is not common to all. But nature has collected all these uses together in 
one, producing a differentiation of this part for the differences of its operation.”  
The reason why nature in these cases does assign multiple functions to the same part 
seems to be that the second functions are all non-necessary ones, and that their 
activities are close enough to the primary function so that the part only needs to be 
differentiated in order to accommodate the second function.105  
 While nature may sometimes use one part for more functions, it will never 
produce more parts for one function. For one principle posits that nature never 
assigns more parts to an animal than that is sufficient for the sake of the 
performance of a certain function.106 For instance, Aristotle argues that animals for 
which it is possible to receive a means of defense only receive one means for the sake 
of this function. That is, nature gives horns to some animals, spurs to others, and to 
again others for instance the capacity to emit some kind of excrement, but (PA.III.2, 
663a17-18):  
Ἅμα δ’ ἱκανὰς καὶ πλείους βοηθείας οὐ δέδωκεν ἡ φύσις τοῖς αὐτοῖς. 
“Nature has not provided modes of protection to the same animals that are at once 
sufficient and more than sufficient.” 
In other words, if the performance of a certain function is necessary or for the better 
for a certain animal, the animal receives only as many parts as are sufficient for the 
performance of that function. Formal natures do not give more than is sufficient, 
but, on the other hand, they also do not give less. For instance, while living beings 
that are immobile need and receive only few parts (as they need to perform only a 
few actions; cf. PA.II.10, 656a1-3), animals that are mobile, need – and hence 
receive – more parts than immobile animals (PA.IV.7, 683b5-7):  
Τῶν δὲ ὀστρακοδέρμων οὐκ ἔστι τὸ σῶμα πολυμερές. Τούτου δ’ αἴτιον τὸ μόνιμον 
αὐτῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν· πολυμερέστερα γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῶν ζῴων τὰ κινητικὰ διὰ 
τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν πράξεις· ὀργάνων γὰρ δεῖται πλειόνων τὰ πλειόνων μετέχοντα κινήσεων.  
“The body of the hard-shelled animals does not have many parts. The cause of this 
is that their nature is sessile; for to have more parts is necessary for those animals 
                                                 
105 PA.IV.10, 689a4-15. 
106 Aristotle’s remark with regard to the heart that “wherever possible, one origin is better than many” in 
PA.III.4, 665b14-15 (cf. PA.III.4, 665b28-31) might be interpreted as referring to the same parsimony of 
nature: since one origin is sufficient, and it is possible to have only one origin, it is better to have only one. 
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that are mobile, because of their activities; for those partaking of more motions are 
in need of more organs.”  
Another principle posits that formal natures always assign parts exclusively or largely 
to those animals that are able to use them. This principle provides the framework 
within which in particular the distributions of non-necessary, luxury parts can be 
explained (PA.III.1, 661b28-31):  
Τῶν τε γὰρ πρὸς ἀλκήν τε καὶ βοήθειαν ὀργανικῶν μορίων ἕκαστα ἀποδίδωσιν ἡ φύσις 
τοῖς δυναμένοις χρῆσθαι μόνοις ἢ μᾶλλον, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ μάλιστα, οἷον κέντρον, 
πλῆκτρον, κέρατα, χαυλιόδοντας καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν 
ἰσχυρότερον καὶ θυμικώτερον, τὰ μὲν μόνα τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν μορίων. 
Ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοῖς θήλεσιν ἔχειν, οἷον τὰ πρὸς τὴν τροφήν, ἔχουσι μὲν 
ἧττον δ’ ἔχουσιν, ὅσα δὲ πρὸς μηδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, οὐκ ἔχουσιν. 
“Of the instrumental parts that are for strength and protection, nature provides 
each of them only, or especially, to those animals that are able to use them, and 
especially to the animals able to use them most, [parts] such as sting, spur, horns, 
tusks, and if there is another such part. And since the male is stronger and more 
spirited, in some cases he alone has such parts, in other cases he has more than the 
female. For those parts which it is necessary for females to have as well, e.g. parts 
related to nourishment, they have, but they have less; while those related to none of 
the necessities, they do not have.”107  
All animals, both male and female, by necessity have all parts that are present for the 
sake of the performance of the essential or vital functions; the usability principle108 
obtains to a lesser degree since, presumably, females too must be able to use their 
necessary parts sufficiently enough to be able to survive and reproduce. The absence 
of the defensive parts in females is thus explained by their inability to use them. 
These principles are evidently related to the principle that ‘nature does nothing in 
vain’,109 which will be discussed below: nature does not assign parts to animals that 
cannot (optimally) use them, or parts that are more than sufficient for an animal’s 
needs, as in those cases the parts would be in vain. 
In sum, the principle of economical assignment is used to set the 
framework within which it is possible to explain the ratios between parts and 
                                                 
107 Cf. PA.IV.8, 684a27-30, PA.IV.10, 687a10-12. 
108 Cf. PA.IV.10, 687a10-15. 
109 Cf. Lennox (2001a), 189 and 203n.16. 
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functions present in the animals that have them. Nature always provides what is 
sufficient, and never less than is needed.  
 
3.3.1.c Principles of ‘optimal production’ 
Thirdly, there are principles that posit the goal-directedness of the actions of the 
formal natures in ‘making’ or ‘producing’ natural beings, such as animals, their parts, 
and their differentiations. In some sense, these principles are the most important 
ones, because they pertain directly to the coming to be and presence of parts and 
their differentiations. 
One such principle posits that nature does everything either because it is 
necessary, or because it is better. This principle pertains to the status of parts and 
their differentiations, and hence to the causal patterns underlying their presence – 
the principle helps to find the function of structures. For it is posited with regard to 
all parts that (at least for the most part) their presence is either necessary, or for the 
better (the two options are mutually exclusive – if the part is not necessary, then it 
must be for the better). Parts are necessary for an animal when it cannot do without 
those parts (the animal would either not be able to survive or not be the kind of 
animal it is); the presence of the part is thus conditionally necessary for the 
performance of a necessary function. Parts are for the better for an animal, when the 
animal strictly speaking could do without them (it would not die or loose its 
identity), but would be less well off; the part is present for the sake of some 
subsidiary or luxurious function or good. The principle also pertains to the status of 
differentiations: differentiations of parts are also either necessary for an animal given 
its specific way of life and/or its dimensions (which are included in the definition of 
its substantial being), or are ‘merely’ for the better in case the animal could do 
without the differentiation, but would be less well off. As we have seen previously in 
3.2.4 that the ‘for the better’-part of the principle is often used in conjunction with 
references to material necessity as the cause of the coming to be of the material used 
in the differentiation.  
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Aristotle invokes the principle most explicitly in a passage in GA (GA.I.4, 717a12-
31):110  
Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἄρρεσι διαφορᾶς τῶν σπερματικῶν ὀργάνων εἴ τις μέλλει 
 θεωρήσειν τὰς αἰτίας δι’ ἅς εἰσιν, ἀνάγκη λαβεῖν πρῶτον τίνος ἕνεκεν ἡ τῶν ὄρχεών ἐστι 
σύστασις. εἰ δὴ πᾶν ἡ φύσις ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖ ἢ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον, κἂν τοῦτο τὸ 
μόριον εἴη διὰ τούτων θάτερον. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν 
φανερόν·πᾶσι γὰρ ἂν ὑπῆρχε τοῖς γεννῶσι, νῦν δ’ οὔθ’ οἱ ὄφεις ἔχουσιν ὄρχεις οὔθ’ οἱ 
ἰχθύες·ὠμμένοι γάρ εἰσι συνδυαζόμενοι καὶ πλήρεις ἔχοντες θοροῦ τοὺς πόρους. 
λείπεται τοίνυν βελτίονός τινος χάριν. (...) οἱ δ’ ὄρχεις εἰσὶ πρὸς τοῦτο μεμηχανημένοι· 
τοῦ γὰρ σπερματικοῦ περιττώματος στασιμωτέραν ποιοῦσι τὴν κίνησιν (...).  
“With regard to the differentiation of spermatic organs in males, if one is to search 
for the explanations of why they are there, one must first grasp the end for which 
testes are constituted. Now if nature does everything either because it is necessary 
or because it is better, then this part too must be because of one or the other. That 
it is not necessary for generation is evident: for it would be present in all that 
generate, but as it is neither the snake nor the fish have testes (for they have been 
seen coupling and with the channels full of semen). It remains then that it is for the 
better in some way. (...) The testes are contrived for this; for they make the 
movement of the spermatic secretion steadier (...).”  
The passage is illuminating, for it demonstrates how Aristotle employs the principle 
in the practice of explaining biological phenomena. The question to be answered is 
why there is a differentiation of spermatic organs in males, and a first step in finding 
the explanation for this phenomenon is to grasp the function of testes (which must 
have something to do with generation). First, the principle is used as a heuristic: if 
parts are either necessary or for the better, and if it can be observed that not all 
animals that need the function (and all animals necessarily need to generate) have the 
part, then the only option that is left is that testes are for the better, and therefore 
must perform some contributory function. Next, Aristotle is able to present an 
explanation: in some animals a steadier emission of seed is better (because of their 
hot-tempered character), and it is because this is better that the animals that have 
testes have them. In this particular case, the use of the principle helps to solve the 
puzzle of why not all animals that need to perform a certain function have all the 
                                                 
110 For examples of the use of this principle in PA see PA.III.7, 670a23-29 (the heart and liver are 
necessary parts), PA.III.7, 670b23-27 (the presence of the kidneys is not necessary, but for the better). Cf. 
also GA.V.8, 788b20-25. 
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parts that are associated with this function: while some parts are necessary for this 
function, others are ‘merely’ contributory to it.111  
Another principle posits that ‘nature does nothing in vain, but always, given 
the possibilities, does what is best for the substantial being of each kind of animal.’112 
What is among the possibilities for nature to produce is established inductively 
through observation: what is possible for a certain animal kind to have is in fact what 
can be observed to be realized in other animals that belong to the same wider kind 
(the possibilities are thus natural possibilities). The features do not have to be 
generic as such, but they do have to be present among at least some members of the 
group of animals in question. 
 In accordance with the line of interpretation proposed by Lennox,113 I 
believe that whenever Aristotle refers to the ‘nature does nothing in vain’-part of the 
principle, he invokes it in order to set the framework within which it is possible to 
explain the absence of a part that could reasonably have been expected to be present 
in a certain kind of animal.114 Starting from this principle, Aristotle offers the 
counterfactual argument that if the formal nature of this particular animal had 
equipped the animal with the part in question, the part would have been in vain. 
(The part would have been in vain either because: (i) the animal would not have 
been able to use it, either at all or properly; or because (ii) the part would have been 
superfluous as the animal already possesses another part performing the same 
function for which the other part would come to be; (iii) the part would perform a 
function the animal does not actually require; (iv) the part would have to come to be 
                                                 
111 The function of spermatic generation is in some animals performed by channels, in others by channels 
and internal testes, in again others by channels, external testes and a penis. This differentiation among 
parts present for the sake of spermatic generation can be explained by reference to the hierarchy of parts: 
the presence of channels is necessary for generation (as they are present in all animals that generate), while 
the presence of internal/external testes and a penis must be for the better (as certain animals, like birds 
and footless animals, lack testes (and a penis) because they lack the proper place for it; GA.I.5, 717b14-
19). The remainders of the chapters GA.I.4-7 set out how the presence testes and a penis contribute to 
the function of generation as they ensure the semen to be in the optimal state of concoction and heat 
when it enters the female body. 
112 See mainly IA.II, 704b12-18 and IA.XII, 711a18-29. 
113 See Lennox (2001a), 205-223; I disagree, however, with Lennox’s claim that the principle is used as a 
premise in the explanation (2001a, 212), and with his interpretation of the use of the second part of the 
principle. 
114 I have found only one exception to this ‘rule’, namely in IA.XII, 711a18-29 (“The reason is that nature 
never does anything without a purpose, as has been said before, but creates all things with a view to what 
is best among the possibilities”), where the full principle is invoked to explain the differentiation between 
parts (i.e. the differentiation between ways of bending legs, shoulders and hips), rather than the absence of 
parts; it seems that in this case, the second part of the principle is operative.  
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at a non-suitable place). Once it has been established that the presence of the part 
would be in vain, the principle allows the inference that that is in fact the reason why 
it is absent: nature never produces parts that are in vain (the principle validates the 
kind of counterfactual reasoning used). In any case, the part would be in vain in this 
particular animal, and as nature never does anything in vain, this explains why this 
part is lacking in this particular animal. This type of reasoning reflects what Aristotle 
elsewhere calls a ‘syllogism from a hypothesis’.115 
For instance, Aristotle uses the principle to explain the absence of feet in 
snakes (IA.VIII, 708a9-20): 
τοῖς δ’ ὄφεσιν αἴτιον τῆς ἀποδίας τό τε τὴν φύσιν μηθὲν ποιεῖν μάτην, ἀλλὰ πάντα πρὸς 
τὸ ἄριστον ἀποβλέπουσαν ἑκάστῳ <ἐκ> τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, διασώζουσαν ἑκάστου τὴν 
ἰδίαν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν αὐτῷ εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἡμῖν εἰρημένον, τὸ τῶν 
ἐναίμων μηθὲν οἷόν τ’ εἶναι πλείοσι κινεῖσθαι σημείοις ἢ τέτταρσιν. ἐκ τούτων γὰρ 
φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν ἐναίμων ὅσα κατὰ τὸ μῆκος ἀσύμμετρά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην τοῦ 
σώματος φύσιν, καθάπερ οἱ ὄφεις, οὐθὲν αὐτῶν οἷόν θ’ ὑπόπουν εἶναι. πλείους μὲν γὰρ 
τεττάρων οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτὰ πόδας ἔχειν (ἄναιμα γὰρ ἂν ἦν), ἔχοντα δὲ δύο πόδας ἢ 
τέτταρας σχεδὸν ἦν ἂν ἀκίνητα πάμπαν· οὕτω βραδεῖαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἀνωφελῆ 
τὴν κίνησιν. 
“The cause of why snakes are footless is, both, that nature does nothing in vain, but 
always with a view to what is best for each thing within the bounds of possibility, 
preserving the specific substantial being and essence of each, and, in addition, that 
which we stated before, namely that no blooded animal can move itself at more 
than four points. From those things it is evident that blooded animals whose length 
is out of proportion to the rest of their dimensions, like snakes, cannot possibly 
have limbs. For they cannot have more than four feet (or they would be bloodless), 
and if they had two feet or four they would be practically stationary: so slow and 
unprofitable would their movement necessarily be.”116 
All blooded land-dwellers possess four feet, and thus is it remarkable that snakes, 
who are also blooded and land-dwellers, do not have any feet. The explanation 
Aristotle gives for the absence of feet in snakes starts by establishing the futility of a 
snake having four feet: given that a snake can only possess a maximum of four feet, 
those four feet would not enable it to move swiftly at all. If the possession of four 
                                                 
115 See Bobzien (2002), 365. 
116 Cf. IA.II, 704b12-18, which will be discussed in 3.3.2. 
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feet is in vain for snakes, then that is why nature did not generate them in snakes (cf. 
PA.IV.13, 696a10-15).117  
The second part of the principle is used to set the framework for 
explanations of the presence of parts118 and of their differentiations in those cases 
where observation shows that there are several means for nature to fulfill a certain 
functional need. For instance, Aristotle invokes the second part of the principle in 
order to be able to explain why human beings have hands instead of forelimbs like 
all other blooded, viviparous land-dwellers (PA.IV.10, 687a15-18):  
Ὀρθῷ δ’ ὄντι τὴν φύσιν οὐδεμία χρεία σκελῶν τῶν ἐμπροσθίων, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ τούτων 
 βραχίονας καὶ χεῖρας ἀποδέδωκεν ἡ φύσις. (...) Εἰ οὖν οὕτως βέλτιον, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἐκ τῶν 
ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖ τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ διὰ τὰς χεῖράς ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος φρονιμώτατος, 
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζῴων ἔχει χεῖρας.  
“And being upright in nature, mankind has no use for forelimbs, and instead of 
these, nature provides arms and hands. (...) So if it is better thus, and nature does, 
among the possibilities, what is best, it is not because they have hands that human 
beings are most intelligent, but because they are the most intelligent of animals that 
they have hands.” 
The explanation Aristotle provides is quite complicated, and draws on several 
principles at the same time, but what is clear is that, after having established that 
having hands is better for human beings as opposed to having forelimbs, the 
principle allows the inference that because having hands is best for human beings 
(because they are most intelligent they are most able to use them), that that is why 
human beings have hands. Compare in this context also PA.IV.9, 685b12-16, where 
Aristotle states that the presence of one row of suckers in one kind of octopus is not 
because it is best, but because it is necessary: observation shows that octopuses can 
either have one or two rows of suckers, but the differentiation is unrelated to what is 
best (rather, the differentiation is necessary given differences in dimensions between 
different kinds of octopuses).   
                                                 
117 See above in 3.2.4, pattern T3, for more examples of the use of the principle that nature does nothing 
in vain. 
118 It is hard to find examples where Aristotle uses the whole principle or only the second part; the two 
examples Lennox (2001a, 216-18; 220-221n.4) gives in support of his interpretation that the complete 
principle is used to account for the presence of parts I find unconvincing: it seems to me that they rather 
explain the absence of parts (IA.VIII, 708a9-20: absence of feet in snakes – see my discussion of this 
example above; PA.IV.13, 695b17-27: absence of distinct limbs in fish), and only in one of them Aristotle 
actually invokes the complete principle (i.e. in the example from IA). 
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In sum, these principles set the framework within which it is possible to explain the 
presence and absence and differentiations of parts in those animals that have them, 
by positing various teleological patterns of causality underlying these ‘productions’. 
Parts and features that are necessary for an animal come to be by conditional 
necessity and are present as a result of primary teleology. What is for the better for 
an animal comes to be either as a result of conditional necessity and primary 
teleology on a secondary level (the presence of the part is conditional upon the 
presence of another part), or as a result of material necessity and is present due to 
secondary teleology. Whatever is absent in an animal must have been in vain, and 
whatever feature the animal has from among the possible features shared by its 
wider kind is what is best for this particular kind of substantial being.  
 
All three principles discussed above build upon the general supposition that all 
animal development is carried out by the goal-directed actions of the formal natures 
in interaction with material nature. The results of natural generation are either 
necessary (in which case the discovery of the final cause should be straightforward, 
given the correlations mapped out in HA), or for the better (in which case the 
discovery of the cause is a little more difficult, and the use of the principle is 
necessary also by way of a heuristic), but in both cases due to some kind of 
teleology. In this way, the principles also function as limits: they eliminate possible 
materialist or ‘spontaneity-theory’ type explanations and restrict the possible 
explanations to teleological ones.  
 
3.3.2 The scientific status of teleological principles 
In the sections above, I have identified the teleological principles as suppositions or 
hypotheses: they posit or assume the goal-directedness of the actions of formal 
natures. This interpretation is based on two passages in the biological works,119 in 
which Aristotle makes explicit comments on the status and the philosophical 
justification of the principles (since they are first principles, they cannot be 
                                                 
119 This interpretation is introduced and defended by Lennox (2001a), 206-211; my account is largely in 
agreement with his, except that I do not believe that the teleological principles are supposed to figure as 
premises in the explanation, but rather as heuristics that lie behind teleological explanations in cases where 
the final causes are not immediately discernable.  
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demonstrated in a deductive manner within the science of nature, but they can be 
shown to be philosophically reasonable).120 The first passage is taken from IA 
(IA.II.704b12-705a2):  
Ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως ὑποθεμένοις οἷς εἰώθαμεν χρῆσθαι πολλάκις πρὸς τὴν μέθοδον 
τὴν φυσικήν, λαβόντες τὰ τοῦτον ἔχοντα τὸν τρόπον ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις, 
τούτων δ’ ἓν μέν ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τῇ 
οὐσίᾳ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ζῴου τὸ ἄριστον· διόπερ εἰ βέλτιον ὡδί, οὕτως καὶ ἔχει κατὰ 
φύσιν. ἔτι τὰς διαστάσεις τοῦ μεγέθους, πόσαι καὶ ποῖαι ποίοις ὑπάρχουσι, δεῖ λαβεῖν. 
(...) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι τῶν κινήσεων τῶν κατὰ τόπον ἀρχαὶ ὦσις καὶ ἕλξις.  
“The starting point of our investigation is achieved by positing [principles] that we 
are accustomed constantly to use for our science of nature, assuming that this is the 
way in which things are in all the works of nature. One of these is that nature does 
nothing in vain, but always, given the possibilities, does what is best for the 
substantial being of each kind of animal; therefore, if it is better in a certain way, 
that is also how it is by nature. Next, we must posit [as a principle] the dimensions 
of magnitude of what size and of what kind they belong to which kinds of beings. 
(...) Further, [we must posit] that the sources of movements in place are thrusts and 
pulls. (…).”  
In this chapter, Aristotle introduces three principles, which are apparently 
‘commonly posited as a general principle in natural science’. That they are “posited” 
points towards their status as suppositions, which is conform the language of APo.; 
there Aristotle defines a hypotheses as follows (APo.I.2, 72a19-21): 
Θέσεως δ’ ἡ μὲν ὁποτερονοῦν τῶν μορίων τῆς ἀντιφάσεως λαμβάνουσα, οἷον λέγω τὸ 
εἶναί τι ἢ τὸ μὴ εἶναί τι, ὑπόθεσις. 
 “A posit that assumes either of the parts of a contradictory pair, I mean that 
 something is the case or is not the case, is a hypothesis.”121 
In APo.I.2, Aristotle identifies as principles (i) axioms (axiômata), which are general 
principles or propositions that need to be known in order to be able to learn 
anything whatsoever; and also (ii) posits (theseis), which are domain-specific 
principles or propositions, proprietary to the subject-matter being investigated. 
Hypotheses form a subdivision of these posits, for Aristotle divides the posits into 
definitions (horismoi) on the one hand, where definitions are posits stating what a 
                                                 
120 See APr.II.16, 64b28-38; APo.I.12, 77b3-15; Top.I.1, 100a30-b20; Top.VIII.3, 158a31-b4; Ph.II.1, 193a2-
9. 
121 Cf. also APo.I.10, 76a31-37; 76b3-23. 
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thing is (definitions thereby demarcate the subject domain of the investigation at 
hand), without asserting that this thing is or is not, and into hypotheses (hypotheseis) 
on the other hand. Hypotheses are posits that state that something is or is not the 
case. The hypotheses are thus assertions about the previously defined domain. The 
principles concerning the agency of the formal nature described above fit this 
description of a posit stating that something is the case: it is posited on the most 
general level that the actions of formal natures are always for the sake of something. 
The scope of these hypotheses is the whole science of nature; they pertain to 
everything that has a formal nature (and not only to living beings).  
The second passage in which Aristotle refers explicitly to the status of a 
teleological principle is in GA, where Aristotle is in the midst of explaining why 
teeth come to be at the exact moment they do (GA.V.8, 788b20-25):  
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ὑποτιθέμεθα, ἐξ ὧν ὁρῶμεν ὑποτιθέμενοι, οὔτ’ ἐλλείπουσαν οὔτε 
μάταιον οὐθὲν ποιοῦσαν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων περὶ ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῖς μέλλουσι 
λαμβάνειν τροφὴν μετὰ τὴν [τοῦ γάλακτος] ἀπογαλάκτισιν ἔχειν ὄργανα πρὸς τὴν 
ἐργασίαν τῆς τροφῆς. 
“But since we suppose, supposing based on the things we observe, that nature 
neither falls short nor produces anything pointless among the possibilities in each 
case, it is necessary for animals that are to take in nourishment after suckling to 
have instruments for the chewing of food.” 
Again, the principle is introduced not in terms of something that has been or can be 
demonstrated, or that is taken as evident a priori, but of something that is being 
supposed on the basis of empirical evidence. This observational nature of the 
principles is supported by another passage (Resp.X, 476a13): 
 ἐπεὶ μάτην οὐδὲν ὁρῶμεν ποιοῦσαν τὴν φύσιν 
“[S]ince we see that nature does nothing in vain.” 
Elsewhere, Aristotle argues that the principles that are peculiar to each science are 
acquired through experience, and that in some cases this experience is observational. 
For instance, Aristotle argues that one’s ability for laying down hypotheses correlates 
with the amount of experience one has with the domain of investigation, and 
subsequently describes experience in terms of having made observations (GC.I.2, 
316a5-10): 
Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον δύνασθαι τὰ ὁμολογούμενα συνορᾶν ἡ ἀπειρία. Διὸ ὅσοι 
ἐνῳκήκασι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς μᾶλλον δύνανται ὑποτίθεσθαι τοιαύτας ἀρχὰς αἳ ἐπὶ 
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πολὺ δύνανται συνείρειν· οἱ δ’ ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἀθεώρητοι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὄντες, 
πρὸς ὀλίγα βλέψαντες, ἀποφαίνονται ῥᾷον.  
“And the cause of the lesser ability of taking a comprehensive view of the admitted 
facts is lack of experience. For that reason, all those who live in a more intimate 
association with natural things will be more able to lay down such principles, which 
can bring things together for the most part. Those people, who on the basis of 
many arguments are unobservant of the facts, produce [principles] too easily, 
having seen only a few things.” 
The assumption is apparently that the more empirical evidence one collects, the 
more easily one will produce principles, and the more these principles will be in 
accordance with the facts. Aristotle provides a similar argument in the following 
passage (APr.I.30, 46a17-24):  
ἴδιαι δὲ καθ’ ἑκάστην αἱ πλεῖσται. διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἐμπειρίας ἐστὶ 
παραδοῦναι, λέγω δ’ οἷον τὴν ἀστρολογικὴν μὲν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς ἀστρολογικῆς 
ἐπιστήμης (ληφθέντων γὰρ ἱκανῶς τῶν φαινομένων οὕτως εὑρέθησαν αἱ ἀστρολογικαὶ 
ἀποδείξεις), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἄλλην ὁποιανοῦν ἔχει τέχνην τε καὶ ἐπιστήμην· ὥστ’ 
ἐὰν ληφθῇ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ἕκαστον, ἡμέτερον ἤδη τὰς ἀποδείξεις ἑτοίμως 
ἐμφανίζειν.  
“Most principles of each [science] are peculiar to it [i.e. posits, to which the 
hypotheses belong, are the most numerous]. Hence it is the task for experience to 
give the principles that belong to each [science]. I mean, for instance, that 
astronomical experience [provides the principles] of astronomical science (for once 
the appearances had been sufficiently grasped, the astronomical demonstrations 
were discovered), and the same holds for whichever other art or science. Therefore, 
each time when the facts about each [science] are grasped, we will immediately be 
well-prepared to bring out their demonstrations.”   
Aristotle explains the acquisition of experience in the natural sciences in terms of 
grasping the appearances: once the appearances are grasped, the demonstrations 
follow easily, presumably because of the principles discovered on the basis of the 
appearances (i.e. because of the generalizations over the individual observations).122 
A last passage that is relevant in this context is the following one, in which Aristotle 
rebukes some predecessors for having assumed principles that go against 
observation (DC.III.7, 306a5-17):  
                                                 
122 Irwin (1988), 30. 
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Συμβαίνει δὲ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων λέγουσι μὴ ὁμολογούμενα λέγειν τοῖς φαινομένοις. 
Τούτου δ’ αἴτιον τὸ μὴ καλῶς λαβεῖν τὰς πρώτας ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βούλεσθαι πρός 
τινας δόξας ὡρισμένας ἀνάγειν. Δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν αἰσθητάς, τῶν δὲ 
ἀϊδίων ἀϊδίους, τῶν δὲ φθαρτῶν φθαρτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅλως δ’ ὁμογενεῖς τοῖς 
ὑποκειμένοις. Οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν τούτων φιλίαν ταὐτὸ ποιεῖν ἐοίκασι τοῖς τὰς θέσεις ἐν τοῖς 
λόγοις διαφυλάττουσιν· ἅπαν γὰρ ὑπομένουσι τὸ συμβαῖνον ὡς ἀληθεῖς ἔχοντες ἀρχάς, 
ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνίας δέον κρίνειν ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, καὶ μάλιστα ἐκ τοῦ τέλους. Τέλος 
δὲ τῆς μὲν ποιητικῆς ἐπιστήμης τὸ ἔργον, τῆς δὲ φυσικῆς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀεὶ κυρίως 
κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν.  
“The result is that though they speak about the appearances they say things that are 
not in agreement with the appearances. And the reason is that they assume the first 
principles not in the right way, but by wanting to derive everything from certain 
predetermined beliefs. For, presumably, the principles of perceptible things should 
be perceptible, and of eternal things eternal, and of perishable things perishable, 
and in general they should be homogeneous to their subject matter. They, because 
of their love for them [i.e. these beliefs] seem to do what those people do who 
defend their positions in argument: for they admit of every outcome thinking that 
their principles are true, as if some [principles] do not need to be judged from what 
follows from them, and especially by their end result. For the end result of 
productive science is the product, while that of natural science is what always 
appears properly in accordance with perception.”  
According to this passage, domain-specific principles concerning perceptible 
phenomena (such as for example teleological principles concerning biological 
phenomena) are empirical in a double sense. First, because the principles should be 
homogeneous with the scientific domain to which they apply, the principles 
themselves need to be ‘perceptible’, which in the light of the previous passages must 
mean ‘to be based on perception.’ Principles pertaining to perceptible phenomena 
are themselves derived from such phenomena. Secondly, the principles must be in 
agreement with the actual observations; regardless of the source of the principle, 
their assumption is always in some sense empirical: 123  the observations or 
phenomena form the ‘criterion of truth’ against which the principles need to be 
checked and judged. The implication is that if the principles cannot successfully 
                                                 
123 Hankinson & Matthen (1999), 212. 
Chapter 3. Explaining parts of animals 
 262
account for the observations as they stand, they must have been assumed wrongly, 
and hence must be rejected.124  
In sum, the teleological principles Aristotle uses in his explanations are 
empirical, just as the notion of teleology itself is empirical.125 The way towards 
teleological principles can be described as the discovery of generalizations, 
inductively arrived at through observation of many, many phenomena.126 Because 
for the most part, the results of the actions of formal natures can be seen to serve 
the (vital, essential, or ‘merely’ luxury) needs of a living being, the inference is 
justified that formal natures act for the sake of something. Using this as a starting 
point in the explanations of difficult cases where the final cause is not immediately 
evident or cannot be derived from the definition of the substantial being of the 
animal in question, Aristotle is able to narrow down the possible explanations. This 
use of the principles is heuristic: it directs us to the discovery of explanations we 
would otherwise have missed. This usage is not made very explicit in Aristotle’s 
biology, but there is at least one passage that hints at it (Resp.III, 471b24-29): 
αἴτιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ μὴ λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν καλῶς τό τε τῶν μορίων ἀπείρους εἶναι 
τῶν ἐντός, καὶ τὸ μὴ λαμβάνειν ἕνεκά τινος τὴν φύσιν πάντα ποιεῖν· ζητοῦντες γὰρ τίνος 
ἕνεκα ἡ ἀναπνοὴ τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων τοῦτ’ ἐπισκοποῦντες, οἷον ἐπὶ 
βραγχίων καὶ πνεύμονος, εὗρον ἂν θᾶττον τὴν αἰτίαν.  
“The main cause of why [investigators] do not speak well about these things is on 
the one hand that they lack experience of the internal parts, and on the other hand 
do not make the assumption that nature in every case acts for the sake of 
something; had they inquired for the sake of what respiration belongs to animals, 
and had they investigated this question in the presence of the parts involved, that is, 
the gills and lungs, they would quickly have found the explanation.” 
Teleological principles are thus not axiomatic in the sense of a priori postulates that 
cannot be refuted: teleological principles are used because they set up a framework 
within which inferences to the best explanation can be drawn and because they yield 
the phenomena in the most plausible and coherent way.127  
                                                 
124 Cf. GAIII.10, 760b28-33 and EN.I.8, 1098b11-12: τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνᾴδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ 
δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τἀληθές; “if a <principle> be true, all the facts harmonize with it, but if it is false, 
it is quickly seen to be discordant with them.” 
125 Gotthelf (1987), 214 and 229. 
126 Kullmann (1990), 338-340. 
127 Hankinson (2002-2003), 22. 
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3.4 Teleology and necessity in biological explanations 
 
3.4.1 The problem of the relation between teleology and necessity 
In the previous sections, I have argued that Aristotle often refers to necessity as a 
cause of the coming to be of animal parts and their differentiations in addition to 
final causes or ‘the better’. In discussing the various types of explanations, I have 
claimed that whenever Aristotle refers to ‘from necessity’ as a cause of coming to be, 
he means ‘from material necessity’, and not ‘from conditional necessity’ as is 
generally thought. 128  In doing so, I have attributed a positive role to material 
necessity in the generation of animal parts. The material nature of an animal does 
not merely constrain the realizations of form ‘carried out’ by the formal nature of 
the animal,129 but it also generates materials that may be used by the formal nature 
for the formation of parts that are not necessary, but serve the well-being of the 
animal. In some cases, material necessity even produces structures on its own 
accord, while the formal nature ‘merely’ allows those structures to form, because 
they serve the well-being of the animal. The claims that there is room for material 
necessity in the biological realm, and that its role is not purely negative, are 
controversial ones and need additional argumentation, which I will provide in this 
section.  
  As I discussed in chapter 1.3, the relation between teleology and necessity is 
altogether a controversial and problematic one. First, there is the notorious problem 
of whether or not final causes are ‘real causes’ or rather merely ‘epistemic reasons’, 
and whether or not ultimately teleological explanations ‘add’ anything that is not 
already accounted for through material and efficient cause explanations. While most 
scholars hold that the identification of the end of a natural process helps to explain 
that process and therefore attribute explanatory force to teleological explanations, 
some scholars130 think that ultimately these teleological explanations can be reduced 
to material and efficient cause explanations without any loss on the ontological level. 
                                                 
128 See e.g. Lennox (2001b), 233: “A single explanandum is explained both as necessary and for the sake 
of protection. The necessity is presumably conditional, but Aristotle does not make this obvious.” My 
account is most congenial to that of Gill (1997), 146-147, although I do not identify material and 
unqualified necessity in all cases. 
129 For this ‘negative’ role of material necessity in the generation of animals, see Lennox (2001a), 182-204. 
130 This position, labeled as ‘supererogatory compatibilism’ by Bradie & Miller (1999), is defended by 
Wieland (1975), Nussbaum (1978), and Sorabji (1980).  
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Under this interpretation, there is no final causation in nature, and all natural 
phenomena can be accounted for by reference to material necessity. In chapter 1.1.1, 
I have argued against this interpretation that Aristotle conceives of final causes as 
real causes and of explanations as intensional in form.  
Secondly, there is the problem of what I would call an ‘overestimation’ of 
the causal role of teleology among those scholars who argue for a realist 
interpretation of final causes, and who attribute to Aristotle the view of that 
teleology is ontological irreducible to the cause of necessity. 131  Although these 
scholars disagree about which aspect of Aristotle’s philosophy best captures this 
irreducibility, 132  they all agree that there is no role for material necessity in the 
sublunary realm and argue that function is always causally prior in sublunary 
generation. Consequently, they have explained away all material necessity in 
biology;133 reduced it to conditional necessity;134 or assigned only a negative role to it 
in constraining the realizations of function.135 Although I agree with the overall, 
realist interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology defended by these scholars, I believe 
that there are two problems in their accounts.  
The first problem is that many of the realist interpretations of Aristotle’s 
teleology focus on the issue of the irreducibility of teleology in terms of material 
(and efficient) causation, which – as I have argued in chapter 1.3136 – is not an issue 
for Aristotle. Aristotle’s criticism of the materialist accounts of his predecessors 
rather pertains to the issue of intrinsic versus accidental causation: material causes 
are part of the causal story, but they are not the whole story. Aristotle expresses no 
                                                 
131 This position, labeled as ‘irreducible compatibilism’ by Bradie & Miller (1990), is defended by Balme 
(1965, 1987), Charlton (1985), Code (1997), Cooper (1982, 1985, 1987), Gotthelf (1980, 1987), Lennox 
(1982). For an outline of the differences among the main defenders of this position, see the introductory 
pages to the subject of teleology and necessity in Gotthelf & Lennox (1987), 199-203. 
132 Balme (1965, 1987), for example, brings up the indeterminateness or imprecision of material processes, 
which could not by themselves produce determinate and living complexes, while Cooper (1982, 1985, 
1987) rather points to the ‘permanence of the species of living things,’ which is only explicable on the 
basis of teleological principles, and to the notion of the good (material natures and processes are 
insufficient to explain why a certain material outcome is good for the being that possesses it). Gotthelf 
(1976, 1987) speaks of the natures and potentials of animals as ‘irreducible potentials for form’, which are 
actualized in teleological processes (what is being realized is the animal’s form which is its final cause, as it 
is that which the potential being actualized is irreducibly for). 
133 Balme, 1987. 
134 Cooper, 1987; Johnson, 2005. 
135 Gill (1997), 147-148; Lennox (2001a), 182-204. 
136 The argument in chapter I.3 builds heavily upon the thesis defended by Sauvé Meyer (1992). 
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need to eliminate material causes from explanations of sublunary phenomena or to 
reduce them to conditional necessity in the sublunary realm.  
The second problem is that in discussing the relation between teleology and 
necessity, scholars have concentrated mainly on Aristotle’s ‘theoretical’ discussions 
of teleology and necessity,137 while neglecting his use of these concepts in his actual 
explanations of nature.138 These ‘theoretical’ passages supposedly rule out any role 
for material necessity in the sublunary realm, but I believe this interpretation to be 
based on a misunderstanding of the use of the notion of necessity in these texts, and 
on the mistaken identification of material necessity with unqualified necessity in all 
cases.139 Moreover, Aristotle’s actual teleological explanations reveal that whenever 
Aristotle uses the term ‘necessity’, which he does relatively rarely, he must mean 
‘material necessity’, and not ‘conditional necessity’ which is the default in the 
majority of teleological explanations.   
 
As I will explain in more detail below, in his actual explanations, Aristotle uses 
‘necessity’ simpliciter to refer to the causal process of coming to be in which some 
outcomes are necessary, given the material nature of the things involved in the 
process. This is the type of necessity that we call ‘material necessity’. In other words, 
within a materially necessitated causal sequence in which the prior event causes the 
posterior, it is the material nature of the prior, which, in the sublunary realm, for the 
most part, necessitates the posterior (but not always, because the occurrence of the 
posterior is itself not necessary without qualification). The direction of the 
necessitation is from the prior to the posterior. For instance, in an absence of heat, 
the material nature of the water in a pond will for the most part necessitate the 
coming to be of ice (but not always – consider the case in which the water is running 
continuously and does not freeze). 
                                                 
137 Our main sources for Aristotle’s ‘theoretical’ views on the relation between teleology, material 
causation, and necessity are APo.II.11, 94b27-95a3; Ph.II.8-9, 198b10-199a7; Ph.II.8-9, 199b34-200b11; 
GC.II.11, 337a35-338b19; PA.I.1, 639a1-642b4, and Met.I.3, 983a24-984b22. 
138 With the exception of Lennox (2001a), who, based on Aristotle’s actual explanations, argues that on 
some level material necessity plays a causal role in biology independently of conditional necessity, albeit 
only a negative one.  
139 For the identification of material necessity with unqualified necessity, see for instance Cooper (1987), 
259-260 (also 260n.20); 266; and Gill (1997), 147 (also 147n.6).  
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‘Conditional necessity’ refers to the conditional relation between the prior and the 
posterior in a teleological sequence. The direction of necessity also works from the 
prior to the posterior (i.e. from the possession of a form in potentiality to the 
actualization of it), although what chronologically comes to be last is prior in 
explanation. In those cases where conditional necessity obtains, the coming to be or 
presence of the prior (e.g. stones) is necessary only if the posterior (e.g. house) is to 
be realized, and it is only because it is necessary (but not without qualification) that 
the posterior is realized that the prior takes place. The expression indicates, first, that 
the necessitation (or causation) involved in the process is due to teleology (i.e. to 
forms that are to be realized, and not to the material nature of the prior). Secondly, it 
indicates that the prior is only necessary as a necessary prerequisite or condition for 
the realization of the posterior, which is the end that constitutes the final cause. 
Moreover, it is the end to be reached that determines what kind of material has to be 
present first and what kind of processes it needs to undergo. Inferences in these 
cases are one-directional: the coming to be or presence of the prior does not always 
necessitate the coming to be or presence of the posterior, and hence one can only 
draw the inference that if the posterior has come to be or is present, than necessarily 
also the prior has come to be or is present.  
On the other hand, Aristotle uses the expression ‘unqualified necessity’ to 
refer to the ‘absolutely’ necessary relation between the prior and the posterior in a 
causal sequence, in which the prior always, without exception, necessitates the 
posterior, because the occurrence of the posterior is necessary without qualification. 
In some cases, Aristotle also uses the expression to indicate that the necessity does 
not presuppose the presence of a form to be realized, and that in that sense, the 
necessity involved is ‘simple’ or ‘unconditional’, as opposed to ‘conditional’ (e.g. in 
Ph.II.9; see my discussion below). However, in most cases, Aristotle uses the 
expression to indicate that the prior in a causal sequence, always, without exception, 
necessitates the posterior: that is, the process of necessitation cannot be stopped by 
interference of other factors. This allows for inferences from the prior to the 
posterior in those cases where unqualified necessity obtains (for instance, in 
mathematics, or in cyclical natural processes): if the prior (e.g. clouds) comes to be, 
than necessarily and without exception, the posterior (e.g. rain) will come to be 
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too.140 In cyclical processes, the inference works in both directions (from the prior 
to the posterior, but also from the posterior to the prior). Unqualified necessity, 
understood as a means to qualify the validity of certain inferences, cannot as easily 
be identified with material necessity, which indicates a type of causality. This is even 
more so, because materially necessitated processes in the sublunary realm allow for 
exceptions (the posterior need not always come about), while unqualified necessity 
indicates that things come to be necessarily and always. Aristotle thus uses 
unqualified necessity often in a modal way: it pertains to the question of whether the 
cause that precedes its effect in time necessitates the outcome always, or only for the 
most part, where ‘unqualified necessity’ indicates the former.141 
These distinctions between ‘causal’ and ‘modal’ uses of necessity,142 and 
between material and unqualified necessity is important, for it is only unqualified 
necessity in a modal sense that Aristotle denies to exist in the sublunary realm. That 
is, in the sublunary realm, we cannot draw inferences from the existence of the prior 
to the existence of the posterior.143 The difference between the two domains is that 
in the eternal, unchanging realm of the heavenly bodies, the prior always necessitates 
the posterior (i.e. things are necessary without qualification), while in the changing, 
sublunary realm the prior necessitates the posterior only for the most part (either by 
material or by conditional necessity).  
In the sections below, I will first discuss the various notions of necessity 
that Aristotle employs in the ‘theoretical’ passages on the relation between teleology 
and necessity, and thus offer further support for my interpretation of Aristotle’s 
notions of material, conditional, and unqualified necessity. The theoretical passages 
in the first book of PA will hereby serve as a point of reference. Next, I will offer an 
analysis of the interplay between necessity and teleology in the actual explanations 
                                                 
140 As we would say, the prior is both necessary and sufficient for the coming to be or presence of the 
posterior. 
141 In Met.V.5, Aristotle lists as one of the five types of necessity ‘that which cannot be otherwise’ 
(Met.V.5, 1015a34-35: ἔτι τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖόν φαμεν οὕτως ἔχειν); I submit that this 
refers to unqualified necessity in a modal sense, and not to a type of causality. Hence, pace Gill (1997), 
146-147 and Cooper (1987, 260n.20), material necessity cannot be identified with or subsumed under 
unqualified necessity in this text, although the two do coincide in materially necessitated processes that 
take place in the heavenly realm.  
142 For the distinction, see Kupreeva (2007).  
143 Cf. Charles (1988), 7-8. 
Chapter 3. Explaining parts of animals 
 268
Aristotle offers in PA.II-IV, which will complement the general framework of types 
of explanations as set out in 3.2.  
 
3.4.2 Theoretical discussions of teleology and necessity  
The first chapter of PA.I is the lengthiest and perhaps also the most complex 
chapter of the first book. It discusses a great variety of principles, methodological 
issues, and the types of causes involved in the study of nature. In these discussions, 
Aristotle refers mainly to teleology and necessity as the causes that are operative in 
nature, whereby teleology has priority over necessity (I will argue below that the 
priority Aristotle assigns to final causes is that of explanation, not of causation). 
However, in setting out the relation between teleology and necessity Aristotle 
employs at least four different notions of necessity: material (or natural) necessity, 
conditional necessity, unqualified necessity, and enforced necessity, all of which are 
related to teleology in different ways. In the sections below, I will first discuss briefly 
a passage in GC.II.11, which I believe illustrates the difference between unqualified 
and conditional necessity in a manner that is more lucid than Aristotle’s account in 
PA.I.1. Next, I will offer an analysis of the passages in PA.I.1 that concern the 
relationship between teleology and different types of necessity,144 while connecting 
them to other passages in the Aristotelian corpus that offer ‘theoretical’ treatments 
of the issue.    
 
3.4.2.a Four types of necessity: unqualified, conditional, material, and enforced  
In GC.II.11, Aristotle addresses explicitly the issue of causal sequences in natural 
processes, that is, of natural processes in which one state of affairs can be observed 
to come to be after another in a continuous (συνεχῶς) sequence (GC.II.11, 337a34-
b1). He then raises the question of whether things always come to be necessarily, or 
whether their generation is contingent (GC.II.11, 337b1-3):  
σκεπτέον πότερον ἔστι τι ὃ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται, ἢ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐνδέχεται μὴ 
γενέσθαι. 
“We should investigate whether there is anything that will necessarily exist, or 
whether everything may fail to come to be.” 
                                                 
144 The relevant passages are: PA.I.1, 639b20-29; 640a1-9; 640a33-b3; 640b4-641a17; 642a1-13; 642a13-
15; and 642a32-642b2. 
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Aristotle reformulates the first alternative as the question whether for some things 
that come to be it is necessary without qualification to come to be (GC.II.11, 
337b10-11: ἀλλ’ ἔνια ἀναγκαῖον ἁπλῶς γίνεσθαι). The question Aristotle sets out to 
answer in this chapter is thus the following: Are there only things of which the 
coming to be is ‘merely’ for the most part (but not always, because the causal 
sequence may be interrupted by external factors)? Alternatively, are there also things 
of which the coming to be is necessary without qualification (because the causal 
sequence cannot be interrupted by external factors)?  
In the remainder of the chapter, Aristotle explains the differences in the 
relation between the prior and the posterior in the two types of causal sequences of 
generation (GC.II.11, 337b14-25): 
Εἰ δὴ τὸ πρότερον ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἔσται, οἷον εἰ οἰκία, θεμέλιον, εἰ δὲ 
τοῦτο, πηλόν, ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ εἰ θεμέλιος γέγονεν, ἀνάγκη οἰκίαν γενέσθαι; ἢ οὐκέτι, εἰ μὴ 
κἀκεῖνο ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι ἁπλῶς· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀνάγκη καὶ θεμελίου γενομένου γενέσθαι 
οἰκίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἦν τὸ πρότερον ἔχον πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον, ὥστ’ εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται, ἀνάγκη 
ἐκεῖνο πρότερον. Εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι τὸ ὕστερον, καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀνάγκη· καὶ 
εἰ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τοίνυν ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ’ οὐ δι’ ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ὑπέκειτο ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης ἐσόμενον. Ἐν οἷς ἄρα τὸ ὕστερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἐν τούτοις ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ 
ἀεὶ τοῦ προτέρου γενομένου ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι τὸ ὕστερον. 
“If it is the case that the coming to be of something earlier is necessary if a later 
thing is to be, e.g. if a house, then foundations, and if foundations, then clay, does it 
follow that if there have come to be foundations a house must necessarily come to 
be? Or can we not yet say this, unless it is necessary without qualification that the 
latter itself come to be? In this case, if foundations have come to be, it is also 
necessary that a house come to be; for such was the relationship of the earlier thing 
to the later, namely, that if there is to be the latter, necessarily there will be the 
former, earlier thing. If, accordingly, it is necessary for the later one to come to be, 
it is necessary also for the earlier one, and if the earlier one comes to be, it is 
accordingly necessary for the later one to do so – but not because of the earlier one, 
but because it was assumed that it was necessary it should exist. So in those cases 
where it is necessary for the later one to exist, there is conversion, and it is always 
necessary, if the earlier has come to be, that the later should also come to be.”  
The distinction Aristotle draws is this: in the case of conditionally necessitated 
processes, such as house-building, the coming to be of the prior (i.e. the 
foundations) is necessary if the posterior (i.e. the house) is to be, but it is not the case 
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that once the prior has come to be, the posterior necessarily will come to be. For the 
coming to be of the posterior depends upon the realization of the prior, but the 
prior does not without exception necessitate the coming to be of the posterior; the 
process may be interrupted by external factors. Only if a process of coming to be is 
absolutely necessary (i.e. when the process of necessitation cannot be interrupted), it 
is true to say that if the prior has come to be, the posterior necessarily will come to 
be, and vice versa if the causal nexus is reciprocal.145 The example of house-building 
is a stock example illustrating conditional necessity. However, what is at stake here is 
not just the conditional relation between the prior and the posterior, but much more 
the type of inference one is allowed to make in conditionally necessitated processes. 
The issue Aristotle raises here is that in conditionally necessitated natural processes, 
the causal sequence of generation is not always continuous. Similarly, the notion of 
unqualified necessity used in this passage does not pertain to the type of causality 
involved in the coming to be of things; Aristotle does not speak of final causation 
versus material causation in this context. He is rather interested in the relation 
between the prior and the posterior in a particular type of a causal sequence of 
coming to be. In things for which it is absolutely necessary to come to be, the prior 
necessitates the posterior always and without exception. The expression ‘unqualified 
necessity’ indicates that if the prior is present, there will always be the posterior.  
In sum, the difference between unqualified and conditional necessity 
Aristotle sketches here pertains not primarily to the type of causality that is involved 
in a natural process, but rather to the relation between the prior and the posterior in 
such a process and the types of inferences that are possible. In natural processes to 
which unqualified necessity pertains, it is necessary for the posterior to exist, and 
hence it is possible to draw inferences from the existence of the prior to the 
posterior. In conditionally necessitated natural processes, it is not necessary for the 
posterior to come to be after the prior has come to be, and hence it is not possible 
to draw inferences from the existence of the prior to the posterior. 
 
I believe that Aristotle refers to this particular distinction between the necessity 
holding between the prior and the posterior in causal sequences also in the passage 
                                                 
145 Cf. Charles (1988), 14-17. 
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about teleology and necessity in PA.I.1 (PA.I.1, 639b20-29), to which I will turn 
now. In this passage, Aristotle criticizes his materialist predecessors, not for giving 
explanations in terms of material causes rather than in terms of final causes as some 
scholars hold, 146  but for being mistaken about the kind of necessity that holds 
between the prior and the posterior in natural generated processes. 
The discussion in PA.I.1 starts with a series of methodological dilemmas, 
the third of which pertains immediately to the relationship between teleology and 
necessity. Aristotle states that, given that we perceive that several types of 
explanations apply to natural generation – i.e. teleological and efficient causal 
explanation – we need to determine which of the two is first, and which one is 
second (PA.I.1, 639b11-14). Aristotle solves this dilemma by pointing to the fact 
that the goal of something is given with its logos. Because a logos is a starting point – 
either as the form and the definition of the substantial being in nature, or as the 
definition in art – explanations that state that for the sake of which have priority 
over explanations that state the efficient cause.147 Because I take the passage to be 
about explanations, 148  rather than about causality, I take it that the priority of 
teleology at stake here is epistemological or explanatory priority, rather than causal 
priority. In both art and nature, it is the definition of the end to be achieved or the 
form to be realized that causally precedes and determines the process realizing the 
goal that constitutes the final cause. However, a search for the way in which things 
come to be and for the reason why they come to be presupposes an earlier 
understanding of the end.149  
This discussion about explanation in natural generation leads to a 
discussion about explanation in terms of necessity, for it is to necessity that Aristotle 
claims his predecessors attempted to trace back all their explanations (PA.I.1, 
639b21: εἰς ὃ πειρῶνται πάντες σχεδὸν τοὺς λόγους ἀνάγειν). The problem Aristotle 
finds with the materialist explanations of his predecessors is not so much that this 
type of explanation is wrong or insufficient, but that his predecessors had not made 
                                                 
146 Gotthelf (1987), 188; Cooper (1987), 259. 
147 PA.I.1, 639b14-19; see also my analysis of this difficult passage above, in 3.1.2. 
148 See in particular PA.I.1, 639b18-19: “they give the accounts and the explanations of each of the things 
they produce” (ἀποδιδόασι τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας οὗ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστου); Aristotle picks up on the issue 
of explanation in the following lines (i.e. PA.I.1, 639b21, cited above).  
149 Cf. Code (1997), 137; Bolton, in an unpublished paper on the primacy of final causes in Aristotle, 
argues for a similar interpretation of this passage; see also, ibidem (1997), 118-119. 
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the right distinctions between the ways in which necessity in nature is spoken of 
(PA.I.1, 639b22: οὐ διελόμενοι ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον). The two types of 
necessity belonging to natural things that Aristotle puts forward for discussion here 
are ‘unqualified necessity’ and ‘conditional necessity’ (PA.I.1, 639b22-29): 
Ὑπάρχει δὲ τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, τὸ δ’ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ τοῖς ἐν γενέσει πᾶσιν, 
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς, οἷον οἰκίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτῳοῦν τῶν τοιούτων. Ἀνάγκη δὲ 
τοιάνδε τὴν ὕλην ὑπάρξαι, εἰ ἔσται οἰκία ἢ ἄλλο τι τέλος· καὶ γενέσθαι τε καὶ κινηθῆναι 
δεῖ τόδε πρῶτον, εἶτα τόδε, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐφεξῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους καὶ οὗ 
ἕνεκα γίνεται ἕκαστον καὶ ἔστιν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις. 
“The [necessity] that is unqualified belongs to the eternal things, and the one that is 
conditional also belongs to all things that come to be, as well as to things produced, 
such as to a house and to any other such thing. For it is necessary that such material 
is present, if there is to be a house or any other end: and it is necessary that first this 
comes to be and is changed, and next that, and so step by step up to the end and 
that for the sake of which each thing comes to be and is. It is the same way too for 
things that come to be by nature.” 
In this passage, Aristotle differentiates the domains of the natural world150 according 
to the type of necessity that pertains to it, and thereby introduces a special type of 
necessity into the domain of generated natural beings. While unqualified necessity 
holds of the eternal, natural realm of the heavenly bodies, among the generated natural 
beings there is also a kind of necessity present, namely conditional necessity (this is 
what I take to be the most natural reading of the particle kai in PA.I.1, 639b23).151 
Aristotle then gives a characterization of conditional necessity in terms of the 
material that has to be present first, and the changes that have to take place first, if 
some (natural or artificial) end is to be realized.  
The purport of this passage is not a denial of the existence of material 
necessity in the sublunary realm, but an introduction of a special kind of necessity in 
                                                 
150 Pace Gotthelf (1987; 170-171), I believe the contrast between the eternal and the generated to be a 
contrast within the realm of the natural, and not between mathematics and the science of nature; this is 
clear from the introduction of the issue (PA.I.1, 639b20: Τὸ δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν 
ὁμοίως). 
151 Lennox (2001b), 128 discusses three different readings of kai: first, its connotation is ‘in addition’ and 
it is used to include conditional necessity in addition to unqualified necessity among the natural things that 
are generated; secondly, its connotation is ‘in addition’ and it is used to attribute another type of necessity 
to natural things that are generated; thirdly, its connotation is ‘actually’ and it is used to emphasize the 
presence of conditional necessity among natural things that are generated. This last reading is defended by 
Balme (1992), 84. Lennox does not point out which interpretation he thinks is most plausible in this 
context. 
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that realm, which is conditional, and which involves a special form of causal 
inference. The addition of an explication of conditional necessity (in PA.I.1, 639b26-
30) is important in this passage, because it makes explicit what Aristotle takes to be 
the causal sequence and the type of inference belonging to (non-cyclical) generations 
of sublunary natural things. For he takes the end as a starting point, and then 
deduces from this end the consecutive steps leading up to its realization. The 
‘mistake’ Aristotle’s predecessors have made is to have neglected the conditionality 
of necessity pertaining to all generated things, both natural and artificial. Thus, when 
giving explanations in terms of necessity with regard to (non-cyclical) generated natural 
things, one should not make the mistake of thinking that the necessity of the causal 
sequence is absolute (as is the case in eternal natural processes). That is, one should 
not think that the prior necessitates without exception the coming to be of the posterior, 
but rather acknowledge the fact that the prior is merely a necessary precondition of 
the posterior.   
 
Aristotle illustrates this distinction between the causal sequences of processes in the 
natural sublunary world and of processes in the natural eternal world of the heavens 
more clearly in the remainder of GC.II.11. First, Aristotle attributes unqualified 
necessity to all natural processes that are eternal and cyclical (GC.II.11, 337b35-
338a5): 
τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεὶ ἅμα· ὃ γὰρ εἶναι ἀνάγκη οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ εἶναι· ὥστ’ εἰ ἔστιν 
ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀίδιόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰ ἀίδιον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Καὶ εἰ ἡ γένεσις τοίνυν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, 
ἀίδιος ἡ γένεσις τούτου, καὶ εἰ ἀίδιος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Εἰ ἄρα τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἁπλῶς ἡ 
γένεσις, ἀνάγκη ἀνακυκλεῖν καὶ ἀνακάμπτειν.  
“For what is of necessity coincides with what is always, because that which must be 
cannot not be. Hence a thing is eternal if it is of necessity; and if it is eternal, it is of 
necessity. And if, therefore, the coming to be of a thing is necessary, its coming to 
be is eternal; and if eternal, necessary. It follows that the coming to be of anything, 
if it is necessary without qualification, must be cyclical and must return upon itself.” 
As examples of such phenomena that are necessary without qualification Aristotle 
names the movement of the heavens, the evaporation-cycle, and the cycle of air 
(GC.II.11, 338a18-19: ἡ κύκλῳ κίνησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ; GC.II.11, 338b6: ὕδατα καὶ 
ἀὴρ). Aristotle then contrasts these phenomena with the generations of human 
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beings and animals, which are sublunary processes of beings whose substances are 
perishable. The necessity involved in these processes ‘does not return upon itself’ 
but is conditional (GC.II.11, 338b6-11): 
Τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰ μὲν οὕτω φαίνεται, οἷον ὕδατα καὶ ἀὴρ κύκλῳ γινόμενα, καὶ εἰ μὲν 
νέφος ἔσται, δεῖ ὗσαι, καὶ εἰ ὕσει γε, δεῖ καὶ νέφος εἶναι, ἄνθρωποι δὲ καὶ ζῷα οὐκ 
ἀνακάμπτουσιν εἰς αὑτοὺς ὥστε πάλιν γίνεσθαι τὸν αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἰ ὁ πατὴρ 
ἐγένετο, σὲ γενέσθαι· ἀλλ’ εἰ σύ, ἐκεῖνον. Εἰς εὐθὺ δὲ ἔοικεν εἶναι αὕτη ἡ γένεσις. 
“Then why do some things seem to be such, as for instance rain and air that come 
to be cyclically, namely that if there is a cloud, it is necessary that it rains, and if 
there is rain, it is also necessary that there is a cloud, but human beings and animals 
do not return to themselves such that the same thing comes to be again. For it is 
not necessary if your father came to be, that you come to be, but if you came to be, 
then he came to be. And it seems that this coming to be is rectilinear.” 
The coming to be of the posterior in the causal sequence entails the necessity of the 
prior having occurred first, but not the other way around. This rectilinearity of the 
sequence of conditional necessitated events was also brought up by Aristotle in the 
description of conditional necessity in PA.I.1, 639b28-29. This indicates that 
Aristotle’s focus in these texts is on the nature of the causal sequence, and not 
primarily on the type of causality involved.   
In sum, Aristotle’s denial of the existence of unqualified necessity in the 
realm of natural beings that are perishable (and not eternal), and whose coming to be 
is rectilinear (and not cyclical), does not have to imply a denial of the operation of 
independent material causation and necessity in that realm. Aristotle’s prime concern 
in both PA.I.1, 639b22-29 and GC.II.11 is not causation as such but the relation of 
necessity between the prior and the posterior in causal sequences. Aristotle believes 
it to be important to shed clarity on this relation, because the validity of 
demonstrations in both the natural and the theoretical sciences depends on the 
correct representation in those demonstrations of the necessary relation between 
items in a causal sequence.   
 
The passage in PA in which Aristotle discusses the different modes of necessity in 
demonstrations of the natural sciences and of the theoretical sciences is complicated, 
so let me quote it in full (PA.I.1, 639b29-640a9):  
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Ἀλλ’ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀποδείξεως καὶ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἕτερος ἐπί τε τῆς φυσικῆς καὶ τῶν 
θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν. Εἴρηται δ’ ἐν ἑτέροις περὶ τούτων. Ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὄν, 
τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐσόμενον· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοιόνδε ἐστὶν ἡ ὑγίεια ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀνάγκη τόδ’ εἶναι ἢ 
γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπεὶ τόδ’ ἐστὶν ἢ γέγονεν, ἐκεῖνο ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν ἢ ἔσται. Οὐδ’ 
ἔστιν εἰς ἀΐδιον συναρτῆσαι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀποδείξεως τὴν ἀνάγκην, ὥστε εἰπεῖν, ἐπεὶ 
τόδε ἐστίν, ὅτι τόδε ἐστίν. Διώρισται δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐν ἑτέροις, καὶ ποίοις ὑπάρχει 
καὶ ποῖα ἀντιστρέφει καὶ διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαν. 
“However, the mode of demonstration and of necessity is different in the natural 
and the theoretical sciences. These have been discussed elsewhere. For the starting 
point is, in the latter cases, what is, in the former, what will be. So: ‘since health or 
man is such, it is necessary that this is or comes to be’, but not ‘since this is or has 
come to be, that of necessity is or will be.’ For it is also not possible to connect the 
necessity in such a demonstration to eternity, so as to say, ‘since this is, therefore 
that is’. These matters too have been determined elsewhere, namely in what sorts of 
things [this kind of necessity] is present, what kind of processes convert and 
because of what cause.” 
Before turning to an analysis of the different modes of demonstration and necessity, 
I first need to say a few words about the distinction Aristotle draws here between 
the natural and the theoretical sciences. Usually, Aristotle depicts natural science as 
being itself one of the theoretical sciences, 152  and distinguishes the theoretical 
sciences from the practical and productive ones. In this passage, however, Aristotle 
singles out that part of the science of being that is concerned with generated things 
from that which is concerned with eternal things.153 Natural science would then have 
to be understood in the narrow sense of the science that deals with natural beings 
whose substances are perishable. The theoretical sciences would be those sciences 
that deal with substances that are imperishable and eternal.  
 Again it seems that what is at stake here in this passage about 
demonstration is the relation of necessity between the prior and the posterior in a 
causal sequence, and the inferences one can draw from them, rather than differences 
in types of causality.154 Aristotle illustrates that in the case of most generated natural 
                                                 
152 Lennox (2001b), 129; Met.E.1, 1025b18-1026a23 and PA.I.1, 641b11 (hê physikê theôrêtikê). 
153 I believe that this reading is most consistent with the preceding distinctions between the natural 
generated beings on the one hand and the eternal (natural) beings on the other. For alternative 
interpretations, see Lloyd (1996), 29, and Johnson (2005), 162-163. 
154 Although, of course, the fact that generated natural beings come to be (largely) by conditional necessity 
explains why their coming to be is not necessary without qualification in a modal sense. 
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beings, the causal sequence from prior to posterior might be interrupted (for the 
necessity is not connected to eternity), and that hence one can only draw inferences 
from what is posterior to what is prior. The starting point of the demonstration is 
therefore the posterior, or the end to be realized, and from there one reasons back 
to the necessary prerequisites that have to be realized if the end is to be realized. On 
the other hand, in cases where the necessity can be connected to eternity and where 
the sequences of causes convert, the inferences work in two directions: if this, 
therefore that is, and if the prior has come to be, the posterior will also come to be. 
Perhaps the mistake Aristotle thinks his predecessors have made was that they 
thought that in all causal chains the prior predetermines and necessitates the 
posterior, while that is only true in some cases. What Aristotle points out here is that 
in his demonstrations in the natural sciences, the ‘direction’ of the inference has to 
be captured in the right way, that is, from the posterior to the prior. At the end of 
the passage, Aristotle refers to other determinations made elsewhere; presumably, 
the reference is to GC.II.11 (discussed above), where necessity is claimed to convert 
only when the substantial being to which it belongs is imperishable and when the 
sequence of events is cyclical.  
 The upshot of this passage is that demonstration in the natural sciences, 
and hence demonstrations of biological phenomena, take the end or the final cause 
as a starting point (for these can be observed to have been realized), and then work 
back from this end to the conditionally necessary antecedents that have to come to 
be first and which the realization of this end demands. Because what is prior in a 
causal sequence in the case of most natural generated things does not necessarily 
determine or necessitate the coming to be of the posterior without qualification, the 
inference in natural demonstrations is one-directional from end to the preconditions 
of the end. 
 
Another passage that might shed light on the distinction between inferences about 
natural, generated phenomena, and inferences about eternal phenomena is 
Aristotle’s discussion of inferences about mathematical objects in the Physica (Ph.II.9, 
200a15-22):  
ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἔν τε τοῖς μαθήμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένοις τρόπον 
τινὰ παραπλησίως· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ εὐθὺ τοδί ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσας 
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ἔχειν· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπεὶ τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο· ἀλλ’ εἴ γε τοῦτο μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ ἔστιν. ἐν δὲ 
τοῖς γιγνομένοις ἕνεκά του ἀνάπαλιν, εἰ τὸ τέλος ἔσται ἢ ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἔμπροσθεν ἔσται ἢ 
ἔστιν· εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ μὴ ὄντος τοῦ συμπεράσματος ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἔσται, καὶ 
ἐνταῦθα τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα.  
“There is necessity among the mathematical things and among things that come to 
be by nature in a way that is somewhat similar. For ‘since the straight is such, it is 
necessary that the triangle has [angles] equal to two rights’; but not ‘since that, the 
former’, but rather ‘if that is not the case, then neither the straight is the case. 
Among things that come to be for the sake of something it is reversed, namely ‘if 
the end will be or is, then also that which precedes it will be or is’; and if not, just as 
there [in the case of mathematical things] if the conclusion is not present there will 
not be the starting point, so here there will not be the end and that for the sake of 
which.”  
In this passage, too, Aristotle discusses the validity of inferences from the prior to 
the posterior (and the other way around) in different causal sequences. In some 
sense, inferences pertaining to mathematical objects are similar to inferences 
pertaining to natural, generated things: in both cases, the causal sequence and the 
necessitation are linear and one-directional, and hence the inference works in one 
direction only. In mathematics, the inference from the prior to the posterior is valid: 
if this is the straight, then the triangle will have angles equal to two rights. However, 
the inference does not work in the other direction: it does not follow from the 
triangle having angles equal to two rights that the straight is such. At most, one can 
say that if the triangle does not have angles equal to two rights, that the straight is 
not such. In natural generation, the inference from the posterior to the prior is valid: 
if there is or will be a house, then what precedes it (e.g. bricks and stones) is or will 
be too. Again, the inference does not work in the other direction: it does not follow 
from the presence of bricks and stones that there will be a house. At most, one can 
say that if there are no bricks and stones, then there will also not be a house. What is 
different in the two cases is that the starting point and end point of the inference are 
reversed (this is also what the different uses in tense point to):155 in mathematics, the 
inference is from the prior to the posterior, while in natural generation the inference 
is from the posterior to the prior.  
                                                 
155 Cf. Gotthelf (1987), 197-198. 
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Again, the necessity Aristotle is talking about here is the necessity pertaining to the 
relationship between items in a causal sequence: this is why he can call them ‘about 
the same, but reversed’. The relationship of necessity between items in the causal 
sequence of natural generation is not one of unqualified necessity, because the prior 
does not always necessitate the posterior and because the posterior does not always 
come about. This is due to the ‘for the most part’ character of the realm of 
perishable beings, not to the types of causes that are operative in the sublunary realm 
as such. It is my opinion that, in the sublunary realm, the outcomes of all processes of 
natural generation that are non-cyclical, whether they occur because of material 
causation or final causation or both, are never necessary without qualification.   
 The types of causation that are operative in nature and art are discussed in 
the preceding paragraphs leading up to this discussion of necessity in mathematics. 
There Aristotle tries to answer the question what the role of material nature is in the 
explanation of generation (of either natural beings or artifacts), given that he 
previously concluded that nature always acts for the sake of something (Ph.II.9, 
199b34-200a15):   
Τὸ δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης πότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἢ καὶ ἁπλῶς; νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἴονται τὸ 
ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι 
νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς, διὸ οἱ λίθοι 
μὲν κάτω καὶ τὰ θεμέλια, ἡ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα· 
κουφότατα γάρ. ἀλλ’ ὅμως οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τούτων γέγονεν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα πλὴν ὡς 
δι’ ὕλην, ἀλλ’ ἕνεκα τοῦ κρύπτειν ἄττα καὶ σώζειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, 
ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ἕνεκά του ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι 
γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ’ ἢ ὡς ὕλην, ἀλλ’ ἕνεκά του, οἷον διὰ τί ὁ πρίων τοιοσδί; ὅπως τοδὶ καὶ 
ἕνεκα τουδί. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι, ἂν μὴ σιδηροῦς ᾖ· ἀνάγκη 
ἄρα σιδηροῦν εἶναι, εἰ πρίων ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δὴ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, 
ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς τέλος· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δ’ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. 
“Does necessity hold conditionally or also without qualification? For now people 
think that necessity is present among what comes to be, just as if someone would 
think that a wall comes to be of necessity, because things that are heavy are naturally 
carried downwards and things that are light to the top, and that therefore the stones 
and the foundations are at the bottom, and earth above because it is lighter, and on 
the very top wood, because it is the lightest. But surely even though the wall did not 
come to be without those, it did not come to be because of them except as by 
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means of the material, but rather for the sake of enclosing and protecting certain 
things. And it is the same way in all other things, in as many are for the sake of 
something, that they on the one hand cannot be without things that have a 
necessary nature, but they are not because of these, except as by means of material, 
but for the sake of something, such as for instance: on account of what is a saw like 
this? That this may be, and for this. It is impossible, however, that this for the sake 
of which should come to be, unless it is made of iron. It is necessary, then, that it 
should be made of iron, if there is to be a saw, and its work to be done. The 
necessary, then, is necessary on some condition, and not as an end: the necessary is 
in the matter, the ‘that for the sake of which’ in the account.” 
In this passage, Aristotle distinguishes between the necessity governing materials that 
presupposes the operation of final causality, and the necessity that is ‘unqualified’. 
This latter type of necessity is the necessity that does not presuppose the operation 
of final causality, but is rather associated with matter acting according to its own 
material potentials (note that in the following lines, Aristotle simply speaks of 
‘necessity’ and not of ‘unqualified necessity’). Aristotle’s basic claim here is that, 
although material causation does play a role in the generation of natural and artificial 
things, it usually operates within the context of final causality. Ultimately, final 
causality is responsible for the generation of complex wholes (i.e. the presence of 
formal natures that operate as an internal goal-directed source of change). Materials 
acting on their own necessitate outcomes only qua material, while the materially 
causal processes themselves can only fully be explained by reference to the goals that 
need to be realized. On the level of complex generated beings, the necessity residing 
in matter operates for the most part on the condition of ends that need to be realized, 
and not simply on its own.  
This does not mean that Aristotle rejects the necessity of material causes in 
generation altogether. As Cooper points out, the question Aristotle addresses is not 
whether there is such thing as material necessity in generation, but rather how it 
operates in nature (cf. Ph.II.8, 198b11-12: ἔπειτα περὶ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου, πῶς ἔχει ἐν τοῖς 
φυσικοῖς).156 The passage is part of a larger argument for the existence of natural 
teleology and for the assumption of forms and ends to explain the regular generation 
of complex wholes (see chapter 1.3). For the most part, the presence of a form 
                                                 
156 Cooper (1987), 262. 
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precedes the coming to be of a complex natural whole, and in those cases material 
necessity is always subordinate to and conditional upon the operation of teleology 
(i.e. upon the goal-directed actions of the formal nature). However, in the example 
of the coming to be of teeth, Aristotle left open the possibility for material causation 
to operate on its own. In some cases, the goal-directed actions of the formal natures 
come in at a second stage. The passage as I read it thus argues for the overarching 
operation of final causation, while retaining the causal power of material necessity as 
an incidental source of the coming to be of materials on its own accord.   
 
In the discussion in PA.I.1 about the nature of the two types of explanations that 
the student of nature should produce, Aristotle refers to two other modes of 
necessity, which he claims he has discussed in another treatise (PA.I.1, 642a1-7):  
Εἰσὶν ἄρα δύ’ αἰτίαι αὗται, τό θ’ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· πολλὰ γὰρ γίνεται, ὅτι 
ἀνάγκη. Ἴσως δ’ ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε ποίαν λέγουσιν ἀνάγκην οἱ λέγοντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῶν 
μὲν γὰρ δύο τρόπων οὐδέτερον οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, τῶν διωρισμένων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ 
φιλοσοφίαν. Ἔστι δ’ ἔν γε τοῖς ἔχουσι γένεσιν ἡ τρίτη· 
“Clearly, then, there are these two explanations, that stating the for the sake of 
which and that stating the ‘from necessity’; for many things come to be because it is 
a necessity. One might perhaps be puzzled about what sort of necessity those who 
speak of ‘from necessity’ mean; for it cannot be either of the two modes defined in 
our philosophical discussions. There is a third mode among the things that partake 
of generation.”  
The third mode of necessity Aristotle mentions here is most likely to be conditional 
necessity: among things that partake of generation, this is the predominant form of 
necessity. Aristotle illustrates this type of necessity with an example (PA.I.1, 642a7-
12):   
λέγομεν γὰρ τὴν τροφὴν ἀναγκαῖόν τι κατ’ οὐδέτερον τούτων τῶν τρόπων, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχ 
 οἷόν τ’ ἄνευ ταύτης εἶναι. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπεὶ δεῖ 
σχίζειν τῷ πελέκει, ἀνάγκη σκληρὸν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ σκληρόν, χαλκοῦν ἢ σιδηροῦν, οὕτως 
καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον (ἕνεκά τινος γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ 
ὅλον), ἀνάγκη ἄρα τοιονδὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τοιωνδί, εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται.  
“For we say nourishment is something necessary according to neither of those two 
 modes of necessity, but because it is not possible to be without it. And this is as in 
the conditional type. For just as – since the axe must split – it is a necessity that it be 
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hard, and if hard, then made of bronze or iron, so too since the body is an 
instrument (for each of the parts is for the sake of something, and likewise also the 
whole), it is therefore a necessity that it be of such a character and constituted from 
such things, if that is to be.”  
Conditional necessity thus pertains to the materials and the material potentials 
necessary for the realization of some functional whole, whether it is a living being or 
artifact. ‘Necessary’ in this context means that it cannot be without it. Aristotle calls 
the necessary relation between materials and parts on the one hand and wholes on 
the other hand ‘like’ necessity on a condition, presumably because he is talking in the 
first place about relations between two things, and only on a secondary level about 
the type of causation involved. However, the implication is also that whatever is 
necessary for a living being in the sense that it cannot be without it, must come to be 
as a result of (primary) teleology and ‘conditional’ necessity. If something is 
necessary on a condition, the necessity imparted in a material process is imparted by 
a final cause.  
 
The other two types of necessity that are defined “in our philosophical discussions,” 
but which are not typically part of the explanations a student of nature should 
produce, are probably the two that Aristotle distinguishes in APo.II.11, 94b37-
95a2.157 The first is the necessity that is “in accordance with nature and impulse” 
(APo.II.11, 94b37-95a1: ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὴν ὁρμήν), usually interpreted as 
material or natural necessity.158 The second is the type of necessity “that is by force 
and contrary to impulse” (APo.II.11, 95a1-2: ἡ δὲ βίᾳ ἡ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν) or ‘enforced 
necessity’. A stone, for instance, which has an earthy constitution, moves 
downwards because of material or natural necessity, and upwards only because of 
enforced necessity.  
 Interestingly, Aristotle connects these two types of necessity with teleology 
in APo.II.11, without introducing his notion of conditional necessity yet. Aristotle 
provides two examples, illustrating how “it is possible for the same thing to be both 
for the sake of something and from necessity” (APo.II.11, 94b27-28: Ἐνδέχεται δὲ 
                                                 
157 Rather than the five different meanings of necessity discussed in Met.V.5, pace Charles (1988), 8-10 and 
Cooper (1987), 259n.19. 
158 Or: ‘pre-conditional necessity’ as Lennox (2001a), 187, calls it. 
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τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕνεκά τινος εἶναι καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης). Both examples concern phenomena (i.e. 
light shining through lanterns and thunder)159 in which the necessity involved is 
material necessity (which is not conditional upon the end for the sake of which the 
phenomenon is said to occur), and in which the proclaimed purposes of the 
phenomena do not seem to be the proper ends or final causes of these phenomena.160 
At least in this context, Aristotle allows material necessity to operate on its own, and 
at the same time to serve some (secondary) purpose.  
 Aristotle’s claim in PA.I.1 that there is a third type of necessity present in 
things that partake of generation therefore does not exclude the presence of the two 
other types of necessity in nature,161 nor does it reduce all necessity in nature 
conditional necessity.162 All that Aristotle needs to be saying here is that it must be 
this third type of necessity that is meant by “those who speak of ‘from necessity’”. 
Both the discussion in APo.II.11163  and the example of a biological explanation 
Aristotle present at the very end of PA.I.1 give evidence for the fact that Aristotle 
counts material and enforced necessity as causes in natural generation. The example 
pertains to the circulation of air during breathing runs like follows (PA.I.1, 642a32-
642b2):  
                                                 
159 Aristotle gives two examples of phenomena that can be explained both teleologically and of necessity, 
one of ‘being’, i.e. the fact that light shines through a lantern (APo.II.11, 94b28-31), and one of ‘coming to 
be’, i.e. the occurrence of thunder (APo.II.11, 94b31-32). The phenomenon of light shining through a 
lantern is said to be due to necessity, for ‘being a fine body’ holds of all ‘light’, and ‘passing through a 
larger body’ holds of all ‘finer bodies’ (and a lantern is a larger body than light). This is one explanation of 
why all light passes through lanterns, the other is because it is for the sake of something: namely, that we 
may not stumble. So, too, the occurrence of thunder is said to be due to necessity, because ‘noise’ holds 
of all ‘extinguishing of fire’, and ‘extinguishing of fire’ holds of all ‘thunder’, which is why ‘noise’ ‘holds of 
all thunder.’ Thunder is also explained as occurring for the sake of something, namely “to threaten the 
denizens of Tartarus in order to make them afraid.” 
160 That is, unless we accept the awkward consequence of denying that light still shines through lanterns 
the moment we stumble or of denying that thunder is still what it is (in reality and not homonymously; cf. 
PA.I.1, 640b29-641a5) the moment the denizens of Tartarus are no longer threatened by it. On the 
contrary, light will still shine through a lantern even if this would not have any function, because that is 
what finer bodies naturally do – they pass through larger bodies. The examples are examples of secondary 
teleology, in which the function or uses are imposed by human beings or Zeus on things that happen of 
material necessity. 
161 Lennox’s translations of this passage (Lennox (2001b), 7: “but it is especially in things that…”; (2001a), 
186: but the third sort is present in those things which come to be”) are misleading as they suggest that 
the two types of necessity mentioned first do not exist in things that partake of generation. The Greek, on 
the other hand, does not exclude this possibility, but rather emphasizes that in things that partake of 
generation there is a third type of necessity.  
162 As Balme (1972), 76-84; 100 and (1987), 283-5 holds. 
163 One could object that Aristotle never uses the notion of conditional necessity in APo., and that the PA 
text is a revision of an earlier statement contrasting teleology with material necessity; however, Aristotle 
does not explicitly revoke his statements on the presence of material necessity in nature in PA. 
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Δεικτέον δ’ οὕτως, οἷον ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἡ ἀναπνοὴ τουδὶ χάριν, τοῦτο δὲ γίγνεται διὰ τάδε 
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Ἡ δ’ ἀνάγκη ὁτὲ μὲν σημαίνει ὅτι εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, ταῦτα 
ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ἔχειν, ὁτὲ δ’ ὅτι ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχοντα καὶ πεφυκότα. Τὸ θερμὸν γὰρ 
ἀναγκαῖον ἐξιέναι καὶ πάλιν εἰσιέναι ἀντικροῦον, τὸν δ’ ἀέρα εἰσρεῖν. Τοῦτο δ’ ἤδη 
ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν. Τοῦ ἐντὸς δὲ θερμοῦ ἀντικόπτοντος, ἐν τῇ ψύξει τοῦ θύραθεν ἀέρος ἡ 
εἴσοδος.  
“One should give demonstrations in the following way, for example, breathing exists 
for the sake of this, while it [i.e. breathing] comes to be from necessity because of 
these. But ‘necessity’ sometimes means that if this is to be that for the sake of 
which, then these must be so [i.e. by conditional necessity]; but at other times it 
means that things are so in respect of their character and nature [i.e. by material or 
natural necessity]. For it is necessary for the hot to go out and come in again upon 
meeting resistance, and for the air to flow in – that is already necessary. But because 
the heat meets internally with resistance, the reason of the entrance and the exit [of 
the air] is in the cooling.” 
In his example, Aristotle acknowledges the explanatory power of references to both 
conditional necessity and a type of necessity rooted in the material nature of 
elements. Breathing is for the sake of something, namely cooling, and an animal will 
have to be able to cool itself if it is to live (cf. PA.III.6, 669a11-13; 669a12-13: ὥστ’ 
ἐν τῷ πνεύματι αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοῦ ζῆν); hence the organs for cooling come to be 
by conditional necessity. However, some things occur because of the material nature 
of bodies involved in the cooling process: the circulation of air itself does not occur 
for the sake of something, nor is it conditional upon some end,164 but it happens in 
accordance with and due to the element’s natures and powers. As Aristotle puts it: 
the circulation of air is immediately (i.e. not conditionally) necessary (PA.I.1, 642a36: 
ἤδη ἀναγκαῖόν). If Aristotle’s own example 165  of an explanation of a natural 
                                                 
164 Pace Lennox (2001b), 152, who thinks that the ‘mechanics’ of breathing should be viewed as 
embedded within a demonstration that this process of breathing is necessary for a certain end. The 
mechanics described, however, do not refer to breathing as such but to the circulation of air, occurring 
due to certain ‘natural laws’, which might as well take place outside an animal’s lung. 
165 However, as Lennox (2001b), 151, points out, this example does not exactly represent Aristotle’s own 
account of the mechanics of breathing as he describes it in Juv.27, 480a25-b4. Of course, it is not 
uncommon for Aristotle to use examples that draw from common beliefs, rather than from his own 
theories (cf. Balme (1972), 101), but this does not mean that Aristotle is not committed to the general 
pattern of explanation – especially since he is giving an example of good practice.  
A.P. Bos, in private correspondence, suggests that the main subtext for Aristotle’s example is 
Plato’s account of respiration in Pl.Tim.78D and 79D. He proposes the following translation and 
interpretation: “One should demonstrate in the following way, for example, breathing exists for the sake 
of this [i.e. cooling], and this [i.e. cooling] comes to be from necessity because of these. But ‘necessity’ 
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phenomenon refers to both conditional and material necessity, we should expect his 
actual explanations also to refer to material necessity in at least some cases.166 
 
In sum, in the majority of the passages discussed above, Aristotle contrasts 
unqualified and conditional necessity in terms of the relation of necessity between 
the prior and the posterior in a causal sequence. In natural (and artistic) generative 
processes, the coming to be of the conditionally necessary prerequisites do not 
guarantee the coming to be of the end, and therefore in demonstrations and 
explanations alike, we need to start from the end, and reason our way back to the 
prerequisites. Inferences from the prior to the posterior in nature are only possible 
with regard eternal, cyclical processes, where the necessity converts. There is no 
‘unqualified necessity’ in this modal sense in the sublunary natural realm.  
In the passages in which Aristotle is concerned with causation, Aristotle 
argues that material necessity in natural generation is subordinated to teleological 
processes and thus conditional upon the presence of some form. Material causation 
necessitates the coming to be of certain materials on its own accord, but in most 
cases the material process itself only takes place because some end needs to be 
realized. Hence, the student of nature should refer to both teleology and conditional 
necessity in explaining the phenomena. However, Aristotle does not claim that every 
aspect of a complex whole needs to be conditionally necessitated. In nature, material 





                                                                                                               
sometimes means that (a) if this is to be that for the sake of which, then it has to possess these things of 
necessity, but at other times it means that (b) things are thus and they are thus by nature. For [according 
to an explanation according to b] it is necessary for the hot to go out and come in again upon meeting 
resistance, and for the air to flow in. That [is the theory of Plato, see Tim.78D; cf. 79D, and that] is indeed 
necessary. But [in that explanation Plato does not account for the purpose of respiration, which is cooling; 
therefore we have to say that] because the vital heat meets with resistance internally, the reason of the 
entrance and the exit of the external air is in the cooling [for this use of en compare Ph.IV.3, 210a21].” 
The final sentence of this passage is obscure; I follow Bos in my translation above, because his reading 
seems to make the most sense of the text. Under this interpretation, Aristotle acknowledges the causal 
influence of necessity in the process of respiration as described by Plato, but corrects him for having 
neglected teleology: ultimately, it is the function of cooling that explains why breathing takes place.  
166 Cf. Cooper (1987), 257-258. 
The practice of teleological explanations in Aristotle’s biology 
 285
3.4.2.b Aristotle’s criticism of his materialist predecessors  
In the former sections, I have argued that Aristotle criticizes his materialist 
predecessors for not acknowledging the operation of final causation in addition to 
material causation and for misunderstanding the type of necessitation involved in 
materially caused processes. In this section, I will present a brief overview of 
Aristotle’s critique of his predecessors as presented in PA.I.1, 640b4-641a17 to 
complement these earlier arguments and my interpretation of Aristotle’s defense of 
natural teleology in Ph.II.8 (see chapter 1.3).  
 
Aristotle’s more extensive critical evaluation of the views of his materialist 
predecessors follows upon his remarks about how those materialists failed to make 
the right distinctions concerning the type of necessity involved in different realms of 
nature, and about the structure of demonstration in the natural sciences.  
 The first issue Aristotle brings up is that in investigating nature, one should 
take into account that generation is for the sake of being, and not being for the sake 
of generation. Generation should thus be understood in terms of being, i.e. in terms 
of the finished product that results from the process of generation, rather than that 
the result should be understood in terms of the processes of generation that lead up 
to its coming to be. According to Aristotle, Empedocles got this priority relation 
wrong, and because of that gave the wrong explanation of natural phenomena 
(PA.I.1, 640a19-24): 
Διόπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηκε λέγων ὑπάρχειν πολλὰ τοῖς ζῴοις διὰ τὸ 
συμβῆναι οὕτως ἐν τῇ γενέσει, οἷον καὶ τὴν ῥάχιν τοιαύτην ἔχειν, ὅτι στραφέντος 
καταχθῆναι συνέβη, ἀγνοῶν πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι δεῖ τὸ σπέρμα τὸ συνιστὰν ὑπάρχειν 
τοιαύτην ἔχον δύναμιν, εἶτα ὅτι τὸ ποιῆσαν πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν οὐ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ 
καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ·  
“For this reason Empedocles did not speak accurately when he said that many 
things belong to animals because things turned out that way during generation, for 
instance also that the backbone is such, because it happened to get broken by being 
twisted. He did not know, first, that the sperm that puts it together must be present 
already having such a potential, and second, that the producer was prior not only in 
definition but also in time.”   
Aristotle’s argument against Empedocles here is similar to that in Ph.II.8 concerning 
the generation of teeth (see chapter 1.3.1.b). Animals and their parts are not the way 
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they are because that is how they ‘happened’ to ‘turn out’ during the process of 
generation. Rather, they are the way they are because of formal and final causation. 
The form is present in the seed (and thus precedes the process of generation), and 
the fully realized end which constitutes the final cause is present in the father, who 
transmits the seed to the female, who contributes the matter to the process of 
generation. The main point of disagreement between Aristotle and Empedocles is 
that the latter turns the outcomes of natural processes into mere matters of luck, 
while for Aristotle these outcomes are the result of intrinsic causation, 167  and 
therefore have to be explained primarily in terms of these intrinsic causes (i.e. formal 
and final causation).168  
 This argument in favor of the priority of being is related to Aristotle’s later 
criticism of the ‘ancients who first began philosophizing about nature’ (PA.I.1, 
640b4). In Aristotle’s view, their accounts of natural phenomena in terms of the 
material constitution of things are not enough (PA.I.1, 640b22: Οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν) for 
the purposes of determining the full explanation of something. As Aristotle points 
out, when talking about artifacts such as beds, we would rather try to define their 
form, rather than their matter, or at least talk about the composite of matter and 
shape. Form or configuration are much more important (PA.I.1, 640b28: κυριωτέρα) 
according to Aristotle, simply because they are more ‘informative’ – they tell us what 
things are. Explanations of phenomena that refer only to the constitutive material 
lack informative content.  
 Next, Aristotle focuses specifically on Democritus, who appears to have 
thought that things are what they are in virtue of their configuration and color. 
Against this theory, Aristotle claims that although, for instance, a corpse has the 
same shape as a human being, we would not call a corpse a human being, except 
                                                 
167 Cf. Sauvé Meyer (1992), 794-795. 
168 For a similar criticism, see also Met.I.3, 983a24-984b. There Aristotle argues that: “it is not likely either 
that fire or earth or any such element should be the reason why things manifest goodness and beauty both 
in their being and in their coming to be, or that those thinkers should have supposed it was; nor again 
could it be right to entrust so great a matter to spontaneity and chance. When one man said, then, that 
mind was present – as in animals so throughout all of nature – as the cause of order and of all 
arrangement, he seemed like a sober man in contrast with the random talk of his predecessors (Met.I.3, 
984b11-18).” The upshot of this critique is that according to Aristotle, phenomena exhibiting properties 
like goodness and beauty, order and arrangement, cannot be the result of accidental material causation, 
spontaneity, or chance. 
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homonymously, because it cannot perform the function that belongs to it.169 The 
same holds for bronze or wooden hands, a drawing of a physician, or a flute made 
of stone: we do not call them a hand, a physician, or a flute, because they cannot 
perform their proper functions (PA.I.1, 640b29-641a5). Aristotle thus stresses that 
what something is, is ultimately determined by the function(s) it performs. In 
Aristotle’s view, Democritus’ theory is not specific enough or “too simple” (PA.I.1, 
641a5: Λίαν οὖν ἁπλῶς εἴρηται), because he failed to connect form to essential 
functions.  
Finally, Aristotle indicates that he also thinks that “the way in which the 
natural philosophers speak of the generations and causes of configuration” is too 
unspecified, as well (PA.I.1, 641a7-8: Οὕτως γὰρ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι τὰς γενέσεις καὶ 
τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ σχήματος λέγουσιν). When asked “by what powers” something is 
crafted, they respond in terms of the nature of the elements. Aristotle then argues 
that a carpenter will be able to give a better response, by pointing to the tools by 
which something came to be, and ultimately by stating the reason why the tools were 
used in the way they were and for the sake of what they were used (PA.I.1, 641a8-
13). The deficiency in the account of the philosophers is thus that they fail to explain 
why the elements move the way they do – they fail to state the ‘that for the sake of 
which’. This is why Aristotle concludes that these natural philosophers “did not 
speak correctly” (PA.I.1, 641a14: ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσι). 
 
In short, Aristotle points out the deficiencies of materialistic explanations mainly by 
showing how the inclusion of formal and final causes render a much better and 
fuller understanding of what a thing is and of why it is present or has come to be. 
Aristotle argues that explanations only in terms of material causes are not 
informative enough, or too simple relative to other types of explanation. The upshot 
of the whole discussion is thus not to argue for the exclusion of explanations in terms 
of material causes and necessity, but to stress the importance of the inclusion of 
formal and final causes into the study of nature. Natural phenomena are most 
                                                 
169 For Aristotle’s principle of homonymy, see chapter 2.1.2.c. 
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completely explained by explanations that refer to the ends of those phenomena, 
and not only to their material constitutions.170  
 
3.4.3 Teleology and necessity in the biological explanations of PA.II-IV 
In this section, I will turn to an analysis of Aristotle’s use of teleology, conditional 
necessity, and material necessity in the actual explanations of biological phenomena 
in PA.II-IV. 
 
3.4.3.a Necessity is spoken of in many ways 
Aristotle indicates in his theoretical introduction to the science of nature in PA.I.1 
that necessity is among those things that are “spoken of in many ways” (PA.I.1, 
639b23: ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον; cf. Met.V.5). Unfortunately, this is not only 
true for his predecessors, but also for Aristotle himself, because he never makes 
explicit which of the four types of necessity he means when he uses the term in his 
actual explanations. There are, however, some slight differences in his references to 
necessity on a linguistic level, and I believe that these differences make it possible to 
distinguish references to conditional necessity from those to material necessity.  
In both PA.II-IV and GA.I-V, we find two kinds of expressions involving 
necessity.171 First, Aristotle uses necessity as a relational term, indicating that 
something is necessary for another thing.172 Usually, Aristotle indicates that certain 
parts are necessary for certain functions, or that certain functions are necessary for 
certain animals. I take it that these expressions indicate that some structure is 
conditionally necessary for some end, and that hence that structure will have to 
                                                 
170 This, then, is also the conclusion Aristotle reaches near the end of the our chapter dealing with proper 
method of the science of nature (PA.I.1, 642a13-15): “clearly, then, there are two sorts of cause [i.e. 
necessity and teleology], and first and foremost one should succeed in stating both, but failing that, at 
least attempt to do so; and clearly all who do not state this say virtually nothing about nature.” 
171 There is a third kind of expression, which I will not discuss further in this chapter, in which necessity 
refers to the notion of logical implication or consequence, indicating the conclusion of an account. See, 
for instance the following two passages: “And further, since none of the bloodless parts, nor the blood, is 
perceptive, it is clear that the first thing that holds it as in a vessel must be its origin (anagkaion einai). That 
it appears to be this way not only accords with our account, but with perception as well (PA.III.4, 666a16-
19)” and “So since it is necessary (anagkê einai) for one or the other of these to be an origin, and it is not 
the liver, it is necessary (anagkê einai) that the heart should also be the origin of the blood (PA.III.4, 
666a31-33).” In both examples, Aristotle rules out all other possibilities, after which only one option 
remains, which then must ‘of necessity’ be the right option.  
172 In these cases, Aristotle uses formulations like ‘it is necessary for x to be y’ or ‘it is necessary for x to 
have y’ (anagkê/anagkaion einai/echein, anagkaios/ex anagkês einai). 
The practice of teleological explanations in Aristotle’s biology 
 289
come to be by conditional necessity and will be present as a result of primary 
teleology (i.e. of the goal-directed actions of the soul or formal nature of the animal).  
Secondly, Aristotle uses expressions that refer to necessity to indicate the 
cause of something’s coming into being, often in contrast to or in concomitance 
with a final cause.173 Usually, these expressions pertain to the coming to be of parts 
or residues. I take these expressions to refer to material necessity, as Aristotle usually 
explicates the necessity involved in terms of the material natures of the elements. 
Let me give an example of these two uses of necessity. Aristotle states that 
the two parts by which nourishment enters and residue exists are “most necessary” 
in all complete animals (PA.II.10, 655b28-32; 655b30: δύο τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα μόριά 
ἐστιν). The reason for this is that it is not possible to be or to grow without 
nourishment: the two parts are necessary for the realization of the function of 
nourishment, and the parts are most necessary because without nourishment, the 
animal will not be able to survive or to grow. The coming to be of these parts must 
therefore be due to conditional necessity and primary teleology. However, Aristotle 
explains the coming to be of the omentum as follows (PA.IV.3, 677b22-29): 
Ἡ μὲν οὖν γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τοιαύτη τοῦ μορίου τούτου· ξηροῦ γὰρ καὶ 
 ὑγροῦ μίγματος θερμαινομένου τὸ ἔσχατον ἀεὶ δερματῶδες γίνεται καὶ ὑμενῶδες, ὁ δὲ 
τόπος οὗτος τοιαύτης πλήρης ἐστὶ τροφῆς. Ἔτι δὲ διὰ πυκνότητα τοῦ ὑμένος τὸ 
διηθούμενον τῆς αἱματώδους τροφῆς ἀναγκαῖον λιπαρὸν εἶναι (τοῦτο γὰρ λεπτότατον) 
καὶ διὰ τὴν θερμότητα τὴν περὶ τὸν τόπον συμπεττόμενον ἀντὶ σαρκώδους καὶ 
αἱματώδους συστάσεως στέαρ γίνεσθαι καὶ πιμελήν.  
“The generation of that part happens of necessity in the following way: when a 
 mixture of dry and moist is heated, the surface always becomes skin-like and 
membranous, and this location is full of such nutrient. And further, on account of 
the thickness of the membrane, it is necessary for the filtrate of the bloody 
nourishment to be fatty (for this is thinnest), and to become hard or soft fat rather 
than a fleshy and bloody composition when it undergoes concoction owing to the 
heat in this region.”  
The omentum comes to be as the result of the necessity residing in the character and 
the potentials of the elements present in a certain region of the body, i.e. as the 
result of the processes of solidification and concoction. Later (in PA.IV.3, 677b30-
                                                 
173 In these cases, Aristotle uses formulations like ‘x exists of necessity’ (einai ex anagkês) or ‘x comes to be 
of necessity’ (gignesthai/sumbainei ex anagkês). 
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32) Aristotle explains how nature then uses the membrane for the sake of the proper 
concoction of the nourishment, but this function is secondary upon the coming to 
be of the part itself.  
 
Outside PA, there is only one passage (namely GA.V.1) where Aristotle discusses 
the different operations of the two types of necessity, while at the same time giving 
actual explanations of natural phenomena. The context is a discussion of the 
pathêmata. These ‘affections’ are the characteristics shared by either the complete 
animal kind or all animals in general, or the characteristics that are present 
incidentally in some individuals belonging to one kind, but not in others of the same 
kind. It is here that Aristotle distinguishes between phenomena like that of the eye 
and that of the blueness of an eye (GA.V.1, 778a29-b19). The first category of 
phenomena that are like the eye are for the sake of something, or at least come to be 
for the sake of something and through material and efficient causes (the teleology 
operative is primary). These are phenomena that (i.) are included in the definition of 
animals; (ii.) are for the sake of some end; or (iii.) are ends in themselves (GA.V.1, 
778b12-13: ὅσαπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐνυπάρχει τῷ ἑκάστου ἤ ἐστιν ἕνεκά του ἢ οὗ ἕνεκα). 
The second category consists of those phenomena that do not come to be by final 
causation but by necessity only, because “they are not the product of nature in 
general nor yet characteristic of each separate kind (GA.V.1, 778a30-31: ὅσα γὰρ μὴ 
τῆς φύσεως ἔργα κοινῇ μηδ’ ἴδια τοῦ γένους ἑκάστου).” Aristotle explains the 
difference between generic characteristics and individual ones as follows (GA.V.1, 
778b15-19): 
ὀφθαλμὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξει (τοιόνδε γὰρ ζῷον ὑπόκειται ὄν), τοιόνδε δὲ 
ὀφθαλμὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης μέν, οὐ τοιαύτης δ’ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ’ ἄλλον τρόπον, ὅτι τοιονδὶ ἢ 
τοιονδὶ ποιεῖν πέφυκε καὶ πάσχειν.  
“An animal must of necessity have an eye (for an animal is supposed to be of such a 
sort), but it will have an eye of a particular kind of necessity in another sense, not 
the sense mentioned above, because it is its nature to act or to be acted on in this or 
that way.”  
The two types of necessity referred to here are conditional and material necessity. 
An animal has eyes because it is by definition a perceptive being; perceiving is an 
essential function, and therefore animals must – by conditional necessity – have eyes 
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for the performance of that function. On the other hand, animals have blue (or 
brown, etc.) eyes because of material necessity: the color of the eye is incidental to 
the function for the sake of which the eye has come to be. 174  The individual 
differences between the material elements constituting eyes cause the differences in 
color on their own accord.  
Interestingly, according to GA.V.1, teleological explanations of the presence 
of parts refer typically only to the proper function those parts perform, while their 
coming to be and their material constitution175 is explained by reference to both their 
function and the material and efficient causes that are at work (i.e. conditional 
necessity). Features of animals that are not present for the sake of something, and 
that are unrelated to their essence (GA.V.1, 778b1), are explained as being the result 
of material necessity alone. As Aristotle puts it (GA.V.1, 778b14-16):  
ἤδη τούτων τὸ αἴτιον ἐν τῇ κινήσει δεῖ καὶ τῇ γενέσει ζητεῖν ὡς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει τὴν 
διαφορὰν λαμβανόντων. 
“The cause of them must be sought in the movement or process of coming into 
being, because they receive the difference in the actual formation.” 
This text gives room to material necessity, even if only at a very limited level, in the 
coming to be of the pathêmata or the individual differences between animals, such as 
the color of their eyes, the pitch of their voice, skin color, and the color of their hair 
or feathers (GA.V.1, 778a18-20).  
However, some scholars176 hold that the process of an eye becoming blue is 
– although perhaps indirectly – still ultimately conditional upon the coming to be of 
an eye. Because the coming to be of the eye is conditionally necessitated by its 
function of sight, the color of the eye (since “an eye has to have some color”)177 
must be conditionally necessitated, too. This, however, need not be true. Ultimately, 
of course, all the materials that are present in a living being are present as the result 
                                                 
174 For pathêmata that do contribute to the purpose of the eye, see PA.II.2, 648a14-15. 
175 For other explicit references to the conditionality of the material constitutions of parts on the function 
they need to perform, see: PA.II.16, 660a8-10; PA.IV.7, 683b4-7; PA.IV.10, 687b27-29; PA.IV.10, 
689a19-21; PA.IV.11, 691b9-16. 
176 Cooper (1987), 263-9; 267: “But, secondly, where material necessity does function – in forming the 
membrane round an animal fetus, in making an eye blue or brown, and so on – it is on Aristotle’s view at 
best a proximate cause of the necessitated feature. That a blue eye is produced depends upon the 
properties of the material and their materially necessary interactions as the eye is being formed; but it is 
not, on Aristotle’s theory, by material necessity that those materials, with their necessitating properties, are 
present in the first place.” Cf. Lennox (2001a), 194-5; Liatsi (2000), 42; and Kullmann (1974), 295. 
177 Liatsi (2000), 85. 
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of conditionally necessitated processes, but that does not mean that they are all 
conditionally necessitated themselves. Given all the conditionally necessitated 
material processes taking place in the body of a living being, it must be the case that 
the interaction between these processes gives rise to incidental coming into beings of 
new materials, or that there remain residues that are then left by the formal nature of 
an animal to act according to their own natures. As we have seen above, Aristotle 
draws a clear distinction between matter that has come to be by conditional necessity 
for the sake of realizing some part, and between matter that has come to be by 
material necessity. The latter type of matter has not come to be for the sake of a 
‘predetermined’ function (that is, there is no form necessitating the coming into 
being of this matter), but it may or may not be used by the formal nature of the 
animal for the sake of something good. Because the materials that cause the blueness 
of eyes have not come to be for the sake of making the eyes blue (and that is 
because a particular eye color does not serve a particular function according to 
Aristotle), they are not conditionally necessitated in a strict sense. Instead, as 
Aristotle points out himself, they are due to the material and efficient causal 
processes that take place during generation itself. Presumably, because they do the 
individual animal no harm, the formal nature does nothing to redirect or to dispose 
of these materials.  
 In sum, one could say that according to Aristotle teleology and necessity 
are related to each other in the three following ways. First, things that come to be 
and are present for the sake of something, and are part of the essence of an animal, 
come to be by conditional necessity and are present by primary teleology. Second, 
things that come to be of material necessity, and are not part of the essence of an 
animal, but are used by the formal nature of some animal for some good purpose, 
come to be by material necessity, and are present by secondary teleology. Third, 
things that come to be of material necessity, and are either irregular or particular for 
some individual animal, and are not used by the formal nature of some animal for 
some good, come to be and are present simply by material necessity. In the 
following subsections, I will briefly show how each of these possible relations 
between necessity and teleology are played out in the actual explanations Aristotle 
provides in PA. 
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3.4.3.b Primary teleology and conditional necessity 
Primary teleology and conditional necessity play a causal role at different levels in the 
coming to be of the living organism. Usually, Aristotle explains his notion of 
conditional necessity in terms of matter having to come to be first if there is to be a 
certain end-product with a certain function (e.g. if there is to be a wall for the sake of 
protection, there first have to be stones and wood). In the biological context, 
however, conditional necessity describes causal relations at three levels. First, 
conditional necessity characterizes the relation between matter and parts that 
perform necessary functions for which that matter comes to be. Second, conditional 
necessity characterizes the relation between those parts and the necessary functions 
they perform. Thirds, conditional necessity characterizes the relation between 
necessary differentiations of parts and the optimalization of the function for which 
they come to be. The type of teleology involved in these cases is primary teleology. 
The first level at which primary teleology and conditional necessity are 
picked out by Aristotle is in the explanations of the coming to be and the presence 
of certain materials. In these cases, it is the function that conditionally necessitates 
the coming to be of the materials constituting the part that performs that function 
(PA.IV.10, 689a20-21): 
Ὅτι δ’ ἔχει καὶ τὰ σχήματα τῶν μορίων τούτων πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν ἀναγκαίως, οὐκ 
ἄδηλον.  
“But that the configuration178 of these parts is necessarily for their operation is not 
hard to see.”  
As I argued in 2.1.2.d, the function a part should perform does not determine what 
kind of matter should be present first, but it rather determines what kind of potentials 
the matter that has to be present first should have. As Aristotle explains in PA.II.1, 
it is better to speak of composite matter in terms of the primary contrary potentials 
(cold/moist; hot/moist; cold/dry; hot/dry), rather than in terms of the elements 
themselves (PA.II.1, 646a14-20): 
Ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἴσως ἐκ τῶν δυνάμεων λέγειν, καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐξ ἁπασῶν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐν 
ἑτέροις εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. Ὑγρὸν γὰρ καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὕλη τῶν 
συνθέτων σωμάτων ἐστίν· αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ταύταις ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οἷον βάρος καὶ 
                                                 
178 That schêma here means more than just the physical or visible shape of the part, is clear from the next 
passage in which Aristotle picks up this phrase, but now refers to the natural constitution (sunestêke tên 
phusin) of the part which gives it its necessary abilities to perform its function (PA.IV.10, 689a27-30).  
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κουφότης καὶ πυκνότης καὶ μανότης καὶ τραχύτης καὶ λειότης καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα 
πάθη τῶν σωμάτων.  
“And yet, perhaps it is better to speak of composition from the potentials, and not 
from all of them, but as stated previously in other works. That is, moist, dry, hot 
and cold are matter of the composite bodies, while the other differences, e.g. 
heaviness and lightness, density and rarity, roughness and smoothness, and the 
other bodily affections of this sort, follow these.” 
The four potentials are primary to the elements and the uniform parts that are 
constituted from the elements (and to the non-uniform parts that are constituted 
from the uniform parts), and they form the basis of material explanation.179 The 
function a part needs to perform thus determines the complex combination of 
potentials the part needs to have, although it does not fully determine the exact 
material constitution of it (much of that will depend upon the kind of animal in 
which the function is being realized). In addition, the material nature of the animal in 
which the function is realized plays a role in limiting the kinds of material in which 
the necessary functions can be realized.180 
The second level at which conditional necessity and primary teleology play 
are picked out in explanations is in the explanation of the coming to be of both 
necessary parts and of non-necessary parts as being for the sake of the performance 
of necessary functions.181 That is, conditional necessity characterizes the relation 
between a part and the necessary function for the performance of which it came to 
be, but also the relation between a part and the necessary function to which its 
coming to be contributes.  
Functions are necessary when they are either of vital or of essential 
importance for the animal, and are therefore part of the animal’s substantial being. 
Vital functions are those functions that are necessary for the existence or the survival 
of an animal; without the ability to perform its vital functions the animal would die 
immediately. For this reason, the liver is a necessary part, because it performs the 
                                                 
179 See Lennox (2001b), 180-181. 
180 Cf. Lennox (2001a), 196-199. 
181 Parts that serve non-necessary functions (that is, functions that are not of vital of essential importance 
to the animal), but merely serve ‘luxurious’ functions that contribute to the animal’s well-being, never 
come to be as a result of conditional necessity, but are always the result of material necessity and 
secondary teleology. These parts will be discussed below in 3.4.3.c. 
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vital function of food concoction in all the blooded animals (this is also why its 
material constitution affects the life-span of the animal; PA.IV.2, 677a36-b5):  
Εὔλογον γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ἥπατος φύσιν ἐπίκαιρον οὖσαν, καὶ ἀναγκαίαν πᾶσι τοῖς ἐναίμοις 
ζῴοις αἰτίαν εἶναι, ποιάν τιν’ οὖσαν, τοῦ ζῆν ἐλάττω ἢ πλείω χρόνον. (...) τῶν δ’ ἄλλων 
οὐδὲν σπλάγχνων ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τοῖς ζῴοις, τὸ δ’ ἧπαρ μόνον· 
“In fact it is reasonable, that since the nature of the liver is vital, and necessary to all 
the blooded animals, its being of a certain character is a cause of living a shorter or 
longer time. (…), and none of the other viscera is necessary to these animals, but 
only the liver.”182  
Essential functions are those functions that are specific for and proper to the whole 
animal-kind or a subspecies thereof; without the ability to perform its essential 
functions the animal would either not be an animal at all, or not be the kind of 
animal it is supposed to be. For instance, without perception, an animal would not 
be an animal anymore (PA.II.2, 647a20).183 The essential functions and the parts 
required to perform these functions are all picked out by the definition of the 
substantial being or by the form184 of the animal. The parts and characteristics that 
are conditionally necessitated by these essential functions constitute the basic 
features of animals, that is, they do not need any further explanation, but instead 
other parts and characteristics are explained in terms of them.185 Note that not only 
functions are picked out by the definition of an animal, but also other essential 
features, such as whether or not an animal is blooded (see PA.IV.5, 678a26-34; 
                                                 
182 Examples of other vital functions with their respective parts are, for all animals: the function of 
heating, performed through the heart or its analogue (PA.II.3, 650a6-8; PA.II.7, 652b15; PA.III.4, 
665b10-15; PA.III.4, 666a22-24); the function of receiving nourishment, performed through the mouth 
and stomach (PA.II.10, 655b28-31; PA.IV.5, 681b13-16; PA.III.14, 674a13-19); the function of excreting 
residue, performed through the intestines (PA.II.10, 655b28-31; PA.IV.5, 681b13-16; PA.III.14, 674a13-
19); the function of reproduction, performed through a variety of reproductive parts (GA.I.2-8, 716a18-
718b28); for blooded animals: the function of cooling the heat performed by the brain (PA.IV.10, 686a5-
7) and the lung (PA.III.6, 668b33-35). Limbs, evidently, are not vital for an animal to have (PA.III.4, 
665b21-27): “the limbs, however, by nature develop differently in different animals, and are not among 
the necessities of life, which is why even when they are removed an animal continues living (οὐκ ἔστι τῶν 
πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων, διὸ καὶ ἀφαιρουμένων ζῶσιν); and it is clear that adding limbs would not destroy it.” 
183 Examples of other essential functions are, of all animals: sensation (PA.II.8, 653b19-23; GA.V.1, 32-
34) and perception (PA.II.2, 647a20-23; PA.IV.5, 681b13-16), and reproduction (GA.I.23, 731b5-8); of 
blooded animals: respiration (performed by the lung; PA.III.6, 669b8-12); of birds: flying (PA.IV.12, 
693b2-13); of fish: swimming (PA.IV.13, 695b17-25). 
184 For the identification of the form with the definition of the substantial being, see GC.II.9, 335b6-7. 
185 Cf. Gotthelf (1987), 189-192. 
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PA.IV.12, 693b2-13; PA.IV.13, 695b17-25; cf. PA.II.2, 648a20), 186  or what its 
dimensions are.187  
Parts that are not necessary for necessary functions, but rather contribute 
to the performance of that function by some other part, also come to be by 
conditional necessity. However, these parts come to be at a later stage during the 
generative process, and only come to be if it is possible for the animal to process the 
amounts of food necessary for the production of these parts, and if it is on the 
whole possible for the animal to have the part. For instance, in order for an animal 
to be able to have a penis and testes (which are non-necessary parts for a necessary 
function) in addition to ducts for semen (which are necessary parts for a necessary 
function), it has to have at least two legs. 
 The third level at which Aristotle picks out conditional necessity and 
primary teleology in explanations, is in the explanation of the coming to be of the 
differentiations in the bodily affections or material constitutions between parts that 
bear the same name and perform the same (primary and proper) function. These 
differentiations are conditionally necessary for the part to perform its function 
better. This is perhaps the most important level of explanation in Aristotle’s biology, 
for it is here that the specific formal and material nature of each kind of animal 
needs to be taken into account. Parts and the materials from which they are 
constituted always come to be for the sake of the performance of a certain necessary 
function in a particular kind of animal. It are the material and formal nature of this 
animal and its main differentiae that ultimately determine the exact material 
constitution of its parts. 
The differentiae, of which the main four are the animal’s life, dispositions, 
activities and the (other) parts it has, put extra requirements on how the necessary 
function should be performed by a particular kind of animal, or cause the need for 
one part to perform multiple functions. The differentiae cause a refinement of the 
‘job-descriptions’ of the parts an animal has, and these functional refinements 
conditionally necessitate a particular differentiation of the material constitution or of 
                                                 
186 Other non-functional essential characteristics are, of all animals: being male or female (GA.I.20, 
729a22-33; GA.II.1, 731b18-20); of insects: being segmented into parts (PA.IV.6, 682b27-29); of lobsters: 
having claws (PA.IV.8, 684a32-b1); of mankind: standing upright (PA.IV.10, 686a25-31). 
187 For example, the length and thinness in a certain kind of octopus; see PA.IV.9, 685b12-15; cf. IA.8, 
708a9-20.  
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the location of the parts (relative to similar parts in other animals). The functional 
differentiations of similar parts in different kinds of animals are thus the causes of 
the material differentiations among them.188 The same holds for those cases in which 
a part needs to perform a second necessary function in addition to its primary and 
proper function. The second function conditionally necessitates the material 
differentiation of the part relative to the parts that perform the same primary 
function in other animals (and relative to how that part would have been realized in 
that animal if it only had to perform its primary function).  
In sum, necessary functions conditionally necessitate the coming to be of 
parts, both at the level of the material and material potentials the parts need to have 
in order to perform their functions well enough for the animal to survive and to be 
what it is, and on the level of their specific material differentiations in each particular 
kind of animal. 
 
3.4.3.c Secondary teleology and material necessity 
I have defined secondary teleology as the goal-directed actions of the formal nature 
of an animal that are undertaken with regard to matter or even complete parts that 
are already present (because they came to be by material necessity 189  or by 
conditional necessity for the sake of some other function). 190  As we have seen 
above, in some cases, the coming to be of the part or the materials out of which the 
                                                 
188 Some clear examples where differentiae cause functional refinements can be seen in PA.III.1, 662b5-
16; PA.III.4, 665b1-5; PA.III.6, 669a24-b7; and PA.IV.12, 693a10-16; clear examples of where the need 
to perform a second function causes a functional refinement can be seen in PA.III.1, 661a36-b6 and 
PA.IV.10, 688a19-25. 
189 For some explicit examples, see PA.IV.3, 677b22-29 (677b22: hê genesis ex anagkês sumbainei) and 
PA.IV.4, 678a3-10 (678a3: tên genesin ex anagkês ousan). 
190 In using the term ‘secondary teleology’ in this chapter, I have relied on Lennox’s brief analysis of 
‘indirect teleology’ in Lennox (2001b), 248-249. There are, however, some important differences. Unlike 
Lennox, I opt to speak of secondary teleology not in each case in which the formal nature is said to ‘use’ 
or ‘make use’ of materials for various ends, but only in those cases where (i) the materials are claimed to 
be present of necessity (these are usually the residues or other excessive materials); or (ii) where an 
existing part is made use of for another function without the formal nature adapting that part for the 
performance of this second function. I agree with Lennox (2001b, 249) that these instances are 
“contrasted with the production of the principal organs of biological functions, for which the uniform 
parts come to be.” However, I would like to add that the production of these principal organs, that is, of 
the parts performing vital or essential functions, is always due to conditional necessity (the materials and 
parts are generated for the sake of the function they perform), and that those parts are always constituted 
from concocted nourishments, while non-necessary parts seem mostly to be constituted from ‘left-over’ 
or ‘spontaneously’ produced materials. Rather than there being merely a ‘contrast’ between two types of 
production of parts, Aristotle is actually laying out two different causal stories in the coming to be of parts 
(cf. GA.II.6, 744b12-27). 
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part is constituted is non-conditional upon the use to which it is put, but is the result 
of material necessity. The function the formal nature then attributes to this part or 
matter explains why the part or matter is present in the animal. It seems that in cases 
like these, the formal nature is quite literally ‘confronted’ with the presence of some 
materials or even of a fully developed structure (such as eyebrows), which it did not 
conditionally necessitate. Sometimes, the formal nature excretes the extra materials, 
but usually, it uses them for the sake of something good; the characteristic activity of 
nature in these cases is that of using. In short, the generative processes of these 
phenomena are not the result of primary teleology (and hence the explanation of 
their coming to be does not include references to the functions to which they are put), 
but their presence, organization, or distribution in an animal’s body is. Therefore, 
their presence needs to be explained in terms of the function they serve.  
 
Let me give a more detailed sketch of the types of phenomena that Aristotle explains 
by reference to secondary teleology and material necessity, and of the extent to 
which material necessity plays a role in the generation of these phenomena.  
First there are parts that have come to be for the sake of some other (i.e. 
their primary and proper) function, and which are then put to a second use by the 
formal nature of the animal, but without conditionally necessitating any material 
adaptations of that part.191 For instance, the elephant’s trunk, which is a special kind 
of nostril, has come to be and is present for the sake of breathing and has the 
material constitution and dimensions it has (softness, the ability to bend, and 
extraordinary length) for the sake of this function. However, the trunk is also put to 
a second use, namely grasping, to make up for the uselessness of the elephant’s feet 
in this respect. Aristotle explains that (PA.II.16, 659a20-23): 
ὑπάρξαντος οὖν τοιούτου τοῦ μυκτῆρος, ἡ φύσις παρακαταχρῆται, καθάπερ εἴωθεν, ἐπὶ 
πλείονα τοῖς αὐτοῖς μορίοις, ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν προσθίων ποδῶν χρείας. 
“Since it [i.e. the trunk] is such,192 nature, as usual, turns the same part to more than 
one use, here using the trunk in place of the front feet.”  
                                                 
191 Aristotle uses the verb (para)katachrêsthai in these cases; see for example PA.IV.6, 683a19-25, PA.II.16, 
659a21 and 659a35, and PA.IV.10, 690a1.  
192 Lennox’s translation (2001b), 42, “since it is present” glosses over toioutou; it is because the trunk 
already has the material disposition it has – that it is of such a material nature – that it can be used for 
grasping, too.  
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This means that in this case, exactly because the trunk has been constituted from 
materials that have potentials that make it fit for breathing, those very same 
potentials also allow the elephant to use the trunk for grasping. The use to which 
nature puts the part thus follows the potentials that are already present in the part. 
The coming to be of the trunk and of its constitutive materials is conditionally 
necessitated by its primary function of breathing. The second function of grasping is 
not part of the explanation of its generation (– the potentials required to perform 
this second function are already available),193 but only of the explanation of the 
trunk’s presence. Only the potentials that facilitate breathing, so to speak, are 
conditionally necessitated in a strict sense, while the fact that they also facilitate the 
function of grasping is incidental. The type of necessity operative in this type of 
biological phenomenon, however, is not easy to determine. Because of the accidental 
nature of the presence of the ‘right’ potentials, it seems right to say that the necessity 
involved is material, although, de facto there are no materials or potentials present in 
the trunk that did not come to be as a result of conditional necessity, albeit in an 
indirect way. 
Secondly, there are parts that are formed by the formal nature from the 
material that is already present in the animal as a result of material necessity (in the 
form of a residual surplus, secretion, sediment, or excess);194 the formal nature puts 
these materials or parts to some good use in accordance with the potentials the 
available material has. In general, these are parts that perform non-necessary, 
‘luxurious’ functions, which contribute to the well-being of an animal. I have found 
one example, however, in which processes that take place of material necessity are 
used by the formal nature to realize the necessary function of reproduction. This is 
the use of the female menses for the development of the embryo (GA.II.4, 738a33-
b5): 
Ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν οὖν ἡ περίττωσις αὕτη γίγνεται τοῖς θήλεσι διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας· 
μὴ δυναμένης τε γὰρ πέττειν τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκη περίττωμα γίγνεσθαι μὴ μόνον τῆς 
ἀχρήστου τροφῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ <τοῦ αἵματος> ἐν ταῖς φλεψίν, ὑπερβάλλειν τε πληθύοντα 
                                                 
193 Cf. PA.IV.9, 685a27-29: “Accordingly [i.e. because their trunk is small and their feet are long], in the 
octopuses the feet are not only useful for swimming, but also for walking, while in the other two groups 
[i.e. the cuttlefish and the squid] they are useless for this; for their feet are small, while they have a large 
trunk.” 
194 PA.II.7, 653b10-11 (hupostêma); PA.II.9, 655a23-27 (huperochên); GA.II.6, 744b12-27 (hupoleimmata kai 
perittômata); PA.II.2, 647b27-28 (hupostasis); PA.IV.10, 690a6-9 (apokrisis). 
Chapter 3. Explaining parts of animals 
 300
κατὰ τὰς λεπτοτάτας φλέβας. ἕνεκα δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ τέλους ἡ φύσις 
καταχρῆται πρὸς τὸν τόπον τοῦτον τῆς γενέσεως χάριν ὅπως οἷον ἔμελλε τοιοῦτον 
γένηται ἕτερον· ἤδη γὰρ ὑπάρχει δυνάμει γε ὂν τοιοῦτον οἵουπέρ ἐστι σώματος 
ἀπόκρισις. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν θήλεσιν ἅπασιν ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι περίττωμα (...).  
“Thus the coming to be of this residue [i.e. the menstrual discharges] among 
females is the result of necessity because of the causes mentioned. Because her 
nature is not capable of concoction, it is necessary that residue must come to be, 
not only from the useless nourishment, but also in the blood-vessels, and that they 
must overflow, when there is a full complement of it in those very fine blood-
vessels. And nature uses it for the sake of the better and the end for this place, for 
the sake of generation, in order that it may become another creature of the same 
kind as it would have become. For, even as it is, it is in potentiality the same in 
character as the body of which it is the secretion. In all female animals, then, some 
residue must of necessity be formed.” 
Material necessity is the cause of the coming to be of the female menses, but nature 
then uses it for the better (namely for generation), because the menses are in 
potentiality the same in character as the body from which it is secreted. That is, the 
matter the female contributes to reproduction is usable for the generation of a living 
being of the same kind, because this matter has the right potentials for it. In a similar 
way, in many animals material necessity causes the coming to be of an earthen 
effluence, which is then used by the formal nature of animals to produce ‘luxury’ 
parts for defense, because it has a defensive potential.195 Examples of such parts are 
teeth, tusks, and horns in the four-footed animals;196 hard and large beaks, spurs or 
claws in the birds;197 more hair in human beings;198 and ink in sepia.199 The material 
                                                 
195 Pace Lennox (2001a), 194-195, who holds that “such material is present for the sake of constituting 
parts which must have a material propensity suitable for defense.” I believe the order of causation is 
rather the other way around. It is because a certain type of material (i.e. earthen material) is available that 
happens to have a defensive potential, that nature can use it to create defensive parts. This is what 
Aristotle explains in the following passage (PA.II.9, 655b4-12): “All these <uniform parts> the animals 
have for the sake of protection; for the whole <organs> constituted from these <uniform parts>, and 
synonymous with them, e.g., the whole hoof and whole horn, have been constructed for the safety of 
each of these animals (…). Of necessity all of these parts have an earthen and hard nature; for this is the defensive 
potential.” 
196 PA.III.2, 663b31-35: “for nature uses the residual surplus of such a body, being present in the larger of 
the animals, for protection and advantage, and the surplus, which flows of necessity to the upper region, it 
distributes in some cases to teeth and tusks, in other cases to horns.” 
197 PA.IV.12, 694a22-27. 
198 PA.II.14, 658b3-5. 
199 PA.IV.5, 679a28-30. 
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used by the formal nature to produce these parts did not come to be because of its 
defensive potential – it is only used in that way because of that potential.200    
In his explanations of the coming to be of such parts, Aristotle provides 
ample descriptions of the processes of materials acting according to their elemental 
natures that are the causes of their formation. It is of material necessity, for example, 
that the extreme surface of a thing solidifies when heated as well as when cooled,201 
or that each time a mixture of dry and moist is heated, the surface becomes skin-like 
and membranous.202 That these material processes are not directly or at all 
conditional upon some end, can be inferred also from the names Aristotle uses to 
indicate the materials resulting from these processes. The material is called a surplus 
(ὑπεροχή) when more matter has been produced than was conditionally necessitated 
by the necessary functions of that animal; the surplus material has come to be 
spontaneously.203 In most cases, the material is called a residue (περίττωμα), which is 
literally the remnant of either useful or useless nourishment taken in by the animal 
for the production and maintenance of necessary parts.204 Sometimes, this residue is 
useless205 (in a double sense: it did not come to be for the sake of something, and 
now that it is present the formal nature cannot use it for the sake of something), and 
is therefore excreted by the animal.206 In most cases, the formal nature of the animal 
will use the residue for something because of the material potentials it has, but, as 
Aristotle puts it emphatically, not always (PA.IV.2, 677a15-18):  
Κατάχρηται μὲν οὖν ἐνίοτε ἡ φύσις εἰς τὸ ὠφέλιμον καὶ τοῖς περιττώμασιν, οὐ μὴν διὰ 
τοῦτο δεῖ ζητεῖν πάντα ἕνεκα τίνος, ἀλλά τινων ὄντων τοιούτων ἕτερα ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα πολλά. 
                                                 
200 This is also why material processes left on their own do not produce fully operative parts with 
functions: although material processes do produce the passive potentials such as hardness, moistness, 
solidness etc. which are the prerequisites for the performance of a function (cf. GA.II.6, 743a37-b17), the 
presence of these potentials as such does not determine which function eventually will be performed by 
the part having those potentials. The softness of flesh, for example, can be explained by reference to its 
material potential; what flesh does (why it is used for protection, and why and how it also is an organ of 
touch), however, and therefore what its definition is, is something which cannot explained without 
reference to teleology (often including the actions of the formal natures). For an illuminating account on 
this issue, see Cohen (1989). 
201 GA.II.4, 739b29-30; cf. the generation of the viscera in PA.III.10, 673a32-b1 and of hair in PA.II.15, 
658b22-25. 
202 PA.IV.3, 677b22-29. 
203 Cf. PA.III.2, 663b25, PA.III.8, 671a2-3 and GA.II.7, 757a21-6. 
204 GA.I.18, 724b25-27; 725a4-5. 
205 Cf. PA.III.14, 674a13-19. 
206 This is what happens, for example, with bile; see PA.IV.2, 677a12-16. 
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“Sometimes nature makes use even of residues for some benefit, yet one should not 
on this account search for what something is for in every case; on the contrary, 
when certain things are such as they are, many other such things happen from 
necessity because of these.”  
The formal nature of the animal makes use of what is present of material necessity 
by redirecting, distributing, and organizing the flow of extra material, or simply by 
leaving it alone. There may be enough material present to form multiple structures, 
but when the material is limited, nature has to follow a functional hierarchy in 
distributing the material. This is how Aristotle explains why none of the horn-
bearing animals has a complete set of teeth (PA.III.2, 664a1-3):  
ἀφελοῦσα γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ φύσις τοῖς κέρασι προσέθηκε, καὶ ἡ διδομένη τροφὴ εἰς τοὺς 
ὀδόντας τούτους εἰς τὴν τῶν κεράτων αὔξησιν ἀναλίσκεται.  
“For taking away from there, nature adds to the horns,207 and the nourishment 
given to the upper front teeth is expended in the growth of horns.”  
The material used by the formal nature to construct one part, cannot be used in 
another place, for “nature cannot distribute the same excess to many different 
locations simultaneously” (PA.II.9, 655a26-8: ἅμα δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἰς πολλοὺς 
τόπους ἀδυνατεῖ διανέμειν ἡ φύσις.).208 An equal distribution is not an option, for the 
potentials of the residue would become weak and not be used optimally (PA.IV.12, 
694a28-694b1):  
Ἅμα δ’ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἄλλοθι ἕκαστα τούτων οὐ ποιεῖ. Διασπωμένη γὰρ ἀσθενὴς γίνεται ἡ 
φύσις τούτου τοῦ περιττώματος· 
“But it does not make each of these in different places simultaneously; for were it 
spread about, the nature of this residue would become weak.” 
In all these cases, the formal nature of the animal determines the optimal 
distribution and organization of the material that has come to be of material 
necessity during the second stage of the development of the animal, and thereby 
puts it to a good use. 
 
In sum, material necessity and secondary teleology are picked out as explanations for 
two types of parts. First, there are parts whose coming to be and presence is 
                                                 
207 Cf. PA.II.14, 658a35-36, PA.IV.13, 695b14-17, IA.17, 714a14-19, and GA.III.1, 749b27-750a4 (750a3-
4: ὃ γὰρ ἐκεῖθεν ἀφαιρεῖ ἡ φύσις προστίθησιν ἐνταῦθα). 
208 GA.IV.8, 777a15-21 (“if the secretion is diverted in the one direction it must cease in the other, unless 
some violence is done contrary to the general rule”). 
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conditionally necessitated by their primary function, but whose material constitution 
has the potentials that allow the formal nature to put the part to a second use 
without changing the part in anyway; the second function that the part needs to 
perform is never an essential or vital function. Secondly, there are parts whose 
constitutive material has come to be of material necessity, and because of the 
potentials this material has, nature organizes it in such a way that it serves a good 
purpose. The function of the part is secondary to its coming to be, and its 
performance contributes to the well-being of the animal. At this level, material 
necessity does not limit the formal nature in realizing any (necessary) functions, but 
rather presents extra opportunities to the formal nature for realizing non-necessary, 
luxurious functions.  
 
3.4.3.d Material necessity 
A small number of biological phenomena are explained by Aristotle through 
reference to material necessity alone. This is because, as we have said above, nature 
cannot and does not make use of what has come to be of material necessity in all 
cases. Here I will briefly mention the four types of biological phenomena that 
Aristotle explains without any reference to final causes.  
First, there are materials like the residues that have come to be of material 
necessity, but which, if nature does not use them for the production of some useful 
part, will be excreted soon. Homogenous parts like bile, urine, and feces belong to 
this group of useless residues; menses and sperm, too, if not used for generation, are 
excreted as useless residue.   
Secondly, in very rare cases, material necessity seems to be responsible for 
the generation of parts that are not disposed of by the formal nature, but that also 
are not put to the performance of a function in the strict sense of the word. Such 
parts are the esophagus and the spleen (for their explanations, see 3.2.3). 
Thirdly, there are the incidental characteristics or affections (the pathêmata) 
of living beings discussed above (see 3.4.3.a; GA.V.1, 778a18-21), such as eye color, 
or pitch of voice. Aristotle summarizes his discussion of these affections by 
emphasizing that they are not the result of (primary) teleology, but only of material 
necessity (GA.V.8, 789b18-20):  
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εἴρηται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὰ μόρια παθημάτων ὅσα γίγνεσθαι συμβαίνει 
μὴ ἕνεκά του ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν τὴν κινητικήν.  
“And we have spoken of the other affections of the parts which are found to occur 
not for any final end but of necessity and on account of the motive cause.” 
These features represent the individual differences between living beings of the same 
species that do not contribute to necessary or non-necessary functions.209 
A fourth type of biological phenomenon that Aristotle explains by 
reference to material necessity is that of the so-called monsters (GA.IV.3, 767b13-
15):  
τὸ δὲ τέρας οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν ἕνεκά του καὶ τὴν τοῦ τέλους αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ 
συμβεβηκὸς ἀναγκαῖον. 
“Monsters are not necessary according to the final cause or end, but they are 
accidentally necessary.”  
Monsters come to be during the process of generation when the male sperm (or 
rather the movement that is imparted through the semen) is too weak to master the 
female matter (GA.IV.3, 769b12-13). If the semen fully masters the female matter, 
then a male offspring will be born who takes after his father; if not, then the embryo 
will be deficient. These deficiencies come in different degrees. The smallest 
deficiency is when a male offspring is born, who does not resemble his father; this is 
called a ‘first monstrosity’ (GA.IV.3, 767b7-8: “for in these cases nature has in a way 
departed from the type”). The next deficiency is the birth of a female offspring. This 
is a monstrosity in some sense, but also something that is “necessary by nature” 
(GA.IV.3, 767b8-9: ἀλλ’ αὕτη μὲν ἀναγκαία τῇ φύσει), because the differentiation 
between sexes needs to be preserved for the sake of reproduction. Finally, when the 
formal nature is not able to master the material nature,210 this leads to different kinds 
of deformations (GA.IV.3, 769b30: ἀναπηρία), which are departures from the form, 
causing, for instance, the coming to be of redundant parts. These monsters are 
‘against nature’, but only against nature in the sense of regular nature (GA.IV.4, 
770b9-18); monsters, just as the residues, are natural in the sense that they are the 
result of materials left to act on their own accord, without a formal nature strong 
                                                 
209 Since there is no struggle for existence in Aristotle’s conception of the living world, differences at the 
level of individuals do not make any biological difference. 
210 GA.IV.3, 768b30-32; GA.IV.3, 769b11-13; GA.IV.4, 770b17-18: ὅταν μὴ κρατήσῃ τὴν κατὰ τὴν ὕλην ἡ 
κατὰ τὸ εἶδος φύσις. 
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enough to limit or direct the flow of materials. In this sense, the coming to be of 
monsters is an accident (GA.IV.4, 770b6: τὸ σύμπτωμα), because the lapse in the 
‘powers’ of the formal nature is accidental and not for the sake of something. 
 This brief overview shows that the role of material necessity in the 
generation of living animals is very diverse, and can be both positive and negative. In 
many cases, material necessity allows the coming to be of extra structures that 
contribute to the well-being of animals. In others, the outcomes of materially 
necessitated processes do not make any significant difference at all in the animal that 
has them. In still others, the outcomes have negative effects, because the formal 
nature of the animal is not able to realize the ends that need to be realized because it 




In the sections above, we have seen that Aristotle uses a wide variety of types of 
explanations to account for the presence, absence, and differentiations of biological 
features. Aristotle uses different explanatory strategies in different contexts, but he 
uses them consistently, following a fixed methodology in order to determine the 
facts to be explained, to discover correlating features, and finally to explain those 
facts. The explanatory project presented in PA in many ways reflects and builds 
upon the scientific ideal as presented in APo. 
Aristotle argues that the student of nature should give both the explanation 
that states the that for the sake of which and the explanation that states the cause of 
necessity, but stresses most of all the importance of the first. As we have seen, the 
importance of final causes is mainly one of explanation. In general, final causes are 
easiest to identify (either by observation of the feature to be explained itself, or by 
observation and comparison of correlating features), and from the discovery of the 
final cause the necessary antecedents in terms of material or efficient causation can 
be derived. Final causes therefore prove to be of important heuristic value, while 
other types of causes – such as the formal and the material cause – picked out in the 
same teleological explanations are causally primary. This does not mean that final 
causes do not play any causal role: functions are subsumed in the forms or essences 
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of living beings, and as such determine the direction and limits of generation and 
growth of the living being, and conditionally necessitate the coming to be of the 
materials constitutive of the functional parts. It only means that the formal cause 
that includes functions, or the material that has certain material potentials usable for 
certain functions, precede and necessitate for the most part the end that constitutes 
the final cause, and that it are these ends that form the starting point of explanation.  
 We have found that Aristotle uses two general types of teleological 
explanations: one that refers directly to final causes, and one that uses teleological 
principles to set the heuristic framework from which subsequently final causes can 
be derived or inferred. These two types of explanations are not used in an indifferent 
way, but are applied at different stages in the explanation of biological phenomena.  
In those cases where the functions and ends of features are readily 
discernable, Aristotle refers to those functions and ends immediately to explain the 
presence of those features, and then determines whether their coming to be is due to 
conditional or material necessity. When the function that explains the presence of 
the feature to be explained is a necessary (i.e. vital or essential) function, the 
teleology operative is primary. Necessary functions are part of the form or essence 
of animals, and therefore conditionally necessitate the coming to be of the parts and 
their differentiations for the sake of the (better) performance of those functions. 
When the function that explains the presence of the part is non-necessary (or 
‘luxurious’), the teleology operative is secondary. Non-necessary functions are 
imparted by the formal nature of an animal upon structures that have come to be by 
material necessity because of the material potentials available in them. The different 
verbs of action ascribed to the formal nature of an animal correspond to the two 
causal patterns that underlie the coming to be of animals and their parts (and thus 
are not just mere metaphors). The description of a nature that makes parts for the 
sake of something represents primary teleology, while the description of a nature 
that uses parts or materials for the sake of something, represents secondary teleology. 
Teleological principles are invoked in those rarer cases where the functions 
or ends of features are not readily discernible, or when the absence of features is at 
stake. In these special cases, generalizations over what the formal nature of living 
beings for the most part does or does not do determine the ‘natural possibilities’ or 
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boundaries within which the explanation ultimately should take place. Because the 
feature to be explained belongs to a kind of animal that shares its form with a larger 
group of animals, the explanation of the presence, absence, or differentiation of that 
feature needs to be found within the confinements of the natural possibilities (i.e. 
the existing, observed realizations of form) found within that group. Within this 
teleological framework, Aristotle draws inferences to the best explanation of the 
features to be explained. The two types of teleological explanations thus 
complement each other in accounting for as many biological phenomena as possible.  
 Necessity is spoken of in many ways in Aristotle, not only in his theoretical 
discussions of the relation between teleology and necessity, but also in his actual 
explanations. The main problem Aristotle finds in his materialist predecessors is that 
they do not take into consideration the special kind of necessitation that is imparted 
by material natures in the sublunary realm. While in the eternal realm of the heavens 
the prior in a causal sequence always and without exception necessitates the coming 
to be of the posterior, in the sublunary realm – that is subjected to generation and 
decay – the prior necessitates the posterior only for the most part, but not always. In 
addition, the materialist predecessors failed to see that material necessity in the 
sublunary realm is mostly (but not exclusively) subject to final causation: it is only on 
the assumption that a certain end needs to be realized that certain materials and 
structures come to be. The upshot is that concerning the sublunary natural 
phenomena one can only draw inferences from the end-result to the prior necessary 
prerequisites, but not the other way around; there is no unqualified necessity in a 
modal sense in the sublunary realm.  
Complete living beings thus reflect three types of causal processes. First, 
primary teleology and conditional necessity are responsible for the parts performing 
the necessary functions, which are created first in the order of generation. On a 
secondary level, they are also responsible for the parts that contribute to the 
performance of necessary functions, which are created next. Second, secondary 
teleology and material necessity are responsible for the parts that perform functions 
that are non-necessary, but contribute to the well-being of the living being. Third, 
material necessity is responsible for the useless residues, for the presence of a few 
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parts that do not have proper functions, for the individual pathêmata of each living 
being, and sometimes for the generation of monsters.  
In sum, nature is a good housekeeper, whose goal-directed actions at 
different stages of the living being’s development produce living beings that are able 
to survive and reproduce, but are also able to enjoy a certain amount of well-being.
  
Appendix: Typology of Parts and Explanations in PA 
 
NECESSARY PARTS AND FUNCTIONS NON-NECESSARY PARTS AND FUNCTIONS 
I. Essential Parts 
(parts are included 
in the definition of 
the substantial 
being of the 
animal; their 
presence is 
necessary for the 
performance of a 
primary function) 
I. Vital Parts 
(parts are necessary 
for the animal to 
stay alive; their 
presence is 
necessary for the 




(parts are not 
necessary for 
the survival or 
being of the 
animal, but they 
contribute its 
well-being; the 




(parts are not 
necessary for 
the animal in 
terms of being 
or survival, but 
they ‘improve’ 




(parts are not 
necessary for 
the animal in 
any way as they 
do not 




Eyes – Perception 
(all animals)   
 
Wings – Flying  
(birds) 
 
Lungs – Cooling 
through air  
(all blooded land-
dwellers & some 
waterdwellers) 
 







Heart - Warming 
 




Mouth – Receiving 
nutrition 
 
Anus, Intestines  – 
excretion residues 
 































 EXPLANATION   
Primary Teleology &  
Conditional Necessity; 
Function is the cause of the coming to be 
and of the presence of the part; 




Necessity on a 
secondary level; 
Parts do not 
have a proper 






Function is the 
cause of the 
presence, not of 
the coming to 
be of the part; 








cause of the 
coming to be 
and the presence 
of the part; parts 




CHAPTER FOUR:  
MAKING SENSE OF THE HEAVENS 




As we have seen in the previous chapters, Aristotle’s theory of natural teleology is 
crucial for the explanation of all natural phenomena: everything that exists or comes 
to be ‘by nature’ comes to be or changes, unless prevented, for a purpose and 
towards an end, and is present for the sake of that purpose or end. The final cause, 
closely related to Aristotle’s concept of nature as an internal principle of movement, 
operates among animate beings (like plants, animals and humans) and inanimate 
objects (such as the elements)1 alike, and thus finds its way also into the 
cosmological realm of the elements and heavenly bodies, comprising stars (astra), 
planets (planêtes, planômena astra), and the sun and the moon.  
 In De Caelo (Cael.), which contains in the first two books Aristotle’s 
problem-steered exposition of his cosmology, traces of his teleological worldview are 
abundant. The nature of the elements is claimed to be such that it provides them 
with an immanent capacity to exercise their specific movements to reach their 
natural places. Left to their own devices, the four sublunary elements would naturally 
move to their natural places and thus constitute four separate, concentrically 
arranged spheres.2 Teleology also permeates the heavenly domain, as all celestial 
movements are said to be trying to reach “the most divine principle” as a final cause 
(Cael.II.12, 292b20-25). Although teleology as a natural tendency is thus without 
doubt an important part of the make-up of Aristotle’s cosmology and celestial 
physics, his general reliance on teleology to explain the different motions and 
features of the heavenly bodies seems to be limited in comparison with the other 
physical treatises. For the whole of Cael. contains only seven instances of explicit 
teleological explanations of cosmological phenomena, six of which are in the second 
book (there is only one instance of teleological explanation in book one, there are 
                                                 
1 Meteor.IV.12. 
2 Bodnár & Pellegrin (2006), 282.  
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none in books three and four).3 Moreover, with one exception (in Cael.II.3, 286a8-9), 
none of these explanations refer directly to final causes. Instead, they all proceed 
through the supposition of teleological principles, which (as I argued in chapter 3.3) 
in biology are only applied in very specific explanatory contexts, namely in those 
cases where the discovery of causes is relatively difficult. This suggests that teleology 
is not readily discernible in the case of the heavens. Aristotle’s use of teleological 
principles is all the more remarkable, because the teleological explanations are the 
only fully-fledged physical explanations Aristotle offers in this treatise. By this I 
mean that the teleological explanations are the only explanations that address the 
nature and causes of the various features and movements of the heavens. The 
treatise mostly consists of statements of fact and mathematical arguments, 
addressing the shape and possible motions of the heavenly bodies. 
The first group of teleological explanations contains explanations that stand 
on their own (i.e. they are not part of an interrelated sequence of arguments) and 
that set out to explain the presence of certain features and motions of the heavens.4 
For instance, in Cael.II.3, Aristotle explains the plurality of the motions of the 
heavens by the principle that everything that has a function is for the sake of that 
function, and that the function of the divine is to move in a circle for eternity; the 
other motions are necessary by conditional necessity if there is to be generation. In 
Cael.II.5, Aristotle concludes that the heavens must move forward (i.e. in the most 
honorable direction), if it is the case that nature always does what is best among the 
possibilities. In Cael.II.12, Aristotle uses the analogy of goal-directed actions 
performed by sublunary beings to explain the complexity of the motions of the 
heavens. In these cases, Aristotle tries to find an explanation for the presence of 
some fact on the assumption that whatever is observed to exist must serve some 
good. 
The second group contains those explanations that form the last argument 
Aristotle offers after a series of mathematical arguments. While the latter point out 
that it is mathematically impossible for some motion or feature of the heavens to be 
                                                 
3 For the teleological explanations, see Cael.I.4, 271a22-33; Cael.II.3, 286a7-9; Cael.II.5, 288a2-12; Cael.II.8, 
290a29-35; Cael.II.9, 291a23-25; Cael.II.11, 291b10-15; Cael.II.12, 292a15-b25. 
4 Evidently there are no teleological explanations of the generation of the heavenly bodies as they are 
eternal and not generated. Cosmological teleological explanations are thus naturally restricted to the 
explanation of the features and motions belonging (or not belonging) to the eternal heavenly bodies. 
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present, the teleological explanation is set up to provide a counterfactual argument 
claiming that those phenomena in reality do not exist, because if they did they would 
be in vain. The teleological principle invoked to explain the absence of heavenly 
features in these cases is that nature does nothing in vain. In short, in Cael.I.4, 
Aristotle argues that there is no movement contrary to a circle, for if there were, one 
body performing that movement would not be able to actually perform its 
movement, and hence would be in vain. In Cael.II.8 Aristotle argues that nature did 
not provide organs for movements to the stars and planets, because they are not 
‘intended’ to move on their own, and so their organs for movement would be in 
vain. The argument in Cael.II.11 is connected to the previous one, for Aristotle 
claims that nature gave stars and planets the shape they have (i.e. spherical), because 
it is the shape least fit for movement on their own. In Cael.II.9 Aristotle claims that 
because nature foresaw the negative consequences of stars and planets moving on 
their own (their noise would make life as we know it impossible), stars and planets 
do not move on their own. 
In this chapter, I aim to shed light on the specific nature of the above 
mentioned teleological explanations in Aristotle’s cosmology and on the problems 
related to their application within this particular branch of the science of nature. In 
addition, I will argue that the use of teleological principles follows from Aristotle’s 
approach to cosmology as a natural science.  
The issues I would like to discuss in this chapter have received relatively 
little attention in the scholarly literature on Aristotle. Scholars who have studied 
teleology in Aristotle’s cosmology have focused almost exclusively on the role of the 
Prime Mover as a final cause in Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics.5 On the other 
hand, Leggatt, in his commentary on De Caelo, claims that Aristotle consciously 
played down the role of teleology in his cosmological treatise, because of his alleged 
dissatisfaction with the type of intentional and psychological teleological 
explanations deployed by Plato in the Timaeus.6 Hence, Leggatt offers little analysis 
of the teleological explanations actually provided in this treatise, because he believes 
them to be of little importance.  
                                                 
5 See, in particular, Kahn (1985). Other studies on cosmology have either left out the question of teleology 
completely (Falcon, 2005), or have subsumed it under the ‘normal’ use of teleology (Johnson, 2005). 
6 Leggatt (1995), 18; 36-37; 207. 
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My main goal will be to show that Aristotle has no reservations about using 
teleological explanations in cosmology, but rather attributes special explanatory force 
to them. In particular, I will argue that the way Aristotle uses teleological principles 
to explain heavenly phenomena, builds upon their – very successful – usage in 
biology, and is thus consistent with his physical approach to cosmology. This is an 
approach he shares with Plato; hence, in my view, Aristotle is not so much fighting 
Plato here, but rather the astronomers who approached cosmology mainly as a 
mathematical science. 
In the first section (4.1), I will offer some further notes on the scientific 
status of cosmology, and argue against Leggatt’s interpretation of the role of 
teleology in Cael. Next, I will present my own interpretation of the teleological 
explanations that address the presence of heavenly phenomena. The teleological 
explanations addressing the absence of heavenly phenomena will be discussed in the 
next and final section (4.2).  
 
4.1 Teleological principles and the explanation of the presence of 
cosmological features 
 
4.1.1 Cosmology as science of nature 
The approach to cosmology taken by Aristotle’s predecessors and contemporaries, 
described as astrologia by Aristotle (corresponding to what we call ‘astronomy’), had 
predominantly been mathematical. The homocentric theories put forward by 
Eudoxus and revised by Callippus were geometrical models that explained the 
apparent movements of the stars and planets by hypothesizing a complex system of 
concentric spheres. The models did not explain the physical mechanics and causes 
underlying those movements,7 mainly because the astronomers were not concerned 
with those issues.8 For Aristotle, however, just as for Plato, cosmology is a part of 
the investigation of nature, and he thus endorsed a ‘physicalized’ conception of the 
                                                 
7 According to Aristotle, astronomy does not at all deal with perceptible magnitudes or with the heavens 
above: see Met.I.8, 989b33-990a15; Met.III.2, 997b16-998a1; and Met.XIII.2, 1076b39-1077a4. 
8 Heath (1932), xliv-xlv; however, see Wright (1973-1974), for a ‘physical’ interpretation of the models of 
Eudoxus. 
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science of cosmology.9 This is evidenced, for instance, in his claim that each of the 
spheres in his system is corporeal, and thus not simply a mathematical construct 
(Cael.II.12, 293a7-8):  
ἑκάστη δὲ σφαῖρα σῶμά τι τυγχάνει ὄν. 
  “For each sphere is some kind of body.” 
Thus, if for Aristotle cosmology is part of the science of nature, and if scientific 
knowledge involves the knowledge of all four causes,10 a mathematical approach to 
cosmology will not be sufficient, for the following reasons. By its very nature, 
mathematical reasoning cannot yield understanding of final causes (there are no final 
causes in mathematics, because there is no change or good in that domain).11 Hence, 
mathematical astronomy only yields understanding of the shape and size of the 
heavenly bodies, and of their distances from each other and from the earth. This 
gives important information about the mathematical properties of the heavenly 
bodies, especially if combined with arguments drawing from principles of physics, 
and certainly Aristotle incorporates some of the most successful astronomical 
theories in his own investigations.12 However, as a natural philosopher, Aristotle is 
also interested in the nature of the heavenly bodies, in their material composition, 
and in the causes of their movements (i.e. in their material, formal, efficient, and 
final causes).13 The opening words of Cael. are significant (Cael.I.1, 268a1-4): 
Ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμη σχεδὸν ἡ πλείστη φαίνεται περί τε σώματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ 
τούτων οὖσα πάθη καὶ τὰς κινήσεις, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅσαι τῆς τοιαύτης οὐσίας 
εἰσίν·  
                                                 
9 Aristotle emphatically introduces his study of the heavens as a part of the study of nature: see Cael.I.1, 
268a1: Ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμη; cf. Cael.III.1, 298b2-3: τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας, Meteor.I.1, 338a20-5. 
Building upon these passages, one could define Aristotelian cosmology as the natural science and 
investigation (hê peri phuseôs episteme, hê peri phuseôs historiea) of the properties (pathê), motions (kinêseis) and 
functions (erga) of bodies (sômata) in the universe, that is, of both the simple bodies such as the elements 
and of the bodies that are composed of them (i.e. the heavens as a whole and its parts), and of their 
principles (archai). 
10 See chapter 1.1 and 5.1; cf. Falcon (2005), 15. 
11 Met.II.2, 996a21-b1. 
12 On Aristotle’s knowledge and use of the Eudoxan theory of concentric spheres, see Mendell (2000), 78-
83. 
13 See Ph.II.2, 193b22-194a12 and Cael.II.14, 297a2-4 (Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν 
λεγόμενα περὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν; “what the mathematicians say in astronomy also testifies to this”); cf. 
Simplicius In Ph. 293, 7-10 and In Ph. 290, 20-24 on the Greek conception of astronomy as being part of 
mathematics, not physics; Mueller (2006), 179-181. 
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“The science of nature is clearly concerned for the most with bodies and 
magnitudes, the affections and motions of these, and further, with the principles, as 
many as belong to this kind of substance.” 
Because the physical sciences are concerned with all four types of causes, and 
especially the understanding of final causes is crucial (because they are concerned 
with things that undergo change), Aristotle needs an additional strategy to extend 
scientific knowledge as he understands it to the domain of the heavens. This strategy 
involves the application of teleological principles, of the sort he employs in his 
biology (see 3.3) precisely as a heuristic for finding final causes where they are not 
immediately observable. In short, Aristotle uses teleological principles to discover 
purposes and functions among the heavenly phenomena, and thereby tries to turn 
cosmology into a proper physical science. 
Aristotle’s ‘physical’ approach towards cosmology also explains why the 
teleological explanations are mainly found in the second book of Cael. For it is this 
book that deals most specifically with the heavenly bodies qua subjects of motion, 
that is, with the plurality, direction, and complexity of their motions, the physical 
mechanisms underlying those motions, and the shape of the heavenly bodies 
required to perform those motions. On the other hand, we find no teleological 
accounts regarding Aristotle’s views on the nature of the heavens as a whole (for 
instance, for such features as the heaven’s size, uniqueness or eternity, topics that are 
dealt with primarily in book I), or regarding the motions and features of the four 
terrestrial elements (dealt with in books III and IV), which are not part of cosmology 
properly speaking. Aristotle’s use of causal language in Cael. also reveals that the 
second book is more concerned with Aristotle’s own attempts to provide physical 
explanations than any of the other books: of the 28 occurrences of the term aition in 
the whole of Cael., 10 can be found in the second book (as opposed to 4 in book I; 3 
in book III, and 11 in book IV), and of the 28 occurrences of the term aitia, 21 can 
be found in the second book (as opposed to none in the first and the third book, 
and 7 in the fourth), while the references to causes and explanations in the fourth 
book are often14 – although not exclusively – used in descriptions of views 
entertained by Aristotle’s predecessors. 
                                                 
14 I.e. in Cael.IV.1, 308a25; Cael.IV.2, 309a5; Cael.IV.2, 309a10; Cael.IV.2, 309a28; Cael.IV.2, 310a2; 
Cael.IV.6, 313a22. 
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As we have seen in the previous chapter, scientific research for Aristotle comprises 
two stages of enquiry: first, one is to conduct systematic observations of the 
phenomena, and next one is to give causal explanations of these phenomena. 
However, as Aristotle makes clear several times in Cael., it is not at all an easy 
undertaking to give physical explanations of cosmological phenomena. The central 
problem is the limitedness – or even lack – of empirical evidence: the observations 
of the heavens we have are too few, and the objects of observation are too far away 
to offer any certain evidence.15 The only observation that seems to be rock solid is 
that of the rotation of the heavens (Cael.I.5, 272a5-6: τὸν δ’ οὐρανὸν ὁρῶμεν κύκλῳ 
στρεφόμενον; “we see the heavens turning about in a circle”). Notwithstanding the 
many methodological caveats we find in Cael. (I will discuss them in 4.1.3 below), 
Aristotle remains confident that it is still possible to give explanations of 
cosmological phenomena that go beyond the mere fact that heavens rotate, and also 
beyond the conclusions mathematical reasoning yields about for instance sizes, 
shapes, and distances. 
My contention is that Aristotle’s use of teleological principles, by analogy of 
their use in the biological domain,16 forms an important part of his strategy to 
increase the possibility of gaining scientific knowledge of the heavens. Thus, when 
Aristotle does proceed to give ‘physical’ (as opposed to mathematical) explanations, 
he is unremittingly teleological in his approach. The explanations thus presented will 
not qualify as demonstrations in a strict sense (i.e. not as demonstrations as 
described in the APo. or PA),17 because they do not set out to demonstrate the truth 
but merely the reasonableness of certain causal scenarios. However, they go a long 
way in taking away some of the puzzlement pertaining to the heavenly realm and 
thus in making sense of the heavenly phenomena. And as Aristotle has indicated 
elsewhere,18 ‘making sense’ in such difficult circumstances entails giving an account 
of the heavens that is free of impossibilities. 
 
                                                 
15 Cf. Mete.I.7 and APr.I.30. 
16 Pace Falcon (2005, 101), who argues that “Aristotle is reluctant to extend the results achieved in the 
study of plants and animals to the imperishable creatures populating the celestial world.”  
17 Cf. Lloyd (1996), 182. 
18 Mete.I.7, 344a5-7: “We consider a satisfactory explanation of phenomena inaccessible to observation to 
have been given when we reduce them to what is possible (ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν τῇ αἰσθήσει νομίζομεν 
ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀναγάγωμεν).” 
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4.1.2 Leggatt on teleology in De Caelo 
Before turning to a discussion of Aristotle’s actual teleological explanations in his 
cosmology, and to a defense of my view of the role of teleology in this particular 
branch of the science of nature, I would first like to review some of the remarks 
Leggatt makes in his commentary on Aristotle’s Cael., because he addresses to some 
extent the same question of the role of teleology in Aristotle’s cosmology. Leggatt’s 
answer is that Aristotle consciously tried to exclude teleology at certain levels of his 
cosmological explanation because of his dissatisfaction with Plato’s teleological 
cosmology.19 I find this interpretation unconvincing.  
In the first place, one could object that Leggatt does not explain why 
Aristotle on seven occasions emphatically does rely on teleological principles in his 
explanation of various features of the cosmos. Aristotle’s dissatisfaction with Plato’s 
teleological cosmology was apparently not so great for him not to use teleology at all. 
In the second place, Aristotle usually never shuns to either openly or implicitly 
discuss or reject Platonic theories from the Timaeus, and there is no indication that 
this is different for Cael.20 However, against Leggatt’s interpretation, there is not a 
single instance in the Cael. (nor, remarkably enough, anywhere else in the corpus) 
where Aristotle criticizes Plato’s conception of teleology, or addresses the subject at 
all. Leggatt’s argument proceeds fully ex silentio. A third and last objection to 
Leggatt’s interpretation is that in the few instances that Aristotle relies on 
teleological principles to explain certain cosmological phenomena, he does so in 
language that is very similar to the intentional, psychological, and providential 
teleological language of the Timaeus. Nature is personified numerous times in the 
treatise and is thereby portrayed as a creative, thinking, caring, and even foreseeing 
‘being’.21 In Cael.I.4 Aristotle speaks, somewhat surprisingly, of a god next to nature 
                                                 
19 Leggatt (1995), 18; 36-37; 207. 
20 Lloyd (1996), 175. 
21 See Cael.I.1, 268a13 (“according to the laws of nature”), Cael.I.1, 268a19-20 (“nature itself leads us 
there”), Cael.I.3, 270a20 (“nature seems rightly to have set”), Cael.I.4, 271a33 (“god and nature make 
nothing in vain”), Cael.II.5, 288a2-3 (“for if nature always produces the best of possibilities”), Cael.II.8, 
290a30-35 (“it is would be absurd that nature gave them no organ for movement – since nature does 
nothing as a matter of chance – and that she should care for animals, but disregard such honorable 
beings; rather, it seems that she, as though deliberately, removed everything by means of which they 
might possibly in themselves have effected forward motion, and that she set them at the greatest distance 
form those things that possess organs for movement”), Cael.II.9, 291a24-25 (“as though nature foresaw 
what was going to be”), Cael.II.11, 291b13-14 (“since nature does nothing without reason or in vain”), 
Cael.II.12, 293a2-4 (“in this way, then, nature both balances things and produces a certain order, having 
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who never produces anything in vain (Cael.I.4, 271a33: Ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν 
μάτην ποιοῦσιν); this might of course be no more than a colloquialism, but it at least 
shows that Aristotle is not that concerned at all with avoiding the theological or 
craft-related language of the Timaeus, here nor in any other of his works.  
In general, Aristotle’s De Caelo is set out as treatise discussing various 
problems and aspects concerning the cosmos starting from Aristotle’s own physical 
principles as set out in his Physica. It’s main concern is not to address all the topics 
from Plato’s Timaeus and to refute or criticize them,22 but to provide an autonomous 
and general explanatory framework saving as much of the phenomena23 in the 
heavens as possible.  
 
4.1.3 Explaining what is present in an empirically underdetermined domain 
For the purpose of clarity, I will offer in this section a separate discussion of the 
teleological arguments in Cael. that are not part of a series, but rather stand on their 
own for the sake of explaining the presence of certain motions and features of the 
heavens (these are the explanations in Cael.II.2, Cael.II.5, and Cael.II.12). Before 
turning to a discussion of the use of teleological principles in these explanations, I 
will first say a few words about the status and supposed explanatory force of the 
explanations.  
Aristotle is very well aware of the fact that offering explanations of what is 
present in the heavens is problematic and difficult given the lack of empirical 
evidence.24 All three explanations that set out to explain the presence of a feature or 
motion of the heavenly bodies are immediately preceded by discussions of the 
methodological problems related to this very enterprise of providing explanations in 
the strong sense for phenomena at such a remove. In Cael.II.3, for example, 
                                                                                                               
given many bodies to a single locomotion, and many loco-motions to a single body”); Cael.III.8, 306b15-
16 (“indeed it seems as if nature itself here shows us the truth of a conclusion to which more abstract 
reasoning also points”). 
22 Cf. Solmsen (1960), 318. 
23 On Aristotle’s project of ‘saving the phenomena’, see Kosman (2000), 89-105; Owen (1961); and 
Nussbaum (1986), 240-263. In Cael., I take phainomena to mean ‘the way people take the heavens to be 
based on their observations of them’, not ‘(theory neutral) observed facts’. 
24 Cf. Burnyeat (2004), 15-16, who observes that “Cael.I. contains an unusually high number of 
occurrences of words like eikotôs and eulogon which express epistemic modesty.” I would like to add to this 
observation that words of ‘epistemic modesty’ are even more abundant in the second book of this treatise 
where the explanation of presence and absence of heavenly features properly speaking is at stake (I 
counted only two occurrences of the word eulogon and none of the word eikotôs in Cael.I; in Cael.II, I 
counted fifteen occurrences of the word eulogon and two of the word eikotôs). 
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Aristotle indicates that the examination of the question of why there are several 
locomotions of the heavens is complicated, but that this is no reason not at least to 
attempt to give an explanation (Cael.II.3, 286a3-7):  
Ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντία κίνησις ἡ κύκλῳ τῇ κύκλῳ, σκεπτέον διὰ τί πλείους εἰσὶ 
φοραί, καίπερ πόρρωθεν πειρωμένοις ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ζήτησιν, πόρρω δ’ οὐχ οὕτω τῷ 
τόπῳ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ τῶν συμβεβηκότων αὐτοῖς περὶ πάμπαν ὀλίγων ἔχειν 
αἴσθησιν. Ὅμως δὲ λέγωμεν. Ἡ δ’ αἰτία περὶ αὐτῶν ἐνθένδε ληπτέα.  
“Since there is no movement in a circle contrary to movement in a circle, we must 
examine why there are several locomotions, though we must try to conduct the 
inquiry from far off – far off not so much in the sense of spatial distance, but rather 
by virtue of the fact that we have perception of very few of the attributes that 
belong to them [the heavens]. Nonetheless, let us speak of the matter. The 
explanation concerning these things must be grasped from the following 
[considerations].” 
The problem Aristotle signals with regard to a scientific investigation of the heavens 
is not just that we are too far removed from the objects of inquiry in distance, but 
also that the type of observation available to us is limited – we cannot dissect the 
heavenly bodies for instance. It is significant that Aristotle nevertheless is confident 
that there is a way of answering this particular question, and that this answer follows 
from teleological considerations. For the consideration ‘from which the explanation 
must be grasped’ is the supposition of the teleological principle that everything that 
has a function must exist for the sake of that function. We will analyze Aristotle’s 
explanation for the existence of several motions of the heavens below, but for now 
it is important to note that Aristotle thinks that the use of teleological principles can 
contribute to the project of gaining knowledge of the heavens. By positing a 
teleological principle, and hence by setting the framework within which one can 
search for the possible functions of those very features that have been observed, one 
might be able to grasp the explanation of why those features are present. On the 
other hand, the implication also seems to be that this kind of knowledge cannot be 
gained by other means: observation is certainly ruled out (observation in this case 
will only yield knowledge of the fact that there are several movement, not of the 
reason why), but also mathematical arguments are not what is called for in these 
situations (for reasons that I will discuss below in 4.1.4.a).  
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The situation is comparable in Cael.II.5, where Aristotle attempts to resolve the 
problem of why the heavens move in the direction they do, as circular motion has – 
mathematically speaking – two possible directions. That the heavens move in one 
direction rather than in the other one must have an explanation, for “either this must 
be a principle or there has to be a principle of it” (Cael.II.5, 287b28). This means that 
the direction of the movements must either be a brute fact of the universe as it is 
(i.e. there is no explanation to be given), or it is dependent on something else, in 
which case it must be possible to give an explanation of it. Before presenting his 
explanation, set out explicitly in teleological terms, Aristotle refers first to the 
difficulty of the subject matter and the limited level of security and plausibility 
attainable in this case (Cael.II.5, 287b29-288a2): 
Ἴσως μὲν οὖν τὸ περὶ ἐνίων ἀποφαίνεσθαί τι πειρᾶσθαι καὶ τὸ περὶ πάντων καὶ τὸ 
παριέναι μηθὲν τάχ’ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι σημεῖον ἢ πολλῆς εὐηθείας ἢ πολλῆς προθυμίας. 
Οὐ μὴν δίκαιόν γε πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐπιτιμᾶν, ἀλλ’ ὁρᾶν δεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ λέγειν τίς ἐστιν, 
ἔτι δὲ πῶς ἔχων τῷ πιστεύειν, πότερον ἀνθρωπίνως ἢ καρτερώτερον. Τὰς μὲν οὖν 
ἀκριβεστέρας ἀνάγκας, ὅταν τις ἐπιτύχῃ, τότε χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ τοῖς εὑρίσκουσι, νῦν δὲ τὸ 
φαινόμενον ῥητέον.  
“Perhaps, then, the attempt to make some statement about some matters, and 
indeed on all matters, and to omit nothing, may well seem to be a mark of great 
simple-mindedness or of much zeal. Yet it is by no means right to censure all 
people alike, but one should consider what their reason is for speaking – what it is – 
and, in addition, the sort of conviction involved in it, whether it is suited to man25 
or something stronger. As to more accurate necessities, whenever someone hits 
upon them, then we should be grateful to those who found them, but for now we 
should state the phenomena.” 
Here Aristotle offers a justification for the kind of approach he takes in 
cosmological inquiry. People might object that the attempt to answer a particular 
question pertaining to the motions of the heavens is ridiculous or hubristic, but what 
should be censured are the intentions and the epistemic attitude of the person 
carrying out the attempt.26 Aristotle readily admits that given what is known about 
the heavens it will not be possible (not for him at least, but, as Aristotle indicates, it 
                                                 
25 Cf. Cael.I.3, 270a12-13: “this also emerges with sufficient assurance from perception, in a manner 
sufficient at least for mortal belief, so to speak.” 
26 Falcon (2005), 98. 
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might be for somebody else) to give an explanation that ‘touches upon more 
accurate necessities’. For now Aristotle gives what he objectively takes to be the 
most plausible explanation; and again this explanation is unremittingly teleological in 
nature.  
 In Cael.II.12, finally, Aristotle deals with two remaining difficulties 
concerning the movements of the stars and the planets. He introduces these two 
problems as follows (Cael.II.12, 291b24-28): 
Δυοῖν δ’ ἀπορίαιν οὔσαιν, περὶ ὧν εἰκότως ἂν ὁστισοῦν ἀπορήσειε, πειρατέον λέγειν τὸ 
φαινόμενον, αἰδοῦς ἀξίαν εἶναι νομίζοντας τὴν προθυμίαν μᾶλλον ἢ θράσους, εἴ τις διὰ 
τὸ φιλοσοφίας διψῆν καὶ μικρὰς εὐπορίας ἀγαπᾷ περὶ ὧν τὰς μεγίστας ἔχομεν ἀπορίας.  
“Since there are two difficulties about which one might reasonably be troubled, we 
should try to state the phenomenon, considering the eagerness to do so a mark of 
modesty rather than of excessive ambition, if, out of thirst for philosophy, one is 
content with small solutions in things in which we have the greatest difficulties.” 
The issues Aristotle addresses here are familiar ones: even if the difficulties are 
particularly great, one should try to give the most plausible explanation one is able to 
offer, no matter how small the solution will be; to do so is not something excessive, 
but part of what philosophy or the attempt to acquire knowledge is all about. 
Therefore, the attempt to state the phenomenon is appropriate. Before solving the 
first of these two difficulties, Aristotle adds another methodological caveat and 
justification of the approach taken (Cael.II.12, 292a14-18):  
Περὶ δὴ τούτων ζητεῖν μὲν καλῶς ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον σύνεσιν, καίπερ μικρὰς 
ἔχοντας ἀφορμὰς καὶ τοσαύτην ἀπόστασιν ἀπέχοντας τῶν περὶ αὐτὰ συμβαινόντων· 
ὅμως δ’ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων θεωροῦσιν οὐδὲν ἄλογον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τὸ νῦν 
ἀπορούμενον.  
“About these things it is worthwhile to seek more understanding, even though we 
have very little resources to start from and that we are at such a great distance from 
what is happening with them [i.e. the heavenly bodies]. Nonetheless, by beginning 
our study from the following [sort of consideration], the present difficulty will not 
appear as anything absurd.” 
The consideration that follows and that will render the difficulty less absurd is again 
teleological in nature (Aristotle uses an analogy based on the goal-directed actions of 
the living beings in the sublunary world). Even though we are far removed from the 
objects of inquiry (for this theme of us being far removed from the heavenly bodies, 
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see also PA.I.5, 644b22-645a5), Aristotle thinks it is possible to extend our 
understanding of the heavens by employing teleological argumentations; the aporia 
might not be solved completely, but the expectation is that teleology will at least 
render the phenomena less perplexing.  
 The tentativeness expressed in these methodological introductions is in line 
with Aristotle’s other remarks elsewhere about what his explanations in general add 
up to.27 According to these remarks Aristotle believes that his explanations amount 
to pistis, but not to alêtheia, and that they are reasonable (eulogon).28 However, this 
does not mean that the explanations actually offered do not objectively speaking 
(and not just in Aristotle’s own view) constitute the most plausible accounts of the 
heavenly phenomena: given the limitations, the explanations offered are the best 
ones possible.29 Thus, although the observations we have are few and limited,30 the 
observed phenomena can be accounted for by positing teleological principles.31  
 
4.1.4 Stating the phenomena by the use of teleological principles 
In the previous section, I claimed that Aristotle uses teleological explanations to 
account for the presence of features and motions of the heavens (i.e. for the 
observed heavenly phenomena) that are difficult to explain otherwise, because of 
our limited access to the heavenly bodies. In this section, I will finally offer an 
                                                 
27 E.g. in Cael.I.4, 270b32-3; Cael.II.1, 283b29-30; and Cael.II.11, 291b11. 
28 Cf. again Aristotle ‘standards’ for explanations regarding things to which we only have limited access in 
Mete.I.7, 344a5-7.  
29 Pace Guthrie (1939), 165. 
30 They are not altogether absent: we can observe for instance that the heavens have more than one 
motion, that they move in a certain direction, and that the planets furthest from the fixed stars undergo 
fewer movements than those nearer to them: see Cael.II.3, 286a3-6; Cael.II.5, 287b24-27; Cael.II.12, 
292a3-9; cf. Cael.II.8, 289b1. See also Lloyd (1996), 162-163 on the observational data from which 
Aristotle drew.  
31 This point is also made by Lloyd (1996, 171) with regard to the explanations in Cael.II.5 and Cael.II.12: 
“Thus it is surely significant that both on the problem of why the heavens revolve in one direction rather 
than in the other – in II 5 – and on the difficulty of the complexities of the movements of the non-fixed 
stars – in II 12 – his positive speculations invoke teleology.” I disagree, however, with Lloyd’s 
interpretation of the significance of this connection between Aristotle’s methodological disclaimers on the 
one hand and his use of teleology on the other: according to Lloyd (1996, 161; 173; 175; 180), Aristotle’s 
main interest in cosmology follows from his concern to establish his teleology, and especially the 
orderliness of the heavens. However, I do not believe that Aristotle’s epistemological hesitations are not 
genuine here, or that Aristotle’s concern for teleology is all that prominent in Cael. (in comparison to the 
other physical treatises, there are relatively few references to teleology). On the contrary, I believe that 
Aristotle uses his teleology, already firmly established on the basis of the abundance of empirical evidence 
discussed in his biological works, to extend – where possible – his knowledge of the heavens.  
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analysis of the actual teleological explanations given in Cael.II.3, Cael.II.5, and 
Cael.II.12, and offer an assessment of their explanatory force.  
 
4.1.4.a Why there are several locomotions of the heavens 
In Cael.II.3, Aristotle states the following teleological principle from which ‘the 
explanation of why there are several locomotions of the heavens must be grasped’ 
(Cael.II.3, 286a8): 
 Ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὧν ἐστιν ἔργον, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔργου.  
“Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function.” 
Through the statement of the principle (common in Aristotle’s biology; see e.g. 
PA.I.5, 645b15-18) that everything that has a function is present for the sake of that 
function, Aristotle makes explicit that in his view teleology extends to the heavenly 
domain, and hence some of the puzzling phenomena can be explained by reference 
to teleology. Aristotle also must refer to teleology here, since material causes alone 
cannot account for the differences in locomotions in the heavens (for all spheres are 
made from the same material).32 The assumption that everything that has a function 
is present for the sake of that function allows a series of inferences that ultimately 
yield (at least part of) the explanation of why there are several locomotions of the 
heavens. Accordingly, Aristotle continues by stating the explanation (Cael.II.3, 
286a8-11):  
Θεοῦ δ’ ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ ζωὴ ἀΐδιος. ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη τῷ θειῷ33 κίνησιν 
ἀΐδιον ὑπάρχειν. Ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ οὐρανὸς τοιοῦτος (σῶμα γάρ τι θεῖον), διὰ τοῦτο ἔχει τὸ 
ἐγκύκλιον σῶμα, ὃ φύσει κινεῖται κύκλῳ ἀεί.  
The activity of god is immortality, and that is everlasting life. In consequence it is 
necessary that an eternal movement holds of the divine. Since the heaven is such 
(for it is a divine body), for that reason it has a circular body, with which it naturally 
moves in a circle for eternity.” 
The reasoning is that, if the function of the divine is immortality, and if the heaven is 
divine, then the function of the heaven is immortality. Furthermore, if being 
                                                 
32 Cf. Simplicius, quoting Alexander, In Cael. 396, 6-9: “it is not possible to make either natural or material 
necessity responsible for these things, since both spheres have the same matter, but it is necessary to give 
an account of the difference in terms of some divine governance or ordering.” 
33 Here I follow Leggatt in reading θειῷ instead of θεῷ with most manuscripts; see Leggatt (1995), 227. I 
believe Aristotle’s argument to be that the heaven partakes in a divine essence, not that the heaven itself is 
a god. 
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immortal is the defining function of the heaven, then it is a necessary prerequisite for 
it to possess an eternal movement. That is, for the heaven as a whole to be able to 
perform its defining function or its activity of being immortal, it has to perform at 
least one kind of eternal movement. And the only kind of motion capable of 
uniform eternal continuity is motion in a circle. This explanation, curious as it may 
sound, resembles those formal cause explanations in the biological works that take 
the essence (or the definition of the substantial being) as a starting point, and derive 
from this essence the necessary prerequisites of something being what it is. Just as 
birds must have wings because they are essentially flyers (and the only way for birds 
to perform their defining function is by using their wings), so too the heaven must 
have a spherical body and move eternally in a circle because it is essentially immortal. 
According to this argumentation, eternal movement in a circle is the proper attribute 
of an immortal body such as the heaven.  
 However, Aristotle has not yet explained why there are several movements; 
the activity of being immortal of the heaven only explains why there is a first eternal 
movement of the heaven. And thus Aristotle continues (Cael.II.3, 286a12-13):  
 Διὰ τί οὖν οὐχ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τοιοῦτον; 
 “Why, then, is not the whole body of the heaven that way?” 
The second part of the explanation of why there are more movements than just this 
one eternal movement of the heavens consists of a complicated chain of arguments, 
based on assumptions that are assumed for the sake of the present argument, but 
will be demonstrated later (Cael.II.3, 286a21-22: Νῦν μὲν οὖν ὑποκείσθω τοῦτο, 
ὕστερον δὲ δειχθήσεται περὶ αὐτοῦ; Cael.II.3, 286a30-31: Ὑποκείσθω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο 
νῦν, ὕστερον δὲ πειρατέον δεῖξαι; the demonstrations follow in Cael.II.13-14 and 
Cael.III-IV). These assumptions, which posit the presence of the sublunary elements 
and their movements, are derived from the necessity of there having to be an eternal 
movement of the outer sphere in order for the heaven to be immortal. The 
reasoning Aristotle employs is thus deductive, but the type of necessity involved is 
sometimes that of a necessary consequence, while at other times it is conditional.34 
Let me give a summary of the chain of arguments (Cael.II.3, 286a13-286b2): 
                                                 
34 The formula ‘ἀνάγκη ... εἶναι’ is repeated six times: in Cael.II.3, 286a13; Cael.II.3, 286a20; and Cael.II.3, 
286b2 (see i., ii., and vi. above) the necessity is conditional; in Cael.II.3, 286a22; Cael.II.3, 286a28; and 
Cael.II.3, 286a32 (see iii., iv., and v. above) the necessity indicates a necessary consequence. 
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i. If there is to be a body moving in a circle eternally it must have a center 
that remains at rest.   
ii. For there to be a fixed centre, the existence of the element earth is a 
necessary condition (i.e. since whatever is made of aether cannot remain 
at rest, there must be a second element next to aether, the natural 
movement of which is to move towards the centre and then to remain at 
rest in the centre).  
iii. If there is to be earth, then it is a necessary consequence that there also is 
fire (for earth and fire are contraries, and if the one exists, so does the 
other).  
iv. If there is to be fire and earth, then it is a necessary consequence that the 
two other elements exist (for water and air are in a relation of contrariety 
to each of the other two elements).  
v. From the existence of the four elements, it necessarily follows that there 
must be generation (for none of the four sublunary elements are 
everlasting).  
vi. If there must be generation, then it is a necessary condition that there 
exists another movement (this must be the motion of the planets, and 
especially that of the sun, which is the efficient cause of life on earth). 
According to this account, generation is a necessary consequence of there being 
sublunary elements, whose existence is a necessary condition for there to be an 
eternal, cyclical movement of the outermost sphere of the heavens carrying the fixed 
stars. However, having established that it is necessary for there to be generation (as a 
consequence of there being the four sublunary elements), Aristotle turns the 
argument around, and reasons that if there is to be generation, then it is 
conditionally necessary for there to be other movements, because the movements of 
the outermost sphere cannot cause generation. Accordingly, generation is that for 
the sake of which all the other movements (namely the movements of the planets) 
take place. This is how Aristotle summarizes the whole explanation (Cael.II.3, 286b6-
9):  
Νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι δῆλον, διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν πλείω τὰ ἐγκύκλιά ἐστι σώματα, ὅτι 
ἀνάγκη γένεσιν εἶναι, γένεσιν δ’, εἴπερ καὶ πῦρ, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τἆλλα, εἴπερ καὶ γῆν· 
ταύτην δ’ ὅτι ἀνάγκη μένειν τι ἀεί, εἴπερ καὶ κινεῖσθαί τι ἀεί. 
“For the moment so much is clear, because of what cause there are several circular 
bodies, namely because it is necessary that there is generation, and generation (is 
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necessary), if there also has to be fire, and that one and the others (are necessary) if 
there also has to be earth, and that one because it is necessary that something always 
remains at rest, if there has to be something that is for ever in motion.”  
The complete explanation of why there are several motions of the heaven is thus 
that there are several functions for the sake of which these motions are present. 
There is one eternal movement in a circle (performed by the outer sphere carrying 
the fixed stars) for the sake of realizing the immortality of the heaven, and there are 
other movements (performed by the inner spheres carrying the planets) for the sake 
of generation. Here, the use of the teleological principle allows Aristotle to draw an 
organic picture of the cosmological system in which the variety of motions that can 
be observed can be explained by the purpose they serve. 
Admittedly, the argument is not without problems, and certainly it does not 
establish an explanation for each of the individual motions of the planets. Most 
problematic is perhaps Aristotle’s claim for the need for there to generation. For, in 
the first place, Aristotle could have established the necessity of there being other 
movements in addition to the one of the sphere with the fixed stars solely on the 
basis of the existence of the four elements: if it is a necessary consequence of this 
first motion that there are four elements that do not partake in eternity, and if these 
elements have motions (cf. Cael.II.3, 286b1: τούτων δ’ ἔστι κίνησις), then this explains 
why there are other motions. In the second place, Aristotle turns the necessity of 
generation in terms of being a necessary consequence of there being four sublunary 
elements, into a necessity of generation as a final cause, for which the motions of the 
planets are a necessary condition. Concerning generation, Aristotle states that “there 
will be spoken more clearly on this matter in what follows,” pointing to his 
discussions in GC.II.10. There he explains that the eternal, circular motions of the 
sun are the efficient causes of continuous coming to be and passing away. Although 
it is thus clear that the motions of the sun cause generation, it is not clear that they 
are necessary for the sake of generation, or in other words, why generation is a 
necessary feature of the world.35  
Presumably Aristotle is trying to unify the heavenly realm of eternal being 
and the sublunary realm of continuous generation (i.e. coming to be and passing 
                                                 
35 This point is well brought out by Hankinson (2002-2003), 31-32; see ibidem for further criticisms of the 
argument.  
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away) by deriving them both from the immortality of the heaven, and in doing so, 
succeeds in giving some rationale for a phenomenon that the astronomers did not 
explain. The plurality of the motions of the heavenly bodies makes sense in the light 
of the need for the heaven as a whole to perform an eternal motion, if it is to be 
truly immortal, and as a corollary – of the need for there to be generation, if this 
eternal movement is to be at all. 
 
4.1.4.b Why the heavens move in the direction they do 
In Cael.II.5, Aristotle states that mathematically speaking, it is possible to move in 
two directions on a circle, i.e. clockwise and counterclockwise. However, the 
possibility of there being two directions in which bodies can move on a circle in the 
heavenly realm raises the following question (Cael.II.5, 287b24-27): 
Ἀλλ’ εἰ μηδὲν ὡς ἔτυχε μηδ’ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου ἐνδέχεται ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις εἶναι, ὁ δ’ 
οὐρανὸς ἀΐδιος καὶ ἡ κύκλῳ φορά, διὰ τίνα ποτ’ αἰτίαν ἐπὶ θάτερα φέρεται, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπὶ 
θάτερα; ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἢ ἀρχὴν εἶναι ἢ εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἀρχήν.  
“But, if it is not possible for there to be anything by luck or by chance among the 
things that are eternal, and the heaven and its cyclical locomotion are eternal, 
because of what cause then are they carried in one direction, and not in the other 
one? For it is necessary that that is either a principle or that there is a principle of 
it.” 
While strictly speaking there is no distinction between movement in one direction 
and movement in the other direction, the assumption that in the heavenly realm 
nothing happens by chance, ‘forces’ Aristotle to ask the question why the heavens 
move in the direction they do, and also to try and answer that question 
teleologically.36 For if some natural phenomenon cannot be by chance, it must have 
a determinate and non-incidental cause, and hence be explainable in terms of either 
necessity or teleology (these are the only two forms of causation possible as opposed 
                                                 
36 Aristotle repeatedly offers the a fortiori argument that if one agrees that animals and plants neither 
come to be nor exist by spontaneity (but for the sake of something), then the claim that spontaneity is the 
cause of the heaven – which is most divine and exhibits the greatest order – must be absurd and that one 
has to conclude that final causality pertains to the heavenly realm as well. See Ph.II.4, 196a24-b5; Ph.II.6, 
198a1-13, and PA.I.1, 641b10-23; 641b16-23: “This is why it is more likely that the heaven has been 
brought into being by such a cause – if it has come to be – and is due to such a cause, than that the mortal 
animals have been. Certainly the ordered and definite are far more apparent in the heavens than around 
us, while the fluctuating and random are more apparent in the mortal sphere. Yet some people say that 
each of the animals is and came to be by nature, while the heaven, in which there is not the slightest 
appearance of chance and disorder, was constituted in that way by chance and the spontaneous.” 
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to chance and spontaneity). Since all the heavenly spheres are made from the same 
matter, Aristotle cannot refer to material causes to account for the direction of 
motion, and thus it remains to search for a teleological explanation.  
 This is the explanation Aristotle offers in an attempt to state the 
phenomenon (Cael.II.5, 288a2-12): 
Εἰ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀεὶ ποιεῖ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τὸ βέλτιστον, ἔστι δὲ καθάπερ τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς 
εὐθείας φορῶν ἡ πρὸς τὸν ἄνω τόπον τιμιωτέρα (θειότερος γὰρ τόπος ὁ ἄνω τοῦ κάτω), 
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τῆς εἰς τοὔπισθεν, ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ 
τὸ ἀριστερόν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, (καὶ μαρτυρεῖ δ’ ἡ ῥηθεῖσα ἀπορία ὅτι ἔχει) 
τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ αἰτία λύει τὴν ἀπορίαν. Εἰ γὰρ ἔχει ὡς ἐνδέχεται 
βέλτιστα, αὕτη ἂν εἴη αἰτία καὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου· βέλτιστον γὰρ κινεῖσθαι ἁπλῆν τε 
κίνησιν καὶ ἄπαυστον, καὶ ταύτην ἐπὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον. 
“For if nature always does what is best among the possibilities, and it is the case 
that, just as among the rectilinear locomotions the locomotion towards the upper 
location is more honorable (the location that is upper is more divine than the one 
that is lower), in the same way also the locomotion to the front is [more honorable] 
than the one to the back, then it [the heaven] has, if also the right and the left, just 
as was said before, (and the difficulty discussed gives evidence that it has), the prior 
and the posterior. For this explanation solves the difficulty. For if it is in the best 
way possible, then this will be the explanation also for what has been said: for it is 
best to move with a motion that is simple and incessant, and with one [i.e a motion] 
that is in the most honorable direction.” 
The starting point of the argument is the teleological principle that nature does 
always what is best among the possibilities, a principle that is well known from 
Aristotle’s biology. In chapter 3 (see 3.3.1.c), I argued that the principle is used to set 
the framework for explanations of the presence of features in those cases where 
observation shows that there are several possibilities for nature to fulfill a particular 
functional need. Here the principle is used in a similar way to explain the presence of 
a particular motion: mathematics shows that there are two possible directions on a 
circle, and it is clear from observation that the heavens move only in one direction, 
and not in the other. Just as nature has given hands to human beings instead of 
forelimbs, because having hands is what is best for them among the two natural 
possibilities (PA.IV.10, 687a15-18), so, too, in the case of the heaven, Aristotle 
argues that nature has given it a motion in one direction, rather than one in the other 
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direction, because this is what is best for the heaven among the two possible 
motions. However, there is an important difference with the cases from biology, 
namely that it is not possible for Aristotle to point out why it is functionally more 
befitting for the heaven to move in one direction, rather than in the other one. In 
the case of human beings, Aristotle can show why it is best for human beings to 
have hands: because of their intelligence they are best able to use hands (and for 
beings with less intelligence it is best to receive forelimbs, because they would not be 
able to use hands). Presumably, however, the heaven would not be any less immortal 
if it were to move in the other direction. 
 This is where Aristotle brings in the analogy with dimensions in case of 
rectilinear motions. As we saw in 3.3.1.a, Aristotle posits dimensions as principles of 
the science of nature and attaches different (functional) values to different 
dimensions. Once it is established that the heaven has dimensions, it is possible to 
attach different values to those dimensions, and consequently to explain the 
direction of movement as what is best or most honorable. In the case of rectilinear 
motions, there are two possible directions of motion, but only one of them is best in 
terms of being more honorable: the best or most honorable direction is upwards, 
presumably because it is towards the divine, instead of away from it. The same holds 
for motions forward and backward: locomotion to the front is more honorable and 
hence the better of the two motions. If the heaven has the dimensions of left and 
right, and of prior and posterior, then that would solve the difficulty: the heaven 
would move in the best or the most honorable direction possible, which is forward. 
 Aristotle does not justify the assumption that the dimensions can be 
applied to the heaven, but instead refers back to earlier discussions, most likely to 
Cael.II.2. There Aristotle addressed a theory of the ‘so-called Pythagoreans’, claiming 
that the heaven has a left and a right. Aristotle accepts this theory somewhat 
reluctantly, and rebukes the Pythagoreans for having forgotten to apply the two 
most important pairs of dimensions to the heaven (i.e. up and down, front and 
back). The justification Aristotle gives for accepting the theory is that just as living 
beings, the heaven is ensouled and has a principle of movement (Cael.II.2, 285a27-
31): 
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Ἡμῖν δ’ ἐπεὶ διώρισται πρότερον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἀρχὴν κινήσεως αἱ τοιαῦται 
δυνάμεις ἐνυπάρχουσιν, ὁ δ’ οὐρανὸς ἔμψυχος καὶ ἔχει κινήσεως ἀρχήν, δῆλον ὅτι ἔχει 
καὶ τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν. 
“Since we have previously determined that such capacities are present in those 
things that possess a principle of movement, and the heaven is ensouled and has a 
principle of movement, it is clear that it has the up and the down and the right and 
the left.” 
The claim that the heaven is ensouled is enigmatic. Although Aristotle never 
explicitly addresses the question of whether or not he believes that the heaven and 
heavenly bodies are alive, scholars have taken this passage as evidence for the view 
that Aristotle thinks they are.37 Whatever the case may be, what is important here is 
that Aristotle only allows self-movers to have dimensions (as the dimensions are 
functionally defined partly by reference to the function of locomotion),38 and 
apparently thinks that the heaven (at least in some way) is such a self-mover. 
However, when it comes to the actual attribution of those dimensions to the heaven, 
Aristotle makes clear that there is no absolute or objective point of reference;39 the 
dimensions can only be attributed to the heaven through the use of analogy and 
thought-experiment. This points to a possible weakness in Aristotle’s explanation: 
whatever the observed direction of the motion of the heaven is, that direction must 
be forward, and hence must be best and most honorable; had the heaven turned in 
the other direction, then Aristotle would have had to say that that direction was 
forward and the best (ultimately, the argument is circular). In other words, there is 
no supporting evidence available that corroborates Aristotle’s conclusion that the 
heaven actually move in the best direction possible. However, in the absence of such 
evidence, the explanation that the heavens move in the direction they do, namely 
                                                 
37 For this view, see e.g. Falcon (2005), 19; 74; and 112; Johnson (2005), 136-140; and Lloyd (1996), 171. I 
hesitate to draw this conclusion, because Aristotle’s claim in Cael.II.2, 285a27-31 is that the heaven as a 
whole is ensouled (not that each of the heavenly bodies is), and because the references to the heavenly 
bodies as being alive (in Cael.II.12) are made as part of an analogy that is drawn for explanatory purposes. 
This does not necessarily mean that Aristotle also endorses this view independently of its explanatory 
merits; pace Falcon (2005, 74), who argues that Aristotle “presumably thinks that the explanatory benefits 
that depend on this assumption are also an indirect argument in support of the assumption itself.”  
38 Cael.II.2, 284b10-284b29; IA.IV, 705a28-b18.  
39 Cael.II.2, 285a31-b8; cf. DA.II.4, 416a3, where Aristotle states that “up and down for all things are not 
what they are for the whole world.” 
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forwards, because that is the best direction of the two possibilities, is the most 
plausible.40   
 
4.1.4.c Why the heavenly bodies move with different complexities 
The first of the two problems that are under scrutiny in Cael.II.12 (and it is the 
solution to this first problem which will have my attention here) pertains to the 
number of movements each of the heavenly bodies undergoes. For even though one 
would expect that the heavenly bodies that are nearer to the outer sphere undergo 
fewer motions than the ones further away, observations of some of the planets41 and 
trustworthy sources (Cael.II.12, 292a6-8) both give evidence that there is no 
correlation between the distance of a heavenly body to the outer sphere and the 
complexity of its motions. According to these sources, the motion of the fixed stars 
can be accounted for by the assumption of the simple motion of one sphere. The 
motions of the planets close to these stars can only be accounted for by the 
assumption of many motions of many spheres, while the motions of the moon and 
the sun can be accounted for by the assumption of fewer motions by fewer 
spheres.42 The earth does not move at all. 
The solution Aristotle sketches here presumably draws upon some version 
of the theory of concentric spheres, in which the movements of the planets can be 
accounted for by the assumption of the motions and connections of several 
(mathematical) spheres. According to this theory, a planet is fixed to one sphere, the 
poles of which are connected to another one, and so on, sometimes leading up to as 
many as five spheres in Callippus’ version of the theory, or nine in Aristotle’s own 
adapted version of the theory (who added so-called unwinders to the system). 
Evidently, Aristotle is committed to a physical version of the theory (Cael.II.12, 
293a7-8: ἑκάστη δὲ σφαῖρα σῶμά τι τυγχάνει ὄν; “each sphere is a body”), but the 
physicality of the spheres as such does not solve the problem: again, all the heavenly 
bodies and their spheres are made from the same matter (aether) and have the same 
                                                 
40 Cf. Hankinson (1998), 185-186. 
41 Cael.II.12, 292a2: Δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο περὶ ἐνίων καὶ τῇ ὄψει γέγονεν; “it is clear that that happens with some 
of them also to observation.” 
42 Modern commentators point out that Aristotle’s claim in Cael.II.12, 291b34-292a1 that “the sun and the 
moon undergo fewer movements than some (ἔνια) of the planets” is problematic, since in whatever 
version of the theory of concentric spheres, the sun and the moon undergo fewer movements than all of 
the other planets. See Leggatt (1995), 246 for an outline of and a possible solution to this problem.  
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shape, and thus the differences in the complexities of their motions will have to be 
explained by reference to a final cause. 
 The considerations Aristotle offers in order to “make the thing that is 
puzzling us to appear as nothing absurd (Cael.II.12, 292a17-18),” is the application of 
the teleological model of action to the heavenly bodies (Cael.II.12, 292a18-22): 
Ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς ὡς περὶ σωμάτων αὐτῶν μόνον, καὶ μονάδων τάξιν μὲν ἐχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ 
πάμπαν, διανοούμεθα· δεῖ δ’ ὡς μετεχόντων ὑπολαμβάνειν πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς· οὕτω 
γὰρ οὐθὲν δόξει παράλογον εἶναι τὸ συμβαῖνον.  
“We think about them as if they are bodies only, and units with a certain order, but 
being altogether without soul; but it is necessary to suppose that they partake in 
action and life: for in that way the result will not seem to be anything absurd.” 
In other words, Aristotle proposes that we stop thinking of the heavenly bodies as if 
they are mathematical objects, and instead think of them as living beings, which 
move and act for the sake of ends and do so in virtue of possessing an internal 
principle of movement (i.e. their soul).43   
In applying the notion of action to the heavenly bodies, Aristotle explicates 
two ‘rules’ that will be helpful in the understanding of the complexity of the 
heavenly bodies. In the first place, Aristotle argues that the further away one is 
removed from the good, the more actions are needed to attain that good; that which 
is in the best state already possess the good, and hence does not need to undertake 
any action; and for that which is too far away the good might not even be attainable 
(Cael.II.12, 292a23-28). Aristotle uses an analogy of the number of exercises a body 
needs to undergo to acquire a good condition to illustrate this ‘rule’: the one who 
already has a good condition does not need to exercise, while people with less good 
conditions have to perform one or more kinds of exercises to achieve a good 
condition, etc. In the second place, Aristotle makes clear – again through the use of 
an analogy, this time drawn from the game of knucklebones – that the more 
intermediate goals need to be achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve the 
ultimate end (Cael.II.12, 292a28-b1).  
These two ‘rules’ that set out the correlations that exist between the 
number of actions that are needed to reach the good and the initial distance from 
                                                 
43 Aristotle usually uses analogies in the other direction: he uses what we know about higher order species 
to illuminate or explain features that belong to lower order species, and not the other way around; Lloyd 
(1983), 37-38. 
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this good are then applied to the motions of the heavenly bodies. Aristotle states 
that we should think44 of the actions of the stars and planets as being analogous to 
those of living beings and plants (Cael.II.12, 292b1-2):  
Διὸ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων πρᾶξιν εἶναι τοιαύτην οἵα περ ἡ τῶν ζῴων καὶ 
φυτῶν.  
“This is why it is necessary that we consider also the action of the stars as being of 
the exact same sort as are the action of living beings and plants.” 
Subsequently, Aristotle fills in the details of this analogy. First, he describes four 
kinds of living beings that occupy the world around us (Cael.II.12, 292b2: ἐνταῦθα) 
and the number of actions they need in order to reach their good:  
a) human beings, who perform the most actions of all living beings;  
b) ‘the person who is in the best state’, who has no need for action;  
c) animals, which perform fewer actions than human beings do; 
d) plants, which perform only one limited mode of action.  
Next, Aristotle formulates four ‘patterns of activity’, laying out the number of 
actions something needs to perform in order for it to reach the good (the smaller the 
number of actions is, the better it is, unless the absence of actions is due to an 
inability to reach the end). The patterns are then illustrated through an analogy with 
a person who performs actions for the sake of being healthy:  
1) One thing already possesses and shares in the best, and therefore does not have 
to reach for it (some people are always healthy);  
2) One thing reaches the good by performing a few actions (some people loose 
weight for the sake of health);  
3) One thing reaches the good by performing many actions (some people loose 
weight and run and do something else for the sake of running, all for the sake of 
health); 
4) One thing does not even attempt to reach it, but tries to get as close to the good 
as possible (some people are unable to reach a state of health, and for them running 
or loosing weight are goals). 
The illustration of this fourth ‘pattern’ leads Aristotle to an explication of a third 
‘rule’, which is that to reach the ultimate best would be the best for all, but if this is 
impossible, that “a thing is better the nearer it is to the best (Cael.II.12, 292b18-19).” 
                                                 
44 For the terminology, see Bogen & McGuire (1986/7), 424-25. 
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Finally, Aristotle is in a position to apply those general patterns to the heavenly 
bodies (Cael.II.12, 292b18-25): 
Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μὲν γῆ ὅλως οὐ κινεῖται, τὰ δ’ ἐγγὺς ὀλίγας κινήσεις· οὐ γὰρ 
 ἀφικνεῖται πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀλλὰ μέχρι ὅτου δύναται τυχεῖν τῆς θειοτάτης ἀρχῆς. Ὁ 
δὲ πρῶτος οὐρανὸς εὐθὺς τυγχάνει διὰ μιᾶς κινήσεως. Τὰ δ’ ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ 
τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀφικνεῖται μέν, διὰ πλειόνων δ’ἀφικνεῖται κινήσεων. 
“And because of this the earth does not move at all, and the planets that are close 
have only few movements: for they do not reach the end, but they are able to reach 
the most divine principle only to a certain point. The first heaven immediately 
attains it immediately through one movement. The bodies in between the first and 
the last reach it, and they reach it through several movements.” 
Ultimately, Aristotle thinks that this analogical reasoning will take away the 
puzzlement regarding the different complexities of the heavenly bodies. In the table 
below, I have made an attempt to reconstruct the analogies underlying Aristotle’s 
explanation.  
 
a-d: sublunary living 
beings 







is able to reach 
the good 
Needs many actions 
to reach the good 
Other planets 
(many movements) 




No actions Something has 
the best 
No actions Outher sphere 
(one movement) 
(achieves the good) 
Animals  Few actions Something that 
is able to reach 
the good 
Needs few actions 
to reach the good 
Sun and Moon 
(few movements) 
(achieves the good to certain 
degree) 
Plants  One action Something that 
is unable to 
reach the good 
Actions do not lead 




(not capable of achieving the 
good) 
 
If this reconstruction is correct, then Aristotle must have meant his analogy to work 
quite loosely: the earth is not really like plants, because the earth does not move at 
all, and the outer sphere is not really like the person who has it all, because the outer 
sphere does perform one (eternal) movement. At most, the teleological framework 
of actions that are undertaken for the sake of reaching the good makes the 
differences among the numbers of motions the heavenly bodies perform less 
perplexing or better understandable (which was of course Aristotle’s goal), but it 
does not fully explain them. Here we touch upon the important problem of to what 
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exactly the analogy between sublunary beings and heavenly bodies amounts. Some 
scholars have taken the analogy quite literally as implying that the heavenly bodies 
are actually alive and that therefore they are actually submitted to a similar teleology 
of actions as the sublunary living beings are. The analogy is thus interpreted in a 
strongly causal sense as the mapping of the causal structure underlying one (well-
known) phenomenon to another (lesser known) phenomenon.45 However, in the 
light of the fact that it is not possible to map the patterns of goal-directed actions in 
exactly the same form to the heavenly domain, and given that Aristotle never 
explicitly states that the stars and planets are alive (he only states that the heaven is 
ensouled, and that we should think of the heavenly bodies as – ὡς – partaking of 
life), we might consider a less strong interpretation of the analogy, namely as a 
means to reduce puzzlement.46 And this is, of course, exactly the way in which 
Aristotle himself introduces the teleological analogy: as a means to make the 
observed phenomena appear as “nothing absurd.” For, the difference in the number 
of motions made by the stars, planets, sun, moon, and earth is less perplexing once 
one thinks of them as if similar to living beings: for, they, too, are different with 
regard to the number of motions that they perform and need to perform if they are 
to achieve their good. 
 
In sum, in all three chapters discussed above, Aristotle uses teleological principles 
and models, all of which are well-known and well-established in his biology, to make 
sense of the presence of three heavenly phenonomena that cannot be accounted for 
by reference to mathematical priniciples or to material and formal causes alone. Lack 
of empirical evidence makes it hard to provide fully fledged physical explanations or 
demonstrations in these cases, but through the use of teleology Aristotle at least 





                                                 
45 See, for instance, Johnson (2005, 139), who argues that the point of this analogy is “that the motion of 
the heavens is purposeful activity.” 
46 For the distinction between a ‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ use of analogy, see Hankinson (1998), 22. 
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4.2 Teleological principles and the explanation of the absence of 
cosmological features 
 
In this section, I will turn to the special cases where Aristotle uses some form of the 
teleological principle that nature does nothing in vain to explain the absence of 
certain motions or features of the heavens, after having already discussed these 
matters from a mathematical perspective. I will first discuss the two major problems 
pertaining to the attempt to explain what is absent in an empirically 
underdetermined domain such as the heavens, and secondly turn to a discussion of 
the explanations in Cael.I.4, Cael.II.8, Cael.II.9, and Cael.II.11 themselves.    
 
4.2.1 Explaining what is absent in an empirically underdetermined domain 
In the former section, we saw that Aristotle was very much aware of the 
methodological problems involved in explaining the presence of heavenly 
phenomena. However, when it comes to the explanation of the absence of features 
and motions of the heavenly bodies, Aristotle seems less careful in his use of 
evidence and his reliance on teleological principles. By claiming that Aristotle is ‘less 
careful’, I mean in the first place, that Aristotle does not hedge his teleological 
explanations for the absence of features as he did in the other cases, nor does he 
provide some kind of justification indicating why the attempt to explain the absence 
of some feature is reasonable. In the second place, there are two possible problems 
in Aristotle’s use of teleological principles to explain the absence of heavenly 
phenomena, which are less pressing in the case of explanations of what is present.  
 The two problems that I find in Aristotle’s teleological explanations of the 
absence of features are the following. The first problem pertains directly to the lack 
of empirical evidence in cosmology: what cannot be observed might still be present 
(but just too far away for us to notice, just as perhaps the concentric spheres are), 
and what can be observed might be the result of a visual illusion. Although Aristotle 
was aware of these problems, in the chapters under discussion in this section 
Aristotle often shows himself to be very confident in deciding how much credence 
to attribute to the observations of the heavens. His general strategy is to explain the 
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phenomena and hence to save them,47 but on occasion, especially where there are 
contradictory observations, the observations that conflict with the theory of the stars 
moving around fixed in concentric spheres are explained away.  
This strategy is especially clear in Cael.II.8, where Aristotle addresses the 
movements of the stars and the heaven as a whole. As both are observed to move as 
a whole (and this observation remains unquestioned, although it is actually not 
possible to observe the movement of the spheres independently of the movement of 
the stars), it is necessary that the change of position either takes place with both the 
heavens and the stars being at rest, or with both moving, or with the one moving 
and the other being at rest. Aristotle rejects the first two options and then argues for 
the third one that the spheres or circles move and that the stars move fixed on these 
spheres. In support of this third option, Aristotle argues that if stars were to move 
on their own, they would either roll or rotate (Cael.II.8, 290a7-11), and neither one 
of these movements is observed to take place (Cael.II.8, 290a11: ἀλλ’ οὐδετέραν 
φαίνεται). When Aristotle sets out to offer further empirical evidence for the absence 
of these movements, he explains away the observation of the apparent rotation of 
the sun48 by claiming that it is caused by our distance to those heavenly phenomena 
and by the weakness and unsteadiness of our vision (Aristotle extends this 
explanation to the twinkling of the stars, which is also merely a visual illusion; the 
single observation of a rotating sun is not considered to be a refutation of the 
theory, because it is reasonable to expect all planets to make the same movement, 
and only the sun seems to rotate), while using the (single) observation that the moon 
always shows its face as evidence for the not rolling of the stars (Cael.II.8, 290a12-
29).49 In addition to this observational evidence (Cael.II.8, 290a30: pros de toutois), 
                                                 
47 For Aristotle’s concern to save the phenomena, see in particular Cael.I.3, 270b4-5 (Ἔοικε δ’ ὅ τε λόγος 
τοῖς φαινομένοις μαρτυρεῖν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα τῷ λόγῳ·; “and it seems like the argument testifies to the 
phenomena, and the phenomena to the argument”); Cael.I.5, 272a5-6; Cael.II.4, 287a12; Cael.II.6, 288b12; 
Cael.II.8, 289b10; Cael.II.14, 297a2-6; Cael.III.7, 306a5-8 (Συμβαίνει δὲ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων λέγουσι μὴ 
ὁμολογούμενα λέγειν τοῖς φαινομένοις.; “The result is that though they speak about the appearances they 
say things that are not in agreement with the appearances”). 
48 Xenophanes might have observed the same phenomenon, and also explains it as a visual illusion; 
DK21A41a: δοκεῖν δὲ κυκλεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀπόστασιν; “[the sun] seems to turn in a circle due to its 
distance.” It is not clear to what kind of phenomenon Aristotle and Xenophanes are referring to; one 
suggestion is that it is sometimes possible to see sunspots on the sun, which are then seen to be ‘moving’ 
when the sun turns.  
49 Cael.II.8, 290a12-29: “In rotating they would have remained in the same place and not change their 
place, which is observed to be so, and everyone maintains as much (ὅπερ φαίνεταί τε καὶ πάντες φασίν). 
Further, it is reasonable that they all perform the same type of movement, but alone of the stars it is the 
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without adding any methodological caveats, Aristotle offers a further teleological 
argument for why it is reasonable to think that the stars move, not on their own, but 
by being fixed in concentric spheres. The problem thus seems to be that, where in 
the biological works Aristotle is very careful in dealing with cases of which the 
observations are inconclusive or absent,50 in cosmology this cautiousness is less 
prevailing.   
The second problem pertains to the ‘justification’ of the use of the principle 
that nature does nothing in vain in the heavenly domain. Prima facie, their use in the 
biological and in the cosmological domain is the same. As we saw in 3.3.1.c, 
Aristotle uses the principle that nature does nothing in vain in order to set the 
framework within which the absence of biological phenomena can be explained 
through a counterfactual argument. However, the use of this particular principle in 
biology is always ‘prompted’ through the comparison of empirical evidence. 
Comparative empirical research shows, for instance, that a particular kind of animals 
lacks a part that is present in all the animals that are related to it (e.g. the comparison 
of snakes with other blooded land-animals shows that snakes are the only ones to 
lack feet). The question of why some part is absent in a particular kind of animal is 
thus rational if it is based on the observation of that part’s presence in other related 
animals. The use of the principle to explain the absence of a part is thus ‘legitimate’ 
and appropriate only if its presence could reasonably have been expected, and if its 
absence is ‘significant’ in the light of its presence in other animals. For instance, it is 
rational to ask why snakes have no feet, because all the other blooded animals that 
live on land all have feet: all these animals, snakes included, share to a certain extent 
the same formal nature, which explains the occurrence of certain co-extensive 
features, such as the possession of a maximum of four feet. The snake possesses all 
the other properties shared by the members of the same wider kind to which they 
                                                                                                               
sun that seems (δοκεῖ) to do this in rising and setting, and it does so not in itself but as a result of the 
distance from which we see it; for our vision, in being extended a long way, skews through weakness. This 
is also perhaps the reason for the apparent twinkling of the fixed stars, and the non-twinkling of the 
planets; for the planets are near, and so our vision reaches them while it is still strong; when, however, it 
reaches the fixed stars, it wavers due to the distance, being over-extended. Now, its wavering makes the 
movement seem to belong to the star, since there is no difference between the movement of our vision or 
of the thing seen. Yet that the stars do not roll either is evident (φανερόν). For a thing that rolls must turn 
about, but the so-called face of the moon is always visible (δῆλόν ἐστι). Consequently, since it is 
reasonable that in moving by themselves they perform their proper movement, but they are not observed 
to be performing them (ταύτας δ’ οὐ φαίνεται κινούμενα), it is clear that they will not move by themselves.” 
50 See, for example, GA.III.10, 760b28-33, GA.I.16, 721a12-17 and GA.II.5, 741a33-b1. 
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belong, except for feet. It is therefore rational to ask why this particular property is 
absent in snakes. It is not rational, however, to ask why snakes lack wings, telescopic 
eyes, or any other part that cannot be observed to belong to any of the members of 
the wider class to which snakes belong. As there is a virtual infinity of properties that 
any animal does not have, it only makes sense for a natural scientist to explain the 
absence of those properties that belong to the ‘natural possibilities’ of that animal. 
And what those natural possibilities are can be established inductively, on the basis 
of extensive observations and comparisons. The problem, as I see it, in the 
cosmological realm is that the range of natural possibilities can only partly, and only 
in a very indeterminate way, be established on the basis of observation. Therefore 
the use of the principle that nature does nothing in vain is not as firmly rooted in 
empirical evidence in cosmology as it is in biology. 
 
4.2.2 Explaining what is not there through the principle that nature does nothing in vain 
Aristotle’s explanatory strategy for the explanation of the absence of heavenly 
phenomena is the supposition of some form of the principle that nature does 
nothing in vain. He then argues counterfactually that if those phenomena had been 
present, they would have been superfluous (in Cael.I.4, 271a33: μάτην; and Cael.II.11, 
291b13-14: μάτην), or harmful (Cael.II.9, 291a25-28) for the heavens and its 
inhabitants. In one case Aristotle turns the argument around to argue for the 
unlikelihood that nature would purposefully have neglected honorable beings by not 
giving them the properties they need (Cael.II.8, 290a29-32: τῶν δ’ οὕτω τιμίων 
ὑπεριδεῖν). Interestingly, all these explanations are offered after a series of 
mathematical arguments (in Cael.I.4) or of discussions of empirical evidence (in 
Cael.II.8 and Cael.II.9). The explanation in Cael.II.11 stands on its own, but is closely 
related to the explanation presented in Cael.II.8 (for this reason, the two 
explanations will be discussed together; see below 4.2.2.b). While the preceding 
arguments in these cases merely point out that it is mathematically impossible for 
some phenomenon to be present, or that its presence has not been observed, the 
teleological argument provides a physical explanation of why those properties ‘in 
reality’ do not exist. In this section, I will analyze the teleological explanations given 
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in Cael.I.4, Cael.II.8, Cael.II.9, and Cael.II.11 in full, and offer an assessment of their 
explanatory force. 
 
4.2.2.a Why there is no motion contrary to motion in a circle 
In Cael.I.4, Aristotle tries to provide plausibility (Cael.I.4, 270b33: ἄν τις λάβοι τὴν 
πίστιν) for the claim that there is no locomotion contrary to locomotion in a circle. 
Aristotle offers about six arguments in favor of this proposition.51 The first five 
arguments are all mathematical in nature and show that motion contrary to motion 
in a circle is mathematically impossible. It is not until the last argument that Aristotle 
makes clear that he actually has a physical situation in mind.52 He introduces the 
teleological principle that ‘nature produces nothing in vain’ and sets out to argue for 
the natural or physical impossibility of such a motion (Cael.I.4, 271a22-33):53  
Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἦν ἡ κύκλῳ τῇ κύκλῳ ἐναντία, μάτην ἂν ἦν ἡ ἑτέρα· * - * εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσαι 
ἦσαν, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κίνησις αὐτῶν, εἰ δ’ ἡ ἑτέρα κίνησις ἐκράτει, ἡ ἑτέρα οὐκ ἂν ἦν. Ὥστ’ 
εἰ ἀμφότερα ἦν, μάτην ἂν θάτερον ἦν σῶμα μὴ κινούμενον τὴν αὑτοῦ κίνησιν· μάτην 
γὰρ ὑπόδημα τοῦτο λέγομεν, οὗ μή ἐστιν ὑπόδεσις. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν 
μάτην ποιοῦσιν. 
“Even if there were a locomotion in a circle contrary to locomotion in a circle, one 
of them would be in vain. For if they were equal, there would not arise a movement 
from them, and if one movement would prevail, the other one would not occur. As 
a result, if there were two, one of the two bodies would be in vain, because it would 
not move its proper movement: for we call that sandal in vain, of which there is no 
strapping. And god and nature do nothing in vain.” 
As usual, the argument is set out in a counterfactual way. Suppose there were a 
locomotion contrary to locomotion in a circle, then one of these two motions would 
be in vain: for to each simple movement belongs a simple body (Cael.I.2, 269a2-4), 
and if there were two bodies moving contrarily on a circle, then either no movement 
would happen (the collision of two bodies of equal strength would keep them at rest 
                                                 
51 Aristotle later refers back to this, and other propositions defended in the first chapters, as ‘first 
supposition’ (see Cael.I.7, 274a34: εἴ τις ἡμῖν ἐάσει μένειν τὰς πρώτας ὑποθέσεις), or ‘suppositions 
concerning motion’ (see Cael.I.8, 276b8: ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς κινήσεις ὑποθέσεων φανερόν). 
52 That the argument in Cael.I.4 pertains to the actual heavenly bodies becomes clear also from the way in 
which the argument ties in with the arguments in other chapters. For instance, the question of whether or 
not there is a motion contrary to motion in a circle is prompted by the earlier argument for the eternity of 
the first bodies in Cael.I.3, 270a19-20 in which the proposition that there is no such motion is already 
presupposed. 
53 I follow Leggatt in transposing Cael.I.4, 271a23-28 to follow Cael.I.4, 271a19; Leggatt (1995), 185. 
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for eternity), or one movement would conquer the other one (in which case the 
latter would not be able to perform its proper function). As Aristotle explains, a 
body that like a sandal can never perform the function for which it is present is in 
vain.54 If, then, such a motion would be in vain, that explains why in fact there is no 
such body of motion. “God and nature”55 simply do not operate in that way.  
In this example, the teleological explanation not only strengthens the 
conclusion of the mathematical arguments for the absence of a motion contrary to 
motion in a circle, but also shows how it applies to the heavenly bodies. Even 
though there are no observations prompting the use of the principle that nature does 
nothing in vain, I do not find its use problematic here. As Aristotle has established 
firmly in his biology, nature does not produce parts that an animal is not able to use, 
let alone whole beings that are not able to perform their natural and proper function. 
The inference that there are no vain bodies in the heavenly sphere, and that 
therefore there is no movement contrary to movement in a circle, is reasonable – and 
that is all Aristotle is trying to establish here.   
 
4.2.2.b Why the heavenly bodies do not move on their own (or, why stars have no feet) 
In Cael.II.8, Aristotle addresses the question of whether or not the stars and planets 
have a movement independently of the movement of the spheres. Aristotle sketches 
three possible scenario’s of the movements of the heavenly bodies and their spheres 
(Cael.II.8, 289b1-3): either both the heavenly bodies and the sphere are at rest; or 
both move; or one of the two moves while the other one stays at rest. The first two 
scenarios are rejected on the basis of empirical evidence (Cael.II.8, 289b5: οὐ γὰρ ἂν 
ἐγίγνετο τὰ φαινόμενα; Cael.II.8, 289b10: Φαίνεται). The option that the spheres are at 
rest while the heavenly bodies move is rejected on the basis of having absurd 
consequences (Cael.II.8, 289b27-28: τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὁμοίως ἔσται ἄλογα). Aristotle 
accepts the last possible scenario in which the spheres move and the heavenly bodies 
                                                 
54 Nature does not produce something that is at the same time impossible and in vain: see PA.II.8, 
653b26-29. 
55 Why Aristotle speaks here of “god and nature” is unclear; kai might be used epexegetically (“god, that 
is, nature”), but perhaps the divine subject matter of the argument (namely the movements of heavenly 
bodies) leads Aristotle to identify (on a metaphoric level) god and nature in positing the principle; cf. 
GC.II.11, 336b27-32 where Aristotle first posits the principle that nature always does what is best, and 
then exemplifies this by describing the actions of god (ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ὀρέγεσθαί 
φαμεν τὴν φύσιν, (...) τῷ λειπομένῳ τρόπῳ συνεπλήρωσε τὸ ὅλον ὁ θεός, ἐνδελεχῆ ποιήσας τὴν γένεσιν). 
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are at rest as being the least absurd (Cael.II.8, 289b34-35: μόνως γὰρ οὕτως οὐθὲν 
ἄλογον συμβαίνει). In favor of this scenario, Aristotle first argues that since the 
heavenly bodies are spherical, and since the natural movements of spherical bodies 
are either rotating or rolling, and neither one of these movements are observed (see 
the discussion of the conclusiveness of this empirical evidence above in 4.2.1), it is 
reasonable to conclude that they do not move on their own (Cael.II.8, 290a7-29). In 
addition to this observational evidence, Aristotle offers a final argument showing the 
unlikelihood of the stars and planets having a movement on their own. The 
argument runs as follows (Cael.II.8, 290a29-35): 
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄλογον τὸ μηθὲν ὄργανον αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὴν 
κίνησιν (οὐθὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχε ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις), οὐδὲ τῶν μὲν ζῴων φροντίσαι, τῶν δ’ οὕτω 
τιμίων ὑπεριδεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἔοικεν ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἀφελεῖν πάντα δι’ ὧν ἐνεδέχετο προϊέναι 
καθ’ αὑτά, καὶ ὅτι πλεῖστον ἀποστῆσαι τῶν ἐχόντων ὄργανα πρὸς κίνησιν. 
“In addition to these arguments, it would be absurd that nature gave them no organ 
for movement (since nature does nothing as a matter of chance), and that she 
should care for animals, but disregard such honorable beings; rather, it seems that 
nature, as though deliberately, removed everything by means of which they might 
possibly in themselves have effected forward motion, and that she set them at the 
greatest distance from those things that possess organs for movement.”  
The structure of this teleological argument is quite complex. In short, it consists of a 
reductio ad absurdum followed by an alternative account proclaiming the purposiveness 
– or perhaps even the providence – of nature. The first part of the argument builds 
upon the implicit counterfactual assumption that if the stars ‘were intended by 
nature’ to be moving on their own, it would be absurd for nature not to have given 
them organs for movement, given the fact that nature did provide such organs to 
‘lesser’ beings. I take the expression that ‘nature does nothing as a matter of chance’ 
to be equivalent to the principle that nature does nothing in vain. Living beings 
always have the parts that they need, and if the heavenly bodies lack organs for 
movement, that lack must be for the sake of something. In other words, if the 
organs for movement are absent in heavenly bodies, it must be because their 
presence would have been in vain (they would have had no function to fulfill in this 
particular kind of being). The reference to the honorable status of heavenly beings 
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implies that Aristotle takes the teleology of nature to apply even more to them than to 
the sublunary beings.56  
The – implicit – underlying teleological principle here is that each capacity 
(in this case the capacity to locomote) requires an organ57 and that thus locomotion 
of the stars is possible if and only if they have organs for locomotion. The absurdity 
lies in the fact that nature did provide less honorable beings with organs for 
movement. We would have to conclude, were we to accept this account as true, that 
nature purposely neglected more honorable beings such as the stars. Since this 
account is of course unacceptable within Aristotle’s view of the way nature operates, 
the opposite scenario, set out in the second part of the argument, must be the case: 
nature has taken away (Cael.II.8, 290a33: ἀφελεῖν) every means of locomotion, and 
thereby set a distance between the heavenly bodies and the sublunary beings 
equipped with organs for movement.58  
The core of this teleological argument for why the heavenly bodies do not 
have a movement of their own, and hence must be fixed in spheres, is the 
assumption (presented as a fact) that heavenly bodies do not have organs for 
locomotion. For, if the heavenly bodies do not have organs of movement, and 
assumed that nature acts for the sake of something, nature must have ‘designed’ 
them not to be able to move on their own.  
In a way Aristotle’s explanation of the movement of the stars here parallels 
and criticizes that of Plato in the Timaeus. In this dialogue, Timaeus explains that the 
divine craftsman did not think it to be necessary to equip the heaven – self-sufficient 
and perfect as it is – with hands or feet for walking (Pl.Tim.33d-34a):   
ἡγήσατο γὰρ αὐτὸ ὁ συνθεὶς αὔταρκες ὂν ἄμεινον ἔσεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ προσδεὲς ἄλλων. 
χειρῶν δέ, αἷς οὔτε λαβεῖν οὔτε αὖ τινα ἀμύνασθαι χρεία τις ἦν, μάτην οὐκ ᾤετο δεῖν 
αὐτῷ προσάπτειν, οὐδὲ ποδῶν οὐδὲ ὅλως τῆς περὶ τὴν βάσιν ὑπηρεσίας. κίνησιν γὰρ 
ἀπένειμεν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν, τῶν ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα 
οὖσαν· διὸ δὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιαγαγὼν αὐτὸ ἐποίησε κύκλῳ 
κινεῖσθαι στρεφόμενον, τὰς δὲ ἓξ ἁπάσας κινήσεις ἀφεῖλεν καὶ ἀπλανὲς ἀπηργάσατο 
                                                 
56 Cf. PA.I.1, 641b16-20. 
57 GA.I.2, 716a24-25. 
58 Aristotle considers it to be better for the superior to be separated from the inferior; cf. GA.II.1, 732a6-
8, where Aristotle explains that it is better for the male and the female to be separated, for “it is better 
that the superior principle should be separated from the inferior.” 
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ἐκείνων. ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν περίοδον ταύτην ἅτ’ οὐδὲν ποδῶν δέον ἀσκελὲς καὶ ἄπουν αὐτὸ 
ἐγέννησεν. 
“For he thought that a being which is self-sufficient would be much better than one 
which is in need of other things. And he did not think it was necessary to attach 
hands to it to no purpose – hands for which there would be no need either to grasp 
or to defend itself against anything; nor had it any need of feet, nor of the whole 
apparatus of walking. For he assigned to it the movement that is most suited to its 
body, [the movement] which, of the seven, is the most appropriate to mind and to 
thinking. And therefore he caused it to move in the same manner and on the same 
spot and revolving in a circle within its own limits. All other six [motions] he took 
away and it was made not to partake in their deviations. And as this circular 
movement required no feet, the universe was created without legs and without 
feet.” 
In this passage, Plato describes how the heaven was created and was given its 
circular movement, which is most appropriate for its spherical shape. The other 
types of movement – forwards/backwards, to the left/to the right, and up/down – 
were taken away from it (Pl.Tim.34a: ἀφεῖλεν). For circular movement no feet (or 
legs) are needed, and therefore Plato’s heaven has no feet. Notwithstanding the 
similarities between the two accounts, Aristotle’s differs in an important way from 
Plato’s. For, while Plato holds that the spherical shape of the heaven and the 
absence of organs for movement make it most suitable for a rotating movement, 
which the heaven then performs on its own,59 Aristotle rather uses these ‘facts’ to 
differentiate between the motions of the heaven as a whole and those of the 
heavenly bodies (Cael.II.8, 290b1-11). While the heaven, in virtue of being spherical, 
is most fit to move on its own (Cael.II.290b1-4; i.e. the heaven as a whole rotates; 
Aristotle agrees on this point with Plato), Aristotle holds – pace Plato – that the 
heavenly bodies, also in virtue of being spherical, do not rotate, and are also least fit 
to effect forward motion on their own (Cael.II.8, 290b5-8):   
πρὸς δὲ τὴν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἀχρηστότατον· ἥκιστα γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῖς δι’ αὑτῶν 
κινητικοῖς· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπηρτημένον ἔχει οὐδὲ προέχον, ὥσπερ τὸ εὐθύγραμμον, ἀλλὰ 
πλεῖστον ἀφέστηκε τῷ σχήματι τῶν πορευτικῶν σωμάτων.  
“[F]or forward movement it is least fit, since it is least like to those things that 
produce motion in themselves; for it does not have any appendage or projection, as 
                                                 
59 Cornford (1975), 56-57. 
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does a rectilinear figure, but stands most apart in shape from those bodies equipped 
for progression.” 
According to Aristotle, spherical bodies lack ‘points of movement’ and hence cannot 
locomote. Aristotle thus uses Plato’s argument, but applies it to the heavenly bodies, 
and concludes that they are unfit for any type of locomotion and hence must be 
carried around by the spheres.  
 The teleological argument Aristotle offers here is in many ways similar to 
explanations we have seen in the biological works. In biology, Aristotle holds that all 
animals that are capable of locomotion must have organs for movement60 and that 
animals without organs for movement are not capable of locomotion.61 These two 
‘laws’ are exhaustive with regard to all blooded land-walkers. The only exception is 
formed by the footless snake, which obviously does not have organs specifically 
designed for movement, but moves forward by bending itself (see also above, in 
4.2.1).62 Since the snake would move badly if it had only four feet, and given the 
principle that nature does nothing in vain and that nature cannot give snakes more 
than four feet (for in that case, the snake would not be bloodless), nature instead 
‘took those parts away.’ However, the fact that snakes do not have organs for 
movement does not mean that they do not locomote: they move forward by bending 
themselves.63 This may point to a problem for Aristotle’s argument concerning the 
heavenly bodies: for the absence of organs for locomotion as such does not provide 
conclusive evidence that the stars in fact do not locomote. Of course, as the 
remainder of Cael.II.8 points out, Aristotle is actually committed to the stronger 
claim that spherical bodies do not only lack organs for movement, but also ‘points 
of movement’, which (at least given Aristotle’s laws of sublunary mechanics) rules 
out any possible way of locomotion. However, it is not clear whether there are any 
natural limitations to the possible ways in which nature could have ‘crafted’ stars in 
order to make them able to move on their own. The absence of both organs and 
points for locomotion in the heavenly bodies in itself might not be enough to 
                                                 
60 PA.IV.10, 686a35-b1: “all (animals) that walk must have two hind feet”; IA.III, 705a19-22: “That which 
moves always makes its change of place by the employment of at least two organic parts, one as it were 
compressing and the other being compressed.” 
61 IA.III, 705a23-25: “And so nothing that is without parts can move in this manner; for it does not 
contain in itself the distinction between what is to be passive and what is to be active”. 
62 PA.IV.11, 690b14-18; IA.IV.705b25-29. 
63 IA.VII.707b6-131; IA.VIII.709a25-b4; IA.X.709b27-28. 
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establish the plausibility of the alternative theory that they do not effect any forward 
movement at all. 
The comparison with explanations invoking the principle that nature does 
nothing in vain in the biological domain may point to another problem concerning 
its application to the cosmological domain. For, as I argued above in 4.2.1, while 
observations show that snakes lack feet, observational evidence of the heavens does 
not provide any certainty about the absence of feet in the heavenly bodies. For all we 
can tell, the heavenly bodies might be too far away for us to see their organs of 
movement. This difference between the reliability of observational evidence is 
important, because Aristotle’s explanation in the case of the heavenly bodies is not 
prompted by the observation that they do not have organs for movement, as it is in 
the case of snakes. There are no observations of the heavens that would reasonably 
lead to the expectation of heavenly bodies having feet in the first place (one might 
object, however, that in this case the philosophical tradition within which Aristotle is 
working prompts this question).64 Rather, Aristotle works the other way around: 
because he wants to present the theory that the stars do not move on their own as 
plausible as possible, he uses the absence of the organs of movement in the heavenly 
bodies to draw exactly this inference. Given the teleological framework that is 
posited by the principle that nature does nothing in vain, however, the inference is 
reasonable.65  
 
The overall success of the teleological argument used in this chapter is thus difficult 
to determine, but at least Aristotle himself seemed to be quite pleased with it, for he 
repeats it in a reversed form in Cael.II.11.  
In Cael.II.8, Aristotle presupposed that the heavenly bodies are spherical in 
shape, and argued that the absence of organs of movements in the heavenly bodies 
makes it all the more likely that they do not move on their own; this he considered 
                                                 
64 On this tradition, see Cornford (1975), 55-6; besides Plato, Empedocles also seems to have argued for 
the footlessness of the heaven (fr.29, Simpl.Ph.1124, 1: τὴν Φιλίαν διὰ τῆς ἑνώσεως τὸν Σφαῖρον ποιοῦσαν, 
ὃν καὶ θεὸν ὀνομάζει, καὶ οὐδετέρως ποτὲ καλεῖ ‘σ φ α ῖ ρ ο ν  ἔ η ν ’ . οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ νώτοιο δύο κλάδοι 
ἀίσσονται, οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γοῦν(α), οὐ μήδεα γεννήεντα, ἀλλὰ σφαῖρος ἔην καὶ <πάντοθεν> ἶσος ἑαυτῶι). 
65 A third problematic aspect of Aristotle’s argument (which is unrelated to the two previous ones) is 
perhaps that it does not provide sufficient reason to believe that the heavenly bodies in fact do not rotate, 
for as Aristotle must concede, their spherical shapes are fit for just that sort of movement. 
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to be an indication that the heavenly bodies actually are spherical (Cael.II.8, 290a35-
b1):  
Διὸ καὶ εὐλόγως ἂν δόξειεν ὅ τε ὅλος οὐρανὸς σφαιροειδὴς εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν 
ἄστρων;  
“Therefore it would also seem reasonable that the heaven as a whole and each of 
the stars is spherical.”  
In Cael.II.11, Aristotle picks up on this issue and provides two further considerations 
that strengthen the supposition that the heavenly bodies are spherical in shape 
(Cael.II.11, 291b10):  
Τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῶν ἄστρων ἑκάστου σφαιροειδὲς μάλιστ’ ἄν τις εὐλόγως ὑπολάβοι. 
“One may most reasonably assume that the shape of each of the stars is spherical.”  
The first of the considerations Aristotle offers in support of this assumption builds 
upon the teleological argument in Cael.II.8 (Cael.II.11, 291b11-17): 
Ἐπεὶ γὰρ δέδεικται ὅτι οὐ πεφύκασι κινεῖσθαι δι’ αὑτῶν, ἡ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν ἀλόγως οὐδὲ 
μάτην ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ σχῆμα τοιοῦτον ἀπέδωκε τοῖς ἀκινήτοις ὃ ἥκιστά ἐστι 
κινητικόν. Ἥκιστα δὲ κινητικὸν ἡ σφαῖρα διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὄργανον πρὸς τὴν 
κίνησιν. Ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι σφαιροειδῆ ἂν εἴη τὸν ὄγκον.  
“For, since it has been shown that they are by nature not such as to move by 
themselves, and since nature does nothing absurd or in vain, it is clear that she also 
gave that shape to things that are immobile that is least mobile. And the sphere is 
least mobile because it does not have an organ for movement. In consequence, it is 
clear that their masses are spherical in shape.” 
Here Aristotle has turned the argument around: given the conclusion of Cael.II.8 
that the heavenly bodies do not have their own movements, and given the 
teleological principle that nature does nothing in vain, the inference is reasonable 
that the ‘physical make-up’ of the heavenly bodies is most appropriate for their 
immobility (where movement is taken in the sense of locomotion). Therefore, the 
heavenly bodies are spherical in shape. Subsequently, Aristotle explains the 
immobility of things that are spherical in terms of not having an organ for 
movement.   
The way in which Aristotle applies the principle that nature does nothing in 
vain in this example is slightly different from its use in the biological works. In 
biology it is used to explain the absence of parts; here it is used to explain why the 
heavenly bodies are least ‘adapted’ to a function they are not supposed to perform. 
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That is, it is used to explain the presence of a feature (i.e. the spherical shape) in 
terms of it not being for the sake of a function the heavenly bodies do not need to 
perform (i.e. locomotion). If it is part of the nature of heavenly bodies to be 
immobile (in the sense of not being able to locomote on their own), then the natural 
bodies they have must be instrumental to this immobility, which is not to have 
instruments for mobility. This way of showing that features belong to a certain being 
by reference to a negatively defined nature is unprecedented in Aristotle’s biology.66 
In the remainder of the chapter, Aristotle provides empirical evidence (Cael.II.11, 
291b19: δείκνυται διὰ τῶν περὶ τὴν ὄψιν) concerning the waxing of the moon to 
strengthen the conclusion of the teleological argument,67 and refers to evidence from 
the astronomers concerning the eclipse of the sun.  
The success of the teleological explanation is again hard to determine. One 
problem is that the arguments in Cael.II.8 and Cael.II.11 are circular: their 
conclusions presuppose one another. In addition, Aristotle does not discuss the fact 
that in some sense the spherical shape is most fitted for movement, namely for 
movement in the sense of rotation; this is in fact what he argued for in Cael.II.8, 
290b2-3: 
 Πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ κίνησιν ἡ σφαῖρα τῶν σχημάτων χρησιμώτατον. 
 “For, the sphere is the figure that is most fit for movement on itself.”  
In sum, in both Cael.II.8 and Cael.II.11 Aristotle goes out of his way to establish the 
plausibility of the assumption that the heavenly bodies do not have a movement of 
their own, and hence must be moving while being fixed in concentric spheres. In 
doing so, he combines observational evidence (for as far as available) and the 
teleological principle that nature does nothing in vain: if our observations of the 
heavens are reliable, then the presence of their spherical shape and the absence of 





                                                 
66 Although there might be hints to such an explanation in PA.IV.7, 683b9-14. 
67 Τhe evidence concerning the moon and the sun is extended to the other heavenly bodies on the 
assumption that they are all “one and alike” (Cael.II.11, 291b17: ὁμοίως μὲν ἅπαντα καὶ ἕν.) 
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4.2.2.c Why the absence of the harmony of the spheres shows that heavenly bodies do not move on 
their own 
In Cael.II.9, turns to the Pythagorean notion of the harmony of the spheres and uses 
the rejection thereof to corroborate his claim that the heavenly bodies do not move 
on their own.  
Aristotle argues that the conclusions of Cael.II.8 show that the theory of 
the harmony of the spheres must be false (Cael.II.9, 290b12-15) for the following 
reason. Given that bodies around us produce a sound when they move through air, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that such enormous bodies as the heavenly bodies 
must produce a sound, too, when they move, and that is must be a very loud one. 
However, since we do not perceive such a loud noise,68 and do not experience any 
effects of this sound independently of our perception (thunder, for instance, has 
destructive effects, and it is reasonable to expect the noise of the heavens to have far 
more destructive effects), Aristotle concludes that the harmony of the spheres must 
simply be absent. Aristotle then uses the absence of the harmony of the spheres as 
evidence for the theory that the heavenly bodies do not move on their own 
(Cael.II.9, 291a6-9):  
Ἅμα δ’ ἐστὶ τό τ’ αἴτιον τούτων δῆλον, καὶ μαρτύριον τῶν εἰρημένων ἡμῖν λόγων, ὥς 
εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς· τὸ γὰρ ἀπορηθὲν καὶ ποιῆσαν τοὺς Πυθαγορείους φάναι γίγνεσθαι 
συμφωνίαν τῶν φερομένων ἡμῖν ἐστι τεκμήριον. 
“At the same time that the cause of those things is clear, it is also a testimony for 
the arguments we have provided, namely that they are true: for that which puzzled 
the Pythagoreans and which made them assert that there arises a harmony from the 
things that move is a proof for us.” 
The argument runs as follows: things either move through a medium and cause 
noise, or they move while being fixed in something else that performs the 
movement, and do not cause noise. If the heavenly bodies were to move on their 
own through a medium, they would produce noise of an enormous magnitude, and 
this noise would shatter our terrestrial realm (Cael.II.9, 291a9-22). From these 
considerations, Aristotle draws a conclusion that is teleological in nature (Cael.II.9, 
291a22-26): 
                                                 
68 The Pythagoreans explain this by claiming that human beings have gotten used to the sound, since they 
have been hearing it since their birth.  
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Ὥστ’ ἐπείπερ οὐ φαίνεται τοῦτο συμβαῖνον, οὔτ’ ἂν ἔμψυχον οὔτε βίαιον φέροιτο 
φορὰν οὐθὲν αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι προνοούσης τῆς φύσεως, ὅτι μὴ τοῦτον 
τὸν τρόπον ἐχούσης τῆς κινήσεως οὐθὲν ἂν ἦν τῶν περὶ τὸν δεῦρο τόπον ὁμοίως ἔχον. 
“Consequently, exactly since this result is not observed, none of them moves with 
an ensouled or forced movement, as if nature foresaw what was going to be the 
result, namely that if their movement were not like this nothing in the place around 
us would be the same.” 
Aristotle thus does not draw the simple conclusion that if none of the effects of the 
harmony of the spheres has been observed, the heavenly bodies cannot be moving 
on their own (i.e. if there are no effects, the causes of these effects must be absent). 
He rather gives a teleological or even providential twist to it: Aristotle argues that it 
is for the sake of preserving the terrestrial realm, that the heavenly bodies do not move 
on their own. In other words, the heavenly bodies do not just not produce such a 
harmony, they ‘were not meant to be’; their being fixed in spheres serves a good 
purpose.69 This argument draws on the principle that nature does nothing in vain: 
had the heavenly bodies moved on their own, their movements would have had bad 
consequences for our life on earth. Aristotle claims that, because nature “foresaw” 
these bad consequences and never does anything that is in vain (which, as we saw in 
the biological works, includes those things that are harmful), it did not produce the 
heavenly bodies in such a way that they could move on their own.  
Just as in the previous explanations, Aristotle uses what has not been 
perceived (i.e. noise) as evidence for something’s absence (i.e. for the absence of the 
harmony of the spheres), and uses the teleological argument that explains this 
absence in support of his theory of the physicality of the concentric spheres. The 
evidence for the absence of the harmony of the spheres is quite strong: even though 
our sensorial input might not be all that reliable when it concerns the heavens, the 
analogy with thunder and the absence of the effects caused by extremely loud noises 
make it reasonable to think that there really is no harmony of the spheres. The 
inference from the absence of bad results to the denial of heavenly bodies 
                                                 
69 This is also how Simplicius reads the passage, see: In Cael.467, 19-27: “Secondly, he [Alexander] also 
correctly recognizes that on the basis of what is said here Aristotle clearly believes that there is also 
providence over things her, since he says that nature, foreseeing things here, made the spheres, but not 
the stars, move. For the efficient cause also foresees this. And it is clear that Aristotle is now calling god 
nature, since what he calls nature in the strict sense – the starting point of motion and rest of what it is in 
– is not only not strong enough to have foresight, but it is such that it does not think or understand at all, 
nor does it perceive since it is naturally implanted first of all in bodies which do not perceive”. 
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performing a movement of their own is perhaps more of a stretch. The function, 
that is, the preservation of our world as it is, does not determine (in the sense of 
conditionally necessitating) the absence of the movement of the heavenly bodies, 
nor the presence of the heavenly spheres. A problem concerning the general theory 
of the argumentation is that Aristotle himself is not committed to the view that stars 
have to move through air or fire in case they were not fixed in a moving sphere: 
there are no natural elements in the region of the heavens except for aithêr. In 
addition, the explanation hints at a cosmological teleology: the heavenly bodies do 
not move while being fixed in concentric spheres because that is best for them, but 
because it is best for us. I have argued in 1.3 that Aristotle ultimately does not 
endorse such a cosmological view of teleology, but again, the teleological argument 
helps Aristotle to make as much sense of the phenomena as possible. 
 
In sum, in all four chapters discussed above, Aristotle applies some form of the 
principle that nature does nothing in vain to the heavenly bodies in order to argue 
for the plausibility of the theory of physical concentric spheres carrying the heavenly 
bodies. In the biological realm, the observation of what happens always or for the 
most part in nature is what allows us to draw inferences about cases in which the 
goal-directedness is less evident. In a domain such as cosmology, which is 
empirically underdetermined, such inferences are necessarily of a conjectural nature. 
However, if teleology extends to the heavenly realm, and Aristotle assumes it does, 
then the use of teleological principles allows Aristotle to make the most sense of the 





To a modern audience, Aristotle’s teleological explanations of heavenly phenomena 
may sound rather unusual, and perhaps even a bit silly, but what I hope to have 
made clear in this chapter is that they make perfect sense within Aristotle’s 
conception of natural science. If the heavens are part of nature, then we need at least 
to attempt to state all four causes for every heavenly phenomenon, even if the 
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investigation has been made difficult because of the scarcity of empirical data. 
Aristotle’s use of teleological principles thus follows from his physical approach 
towards cosmology, and we have seen that this approach is especially prominent in 
the second book of Cael., where Aristotle searches for explanations of the features 
and motions of the heaven as a whole and of the heavenly bodies. The scientific 
investigation of an empirically undetermined domain such as the heavens is difficult, 
and as his methodological reflections show, Aristotle is mostly well aware of all the 
problems involved. However, if one wants to gain knowledge of the heaven and its 
bodies, one has to try and give explanations that at least make the phenomena – 
both in terms of what can and of what cannot be observed – seem as reasonable as 
possible.70  
The strategy Aristotle employs to give plausible accounts is to posit 
teleological principles as a way of heuristic for finding final causes in difficult cases. 
The principles used are not a priori axioms, but suppositions derived from empirical 
evidence; they are generalizations over the actions of the formal nature of beings, 
based on numerous observations made in the biological domain. Just as the use of 
these principles helped Aristotle to find final causes in cases where these were not 
immediate observable in biology, in the same way Aristotle hopes to find 
explanations for natural phenomena in the cosmological realm. This gives a very 
central role to Aristotle’s scientific practice in biology: one could say that where 
Aristotle’s philosophy of science as described in the Posterior Analytics offers the 
student of nature his scientific toolbox, the accessible and rich domain of biology is 
the student’s main workplace. The experience and knowledge acquired in studying 
the biological phenomena may then – of course with suitable adaptations and 
refinements – be applied to other, less accessible domains of nature, such as that of 
the heavens.  
The application of teleological principles to the cosmological domain is 
itself based on the assumption that the heaven is no less teleological – and, perhaps 
even more teleological – than the sublunary realm is. However, as I have pointed out 
above, the lack of empirical evidence in the cosmological realm also weakens to 
                                                 
70 Cf. Irwin (1988), 34. 
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some extent the inferences Aristotle draws within this teleological framework:71 the 
explanations are plausible, but not as ‘conclusive’ as the ones we can find in the 
biological works.  
For De Caelo this means that Aristotle argues as much from as towards 
teleology: starting from the assumption that the heaven as a whole is goal-directed, 
Aristotle tries to give a coherent, plausible, and reasonable picture of the heavens in 
which things are present or absent for a reason. This is Aristotle’s main goal in De 
Caelo: even if it is not possible to give deductions that demonstrate why the heaven 
and the heavenly bodies have the features they have, one can still offer plausible 
physical accounts or inferences to the best explanation that take away some of the 
puzzlement concerning the heavens. 
 
                                                 
71 Cf. Falcon (2005), ix: “there are features of the celestial world that outrun the explanatory resources 
developed by Aristotle for the study of the sublunary world.” 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
 DEMONSTRATING TELEOLOGY  





In the Posterior Analytics (APo.), Aristotle discusses demonstrative knowledge. Despite 
the long tradition of Aristotelian scholarship on this treatise, many details 
concerning the nature of demonstration and its relation to explanation remain 
enigmatic, and are subject of much controversy.2  
This chapter aims to shed light on Aristotle’s pivotal discussion of the 
relation of demonstration, explanation, and scientific knowledge in APo.II.11, and 
specifically on the structure of teleological explanations as presented in this chapter. 
In the first two sections of this chapter (sections 5.1-5.2), I will clarify the examples 
Aristotle provides to illustrate his theoretical remarks about causal explanation. In 
particular, I hope to make sense of the teleological example of walking after dinner 
for the sake of health and to illuminate the explanatory role played by the final cause. 
In the third section of this chapter (section 5.3), I will confront these findings with 
conclusions from the previous four chapters concerning Aristotle’s practice. In 
particular, I will focus on the structure of three of the most common types of 
teleological explanation in Aristotle’s De Partibus Animalium (PA) and its relationship 
to the ‘ideal’ as described in APo.II.11.  
                                                 
1 A shorter version of this chapter is forthcoming as Leunissen (2007b). Previous versions of this chapter 
were presented to the Joint Ancient Philosophy Program at the University of Texas at Austin and the 
Marquette Summer Seminar in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy on the Posterior Analytics and Aristotelian 
Sciences, at Marquette University; I am grateful to all those who asked critical questions and made helpful 
comments. I am also indebted to the participants of the Leiden research seminar on the Posterior Analytics, 
Frans de Haas, Pieter Sjoerd Hasper and Marije Martijn, for their invaluable assistance in analyzing APo. 
II.11. For help and comments on earlier drafts of this chapter, I would like to thank Frans de Haas, Jim 
Hankinson, Pieter Sjoerd Hasper, Jim Lennox, and David Sedley. I thank Jeff Laux for correcting my 
English. The errors which remain are, of course, my responsibility, and the views expressed are not 
necessarily shared by those thanked above. 
2 For present purposes, I leave aside the question whether the Posterior Analytics is supposed to present a 
theory of scientific methodology and investigation or a theory of the organization and presentation of the 
finished scientific system. On this matter, see among others Barnes (1969) and (1993), xi-xix. 
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Ultimately, this will show that Aristotle’s theory and practice of teleological 
explanation are in agreement with each other, and that both are more flexible and 
comprehensive than has been acknowledged so far.  
 
5.1 Causes, explanations, and middle terms 
 
5.1.1   The problem: the middle terms of the examples in APo.II.11 do not pick out all four causes 
In APo.I.2 Aristotle introduces demonstrations as being syllogistic in form and 
causal in content. Demonstrations are thus deductive reasonings that produce 
scientific knowledge (APo.I.2, 71b17-19). For Aristotle, scientific knowledge consists 
ultimately in knowledge of the explanation of why things are the case (APo.I.2, 71b9-
13):  
Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθ’ ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός, ὅταν τήν τ’ αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι’ ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου 
αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ’ ἄλλως ἔχειν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι τὸ 
ἐπίστασθαί ἐστι· 
“We think we have <scientific> knowledge of each thing without qualification (and 
not in the sophistic way, incidentally), when we think we know the explanation 
because of which the state of affairs is the case, that it is its explanation, and also 
[when we think] that it is not possible for this to be otherwise. It is clear that 
something of this kind is what it is to have <scientific> knowledge.”3   
At the beginning of chapter 11 of the second book of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle 
specifies – and, from our perspective, complicates – this assertion by introducing a 
‘doctrine’ of four aitiai, which, he claims, are all to be demonstrated through the 
middle term (APo. II.11, 94a20-27):  
Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπίστασθαι οἰόμεθα ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τὴν αἰτίαν, αἰτίαι δὲ τέτταρες, μία μὲν τὸ τί 
ἦν εἶναι, μία δὲ τὸ τίνων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοῦτ’ εἶναι, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ τί πρῶτον ἐκίνησε, 
τετάρτη δὲ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα, πᾶσαι αὗται διὰ τοῦ μέσου δείκνυνται. 
“Since we think we have <scientific> knowledge when we know the explanation, 
and there are four types of explanation – one, what it is to be a thing, and another, 
given what things being the case it is necessary for that to hold;4 another, what first 
                                                 
3 All translations are mine, unless indicated otherwise. 
4 The expression used here to refer to material causation is puzzling; I believe Aristotle to imply that 
material causes for the most part necessitate their results, or that they at least did so when picked out in 
demonstrations. For present purposes, I shall treat the expression and the example discussed below as a 
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initiated the motion; and fourth, the for the sake of what – all of them are brought 
out through the middle term.”5  
After this short introduction of the subject matter of this chapter, Aristotle moves 
on to explain how indeed each of the four aitiai is indeed brought out or shown 
through the middle term.  
In contrast with the apparent clarity of structure and argument in this 
chapter, its content has raised many interpretative problems for modern scholars, 
most of which pertain to the general purpose of the chapter and to the nature of the 
individual syllogistic examples.  
The sentence stating that “all the aitiai are brought out through the middle 
term” has traditionally been interpreted6 as meaning that all four Aristotelian causes 
can or even must be picked out by the middle term in scientific demonstrations. 
However, under this interpretation the syllogistic examples Aristotle gives to 
illustrate his introductory sentence present us with two major difficulties. In the first 
place, contrary to the expectations of many interpreters the syllogisms posited in no 
way constitute typical Barbara demonstrations (the required mood for science) 
where the predicates hold universally and necessarily of the subjects.7 In the second 
place, it is not immediately clear how the middle terms in the given examples refer to 
the causes in question. In particular, the section that shows how final causes are 
brought out through the middle term is notorious,8 because the final cause is not 
picked out by the middle term, but rather by the major or predicate term.9 Some 
                                                                                                               
‘canonical’ example of material explanation, taken in the broad sense as an explanation stating ‘that out of 
which’. For the problems involved (which do not affect the interpretation presented here), see Barnes 
(1993), 226-7; Detel (1993), 685, 690-4; and Ross (1949), 638-42. 
5 For my translation of APo.II.11, 94a20-94b26, see the appendix at the end of this chapter. 
6 This interpretation ultimately goes back to Philoponus, who criticises this chapter in his commentary on 
APo. (In APo. 376, 12-14; 376, 16-18; 376, 31-2; 377, 21-22 and 377, 26-27). He thinks that the examples 
are wrong and rebukes Aristotle for having set out the syllogisms in a confused way (In APo. 378, 16-19; 
379, 4-9; 379, 33-380, 3). In order to correct Aristotle, Philoponus rearranges the examples and thereby 
manoeuvres the causes into the preferred position of the middle term (In APo. 378, 19-22; 379, 33-380, 3; 
381, 35-36). I have discussed these issues in more detail in Leunissen (2007a). 
7 Cf. Barnes (1993), xvi (“In chapters B11-12 the syllogism is, alas, a positive embarrassment and a bar to 
understanding.”) and 228 and Ross (1949), 647 (Ross calls Aristotle’s examples ‘quasi-syllogisms’).  
8 For the difficulties modern commentators encounter in this section, see, Ross (1949), 642; Barnes 
(1993), 225; 229; and Detel (1993), 695; 707. 
9 See Barnes (1993), 229ff; Detel (1993), 707ff; and Ross (1949), 642-3. The problem is expressed most 
emphatically in Detel (1997), 65-66: “The syllogistic reconstruction of the first of these [two teleological] 
examples Aristotle seems to offer in the subsequent passage (94b12-20) turns out to be, at first sight, 
extremely problematic, though, since he represents the aim of being healthy, not by the middle term, B, 
but by the major term, A. This is clearly incompatible with his general claim, expressed in 94a20-24, that the 
aim too must be proved through the middle term” (the italics are mine). 
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scholars have taken up Aristotle’s own suggestion that things will become clearer if 
we ‘change the logoi’ (94b21-22: metalambanein tous logous), taking it to mean that we as 
readers are supposed to rearrange the syllogism so that the middle term picks out the 
final cause after all.10 However, it is not an easy undertaking to construct such a 
syllogism, let alone to do so while remaining close to the Aristotelian original. On 
the whole, the verdict of interpreters on this chapter has been very negative.11 
 
5.1.2   The hypothesis: the causality of the explanation vs. that of the explanatory middle term  
The hypothesis that I put forward in order to solve the problem outlined above is a 
fairly simple one. I submit that it is not the examples that are wrong, but rather our 
interpretation of what Aristotle means by saying that “all the aitiai are brought out 
through the middle term.” What is crucial for the understanding of this chapter is 
that within an Aristotelian demonstration there can be a difference between the type 
of causality expressed in the explanation of a state of affairs (i.e. the causality 
expressed by the whole demonstrative syllogism), and the type of causality expressed 
in the middle term that picks out the explanans of this state of affairs. In the case of 
teleological explanations, I will even argue for the stronger case that the type of 
causality expressed by the middle term must be different from that expressed in the 
explanation. The upshot of this distinction for Aristotle’s theory of demonstration is 
that all the four types of explanations will be brought out through the middle term, 
but that the middle term itself will not have to refer to the corresponding cause in all 
four cases.  
I will give two examples to illustrate this distinction. First, consider the dia 
ti question why there is a house. In many cases,12 Aristotle takes this to be a question 
about the purpose of the presence of a house. In that case, an adequate explanation 
                                                 
10 Detel in particular puts much work into the rewriting and adaptation of the examples as a consequence 
of interpreting metalambanein tous logous as ‘changing the terms’; see Detel (1993), 684-716 and (1997), 65-
67. Recently, Johnson argued that ‘changing the terms’ should be read as entailing that ‘health’ and ‘good 
digestion’ are convertible in this explanation; see Johnson (2005), 52-55. This, however, is only possible if 
the terms were coextensive, which seems unlikely in this case. Bolton (1997, 115), saves the example, but 
suggests that ultimately what is picked out by the major term (the final cause) is “in its primitive 
definition” equal to what is picked out by the middle term (the material cause). 
11 This might explain why the chapter has largely been ignored by some recent studies on APo.; see, for 
instance, Goldin (1996) and McKirahan (1992).   
12 Aristotle does not offer a complete demonstration of why there is a house in APo.II.11, but the details 
might be inferred from similar examples in Met.Z.19, 1041a23-30, APo.II.12, 95b32-38, and DA.I.1, 
403b3-7.  
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needs to be a teleological one: as Aristotle puts it, a house is present for the sake of 
protecting my belongings against wind, rain, and heat. However, this explanation as 
such does not make it intelligible yet why it is that protection of my belongings holds 
of this house, that is, we have not shown yet why this function belongs per se to this 
subject. This is where the explanatory middle term comes in: the middle term picks 
out the explanans of why a house offers protection. In this example, Aristotle thinks 
the middle term will be something like ‘bricks, stones, and timber,’ because these 
materials explain why a house has the protective properties it has. That is, if a house 
is to be protective, it is a necessity that it be solid and impenetrable by water; 
materials such as cloth or cardboard, unlike bricks, stones, and timber, will not have 
the right material potentials to do the job. The middle term thus picks out the 
material cause of why the function of protection belongs to a house, and thereby 
brings out or shows why the teleological explanation holds.  
A second example is the dia ti question of what is ice. Aristotle takes this 
question to be about the essence of ice – about what ice is (cf. APo.II.12, 95a16-21). 
By assuming (the nominal definition) that ice is solidified water Aristotle makes a 
first move towards an explanation in terms of formal causation. Again, this 
preliminary answer does not qualify as a demonstration yet, because we do not know 
why it is that ‘solidified’ belongs to ‘water’, or why there is ice. The explanatory 
middle term that Aristotle proposes for this example is a complete cessation 
(ekleipsis) of heat: ice comes about when there is a complete cessation of heat. The 
middle term, which picks out the efficient cause13 of the solidification of water, 
reveals the essence of ice: ice is solidified water resulting from a complete cessation 
of heat. While the explanation is a formal cause explanation, the middle term 
bringing out this explanation picks out an efficient cause.  
In sum, Aristotle’s claim that “all the aitiai are brought out through the 
middle term” means under this scheme that all the four types of explanations are 
brought out through the middle term, but that these demonstrations may proceed 
through middle terms that pick out causes of a different type.  
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5.1.3   The semantic distinction between hê aitia and to aition 
Within the context of the Posterior Analytics this philosophical distinction is supported 
by a semantic distinction between the term hê aitia (fem.; pl. aitiai) and the term to 
aition (neut.; pl. aitia). Frede has argued that the two terms were used differently in 
the original legal context in which they arose: to aition designated the agent 
responsible for a state of affairs, while hê aitia designated the accusation.14 This 
distinction between aition as cause and aitia as causal account or explanation seems to 
be preserved in Plato’s Phaedo,15 and perhaps also in Chrysippus16 and Diocles.17  
Outside the Posterior Analytics, there is little or no evidence that Aristotle 
also endorsed this distinction, but within the Posterior Analytics I believe there is.18 
The semantic distinction is not crucial for the philosophical distinction, but a short 
sketch of the semantic distinction might help to get a clearer view of the theory 
Aristotle is setting out in chapter 11.  
First to aition: usually, to aition is characterized as a condition for 
knowledge.19 More specifically, in ‘demonstrations of the reason why’ the middle 
term must always refer to an aition.20 This is what Aristotle points out at the end of 
the following passage (APo.II.2, 89b37-90a9): 
ζητοῦμεν δέ, ὅταν μὲν ζητῶμεν τὸ ὅτι ἢ τὸ εἰ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς, ἆρ’ ἔστι μέσον αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐκ 
ἔστιν· ὅταν δὲ γνόντες ἢ τὸ ὅτι ἢ εἰ ἔστιν, ἢ τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἢ τὸ ἁπλῶς, πάλιν τὸ διὰ τί 
ζητῶμεν ἢ τὸ τί ἐστι, τότε ζητοῦμεν τί τὸ μέσον. (...) συμβαίνει ἄρα ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς 
ζητήσεσι ζητεῖν ἢ εἰ ἔστι μέσον ἢ τί ἐστι τὸ μέσον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον τὸ μέσον, ἐν 
ἅπασι δὲ τοῦτο ζητεῖται. 
                                                                                                               
13 I here follow Charles (1999), 233-5, who identifies ekleipsis as a process (the suffix –sis indicates a nomen 
actionis) and an efficient cause.  
14 Frede (1980), 222-223.  
15 Frede (1980), 223; Lennox (2001a), 282-283; Sedley (1998), 115 and 115n1. 
16 Frede (1980), 222. 
17 Diocles, fr.176 (edition Van der Eijk (2001)). 
18 In other treatises the distinction may only be preserved in ‘technical discussions’ of demonstrations 
such as DA.II.2, 413a11-21; this, however, requires further research. Interpreters of APo. usually take the 
terms to be semantically equivalent, and translate them more or less randomly as cause, reason, or 
explanation. For instance, Barnes (1993), 89-90, “resolved to adhere to a single translation for all 
occurrences of the word [i.e. “aitia and its cognates”]; and I opted for ‘explanation’.” 
19 Knowing why is to know by means of to aition (75a35); this knowledge proceeds from aitia (76a19-20) that 
are primitive (78a25-26). See also 93a4-8; 93b19; 93b21-6; 95a10-12; 95a22-25; 95b14. 
20 The middle term in demonstrations of the reason why always picks out the aition that is immediate and 
primitive (89b15; 90a7-9; 93a4-8; 95a10-12; 95a17; passim in 98b17-99b13). If the deduction does not 
proceed through the aition but through the more familiar of the (non-explanatory) converting terms, that 
is, when the middle term is not an aition, then the demonstration that follows is not a demonstration of 
the reason why, but a demonstration of the fact (78a27-29; 78b4; 78b12; 78b15; 78b24; 79a4).  
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“When we seek the fact or if something is without qualification, we are seeking 
whether or not there is a middle term for it. And when, having come to know either 
the fact or if it is – either partially or without qualification –, we again seek the 
reason why or what it is, we are then seeking what the middle term is. (…) Thus it 
results that in all our searches we seek either if there is a middle term or what the 
middle term is. For the middle term is the aition, and in all cases it is this which is 
being sought.” 
The middle term must pick out whatever is responsible for the connection between 
the two terms it mediates. In this way, the middle term clarifies the causal relation 
between the two terms by providing the real cause (and not merely the epistemic 
reason) of why the one extreme term holds of the other. I therefore translate the 
noun to aition as cause.21   
The term hê aitia is used less frequently in the Posterior Analytics, and is 
usually part of the definition of scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge is always 
knowledge of hai aitiai.22 For instance, in APo.I.2, 71b20-33 Aristotle first picks up 
on his definition of scientific knowledge as being knowledge of the aitia of 
something, and then continues by stating that this knowledge can be reached 
through things that are, among other things, aitios of the conclusion:  
εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἔθεμεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην 
ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ’ εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων 
τοῦ συμπεράσματος· (...) αἴτιά τε καὶ γνωριμώτερα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ πρότερα, αἴτια μὲν ὅτι 
τότε ἐπιστάμεθα ὅταν τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδῶμεν. 
“If then to have <scientific> knowledge of something is what we have posited it to 
be, then demonstrative knowledge in particular must proceed from [items which 
are] true and primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and aitios 
of the conclusions. (…) They [the items that are constitutive of demonstrative 
understanding] must be aitios and more familiar and prior – aitios because we only 
understand something when we have knowledge of hê aitia (…).” 
Other passages23 point out that Aristotle conceives of these aitiai as being larger 
linguistic or syllogistic formulas that state the reason why in answer to the question 
                                                 
21 See, for example, 78b17; 85b22; 94b8; 94b18; 95b20; 95b28; 98a35-b3; passim in 98b17-99b13. 
22 See 71b9-13; 71b30-31; 87b40; and 94a21-7. 
23 See, for example, APo.I.13, 78b28-31; in this passage, Aristotle compares explanations in Camestres to 
explanations in which the middle terms are set too far away: “Explanations (aitiai) of this kind resemble 
extravagant statements (tois kath’ huperbolên eirêmenois), i.e. when you argue by setting the middle term too far 
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‘why’ (to dioti or to dia ti).24 At least within the Posterior Analytics it is thus implied that 
hê aitia itself is a kind of logos or syllogismos containing an explanatory middle term, 
where to aition is a subordinated element of hê aitia.25 I therefore translate the term hê 
aitia with such terms as ‘causal account’ or ‘explanation’,26 and the adjective aitios as 
either ‘causative’ or ‘explanatory’ depending on the context.  
 
Assuming that this semantic distinction between aition and aitia illustrates a 
philosophical distinction between the type of causality that is revealed through the 
middle term and the type of causality picked out by the middle term, I will now 
present a new reading of APo.II.11. 
 
5.2 Towards a new reading of Posterior Analytics II.11 
 
5.2.1 Making sense of the opening statement and the examples in APo.II.11 
In his opening statement of the chapter, Aristotle first recapitulates his definition of 
scientific knowledge. That is, we know something when we know its explanation, 
which is the syllogistic formula stating the aition of the state of affairs to be 
explained. He then specifies four kinds of explanations, which are formulated as four 
different questions as to the reason why (formal explanation is an explanation of 
what is it to be a thing; material explanation is an explanation of given what things 
being the case it is necessary for that to hold; efficient explanation is an explanation 
of what initiated the movement; and teleological explanation is an explanation of the 
for the sake of what). As the ‘since’ (epei de) indicates, this should all be common 
knowledge.  
                                                                                                               
away. Take for example, Anacharsis’ [argument] that there are no flute-girls among the Scythes since there 
are no vines.”  
24 These explanations of the reason why, picking out to aition through the middle term (cf. 78b12-34; the 
term hê aitia occurs in 78b24 and 78b28; 85b23-27 and 85b35-36). In 93b33, hê aitia indicates a non-
syllogistic causal account.  
25 One might object that in APo.I.24, 85b24-27 Aristotle uses the expressions ‘of the aitia and of the dia ti’ 
and ‘of the aition and of the dia ti’ interchangably. However, the first expression applies to the nature of 
the demonstrative syllogism (what is demonstrated is the explanation and the reason why), while the 
second applies to the nature of the universal premise, which is more explanatory in the sense that it shows 
the aition more clearly (cf. APo.I.31, 88a5-6). 
26 Cf. Moravcsik (1974), 3: “aitia are whatever answers a ‘why’-question, and whatever answers a why-
question is an explanation.” 
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The new information is that all of these explanations are brought out through the 
middle term. This is the process of demonstration: the explanations of the reason 
why (to dioti) are demonstrated through middle terms which explain why the 
predicate holds of the subject in the conclusion. The middle term thus reveals a 
causal connection underlying the per se relation between these two terms.27 The point 
is that it is only by setting out the whole syllogism and thereby expressing explicitly 
the cause of why the predicate holds of the subject term that we come to reach true 
understanding of a phenomenon.  
Aristotle then works out three examples of explanations (material, efficient, 
and final) that are brought out through the middle term. Aristotle gives no separate 
example of formal explanation, supposedly because that “that has already been 
proven” (APo.II.11, 94a35-36) in earlier chapters.28 For the sake of completeness, I 
will supply a formal cause explanation from an earlier chapter in my discussion 
below.   
 
5.2.2 Examples of different types of explanations 
My reconstruction of the four examples and their formalizations into syllogisms is as 
follows: 
 
Example 1: Material Explanation (APo.II.11, 94a27-35; cf. Euclid, Elements III.31) 
Explanandum:  i. [Why (dia ti) is there a right angle?] [Why A?] 
ii. Why (dia ti) is the angle in a semicircle a right angle? [Why A of C?] 
A = right 
B = half of two rights (aition = material cause) 
C = angle in a semicircle 





                                                 
27 In APo.I.4, 73a10-17 Aristotle explicates the per se relation in terms of causation, i.e. as something 
holding because of itself (di’hauto). Freeland (1991), 58-60 takes this as evidence for reading Aristotle as a 
causal realist. 
28 I take Aristotle to refer to the demonstrations of the reason why set out in chapter II.8, which is part of 
his larger investigation into the relation of definition and causal explanations in chapters II.8-10. 
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Example 2: Formal Explanation (APo.II.8, 93b8-13)  
Explanandum: i. What is thunder? [What is A?] 
ii. Why (dia ti) is there noise in the clouds? [Why A of C?] 
A = thunder (a sort of noise) 
B = extinction of fire (aition = efficient cause) 
C = cloud 
AaC because of B: thunder is noise in the clouds because of fire being extinguished. 
 
Example 3: Efficient Explanation (APo.II.11, 94a36-b8): 
Explanandum:  i. [Why (dia ti) is there a Persian war?] [Why A?] 
ii. Why (dia ti) did the Persian war come upon the Athenians? [Why A of 
C?]  
A = war 
B = being the first to attack (aition = efficient cause) 
C = Athenians 
AaC because of B: being warred upon holds of the Athenians because of being the first 
to attack.  
 
Example 4: Teleological Explanation (APo.II.11, 94b8-26): 
Explanandum:  i. Why (dia ti) does he walk? [Why C?] 
A = being healthy 
B = food not floating (aition = material cause) 
C = walking after dinner 
AaC because of B: being healthy holds of walking after dinner because of the food not 
floating.  
 
Before turning to an analysis of these examples, let me state from the outset that 
contrary to the traditional interpretation I see no decisive indications in the text as to 
why Aristotle should only be concerned with syllogisms in the Barbara mood. I 
submit that the introduction of the four types of explanations in APo.II.11 rather 
shows that Aristotle is concerned with laying out a general syllogistic structure in 
which every causal relation can be fit. Reading the chapter in this way, the 
contingency and singularity of the examples noted by various critics of Aristotle 
need no longer constitute a lingering problem. They can be accounted for within the 
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larger framework of causal relations Aristotle is interested in, and so can the other 
examples Aristotle mentions in the remainder of the chapter (APo.II.11, 94b27-34).29 
 
5.2.2.a   The example of material explanation 
The first example on material explanation is developed in the context of a discussion 
of the necessary nature of demonstrative syllogisms (APo.II.11, 94a24-27).30 The 
example can be analysed as follows (see also figure 1 below). The dia ti question 
Aristotle poses is ‘because of what the angle in a semicircle is a right angle.’ An 
adequate explanation should thus state the geometrical proof showing ‘that out of 
which’ it follows that the angle in a semicircle is right. This example of material 
explanation in fact reflected in a theorem from Euclid (Elements III.31), and the 
proof might do so as well.  
Here Aristotle induces the search for the middle term by rephrasing the 
question explicitly in terms of material necessity: “given what being the case is it a 
right angle?” What we are looking for is a condition that necessitates the rightness of 
the angle in a semicircle – a condition, incidentally, that will be immediately evident 
once the right mathematical figure has been discovered (cf. Met.IX.9, 1051a22-28). 
Aristotle then formalizes the explanation, while introducing ‘half of two rights’ as 
the middle term (B) that explains why ‘right’ (A) holds of ‘angle in a semicircle’ (C).  
The rationale Aristotle offers in this section is somewhat obscure, but is 
not too problematic once we presuppose the familiarity of Aristotle’s readership 
with the relevant mathematical figure and the proof of the proposition as we know it 
from Euclidean geometry (Aristotle hints at both of them in the above mentioned 
passage in Met.IX.9). Important in this proof is that the geometrical relations 
between ‘right angle’ and ‘angle in a semicircle’ are discovered by division.31 It is this 
                                                 
29 These latter examples are rather more fanciful than serious, such as the Pythagorean belief that it 
thunders in order to frighten the inhabitants of Tartarus, or report scientific views that Aristotle rejects 
elsewhere, such as the explanation of thunder as being fire that is being extinguished in the clouds (this 
explanation is explicitly rejected in Mete.II.9, 369b12-24) or the theory that light is a fine grained substance 
capable of passing through porous bodies (this theory does not seem to belong to Aristotle). For an 
assessment of these kinds of examples, see Wians (1996), 137. 
30 Here Aristotle states that, given a middle term shared by two propositions, it is necessary for the 
conclusion of the syllogism to hold. The middle term, or the two premises taken as one, literally bring 
about the conclusion, and are therefore in a sense the material causes of the conclusion (cf. Ph.II.3, 
195a18-19).  
31 Cf. Met.IX.9, 1051a22-23: mathematical figures, too, are discovered by actualization; for they find them 
by dividing [the figures] (diairountes).  
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division that Aristotle refers to when claiming that “[the term B] is equal to A, and C 
to B, because it [C] is of two rights – half. 32 It is this ‘being half’ that necessitates the 
angle in a semicircle being a right angle. In addition, Aristotle claims that B holds of 
A because ‘being half of two rights’ is a definition of ‘a right angle.’ In sum, the angle 
in a semicircle is thus a right angle because it is half of two rights; ‘being half of two 
rights’ is the material cause of ‘right’ holding of ‘the angle in a semicircle.’ The angle 
in a semicircle is by material necessity a right angle given that it is two rights – divided in 
half.  
In this case, both the causation expressed by the explanation and the 
explanatory middle term that brings out this explanation are of the material type. 
 










5.2.2.b The example of formal explanation 
The second example, on formal explanation (taken from APo.II.8, 93b8-13), can be 
analysed as follows. The dia ti question Aristotle poses is why there is thunder. This 
is a reformulation of the question ‘what is thunder’, which is a question for the 
definition of thunder (Aristotle answers the ‘what is’-question by stating that it is the 
extinction of fire in cloud, which is not a demonstration of the essence of thunder 
yet). For Aristotle, the question why there is thunder is equivalent to the question 
what thunder is, except that the first is a question for a demonstration and the latter 
                                                 
32 Note the word order in the Greek: while B is defined as ½-2R (94a29: hêmiseia duoin orthain; 94a32-33: 
ontos hêmiseos duo orthôn), C is explained as 2R-½ (94a32: duo gar orthôn hêmiseia). 
                                  B 
      α  γ 
 
 
           α             β    δ              γ 
 A               M                           C   
 
Demonstration: ∠ABC = 90° 
∠MAB = ∠MBA (α) 
∠MCB = ∠MBC (γ) 
(i.) β + δ =  180°; 
(ii.) 2α + β = 180°; 
 2γ + δ = 180° 
(iii.) 2(α + γ) + β + δ = 360° 
(iv.) 2(α + γ) = 180° 
(v.) α + γ (‘the angle in a 
semicircle’) = 180° (‘two rights’) 
divided by 2 (‘half’) = 90° 
(‘right’) 
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for a definition.33 An adequate explanation of why there is thunder thus needs to be 
a formal explanation expressing the essence of thunder through a middle term that 
brings out this essence.  
However, as Aristotle indicates in another text where he discusses the same 
example (Met.Z.17, 1041a24-32),34 the only way to get a demonstration is by 
converting the explanandum into a predicative relation.35 This can be done in the 
first place by taking the nominal definition of thunder (as being ‘a sort of noise in 
the cloud’; APo.II.8, 93a22-23). In the second place by turning the request for a 
definition into a dia ti question for a demonstration, in which the object of inquiry is 
‘a something of something else’ (i.e. why is there thunder in the clouds). Because the 
explanation in this case is already known (i.e. thunder comes about through the 
extinction of fire in the cloud), Aristotle sets out immediately to formalize the 
example: the subject term (C) is ‘cloud’; the middle term (B) is ‘extinction of fire’; 
and the predicate term (A) is ‘thunder’. From this it follows that B holds of C, 
because the extinction of fire takes place in the cloud (the cloud is the locus in which 
the phenomenon typically resides), and that A – ‘thunder’ (i.e. a sort of noise) – 
holds of B, because B is a definition of A.  
In this case, the explanatory middle term picks out an efficient cause of 
why there is thunder or noise in the clouds: the origin of motion of the noise lies in 
the extinguishing of fire. It is through this efficient cause that the essence of thunder 
and thereby the formal explanation of why there is thunder are revealed: thunder is 
noise in the clouds caused by fire being extinguished.36  
 
5.2.2.c The example of efficient explanation 
The third example of efficient explanation (APo.II.11, 94a36-b8) is fairly 
straightforward.  Here Aristotle picks a historical example in asking why it is that the 
Persian war came upon the Athenians, rephrased as what the explanation is for the 
                                                 
33 See APo.II.10, 94a1-8: “[One type of definition] will clearly be like a demonstration of what something 
is, differing in arrangement from a demonstration. For there is a difference between saying why it 
thunders and saying what thunder is. In answering why you will say ‘because the fire is extinguished in the 
clouds’. But if you ask ‘what is thunder?’, you will say, ‘a noise of fire being extinguished in the clouds’. 
Hence the same account is given in different ways: in one way it is a continuous demonstration, in the 
other a definition.” 
34 For thunder-examples in APo. and Met., see Charles (1999), 233-235; 238-239. 
35 Lennox (2004), 90n2. 
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Athenians being warred upon. As in the other examples, it is not clear from the 
outset which type of explanation will be demonstrated.37 However, the short 
explanation Aristotle offers first (“because the Athenians attacked Sardis with the 
Eretrians”) points to the type of demonstrative explanation Aristotle is looking for: 
he is looking for some state of affairs that initiated the movement, which is an 
efficient cause (and not for that for the sake of which, such as the desire of the 
Persians to gain an empire). Aristotle then formalizes the example in the following 
way: “War, A; being the first to attack, B; Athenians C.” It is significant that 
Aristotle here adds the notion of ‘first’ to the attack: it is being the first to do wrong 
that is explanatory for being wronged, and this is the origin of motion. 
In this case, the middle term picks out the efficient cause of why war came 
upon the Athenians: for “people make war on those who first began,” which is why 
being warred upon holds of those who first began. The Athenians were the ones 
who first began (they fall under this formal description), and this explains the origin 
of the Persian war.38   
 
5.2.2.d The example of final explanation 
Aristotle introduces the section on final explanation (APo.II.11, 94b8-26) with a 
somewhat puzzling clause: “hosôn d’aition to heneka tinos.” From what follows it is clear 
that the explanations that are at stake here are teleological ones: Aristotle gives two 
parallel examples (“For what reason does he walk? In order to be healthy. For what 
reason is there a house? In order to protect possessions.”), and identifies the final 
cause or the purpose in each example (“In the one case it is in order to be healthy, in 
the other in order to protect.”). He also explains that in these cases there is no 
difference between a ‘because of what’ question and a ‘for the sake of what’ 
question. However, it is not immediately clear whether or not Aristotle means that 
the final cause has to be picked out by the middle term. 
                                                                                                               
36 Charles (1999), 239; Lennox (2001), 141. 
37 A similar example in Ph.II.198a18-19 (“[for the why ultimately leads back either] to the first source of 
motion, e.g. why did they go to war? Because they were plundered, or to that for the sake of which, e.g. in 
order to rule”) points out that the question why there is war can be answered in different ways.   
38 Note that in all three examples the primary explanandum is the occurrence of a certain phenomenon 
(i.e. ‘rightness’, ‘thunder’, and ‘war’) that can be expressed in a predicative relation with a subject in which 
the phenomenon typically and for the most part inheres (i.e. ‘angle in a semicircle’, ‘cloud’, and 
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The introductory clause (APo.II.11, 94b8) has often been read as implying just that 
(i.e. that in these cases the cause is that for the sake of which), but it does not have 
to be read in this way. The Greek has to heneka tinos, which means something 
different from to hou heneka.39 To hou heneka is the more common expression and is 
used more or less as a stock phrase designating the end (literally, ‘that for the sake of 
which’, in which hou is a relative pronoun).40 Tο heneka tinos/tou designates rather the 
teleological relation of something being for the sake of something else (literally, that 
which is for the sake of something, where tinos is a indefinite pronoun). In this 
expression, the ‘to’ is not used as a definite article to substantivate the prepositional 
phrase, but to identify whatever is for the sake of something, or the relation as 
such.41  
Under this interpretation, the point Aristotle makes here is not that the 
explanatory middle term in this case is the final cause, but that the causal relation 
involved is teleological, and that the middle term must pick out something that 
explains how something is for the sake of something. The teleological explanation is 
brought out through a middle term that need not itself be a final cause, but that 
rather shows how an end can hold of something. This causal relation is then 
illustrated by the two examples: walking is for the sake of health, and a house is for 
the sake of protection. The middle term that we are looking for needs to pick out a 
state of affairs that shows why this teleological relation between walking and being 
healthy obtains. 
In a simplified version of the demonstrative syllogism, the predicate term 
(A) is being healthy, the middle term (B) is the food not floating, and the subject 
term (C) is walking after dinner. In this case, the middle term picks out the material 
cause of why being healthy holds of walking after dinner, because it identifies the 
physiological condition that is healthy – a condition that itself is initiated by walking 
                                                                                                               
‘Athenians’). In the demonstration that follows what is revealed is that there is always some aspect of this 
subject that explains the holding of its attributes. 
39 See, e.g., Apostle (1981), 59: “Lastly, there is a final cause [or, that for the sake of which]”; Barnes 
(1993), 60: “suppose it is the purpose which is explanatory”. 
40 See, e.g. Ph.II.2, 194a27-30 “Further, that for the sake of which (to hou heneka), or the end, as well as 
whatever is for the sake of these (hosa toutôn heneka), belong to the same study. But nature is an end and a 
that for the sake of which (hou heneka)” and Cael.II.12, 292b6-7: “for action always consists in two factors, 
when there is that for the sake of which (hou heneka) and that which is for the sake of something (to toutou 
heneka).”  
41 Cf. Ph.II.5, 196b17-22); DA.434a32; GA.715a4; GA.778b13; MA.700b26-27; and Met.1065a31. 
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that brings about health as an efficient cause.42 For the identification of ‘the food not 
floating’ as a material cause, compare Aristotle’s qualification of the boiling of the 
blood surrounding the heart as a material cause of anger in DA.I.1, 403a25-b1. 
 
In all four examples, the different explanations that are at stake are revealed through 
the middle term, which picks out a cause for the holding of the predicate term of the 
subject term. However, in my analysis of the example of teleological explanation, I 
have left two important questions unanswered. First, if Aristotle did not intend the 
final cause to be picked out by the middle term, what does he mean by ‘changing the 
logoi’? Secondly, one might wonder what it is about this example – or about 
teleological explanations in general – that makes it so hard to rewrite the 
demonstrations in such a way that the final cause is actually picked out by the middle 
term. The following sections address these questions.   
 
5.2.3 Teleological explanations and what it means to metalambanein tous logous 
 
5.2.3.a Why walking is for the sake of health 
The argument of the section on final causes is fairly long compared to the 
illustration of the other types of explanation, and it proceeds in a quite complicated 
way. Here I will first separate the different steps in the argument and give a detailed 
interpretation of each; next, I will propose two possible interpretations of 
metalambanein tous logous. Let me start by introducing the way Aristotle originally 
formulates the terms of the explanation (see table 1 below):   
 
Table 1: The original formulations of the terms 
A1: Being healthy to hugiainein Condition Final cause 
B1: The food not floating to mê epipolazein ta sitia Condition Aition 
C: Walking after dinner peripatos apo deipnou Activity Explanandum 
 
For the sake of clarity, I also add the alternative formulations of the terms that 
Aristotle uses during the argument (see table 2 below).43  
                                                 
42 As Bolton (1997), 113-115 suggested.  
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Table 2: The alternative formulations of the terms 
A2: Healthy hugieinos  Productive of condition 
B2: To make the food not 
floating 
to poiein mê epipolazein ta sitia Activity productive of 
condition 
 
The argument that follows the distribution of the terms proceeds in roughly the 
following four steps. First Aristotle asks us to suppose that to make the food not 
floating (B2), holds of C, walking after dinner, and that this is healthy (A2). Note that 
Aristotle changes the formulations of the terms A and B, presumably to show that 
walking (which is an activity) holds of another activity that produces the condition of 
the non-floating of food. It is this latter activity that Aristotle calls healthy, for 
healthy is just that which produces (or is useful to) the condition of being healthy. 
This is in fact the way Aristotle characterizes ‘healthy’ in the Eudemian Ethics (EE.I.8, 
1218b16-22): 
ὅτι δ’ αἴτιον τὸ τέλος τοῖς ὑφ’ αὑτό, δηλοῖ ἡ διδασκαλία. ὁρισάμενοι γὰρ τὸ τέλος 
τἆλλα δεικνύουσιν, ὅτι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν· αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. οἷον ἐπειδὴ τὸ 
ὑγιαίνειν τοδί, ἀνάγκη τόδε εἶναι τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς αὐτήν· τὸ δ’ ὑγιεινὸν τῆς ὑγιείας 
αἴτιον ὡς κινῆσαν, καὶ τότε τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν.  
“And that the end stands in a causal relation to the means subordinate to it is 
shown by teaching. For, having defined the end they show, regarding other things, 
that each of them is a good, because that for the sake of which is causative. For 
example, since ‘being healthy’ is such and such a thing, then necessarily this other 
thing will be what is useful for it. And what is healthy will be the efficient cause of health, 
though only the cause of its being, but not of health being a good.” 
By characterizing walking as an activity that is productive of the food not floating, 
and the latter as being productive of health, Aristotle implies that C is an efficient 
cause of A1, being healthy: walking is productive of a healthy condition (cf. Rh.I.6, 
1362a31-34). Walking and health are thus causes of each other: while walking is the 
efficient cause of health, health is the final cause of walking (cf. Ph.II.3, 195a8-11). 
Now, if walking is a health-producing activity, it remains for the teleological 
demonstration to exhibit why it is that walking effects a change that is directed 
                                                                                                               
43 I will retain the numbering in my discussion of the example on teleological explanation; where it is not 
clear which formulation Aristotle has in mind the term is not numbered. 
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towards health. Accordingly, Aristotle continues the argument (and this is step two) 
by explaining that it is thought that B1, the material condition where the food is not 
floating on the surface, holds of C, walking, and healthy (A2) holds of B (B1). This 
opinion points towards the explanatory role of B1. 
Indeed, Aristotle now (in the third step of the argument) poses the 
question what the aition is that causally connects C, walking, and A, the ‘that for the 
sake of which’.44 The answer is B1, the not floating. Aristotle adds that “this is like a 
definition of that (APo.II.11, 94b19-20).” Probably the first ‘this’ refers to B1, the 
not floating, while ‘that’ refers to A1, being healthy, “for”, Aristotle explains, “in that 
way the A will be explained.” The not floating of the food is like a definition of 
being healthy in the sense that it shows how being healthy in this context (i.e. in the 
context of a person who just had dinner) is to be understood. Part of what it means 
to be healthy in this case is to be in a condition where the food is not floating on the 
surface of the stomach.45  
Finally, Aristotle turns to an account of the minor premise: “For what 
reason does B hold of C?” Aristotle answers that the reason is “because that is what 
being healthy is: to be in such a condition.” The formulation of this response 
suggests that we have touched upon a premise that is not further analyzable but is 
immediately evident (i.e. the premise is immediate). At this point, Aristotle ends his 
discussion of this particular example of teleological explanation.  
 
5.2.3.b Two possible interpretations of metalambanein tous logous 
The section is completed by the enigmatic statement (Barnes called it the ‘Delphic 
injunction’)46 that one needs to metalambanein tous logous, and that “in that way each of 
them will become clearer (APo.II.11, 94b21-22).” The traditional interpretation reads 
this sentence in an apologetic way: Aristotle realizes that his example on the final 
cause is ill-chosen and messy, and that by mistake the middle term does not pick out 
the final cause. In order to make sense of this example, we should therefore 
(stipulate that the terms are coextensive and) rearrange the order of the terms or of 
                                                 
44 The apposition ‘the for the sake of which’ in APo.II.11, 94b18 belongs to A, not to the aition. 
45 As opposed to definitions of health as, for instance, having one’s body in a uniform state (Met.VII.7, 
1032b6-8) or having fasted for a wile (Ph.194b36). 
46 Barnes (1993), 229. 
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the premises in such a way that the middle term will pick out health as the final 
cause. However, I see two problems with this reading that strongly suggest that we 
should look for a different interpretation.  
First, Aristotle spends quite some time explaining the example of 
teleological explanation, and it seems not very charitable to assume that this is not 
the example he actually would have liked to present to his readers. In fact, the 
explanation that walking is for the sake of health is a stock example in the 
Aristotelian corpus, and the rationale Aristotle provides for health holding of 
walking in this chapter is perhaps not entirely transparent, but very much in line with 
other accounts of the example. If my interpretation holds, then we might say that 
Aristotle succeeds quite well in demonstrating how the middle term, i.e. the food not 
floating, exhibits the teleological relation between walking and health. There is thus 
no need to rearrange the example. 
Secondly, Aristotle uses the verb metalambanein as a technical term in the 
Prior Analytics and in the Topics, where it means without exception ‘to substitute 
for’.47 This suggests that we should expect metalambanein tous logous to mean 
something like ‘substituting the logoi (for something else)’. In fact, the use of 
metalambanein as some kind of technical procedure of substitution in these texts 
presents two options for how to interpret the expression in the context of the 
Posterior Analytics and neither one of them implies a rearrangement of the example. 
 One possible interpretation48 is that the substitution concerns the 
formulations (logoi) of the terms. This reading is based on Aristotle’s use of 
metalambanein in chapter 34 of the first book of the Prior Analytics (APr.I.34, 48a1-27):   
πολλάκις δὲ διαψεύδεσθαι συμπεσεῖται παρὰ τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἐκτίθεσθαι τοὺς κατὰ τὴν 
πρότασιν ὅρους. (...) τούτου δ’ αἴτιον τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἐκκεῖσθαι τοὺς ὅρους κατὰ τὴν 
λέξιν, ἐπεὶ μεταληφθέντων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός, οἷον ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς 
ὑγιείας εἰ τεθείη τὸ ὑγιαῖνον, ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς νόσου τὸ νοσοῦν. οὐ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐκ 
ἐνδέχεται τῷ νοσοῦντι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὑπάρξαι. τούτου δὲ μὴ ληφθέντος οὐ γίνεται 
                                                 
47 Smith (1989), 137; 261. See APr.I.39, 49b3-6 (“One also needs to substitute things which have the same 
value for one another – words in place of words, phrases in place of phrases – whether a word or a 
phrase, and always to take a word in place of a phrase; for the setting out of terms will be easier.”); but 
also APr.I.17, 37b15; APr.I.20, 39a27; APr.I.22, 40a34-35; APr.I.23, 41a39; APr.I.29, 45b12-20; APr.I.34, 
48a1-27; APr.I.38, 49b1-2; APr.II.4, 56b7-8, and APr.II.8, 59b1-11; Top.II.2, 110a4-9; Top.V.2, 130a29-
b10; Top.VI.4, 142b3, Top.VI.9, 147b12-14, and Top.VI.11, 148b24-149a7 (passim). 
48 Already suggested by Fortenbaugh (1966), 192. 
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συλλογισμός, εἰ μὴ τοῦ ἐνδέχεσθαι· τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἀδύνατον· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μηδενὶ 
ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχειν ὑγίειαν. (...) Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται 
παρὰ τὴν τῶν ὅρων ἔκθεσιν· μεταληφθέντων γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις οὐδὲν γίνεται 
ψεῦδος. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας προτάσεις ἀεὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν ἀντὶ τῆς ἕξεως 
μεταληπτέον καὶ θετέον ὅρον.  
“Mistakes frequently will happen because the terms in the premise have not been 
well set out. (...) The reason for this is that the terms are not set out well with regard 
to formulation, since if the terms for being in the conditions are substituted [for the 
terms for the conditions themselves], there will not be a deduction; for example, if 
instead of ‘health’ ‘healthy’ is posited, and instead of ‘disease’ ‘diseased’. For it is not 
true to say that being healthy cannot hold of someone diseased. But if this is not 
assumed, there is no deduction, except in respect of possibility: and that is not 
impossible. For it is possible that health holds of no man. (...) It is evident then that 
in all these cases the fallacy results from the setting out of the terms; for if the terms 
for being in the conditions are substituted, there is no fallacy. Thus, it is clear that in 
such premises the term for being in the condition always needs to be substituted 
and posited instead of that of the condition itself.”  
In this passage, Aristotle deals with fallacies that occur when the terms of the 
syllogisms have not been set out well with regard to formulation (48a9: kata tên 
lexin).49 The problem is solved by substituting terms ‘for being in the conditions’, 
that is, adjectives such as ‘healthy’ (hugiainon) and ‘diseased’, instead of the terms for 
the conditions themselves, that is, nouns such as ‘health’ (hugieia) and ‘disease’.  
We might postulate that a similar kind of substitution of the formulation of 
the terms has taken place in APo.II.11: the terms indicating the conditions are 
substituted by terms indicating what is in the condition, or rather, by terms 
indicating what is productive of the condition. We have seen that Aristotle 
substituted hugieinos (A2) for hugiaiein (A1), and to poiein mê epipolazein ta sitia (B2) for to 
mê epipolazein ta sitia (B1). Through these substitutions A and B could be predicated of 
C (a term indicating an activity), and also the causal relations (in this case, both 
material causal and efficient causal ones) between the three terms would become 
more evident. 
 
                                                 
49 There is an interesting parallel for this method of metalêpsis in the ancient grammar tradition; see Sluiter 
(1990), 111ff.  
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A second possible interpretation50 is that the substitution concerns the replacement 
of words by their definitions. This is the stock use of the expression in the context 
of the Topics, and accordingly, we should supply ‘anti tôn onomatôn’ in the passage in 
the Posterior Analytics. One context in which the expression ‘to substitute the 
definitions for the words’ is used in the Topics, is in that of the fallacy of repeating 
the word that is being defined or predicated in the definition or predication. The 
failure pertains to not having used the prior or better known term in the definition 
or predication. The procedure of substituting definitions for words is one of the 
recommended ways to detect the fallacy (Top.VI.9, 147b12-14; Top.VI.4, 142a34-b6): 
Ἄλλος, εἰ αὐτῷ κέχρηται τῷ ὁριζομένῳ. λανθάνει δ’ ὅταν μὴ αὐτῷ τῷ τοῦ ὁριζομένου 
ὀνόματι χρήσηται, οἷον εἰ τὸν ἥλιον ἄστρον ἡμεροφανὲς ὡρίσατο· ὁ γὰρ ἡμέρᾳ 
χρώμενος ἡλίῳ χρῆται. δεῖ δ’, ὅπως φωραθῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα, μεταλαμβάνειν ἀντὶ τοῦ 
ὀνόματος τὸν λόγον, οἷον ὅτι ἡμέρα ἡλίου φορὰ ὑπὲρ γῆς ἐστιν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ τὴν 
φορὰν ἡλίου ὑπὲρ γῆς εἰρηκὼς τὸν ἥλιον εἴρηκεν, ὥστε χρῆται τῷ ἡλίῳ ὁ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ 
χρησάμενος. 
“Another [failure] is, if one has used the term defined itself. This passes unnoticed 
when the actual name of the object being defined is not used, e.g. supposing anyone 
had defined the sun as a star that appears by day. For in bringing in day he brings in 
the sun. To detect errors of this sort, substitute the definition for the word, e.g. the 
definition of day as the passage of the sun above the earth.” 
The expression is also used in the context of examining the correctness of 
definitions rendered of a complex term. For the definition to be correct, the words 
of the complex term have to be substituted by the definitions of the words 
(Top.VI.11, 149a1-3). The substitution of definitions of words used in definitions 
also helps to clear up whether or not the predications hold non-accidentally 
(Top.II.2, 110a4-9): 
λαμβάνειν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὀνομάτων λόγους, καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι ἕως 
ἂν εἴς τι γνώριμον ἔλθῃ· πολλάκις γὰρ ὅλου μὲν τοῦ λόγου ἀποδοθέντος οὔπω δῆλον 
τὸ ζητούμενον, ἀντὶ δέ τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὀνομάτων λόγου ῥηθέντος κατάδηλον 
γίνεται.  
“One should substitute definitions also for the words contained in the definitions, 
and not stop until one comes to something familiar; for often when the definition is 
                                                 
50 This interpretation was suggested to me by Pieter Sjoerd Hasper in personal correspondence. 
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given as a whole, the thing looked for is not cleared up, whereas if for one of the 
words used in the definition a definition be stated, it becomes obvious.” 
Under this interpretation, we need to replace the words set out in the syllogism – 
such as ‘walking’, or ‘being healthy’ – by their definitions (perhaps just as Aristotle 
did himself), until we find the more familiar terms,51 and in that way the predications 
will become clearer. A striking parallel is provided by Galen, who – plainly following 
Aristotle – uses metalambanein in this exact same way while discussing scientific 
demonstrations.52 
 The elliptical expression of metalambanein tous logous might not provide us 
with sufficient information to decide which of the two possible interpretations we 
should favor, but this problem need not concern us too much. Both uses seem to be 
at play in the Posterior Analytics context: Aristotle probably meant some technical 
procedure of substitution that he applied himself in discussing the example, through 
which the causal relations between the terms and the predications became more 
evident.  
 
5.2.3.c Ends cannot be picked out by middle terms 
If my interpretation is right, then Aristotle has offered us an example of teleological 
explanation where the middle term picks out a material cause, while the final cause is 
picked out by the predicate term. This leaves us with the question why Aristotle did 
not simply provide us with an example of teleological explanation where the middle 
term picks out a final cause.  
I believe that Aristotle indirectly addresses this question in the passage 
where he brings up the order of causation in different types of demonstrations 
(APo.II.11, 94b23-26):  
αἱ δὲ γενέσεις ἀνάπαλιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ κίνησιν αἰτίων· ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον 
δεῖ γενέσθαι πρῶτον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ Γ, τὸ ἔσχατον, τελευταῖον δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα.  
                                                 
51 This type of substitution might be connected to the one Charles observes in the Posterior Analytics with 
regard to the example of thunder: in this example the predicative term ‘thunder’ is replaced by its nominal 
definition ‘noise in the clouds’, which both gives us more familiar terms and indicates how thunder is to 
be understood in the relevant syllogism. See Charles (1999), 240. 
52 See Galen, De Methodo Medendi X.39, 5-10: Καί σοι τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον ἤδη ἅπαντα ποιήσομαι, χρώμενος ταῖς 
μεθόδοις ἃς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ὑπομνήμασι κατεστησάμην. ὅτι τε γὰρ ἀρχαὶ πάσης ἀποδείξεώς εἰσι 
τὰ πρὸς αἴσθησίν τε καὶ νόησιν ἐναργῶς φαινόμενα καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ζητουμένων εἰς λόγον χρὴ 
μεταλαμβάνεσθαι τοὔνομα (“that with regard to every inquiry one needs to substitute the definition for the 
word”), δι’ ἐκείνων ἀποδέδεικται· I am grateful to Jim Hankinson for bringing this parallel to my attention. 
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“Here the events occur in the opposite order from the cases where the causes are 
according to motion. For in the latter the middle term must occur first, while here 
C, the ultimate term, [must occur first] and last the for the sake of which.”  
In this passage Aristotle contrasts the order of causation in demonstrations of 
efficient causal explanations with those of teleological explanations. As we saw 
earlier, the middle term in the example of efficient explanation (i.e. being the first to 
attack) picked out an event that later initiated the war against the Athenians. The 
explanatory efficient cause thus precedes the explanandum in time. However, in the 
example of teleological explanation, we saw that the action picked out by the subject 
term (i.e. walking) occurred first. The final cause, health, came about last. It seems 
that in teleological explanations the final causes are literally, in a temporal sense, the 
telos or the end (and culmination) of the events to be explained. 
In later discussions of the temporal relations between the three terms 
(APo.II.12 and APo.II.16), Aristotle puts forward the requirement that the state of 
affairs picked out by the middle term must be simultaneous with the states of affairs 
it explains.53 However, in case of events that come about consecutively (APo.II.12, 
95b13: ephexês), the middle term must be chronologically prior to the states of affairs 
it explains. As Aristotle points out (APo.II.12, 95b33-38), there is no difference in 
demonstration between the two cases.54  
The upshot of these passages is that, given that demonstrations are to 
reflect the order of causation in the real world,55 final causes of events cannot be 
picked out by the middle term, but must always be part of the conclusion that is 
demonstrated. Since an efficient cause of an event typically occurs before the event 
itself, the efficient cause can be picked out through the middle term as being causally 
prior of what needs to be explained. The final cause of an event – although being 
logically prior – typically occurs in actuality after the event itself already has taken 
                                                 
53 See mainly APo.II.12, 95a22: “that which is causative in this way and that of which it is a cause come to 
be simultaneously (hama ginetai),” and APo.II.12, 95a36-37 where it is argued that the middle term must be 
homogonos with the state of affairs it explains. 
54 The coming to be of a house, for instance, is demonstrated through a middle term that picks out a state 
of affairs that is chronologically prior to the explanandum: that is, the earlier coming to be of a 
foundation. See APo.II.12, 95b38: estai themelion proteron. 
55 Cf. Charles (2000), 198-204 on the dependence of the practice of definition on the order of causation in 
the Posterior Analytics.  
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place and the necessary prerequisites have been fulfilled.56 The demonstration then 
shows how the events to be explained actually bring about the end that constitutes 
the final cause.57 This is exactly what Aristotle has shown us, namely that the action 
of walking actually leads to health, because walking is what makes the food not 
floating, and being in a condition of having the food not floating is what being 
healthy is. On this account, ends are part of the conclusion that needs to be 
demonstrated, and cannot be picked out by the middle term through which the 
conclusion is demonstrated.  
 
The question I will focus on below is how this picture of the structure of teleological 
explanations as described in the Posterior Analytics relates to the structure of actual 
teleological explanations offered by Aristotle in his Parts of Animals. I will first turn 
briefly to Aristotle’s discussion of demonstration in the natural sciences, and then 
analyse three predominant types of explanations involving final causes that Aristotle 
uses in his biology. Without going into too much detail, it will be shown that the 
actual teleological explanations illustrate our findings about the theory of explanation 
rather well.58 
 
5.3 Teleological Explanations in Theory and Practice: Evidence from De 
Partibus Animalium 
 
5.3.1 Demonstration in the natural sciences and conditional necessity 
Aristotle discusses the question of demonstration in the natural sciences in the first 
book of PA: the modes of demonstration in the theoretical sciences and in the 
                                                 
56 This might explain why in the case of the teleological explanation in APo.II.11 the explanandum is 
picked out by the subject term (‘why does walking after dinner occur?’), rather than by the predicate term 
as in the other three types of explanation. 
57 Cf. Natali (2001), 95-100. 
58 This question touches upon the important debate on the relation between the ideal of scientific 
investigation and demonstration set out in the Posterior Analytics (the ‘theory’) and the methodological 
reflections and actual explanations Aristotle offers in his treatises on natural science (the ‘practice’). 
Although I cannot defend my position here, I am more sympathetic to the approach defended by, 
amongst others, Lennox (1987a, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c) and Gotthelf (1987), who hold that Aristotle builds 
upon and elaborates his scientific standards for the different sciences, than to the approach defended by, 
amongst others, Lloyd (1996), who argues that Aristotle is a methodological pluralist, and that theory and 
practice cannot be reconciled with each other.  
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natural sciences are different, because the modes of necessity are different (PA.I.1, 
640a3-6):  
Ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὄν, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐσόμενον· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοιόνδε ἐστὶν ἡ ὑγίεια ἢ ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος, ἀνάγκη τόδ’ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπεὶ τόδ’ ἐστὶν ἢ γέγονεν, ἐκεῖνο ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν ἢ ἔσται.  
“For the starting point is in some [i.e. the theoretical sciences] that what is, but in 
others [i.e. the natural sciences] that what will be. For, ‘since health or man is such, 
it is necessary that this is or comes to be,’ but not ‘since this is or has come about, 
that from necessity is or will be.”  
As usual, Aristotle identifies the mode of necessity operative among natural 
perishable things as conditional necessity, which Aristotle here explains as the 
necessity of certain things having to come to be on account of the end being as it is. 
Again, because demonstrations of the reason why have to reflect the true order of 
causality, the necessity that governs deductions of natural phenomena has to be 
conditional, too:59 if the end is to be or is (such and such), then its necessary 
prerequisites have to come to be or be present first (or, in other words, its necessary 
prerequisites cannot not be). The deduction is not of the consequences of a certain 
starting point, but of the antecedents of the end.60 The demonstration that results is 
not as strong as the demonstrations of the theoretical sciences, because the 
physiological or material-efficient prerequisites (though all in some sense being 
conditionally necessary for the end) do not ensure61 the coming to be of the end. Of 
course, for the most part, and if nothing impedes, they will bring about the end.  
These remarks about the nature and structure of demonstrations in the 
natural sciences present the following picture of what these demonstrations in 
practice would look like (cf. table 3 below). First of all, it needs to be noted that the 
predominant form of demonstration is teleological demonstration. What needs to be 
demonstrated in the context of the PA is mainly why certain functions belong to the 
parts whose presence these final causes explain. The final cause of something is the 
realisation of the form of that thing, and this is something that chronologically 
                                                 
59 Cf. Ph.II.9, 200a19-22: “But in things which come to be for an end, the reverse is true. If the end is to 
exist or does exist, that also which precedes it will exist or does exist; otherwise just as there, if the 
conclusion is not true, the principle will not be true, so here the end or that for the sake of which will not 
exist.” 
60 Lloyd (1996), 32. 
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comes to be last. At the same time, this final cause is taken as a (heuristic and 
observational) starting point, presumably as a part of the conclusion of the 
demonstration. Next, one has to work one’s way back to the conditionally necessary 
antecedents, which the realisation of this end demands. These antecedents will be 
exhibited by material or efficient causes (or both) that are directed towards this final 
cause,62  and as such will be picked out by the middle term.  
 
Table 3: Suggested structure of teleological explanations in Parts of Animals 
 
This picture is largely consistent with the example of why one walks after dinner in 
APo.II.11. The question why one walks after dinner parallels the biological question 
why for instance a certain part is present in a certain animal. The question is 
answered by identifying the final cause: in the case of walking, health; in the case of 
biological parts, the function of that part. In both cases the middle term will have to 
pick out the conditionally necessary antecedents that for the most part will bring 
about the end that constitutes the final cause.   
 This general picture can be confirmed through a comparison of the ‘theory’ 
with the three most common types of teleological explanation (analyzed in section 
3.2) that Aristotle actually provides in PA. 
 
5.3.2 The place of final causes in actual teleological explanations 
 
5.3.2.a The explanation of the presence of parts: final cause is subsumed under the formal 
cause 
The most common question in Aristotle’s PA is as we have seen why a certain 
animal has a certain part, and Aristotle typically answers this question by pointing 
out the function that part plays within the particular animal kind that has that part. 
                                                                                                               
61 This is because, as Aristotle explains, the necessity involved does not convert: it is not possible to say 
that ‘since this is, therefore that is or will be.’ See PA.I.1, 640a6-9 and GC.II.11. 
62 As Lloyd rightly points out, the antecedents that are deduced are antecedents of the final cause in a 
chronological or ontological sense, not in a logical one; see Lloyd (1996), 32. 
Predicate term Function, goal P explains presence of S 
Subject term Part (of animal), process Explanandum: why S? 
Middle term Conditionally necessary antecedents Explanans of why P holds of S 
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The presence of parts is thus explained teleologically through reference to their 
function, but in many cases the presence of these functions themselves is explained 
by reference to the definition of the substantial being of the animal.  
Let me explain this by giving an example. The question why birds have 
wings is answered by reference to the function of flying as a part of the definition of 
the substantial being of birds: birds are essentially fliers, and fliers necessarily have 
wings.63 In a formalization of this example, the middle term would be ‘fliers’ (which 
picks out a functionally defined essence), not ‘flying’ (which picks out the function 
or final cause). It is this definition of the substantial being of birds that is taken to be 
explanatorily basic, and which is thus picked out to explain why certain parts with 
certain functions hold of certain animal kinds.64 From the definition of birds as 
blooded fliers not only the presence of wings can be demonstrated, but also many of 
the bird’s other features, like for instance the having of two feet (rather than four, or 
six; see PA.IV.12, 693b2-13).  
Additionally, Aristotle sometimes explains the presence of parts in 
subspecies by reference to the functions that are part of the definition of the 
substantial being of the wider kind. The fact that birds are essentially flyers explains 
according to Aristotle why ducks have wings for the sake of flying. Here, the 
functions (the final causes) tend to be subsumed under the essence (the formal 
cause) of the animal or its wider kind. Wings belong to ducks because ducks are 
essentially birds.  
In these cases, functions and goals are picked out by the predicate term and 
only indirectly through the middle term as being part of the definition of the 
substantial being of something – that is, as being included in the formal cause.65 
Final causes of parts are demonstrated to hold of parts through the functionally 
defined substantial being of an animal, and it is this formal cause that is explanatorily 
basic. 
                                                 
63 See, for example, PA.IV.12, 693b10-14: “for the substantial being of the bird is that of the blooded 
animals, but at the same time that of the winged animals (…); and the ability to fly is in the substantial 
being of the bird.” Cf. PA.IV.13, 697b1-13 and PA.III.6, 669b8-12. 
64 Gotthelf (1987), 190-191. 
65 Cf. Ph.II.9, 200a14: “necessity is in the matter, while that for the sake of which is in the definition 
(logos).”; PA.I.1, 639b13-14: “Now it is apparent that first is the one we call for the sake of which; for this 
is a definition”; and PA.I.1, 640a33-35: “hence we must in particular say that since this is what it is to be a 
human being, on account of this it has these things; for it cannot be without these parts.” 
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5.3.2.b The explanation of differentiations of parts: differentiae are causally basic 
Another common question in PA is why a part has the structural and material 
properties it has in the particular animal that has it. Or, in other words, why the part 
is differentiated in the way it is in this particular animal, relative to other parts with 
the same name and approximately the same function in other animals. 
Take the example of eyes: both birds and insects have eyes for the sake of 
vision, but birds have eyes made of fluid eye jelly, while insects have hard eyes. This 
material differentiation of eyes cannot be explained by reference to the function of 
vision as such, which only requires eyes to be made of some transparent stuff (the 
general function only explains the presence of parts, not their differentiations). 
Aristotle explains these differentiations by claiming that they are for the better: that 
is, they are for the sake of the functional optimization of that part within the 
particular animal kind (PA.II.2, 648a14-19):  
(...) ὑποληπτέον ἔχειν τὴν διαφοράν, τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ 
ἔργα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζῴων, οἷον ἐχόντων ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀμφοτέρων τὰ μέν 
ἐστι σκληρόφθαλμα τὰ δ’ ὑγρόφθαλμα, καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει βλέφαρα τὰ δ’ ἔχει πρὸς τὸ 
τὴν ὄψιν ἀκριβεστέραν εἶναι. 
“They [i.e. parts] should be assumed to possess a differentiation, in some cases 
relative to what is better or worse, in other cases relative to each animal’s functions 
and substantial being. For instance, two animals may both have eyes. But in one 
these eyes are hard, while in the other they are of fluid consistency; and while the 
one does not have eyelids, the other has it – both are for the sake of a greater 
accuracy of vision.”  
Aristotle thus explains the (relative) fluidity of the eyes of birds as being for the sake 
of better vision in birds: birds have fluid eyes to be better able to see. However, 
Aristotle explains this functional optimisation by reference to the specific nature, 
habitat, and needs of the animal in question. That is, the explanatorily basic features 
in these explanations are the four differentiae of the animal kind, which are the other 
parts (and functions) the animal has, the animal’s bios (life-style and habitat), its 
activities, and its disposition. These four differentiae immediately necessitate the 
variation among parts through conditional necessity. The differentiae demand a 
functional fine-tuning of the part, and this will in its turn conditionally necessitate 
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material-structural changes or a relocation of the part. This is clear in the following 
example (PA.II.13, 657b22-29): 
Τὰ δὲ τετράποδα καὶ ᾠοτόκα οὐ σκαρδαμύττει ὁμοίως, ὅτι οὐδ’ ὑγρὰν αὐτοῖς 
ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἀκριβῆ τὴν ὄψιν ἐπιγείοις οὖσιν. Τοῖς δ’ ὄρνισιν ἀναγκαῖον· 
πόρρωθεν γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τῆς ὄψεως. Διὸ καὶ τὰ γαμψώνυχα μὲν ὀξυωπά (ἄνωθεν γὰρ 
αὐτοῖς ἡ θεωρία τῆς τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ ἀναπέτονται ταῦτα μάλιστα τῶν ὀρνέων εἰς ὕψος), 
τὰ δ’ ἐπίγεια καὶ μὴ πτητικά, οἷον ἀλεκτρυόνες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ὀξυωπά· οὐδὲν γὰρ 
αὐτὰ κατεπείγει πρὸς τὸν βίον. 
“The four-footed, egg-laying animals do not blink in the same way as the birds, 
because since they are terrestrial, it is unnecessary for them to have moist and 
accurate vision. But for the birds it is necessary, since they use vision to see from a 
great distance. Accordingly, crook-taloned birds have sharp vision (for they search 
their food from above, which is also why these most of all soar to the heights), 
while those which are terrestrial and incapable of flight, such as domestic fowl and 
the like, do not have sharp vision. For nothing related to their way of life requires 
them to have it.”  
A reconstruction of the premises involved in this example shows that the fact that 
crooked-taloned birds search for their food from above explains why they need 
accurate vision, and it is this need for accurate vision that conditionally necessitates 
the moistness of the eyes of these birds. However, the ability of crook-taloned birds 
to see accurately follows from the material differentiation of eyes: the specific material 
disposition of each kind of eye explains the accurateness of vision of the animal that 
has those kinds of eyes.66 Again, the final cause is part of the conclusion of the 
demonstration, while the middle term refers to formal or material-efficient causes.  
 
5.3.2.c The explanation of luxurious parts: secondary teleology 
A third type of explanation that is fairly common in Aristotle’s PA is the so-called 
‘double-barrelled’ explanation. In these cases, Aristotle explains the presence of a 
part or its differentiation both by reference to a final cause and by reference to 
material necessity. This type of explanation usually pertains to parts or functions that 
are not of vital or essential importance for the animal (and therefore not necessary in 
a strict sense), but ‘merely’ contribute to its well-being. Examples of such parts are 
                                                 
66 For habitat being picked out as an explanatorily basic feature, see Gotthelf (1997a), 85-89 and Charles 
(1999), 249-250.  
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horns, spurs, hoofs, nails, teeth, hair, and eyebrows; these parts all serve the luxury-
function of defence or protection. The doubleness of the explanation indicates that 
these parts are the results of what I have called ‘secondary teleology’. That is, the 
coming to be of the materials out of which the luxurious parts are constituted is due to 
material necessity.67 The presence of these parts, on the other hand, and their 
organization and distribution in an animal’s body are due to the goal-directed actions 
of the formal nature of the animal. Aristotle describes the action of the formal 
nature of the animal in these cases as making use of materials that are present of 
necessity for a good purpose, rather than as producing those materials for the sake of 
some function.68 
Take the example of horns. Aristotle’s discussion of horns (PA.III.2) falls 
into two accounts. In the first paragraphs of his discussion of horns, Aristotle 
explained that horns are present in the animals that have them for the sake of self-
defence and attack (PA.III.2, 663b21-22). Next, Aristotle introduces the second part 
of his account of horns (PA.III.2, 663b22-24):  
 πῶς δὲ τῆς ἀναγκαίας φύσεως ἐχούσης τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον 
 φύσις ἕνεκά του κατακέχρηται, λέγωμεν.  
“We must say what the character of the necessary nature is, and, how nature 
according to the account has made use of things present of necessity for the sake of 
something.”69  
The necessary nature of the animal indicates, I submit, the amount and kind of 
materials that come to be as a result of material necessity, as a by-product or surplus 
of conditionally necessitated processes (without being themselves conditionally 
necessary). As Aristotle explains, large animals seem to produce more earthen 
material than is conditionally necessary (and necessitated) for the production of their 
bones, and it is this residual surplus which is part of the necessary nature of these 
                                                 
67 Explicit examples are PA.IV.3, 677b22-29 (677b22: hê genesis ex anagkês sumbainei) and PA.IV.4, 678a3-10 
(678a3: tên genesin ex anagkês ousan). 
68 Cf. Aristotle’s description of two types of technai in Ph.II.2, 194b1-5. 
69 Here Ogle’s translation (1912: “Let us now consider the character of the material nature whose 
necessary results have been employed by rational nature for a final cause.”) is grammatically closer to the 
Greek than Lennox’s translation is (2001b: “Since there is a necessary nature, we must say how the nature 
according to the account makes use of things present of necessity for the sake of something”). Pôs should 
be taken with echousês in the genitive absolute, and with katakechrêtai: as soon as we know what kind of 
thing the necessary nature is, we can explain how nature makes use of the things that are present on 
account of this necessary nature.    
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animals and which is then “used by nature for the sake of protection and advantage 
(PA.III.2, 663b25-35).”  
What is interesting in these cases is that the function that explains the 
presence (or the differentiation) of the part follows from the potentials the available 
material has.70 The earthen residue is used by the formal nature of an animal to 
produce parts like horns, because this kind of material has a defensive potential. 
Formalizations of examples like these are not easy, but for our purposes it suffices to 
notice that again a final cause will be demonstrated to belong to some feature 
through another more basic feature, in this case the presence of materials with 
certain material potentials.  
 
Let me end this exposition of common types of teleological explanation in PA by 
pointing out that although the actual explanations are more complicated than the 
example of walking after dinner in APo.II.11, the basic structure and the role of final 
causes seem to be the same. In biology, Aristotle attributes functions to 
(differentiations of) parts in order to explain the presence of the latter. However, the 
holding of these functions follows from other, more basic features, such as the 
animal’s essence (that comprises functions), its life-style, or the availability of certain 
material potentials. It thus seems that, also in practice, final causes are what is 





In the preceding sections, I have argued that APo.II.11 shows how each of the four 
types of explanation is brought out through an explanatory middle term, which 
needs not express the same type of causality as the explanation does. 
This interpretation, supported by the lexical difference between aitia and 
aition, takes away the need to rearrange Aristotle’s syllogistic example of walking after 
                                                 
70 This is what Aristotle explains in PA.II.9, 655b4-12: “All these <uniform parts> the animals have for 
the sake of protection; for the whole <organs> constituted from these <uniform parts>, and 
synonymous with them, e.g., the whole hoof and whole horn, have been constructed for the safety of 
each of these animals (…). Of necessity all of these parts have an earthen and hard nature; for this 
potential is of the defensive kind.” 
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dinner for the sake of health. Nothing in the text of APo. suggests that final causes 
must be picked out by the middle term in a teleological demonstration. A comparison 
with the use of metalambanein in the Prior Analytics and the Topics shows that the 
expression ‘metalambanein tous logous’ should be taken as referring to some kind of 
procedure of substitution that Aristotle has applied himself while setting out his 
example, rather than as an admonition to us to change the order of the terms or 
premises. The fact that in teleological explanations the end for the sake of which the 
event is undertaken comes to be chronologically last, together with Aristotle’s 
requirement that explanations have to reflect real causal sequences, explains why it is 
impossible to construct a syllogism in which the middle term picks out this end as a 
final cause. 
A short analysis of Aristotle’s methodological remarks about 
demonstration in the natural sciences and of his actual practice of teleological 
explanation in PA confirms the general picture found in APo with regard to the 
structure of teleological explanations. Functions explain the presence (or 
differentiations) of parts, but the holding of these functions of those parts is 
demonstrated through the discovery of some other basic explanatory feature. Final 
causes are the starting points from which the conditionally necessary antecedents are 
to be traced back, but it is the presence of these prerequisites that cause – for the 
most part, and if nothing interferes – the coming to be of ends.  
Final causes form the starting points of explanations, and then need to be 
demonstrated to hold of the features whose presence they explain; as such, they are 
always part of the conclusion that is being demonstrated, and can never be picked 
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Appendix: Translation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics II.11, 94a20-94b26 
Since we think we have <scientific> knowledge when we know the explanation, and 
there are four explanations – one, what it is to be a thing and another, given what 
things being the case it is necessary for that to hold; another, what first initiated the 
motion; and fourth, the for the sake of what – all of them are brought out through 
the middle term. For, ‘given what thing being the case it is necessary for this to hold’ 
does not occur when one proposition is assumed, but when at least two are. This is 
the case when they have one middle term. Thus when this one is assumed, it is 
necessary for the conclusion to hold. It is clear too in the following way. Because of 
what is the angle in a semicircle a right angle? Given what thing being the case is it a 
right angle? Suppose then that right is A, half of two rights B, the angle in a 
semicircle C. Thus of A’s – right – holding of C – the angle in a semicircle B is the 
cause. For this [B] is equal to A and C to B, because it [C] is of two rights – half. 
Thus given B, half of two rights, being the case, A holds of C (for that was it that 
[necessitates] the angle in a semicircle being a right angle). And that [B] is the same 
as what it is to be it, since the definition signifies this [i.e. what it is to be it]. 
Now it has also been shown that the middle term is explanatory of the 
essence. 
For what reason did the Persian war come upon the Athenians? What is an 
explanation of the Athenians’ being warred upon? Because they attacked Sardis with 
the Eretrians. For that initiated the movement. War, A; being the first to attack, B; 
Athenians C. B holds of C, the Athenians being the first to attack, and A holds of B, 
because people make war on those who have wronged them first. Therefore A holds 
of B, being warred upon to those who first began, and this, B, holds of the 
Athenians – for they first began. And in this case, too, the cause, that what initiated 
the movement, is the middle term. 
Regarding the cases in which the causal relation is that something is for the 
sake of something – for example: for what reason does he walk? In order to be 
healthy. For what reason is there a house? In order to protect the possessions. In the 
one case it is in order to be healthy, in the other in order to protect. There is no 
difference between for what reason it is necessary to walk after dinner and for the 
sake of what it is necessary. Call ‘walking after dinner’ C, ‘the food not floating on 
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the surface’ B, and ‘being healthy’ A. Suppose then that to make the food not 
floating on the surface at the mouth of the stomach holds of walking after dinner, 
and suppose the first is healthy. For it is thought that B, the food not floating on the 
surface, holds of to walk, of C, and that thereof (of B) A, healthy, holds. What then 
is the causal factor for C of A’s – the for the sake of which – holding of it? B, the 
not floating. This is like a definition of it <of A>; for A will here be explained in this 
way. And for what reason does B hold of C? Because that is what being healthy is: 
being in such state. Surely one must substitute the definitions, and in that way each 
of them will become clearer. Here the events occur in the opposite order from the 
cases where the causes are according to motion. For in the latter the middle term 
must occur first, while here C, the ultimate term, [must occur first] and last the for 





Aristotle’s natural treatises display a large variety of uses of teleology as an 
explanatory principle: organisms reproduce for the sake of preserving their own kind 
such that they can participate in the eternal and the divine. Birds have wings because 
they are essentially fliers (being a flier is part of the substantial being of birds), and 
wings are a necessary prerequisite of being a flier. Neither snakes nor stars have feet, 
because in these beings the presence of feet would have been in vain, and nature 
does nothing in vain. Most of the hoofed life-bearing animals have horns, because 
there is an excess of earthen material present in their bodies, and because of the 
defensive potentials this material has, nature uses it for the better to make horns in 
all the males. In the females, however, the excess of material is excreted, because 
females are not strong enough to be able to use the horns, and nature never gives 
anything to an animal that would not be able to use it. Human beings build houses 
for the sake of providing shelter for their belongings, and walk after dinner for the 
sake of being healthy, both because they have the capacity to do so, and because 
they desire shelter and health as something good. 
 
Aristotle considers it foremost the task of natural philosophers to state teleological 
explanations such as the ones cited above, because he is convinced that these 
explanations are the most effective at serving the function of providing scientific 
knowledge. 
For Aristotle, who is a realist concerning causal explanation, the discovery 
of explanations supplies scientific knowledge. We know something when we know 
its causal explanation, and there are four types of causal explanations: formal, 
material, efficient, and teleological ones. In natural philosophy, we have seen that 
Aristotle stresses the importance of teleological explanations. Apparently, the most 
important way (but certainly not the only way) of explaining the presence, absence, 
or differentiation of natural phenomena is by picking out the final causes of these 
phenomena under their causally relevant and appropriate description, and then to 
show how these final causes hold of the phenomena to be explained.  
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The importance Aristotle attributes to teleological explanations does not derive from a 
denial of the causal force of the material and efficient causes in natural phenomena: 
Aristotle argues that the operation and interaction of all four causes are necessary for 
natural phenomena to come about. According to Aristotle, the fact that natural 
processes are regular and typically have regular beneficial outcomes indicates that 
there exist such things as natures and that they are intrinsically directed towards the 
realization of those outcomes. In addition to material and efficient causes operating 
from the ‘bottom up’, there must be overarching formal and final causes at work 
that from the ‘top down’ guarantee the regularity of those outcomes by ordering and 
timing the complex sequence of natural events. Aristotle repudiates his materialist 
predecessors for treating the results of such events as being incidental to chance 
interactions between material elements. They were not able to account for those 
results in terms of intrinsic causation. Aristotle holds that this requires the 
assumption of final and formal causes in addition to material and efficient causes.  
The importance of teleological explanations does not lie in the fact that 
they pick out final causes as being explanatorily basic or causally prior, for final 
causes never are. The ends picked out in explanations of natural phenomena as final 
causes are usually of two types: the natural being’s realized potential for form (i.e. 
the complete and mature living being), or the function that arises from the potentials 
of the material from which a structure is constituted. In the first case, it is the formal 
cause as the potential for form that is causally prior in the coming to be of the living 
being. In the second case, it is the combined material and efficient causes 
necessitating the coming to be of the structure that is causally prior in the coming to 
be of its function. Final causes are causative in virtue of being formally one with the 
formal and efficient cause such that the realization of the form will be the end-state 
towards which the efficient cause is intrinsically directed and confined. In his 
biological works, the coincidence between the three causes leads Aristotle to speak 
of the ‘formal nature’ of an animal, which is identical with its soul. This formal 
nature is then contrasted with the living being’s material nature, which is identical 
with its natural, instrumental body in which the soul is realized. In every case, 
however, the natural end-result that constitutes the final cause is realized last 
chronologically. This means that final causes are never causally prior.      
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The importance of final causes, then, (and hence of teleological explanations that 
pick out those final causes) lies in their explanatory priority. The reason for this is that 
the functions and goals that constitute final causes are in most cases easy to identify, 
either immediately by observation or indirectly through comparative research or 
through the use of teleological principles. Once these functions and goals have been 
established, one can then proceed to determine the conditionally necessary 
antecedents, which will be part of the complete causal explanation. Final causes are 
thus relatively easy to detect, and once detected provide the best starting points for 
the discovery of other causally relevant features and developments related to the 
explanandum. Since all properties and developments are equally significant or 
insignificant from a material-efficient point of view, the boundary between essential 
and incidental properties can only be determined by studying natural beings as 
teleologically organized wholes. For Aristotle not every end of a continuous process 
is a final cause, but only that in which this process – if nothing prevents it – would 
normally culminate. The end that constitutes a final cause is a ‘good’, that is, 
something which contributes to the existence or well-being of the whole of which it 
is part. Through the investigation of natural phenomena from a teleological 
viewpoint, one is able to distinguish the causally relevant features of that 
phenomenon, and thereby to discover the features that are to be included in the 
complete explanation of it.  
 
The general structures underlying Aristotle’s actual teleological explanations 
provided in the natural treatises are largely consistent with the theory of teleological 
explanations as described in APo.II.11. Both practice and theory, however, prove to 
be more complex and flexible than has traditionally been acknowledged.  
Aristotle’s actual teleological explanations consist of explanations that refer 
directly to final causes, and of explanations that make use of teleological principles. 
In those cases where the final causes are immediately discernible, Aristotle starts by 
identifying that final cause and then proceeds to show how this function or goal 
belongs to the natural phenomenon in question. In the case of living beings, the 
functions attributed to the parts of living beings or the living being as a whole are 
the realizations of the capacities of the soul, which are all teleologically grounded as 
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being necessary for or otherwise contributory to the preservation of life and the 
reproduction of the living being in question. The ‘classification’ of the various soul-
functions living beings must and can have in Aristotle’s psychology thereby forms 
the starting points of the explanations in his biology. 
The strategy Aristotle employs to connect the function with the bearer of 
that function in each of these cases depends first and foremost on the type of 
question that needs to be answered (i.e. whether it concerns the presence, absence, 
or differentiation of some part or feature). It also depends on the status of the part 
or feature that needs to be explained. Parts or features that are necessary for the 
living being that has them are shown to belong to the living being through reference 
to their essence, picked out by the definition of their substantial being, which 
includes (among other features) the necessary functions to be realized.1 Parts or 
features that are ‘for the better’, are shown to belong to living beings through 
reference to materials that have come to be by material necessity in their bodies, and 
which are then used for the better by their formal nature. Similarly, necessary 
differentiations of parts are usually shown to belong to the living beings that have 
them through reference to one of their specific differentiae (i.e. the being’s way of 
life, its activities, character, and the parts it possesses), which are then shown to 
require a functional optimalization of the part or feature in question. Non-necessary 
differentiations of parts, on the other hand, are shown to be present on account of 
material that has come to be by material necessity, and which is then used for the 
better. The absence of parts or features is either explained by reference to their lack 
of function for this particular kind of animal, or non-teleologically by reference to 
the absence of the constitutive material (or natural place) in this animal. In 
explaining the actions of animals or human beings, Aristotle first picks out the goal 
of that action. He then shows how this action comes about by reference to the 
intermediate efficient causes, which usually take the form of the desire for an object 
and of the perception of that object as something good. 
Teleological principles, such as “nature does nothing in vain, but always 
does what is best for the substantial being of each kind of animal,” are 
generalizations over the goal-directed actions of formal natures, explicating what 
                                                 
1 Future research will have to make clear how exactly this logos tês ousias is related to other Aristotelian 
notions such as essence, function, and definition as used in natural philosophy. 
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they ‘always’ or ‘never’ do or make when they are said to produce living beings and 
their parts. In general these principles (or suppositions), function as heuristic tools 
and are not part of the premises of the explanation itself. The principles provide a 
framework (established inductively through observation) of what is and what is not 
possible in this world as opposed to other possible worlds, and thereby set the 
natural boundaries within which the explanation of a particular phenomenon must 
take place.  
Teleological principles are used in the following way. First, the presence of 
parts is explained through the use of the principle that nature does everything either 
because it is necessary or because it is for the better. The principle helps to 
determine the status of parts and their differentiations, and thereby to determine the 
kind of function one should look for. The absence of parts is explained through the 
use of the principle that nature does nothing in vain. Aristotle constructs a 
counterfactual argument of the following form: if the formal nature of this particular 
being had equipped it with this part, the part would have been in vain (for instance, 
because it would not have been able to use it properly). The part is absent then, 
because nature does nothing in vain. Finally, the principle that nature does what is 
best is used for explanations of the presence of parts and of their differentiations in 
cases where observation shows that there are several means for nature to fulfill a 
certain functional need. Aristotle shows how the features an animal has are the best 
for it, relative to the other natural possibilities.  
In all the actual teleological explanations provided in the natural treatises it 
is either a formal cause (e.g. an essential property picked out by the definition of the 
substantial being of a living being, or one of its differentiae), an efficient cause, or a 
material cause that turns out to be explanatorily basic, while the functions are shown 
to follow from these factors. Aristotle’s practice provides the following picture of 
teleological explanation. The final cause is taken as a (heuristic and observational) 
starting point of explanation. From there Aristotle reconstructs the conditionally 
necessary antecedents which the realization of this end demands. These antecedents 
will then be exhibited by either material causes, or efficient causes, or formal causes: 
The material causation is either that induced by the potential for form that needs to 
be realized if the animal is to live and to be the animal it is, or that induced by the 
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materials acting according to their own material natures; the efficient causes are 
directed towards a particular end; and the formal causes include functions. These are 
causes that are picked out as being explanatorily basic on account of their causal 
priority in the phenomena in which they operate.  
This picture is consistent with the theory of the structure of teleological 
explanations Aristotle provides in APo.II.11, where he integrates his theory of four 
causes with the syllogistic pattern of scientific demonstrations. It is my contention 
that in this chapter Aristotle shows how there may be a difference between the type 
of causality expressed in the explanation of a state of affairs and the type of causality 
expressed in the middle term that picks out the explanans of a state of affairs. In 
teleological explanations, there must be a difference between the two. In addition, 
Aristotle argues that it is through the explanans that a certain type of causal relation 
is shown to obtain. In contrast with the traditional interpretation of APo.II.11, I 
have argued that in teleological explanations final causes are never to be picked out 
by the middle term as being explanatory of the conclusion, but rather are itself part 
of the conclusion that is being demonstrated. Walking after dinner is for the sake of 
health, because walking brings about the physiological condition of having the food 
not floating on the surface of the stomach, which is exactly what being healthy is in 
the context of a person who just had dinner. The middle term that picks out the 
condition of having the food not floating brings out the teleological relation that 
obtains between walking and health. Under this scheme, teleological explanations are 
explanations in which a final cause is demonstrated to hold of some state of affairs 
through the operation of other types of causes picked out by the middle term. This 
is consistent with the idea that for Aristotle the structure of scientific 
demonstrations in the natural sciences is to reflect the order of causation in the real 
world. If the necessity that obtains in the world of change is conditional, then the 
necessity that governs deductions of natural phenomena has to be conditional, as 
well: if the end is to come to be, then its necessary prerequisites have to come to be 
first. In the natural treatises, Aristotle never produces actual syllogisms, but the 
underlying pattern is largely the same. Final cause are demonstrated to hold of some 
feature through another, causally prior factor that is conditionally necessary for the 
end to be realized, and, where the explanation obtains, also has necessitated that end. 
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This schematic picture of the structure of teleological explanations points also to the 
wider ramifications of this dissertation: both the incorporation of conditional 
necessity into the demonstrative framework, and the room for variability between 
the type of explanation that is being demonstrated and the type of causation picked 
out by the middle term allow for a more flexible and comprehensive model of 
scientific demonstration than is usually attributed to Aristotle under the influence of 
the ancient commentary tradition. 
 
Another aspect of the structure of teleological explanations concerns the integration 
of references to both teleology and necessity in the explanation of living nature. I 
have argued that in his explanations Aristotle picks out (roughly speaking) two types 
of teleology in combination with two types of necessity: primary teleology in 
combination with conditional necessity, and, secondary teleology and material 
necessity.    
Aristotle invokes what I have called ‘primary teleology’ in explaining those 
parts and features of living being that are realizations of capacities already given with 
the kind of soul that being has. The parts and features are the instruments for the 
performance of functions included in the definition of the substantial being of that 
living being. In those cases, the formal nature or the soul of that living being is the 
cause of both the coming to be of those parts and features, and of their presence. 
The necessity of the coming to be of the part or feature in question is conditional 
upon the need of some essential or vital soul-function to be realized; the part and 
features that are present are then exhibited as the necessary prerequisites of 
something being what it is and being able to lead the live it does. 
However, Aristotle also recognizes that some parts or features that can be 
observed to be present among living beings are not given with the definition of the 
substantial being of that animal, but do give rise to the performance of functions 
that contribute to the well-being of the animal. In these cases, Aristotle ascribes the 
cause of the coming to be of the matter constitutive of those parts and features to 
material necessity, while ascribing the cause of their presence to the goal-directed 
actions of the formal nature or soul of the animal. The material processes that take 
place in an animal body for the sake of generating the necessary parts lead incidentally 
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to the generation of residues or to indirectly conditionally necessitated materials. 
These materials are then used by nature – ‘who, as a good housekeeper, is not in the 
habit of throwing away things that could be useful’ – for the sake of some good. 
These processes are teleological in Aristotle’s view, but not without qualification: the 
formal nature of the animal attributes a function to a part or to a flow of material, 
after this part or material has already come to be as the result of material necessity, 
and does so in accordance with the available material potentials. There is no capacity 
for the performance of a function that conditionally necessitates the realization of 
luxurious parts. 
The integration of material necessity in secondary teleological explanations 
gives evidence for my view that Aristotle’s theory of teleology was not developed for 
the sake of replacing materialist explanations, which explained everything in terms of 
material necessity and its coincidental outcomes. In Aristotle’s view, material natures 
usually operate under the constraints of teleology, but not always: sometimes 
material natures operate according to their own natures without being directed 
towards the realization of some end, and give rise to structures that can be and often 
are used for the sake of something. When Aristotle restricts unqualified necessity to 
the eternal realm of the heavenly bodies he does not thereby deny the existence of 
material necessity in the sublunary realm. He rather points out that in causal 
sequences that take place in the heavenly realm the prior always necessitates the 
coming to be of the posterior, because the coming to be of the posterior is necessary 
‘without qualification’. In the sublunary realm the posterior in a causal sequence is 
never necessary ‘without qualification’, whether it is necessitated by conditional 
necessity or by material necessity. The role of material necessity in the sublunary 
realm is therefore not confined to the negative part of constraining the realizations 
of ends in natural beings. It also has a more positive role to play, in that it provides 
extra possibilities (‘extra’ in the sense that the possibilities are not already given with 
the soul some living being possesses) for the realization of features and functions 
that may contribute to some beings’ well-being.  
The distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ teleology also solves 
some of the problems pertaining to the scope of Aristotle’s teleology. For instance, it 
allows us to attribute an anthropocentric purpose to winter-rain (i.e. the growth of 
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crops), without having to conclude that Aristotle’s whole theory of natural teleology 
is anthropocentric. Just as in nature, formal natures make use of what is present by 
material necessity for the better, human beings may impose secondary functions 
upon natural phenomena such as winter-rain (which occurs regularly due to material 
necessity) through the application of art, while following the material potentials and 
propensities rain has. It is the application of art that ensures the regular beneficial 
outcomes of winter-rain, not a pre-existing potential for form that is being realized. 
Aristotelian teleology pertains strictly to individual kinds of formal natures, and is 
not in any essential way anthropocentric or cosmic. 
 
The explanatory power of the actual teleological explanations Aristotle provides of 
natural phenomena derives from two facts. In part, it derives from the success of his 
theory of natural teleology in integrating and making sense of phenomena that 
would otherwise be dissociated facts of our universe. It also derives from the extent 
to which the explanations achieve in actually making sense of natural phenomena, 
that is, to the extent to which they amount to scientific demonstrations of the sort 
required in natural philosophy, or, where this is not possible, to reductions of 
puzzlement. 
Aristotle’s theory of natural teleology, in combination with his theory of 
four causes, allows him to explain natural processes, deliberative action, and artistic 
production as variations of one and the same basic phenomenon. Aristotle sets up 
the analogy between agency and nature, and especially between art and nature (where 
intentionality and deliberation are left out of the picture), in order to bring out the 
goal-directedness of the latter through our familiarity with the goal-directedness of 
the former. The analogies thus serve primarily a didactic function: Aristotle reveals 
the causal frameworks that apply to art and agency and extends those to natural 
generation as far as the similarities hold. Ultimately, however, the goal-directedness 
of art and agency are ontologically dependent on that of nature, where goals are 
asserted to be present most. Living beings (humans, animals, and perhaps in some 
sense even the heavenly bodies) act goal-directedly, and craftsmen produce artifacts 
through goal-directed activity, because they imitate nature and are themselves 
endowed with natures.  
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The force of the analogy between art and nature remains visible also in Aristotle’s 
explanations in the biological works, where the formal, efficient, and final causes are 
said to coincide in the souls of living beings. Aristotle characterizes these ‘formal 
natures’ as internal craftsmen who ‘make’, ‘use’, or ‘redirect’ materials for the sake of 
realizing the living being’s characteristic functions. The theory that nature is goal-
directed thus unifies natural beings such as elements, plants, animals, human beings, 
and even the heavenly bodies under one ontological category. They become 
teleologically organized composites of form and matter. The coming to be and 
presence of their bodies, features, and the occurrence of their motions and actions 
all involve goals, ends, and functions that ultimately contribute to their being and 
life. The teleological explanations Aristotle provides pick out those goals, aims, and 
functions, and relate them to the beings, parts, and events of which they constitute 
the final cause.     
Teleological explanations are most successful in biology. Aristotle provides 
comprehensive and detailed accounts of why parts belong to the animals that have 
them, why they are differentiated in the way they are, and why some animals do not 
have parts that might be expected. The references to functions Aristotle makes in 
these explanations are grounded in his theory of soul. In particular, they build upon 
the classification of the various capacities of the soul to perform living functions and 
upon the idea that the soul is the final cause of the natural body that is instrumental. 
Different kinds of living beings are indicated by their characteristic soul-functions, 
and the parts and bodies they have must be instrumental to those functions. Any 
part of a living being’s body is the way it is for the sake of the capacities that 
characterize its life, because it is causally dependent on and conditionally necessary 
for these capacities. Capacities and the living bodies in which they are realized are 
essentially connected.  
The success of the use of teleological principles in biology as a heuristic 
tool for finding final causes where they are not immediately discernable might have 
inspired Aristotle to use those principles also in cosmology. The lack of empirical 
data in the latter domain makes the endeavor to explain the heavenly phenomena 
very difficult. Aristotle tries to integrate the study of the heavens into the science of 
nature, which means that material explanations of the mathematical properties of the 
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heavenly phenomena are insufficient for a complete scientific understanding of 
them. Aristotle thus uses teleological principles as a heuristic to find final causes, and 
by doing so tries to turn his cosmology into a proper physical science.2 The 
teleological principles are not a priori axioms, but suppositions derived from the 
numerous observations Aristotle made in the biological domain. However, because 
of the lack of empirical data, the teleological explanations that are provided in 
cosmology amount to – as Aristotle keeps pointing out himself – plausible or 
reasonable explanations that take away some puzzlement concerning the heavens. 
They do not constitute explanations that reach the same level of accuracy and 
necessity as the explanations provided in biology. The use of teleology as a principle 
of explanation is thus limited in those domains where our observations of the 
phenomena are incomplete. On the other hand, Aristotle’s attempt to give 
teleological explanations of the features and motions of the heavens shows the 
comprehensiveness of his theory of natural teleology: ultimately he is trying to 
establish a coherent picture of the whole cosmos and all its natural beings in which 
(at least for the most part) things are present or absent or differentiated in the way 
they are for a purpose.     
 
In sum, if my interpretation of the theory and practice of teleological explanations in 
Aristotle holds, then the explanatory work performed by final causes is significantly 
different from what has traditionally been thought. Final causes exert no ‘mysterious 
pull’ from the future, but rather function quite literally as ends and limits of 
developments. They are to be used as starting points for investigations. This does 
not mean, however, that final causes only have a heuristic value: because final causes 
are part of the conclusion that is being demonstrated, the demonstration 





                                                 
2 These principles are typically used in combination with analogies and counterfactual reasoning; 
Aristotle’s explanatory strategies and scientific methodology in De Caelo, especially in relation to the ideal 
as set out in the Posterior Analytics, have not yet received the attention that they deserve. 
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VERKLARING EN TELEOLOGIE IN ARISTOTELES’ NATUURFILOSOFIE 
 
Waarom planten organismen zich voort? Waarom hebben vogels vleugels? Waarom 
hebben slangen noch sterren voeten? Waarom hebben de meeste gehoefde, 
levendbarende dieren hoorns (maar niet alle)? Waarom bouwen mensen huizen en 
maken ze na de maaltijd een wandeling? 
 Vragen zoals deze raken voor Aristoteles het hart van de natuurfilosofie, 
die het ontstaan en bestaan van wezens bestudeert die hun eigen interne principe van 
verandering en rust bezitten. Aristoteles was gedurende zijn hele leven diep 
geëngageerd met het onderzoeken en verklaren van natuurlijke fenomenen, zoals 
valt op te maken uit het grote aantal werken over de natuur van zijn hand dat we 
vandaag de dag bezitten. Van deze werken is de Physica het meest fundamenteel. In 
dit werk zet Aristoteles het algemene theoretische raamwerk uiteen voor zijn 
natuurfilosofie door begrippen zoals ‘natuur’, ‘beweging’, ‘causaliteit’, ‘plaats’ en ‘tijd’ 
te definiëren. In de andere werken onderzoekt Aristoteles meer specifieke 
problemen met betrekking tot de studie van natuurlijke wezens, zoals ontstaan en 
vergaan (in De Generatione et Corruptione), de aard en de beweging van de elementen 
(in De Generatione et Corruptione en in het tweede gedeelte van De Caelo), de 
bewegingen en de eigenschappen van de hemellichamen (in het eerste deel van De 
Caelo), atmosferische oorzaken en veranderingen (in Meteorologica), het begrip ‘ziel’ en 
de relatie tussen ziel en natuurlijk lichaam (in De Anima), en tenslotte de oorzaken 
van het ontstaan en bestaan van levende wezens, van hun delen, en van hun 
bewegingen (in de biologische werken). 
 De vragen die Aristoteles probeert te beantwoorden in de werken over de 
natuur (zoals bijvoorbeeld bovengenoemde vragen), hebben met elkaar gemeen dat 
zij hoofdzakelijk vragen naar de reden waarom, of, zoals Aristoteles het formuleert, 
naar ‘dat omwille waarvan’. Door het stellen van deze specifieke vraag naar het 
waarom probeert Aristoteles de functie te achterhalen die wordt gediend door de 
aanwezigheid, afwezigheid, of materiële differentiatie van een bepaald natuurlijk 
fenomeen, of het doel omwille waarvan een natuurlijke beweging of verandering 




antwoorden op zulke vragen teleologische verklaringen, omdat zij verwijzen naar de 
doeloorzaak (als functie of als ‘goed eindresultaat’) omwille waarvan iets ontstaan is 
of bestaat (of afwezig is, enzovoort). Deze teleologische verklaringen vormen een 
kenmerkende eigenschap van Aristoteles’ onderzoek naar de natuur, en 
weerspiegelen het belang dat hij toekent aan teleologie in het ontstaan en bestaan 
van regelmatige natuurlijke fenomenen. Volgens Aristoteles ontstaat of verandert 
alles dat ‘van nature’ ontstaan is of bestaat – tenzij er iets tussen komt – omwille van 
een doel en is het aanwezig omwille van dat doel. Teleologie opereert dus gelijkelijk 
onder alle natuurlijke wezens, van het niveau van de levenloze elementen tot dat van 
de levende wezens, en zelfs tot aan het domein van de onvergankelijke 
hemellichamen.  
Hoewel het belang van teleologie voor Aristoteles’ natuurfilosofie 
onbetwist is, zijn haar aard en reikwijdte een voortdurend onderwerp van debat. 
Deze debatten hebben met name in de laatste dertig jaar tot een steeds beter begrip 
van Aristoteles’ opvatting van teleologie geleid. De voortuitgang betreft met name 
Aristoteles’ opvatting van teleologie als een descriptief principe van de natuur, te 
weten de interne doelgerichtheid van natuurlijke processen (te contrasteren met 
factoren als toeval of noodzakelijkheid). Wat echter ontbreekt in de bestaande 
literatuur over Aristoteles’ teleologie, is een begrip van de rol die Aristoteles 
toeschrijft aan teleologie in de verklaring van natuurlijke fenomenen.  
De vraag die deze dissertatie heeft willen beantwoorden is hoe Aristoteles – 
gesteld dat hij erin is geslaagd teleologie te grondvesten als een oorzaak van 
natuurlijke fenomenen –deze teleologie vervolgens gebruikt als een principe van 
wetenschappelijke verklaring (bijvoorbeeld hoe hij verwijst naar, conclusies afleidt 
van, premissen bouwt op basis van, en andere mogelijke verklaringen afwijst op 
grond van een teleologische overweging), en dan met name in zijn werken over de 
levende natuur waar verwijzingen naar teleologie het meest prominent zijn.  
  
Deze dissertatie dient een tweedelig doel. Ten eerste hoopt deze studie de functie, de 
structuur en de verklarende kracht van teleologische verklaringen te bepalen in vier 
van Aristoteles’ werken over de natuur: de Physica, De Anima, De Partibus Animalium 
en De Caelo. Daarmee hoop ik inzicht te verschaffen in Aristoteles’ gebruik van 
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teleologie als een principe van verklaring in de wetenschappelijke praktijk van het 
doen van natuurfilosofisch onderzoek.  
Ten tweede hoopt deze studie bij te dragen aan een ruimer 
onderzoeksprogramma dat poogt de relatie tussen Aristoteles’ wetenschapsfilosofie 
en de praktijk in de wetenschappen zelf in kaart te brengen. Met dat doel 
confronteer ik de bevindingen over Aristoteles’ gebruik van teleologie met een 
nieuwe interpretatie van de theorie betreffende de structuur van teleologische 
verklaringen en wetenschappelijke bewijzen die Aristoteles uiteenzet in Analytica 
Posteriora II.11.  
 
De dissertatie bestaat uit vijf afzonderlijke maar gerelateerde studies naar de functie, 
structuur en verklarende kracht van teleologische verklaringen in Aristoteles’ 
filosofie van de levende natuur.  
De kern, bestaande uit hoofdstukken 1-4, is gewijd aan een analyse van de 
teleologische verklaringen die Aristoteles geeft in zijn werken over de natuur: in zijn 
verdediging van het bestaan van de doelgerichtheid van de natuur in de Physica 
(hoofdstuk 1); in zijn analyse van een ‘bio-functionele’ opvatting van de ziel, haar 
functies en haar relatie met een natuurlijk lichaam in De Anima (hoofdstuk 2); in zijn 
onderzoek naar de eigenschappen en delen van levende wezens in De Partibus 
Animalium (hoofdstuk 3); en tenslotte in zijn onderzoek naar de eigenschappen en 
bewegingen van de hemellichamen in De Caelo (hoofdstuk 4).  
In het laatste hoofdstuk (hoofdstuk 5), bespreek ik hoe Aristoteles zijn 
vier-oorzakenleer introduceert in het syllogistische raamwerk van wetenschappelijke 
bewijzen in Analytica Posteriora II.11, en wat daarbij de structuur van teleologische 
verklaringen of bewijzen zou moeten zijn. Volgens mijn analyse wordt in een 
teleologisch bewijs aangetoond dat er een teleologische relatie bestaat tussen het 
explanandum (‘wandelen na de maaltijd’) en de explanans (‘gezondheid’) door het in 
de middenterm identificeren van een tweede, causaal primaire oorzaak (‘het niet 
bovendrijven van voedsel’), die zelf nooit een doeloorzaak kan zijn. Vervolgens 
onderzoek ik in hoeverre deze basisstructuur ook ten grondslag ligt aan de meest 
voorkomende typen verklaringen uit Aristoteles’ praktijk van het verklaren van 




In de conclusie, ten slotte, breng ik al deze gegevens samen en bespreek ik de 
verdiensten en beperkingen van Aristoteles’ gebruik van teleologie als een principe 
van verklaring. De conclusies die ik in dit proefschrift verdedig zijn in het kort de 
volgende:  
 
(1) De functie van het geven van teleologische verklaringen en het zoeken naar 
doeloorzaken is het leveren van wetenschappelijke kennis. Binnen de natuurfilosofie 
zijn volgens Aristoteles van alle soorten verklaringen de verklaringen die verwijzen 
naar functies of doeleinden het meest succesvol hierin vanwege de verklarende prioriteit 
van doeloorzaken.  
De reden hiervoor is dat doorgaans functies van structuren en 
eindresultaten van processen gemakkelijk te identificeren zijn (ofwel direct via de 
waarneming of indirect via het gebruik van teleologische principes als heuristische 
middelen). Zodra deze zijn geïdentificeerd is het mogelijk de condities vast te stellen 
die noodzakelijkerwijs gerealiseerd moeten worden, willen deze functies of 
eindresultaten zich voordoen. Het verschil tussen essentiële en incidentele factoren 
die een rol kunnen spelen in een verklaring wordt pas duidelijk wanneer men 
natuurlijke wezens als teleologisch georganiseerde gehelen gaat beschouwen: via de 
doeloorzaak komt men de andere oorzaken op het spoor en kan men een zo 
compleet mogelijke verklaring van een natuurlijk fenomeen te geven. Deze 
verklarende prioriteit moet nadrukkelijk onderscheiden worden van causale 
prioriteit: doeloorzaken zijn namelijk nooit primair in causale zin en kunnen daarom 
nooit als de primaire verklarende factor worden opgenomen in verklaringen. In deze 
context is het ook belangrijk op te merken dat Aristoteles geenszins de causale 
werking van materiële of efficiënte oorzaken in de natuur ontkent. De kritiek die hij 
uit op zijn voorgangers betreft het feit dat zij niet naast de werking van materiële 
factoren, ook de werking van de formele en finale oorzaken erkenden. Door het 
samenspel van doeloorzaken, vormoorzaken en efficiënte oorzaken (in zijn 
biologische werken verwijst Aristoteles naar dit samenspel als naar de ‘acties van de 
formele natuur’ tegenover de materiële natuur van een wezen), garandeert teleologie 
‘van boven af’ de regelmatigheid van het voorkomen van goede eindresultaten door 
de complexe sequentie van natuurlijke gebeurtenissen te ordenen en te timen. 
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(2) De structuur die ten grondslag ligt aan de teleologische verklaringen die 
Aristoteles in de praktijk levert is grotendeels consistent met de theorie van 
teleologische verklaringen zoals die beschreven wordt in APo.II.11. Zowel de 
praktijk als de theorie blijken echter gecompliceerder en flexibeler te zijn dan 
traditioneel werd aangenomen.  
De teleologische verklaringen die Aristoteles geeft in zijn werken over de 
natuur bestaan ofwel uit verklaringen die direct naar doeloorzaken verwijzen, ofwel 
uit verklaringen die gebruik maken van teleologische principes (zoals dat de natuur 
niets voor niets doet) om doeloorzaken te kunnen identificeren. De strategieën die 
Aristoteles gebruikt om functies of eindresultaten te verbinden met de fenomenen 
die zij verklaren zijn divers, maar steeds afhankelijk van (a) de soort vraag die 
beantwoord moet worden (d.w.z. of het om de aanwezigheid, afwezigheid, of 
differentiatie van een fenomeen gaat); (b) de status van het te verklaren fenomeen 
(d.w.z. of het noodzakelijk is of ‘slechts’ beter is voor het wezen om te hebben). 
Teleologische principes zijn op waarneming gebaseerde generalisaties (in Aristoteles’ 
wetenschappelijk jargon ‘hypothesen’ genaamd) van de doelgerichte handelingen van 
de formele natuur van elke afzonderlijke natuurlijke soort. Deze generalisaties maken 
expliciet wat deze formele natuur ‘altijd’ of ‘nooit’ doet – tenzij zij daarin gehinderd 
wordt – wanneer men zegt dat zij levende wezens en hun delen produceert. Deze 
principes worden elk op hun eigen manier en in hun eigen verklarende context 
gebruikt als heuristische middelen daar waar teleologie niet onmiddellijk te 
onderscheiden is: de generalisaties bieden een raamwerk van wat doorgaans wel en 
niet mogelijk is in deze wereld, en stellen daarmee de grenzen waarbinnen natuurlijke 
fenomenen moeten worden verklaard.  
Alle verklaringen in de natuurlijke werken hebben met elkaar gemeen dat 
causale prioriteit wordt toegekend aan een formele, efficiënte, of materiële oorzaak, 
terwijl de gerealiseerde functies of eindresultaten hieraan secundair zijn: ze zijn het 
gevolg van een gerealiseerde vorm, de uitkomst van processen en veranderingen, of 
worden gefaciliteerd door de potenties die aanwezig in de gebruikte materialen. Dit 
beeld van de praktijk is consistent met de theorie van de structuur van teleologische 




zien dat het in teleologische verklaringen de functie is van de middenterm een 
explanans weer te geven die laat zien dat er een teleologische relatie bestaat tussen 
dat wat verklaard wordt en de doeloorzaak die wordt gegeven om dat fenomeen te 
verklaren. Het vinden van zo’n middenterm is wat een wetenschappelijk bewijs 
oplevert. Deze verklarende middenterm kan echter zelf geen doeloorzaak zijn: dat is 
namelijk in strijd met de eis dat wetenschappelijke bewijzen de volgorde van causatie 
in de werkelijkheid weergeven. Als de noodzaak die in de ondermaanse natuur 
opereert conditioneel is, dan moet de noodzaak in de syllogistische bewijzen van 
natuurlijke fenomenen ook conditioneel zijn: als dit eindresultaat er moet zijn, dan 
moeten de volgende noodzakelijke vereisten eerst gerealiseerd worden. In zijn 
werken over de natuur produceert Aristoteles nooit echte syllogismen, maar de 
onderliggende structuur van zijn eigen wetenschappelijke verklaringen benadert dit 
‘ideaal’ sterk.  
Dit schematische beeld van de structuur van teleologische verklaringen 
wijst ook op de wijdere ramificaties van deze dissertatie: zowel de incorporatie van 
conditionele noodzakelijkheid in het demonstratieve raamwerk als de ruimte voor 
variëteit tussen het type verklaring dat wordt bewezen en het type causaliteit dat 
wordt gerepresenteerd door de middenterm zorgen voor een meer flexibel en 
omvattend model van wetenschappelijke bewijsvoering dan gewoonlijk aan 
Aristoteles wordt toegeschreven onder invloed van de antieke commentaartraditie.  
 
(3) Een ander aspect betreffende de structuur van teleologische verklaringen betreft 
de integratie van verwijzingen naar zowel doelgerichtheid als naar noodzakelijkheid in 
Aristoteles’ verklaringen van de levende natuur. Ik heb beargumenteerd dat 
Aristoteles in zijn verklaringen ruwweg twee soorten teleologie combineert met twee 
soorten van noodzakelijkheid: ‘primaire teleologie’ in combinatie met conditionele 
noodzakelijkheid en ‘secundaire teleologie’ in combinatie met materiële 
noodzakelijkheid. 
 Aristoteles verwijst naar wat ik ‘primaire teleologie’ heb genoemd in de 
verklaringen van die delen van levende wezens die realisaties zijn van potenties die 
reeds besloten liggen in de soort van ziel (of vorm) dat het wezen heeft. In deze 
gevallen is de formele natuur of de ziel de oorzaak van zowel het ontstaan als het 
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bestaan van deze ‘conditioneel noodzakelijke’ delen: zij maakt deze delen omdat het 
levend wezen in staat moet zijn om zijn essentiële en vitale functies te beoefenen. 
Aan de andere kant onderscheidt Aristoteles ook gevallen van delen van levende 
wezens die niet bijdragen tot de beoefening van essentiële en vitale functies, maar die 
wel bijdragen tot hun welzijn. In deze gevallen verwijst Aristoteles naar materiële 
noodzakelijkheid als de oorzaak van het ontstaan van deze ‘luxe delen’, terwijl hij de 
doelgerichte handelingen van de formele natuur of de ziel aanwijst als de oorzaak 
van hun bestaan. De materiële processen die plaatsvinden in het lichaam van een 
levend wezen omwille van het voortbrengen en in stand houden van de 
noodzakelijke delen leidt incidenteel ook tot het ontstaan van extra materialen. Deze 
materialen worden vervolgens gebruikt door de formele natuur – “die, als een goede 
huishoudster, niet gewoon is dingen weg te gooien die bruikbaar zouden kunnen 
zijn” – omwille van iets goeds. De functie die de formele natuur toedeelt aan de 
beschikbare materialen hangt af van de potenties die die materialen hebben en van 
welk gebruik het beste is voor elke soort levend wezen; de teleologie in deze gevallen 
is dus secundair aan het ontstaan van al dan niet bruikbare materialen.  
Wanneer Aristoteles het bestaan van ‘ongekwalificeerde noodzakelijkheid’ 
in het ondermaanse ontkent, ontkent hij daarmee niet het bestaan van materiële 
noodzakelijkheid in dat domein. De term ‘ongekwalificeerde noodzakelijkheid’ duidt 
aan dat in een causale sequentie ‘het voorafgaande’ altijd en zonder uitzondering ‘het 
eropvolgende’ veroorzaakt. Deze vorm van noodzakelijkheid komt alleen voor in het 
bovenmaanse, in de wiskunde, en in cyclische natuurlijke processen. De noodzaak 
die voorkomt in het ondermaanse is materiële noodzaak, die meestal onderworpen is 
aan teleologische processen, maar soms ook los van een te realiseren doel opereert. 
In het laatste geval biedt zij extra mogelijkheden (‘extra’ in de zin dat deze 
mogelijkheden niet reeds als potenties besloten liggen in de vorm of ziel) voor de 
realisatie van luxe delen tijdens de ontwikkeling van levende wezens. 
Het onderscheid tussen ‘primaire’ en ‘secundaire’ teleologie helpt tenslotte 
ook om enkele problemen met betrekking tot de reikwijdte van Aristoteles’ 
teleologie op te lossen. Door deze twee vormen van teleologie te onderscheiden is 
het bijvoorbeeld mogelijk een antropocentrisch doel toe te schrijven aan winterse 




teleologie in zijn geheel antropocentrisch is. Net zoals de formele natuur in de 
formatie van levende wezens gebruik kan maken van wat door materiële 
noodzakelijkheid geproduceerd is om zo het welzijn van het wezen te verbeteren, zo 
kunnen ook mensen ‘secundaire functies’ opleggen aan natuurlijke fenomenen zoals 
regen in de winter (die regelmatig voorkomt vanwege materiële noodzakelijkheid). 
Zij doen dat door middel van de landbouwkunde, waarbij zij gebruik maken van de 
materiële potenties van regelmatige regenval. Het is enkel dankzij de toepassing van 
kunde dat regen in de winter regelmatig goede eindresultaten oplevert; er is geen 
onderliggende vorm die gerealiseerd wordt. Aristoteles’ teleologie beperkt zich tot de 
werking van de formele natuur van elke afzonderlijke natuurlijke soort, en is in geen 
enkel opzicht antropocentrisch of kosmisch.  
 
(4) De teleologische verklaringen die Aristoteles geeft in zijn werken over de natuur 
ontlenen hun verklarende kracht aan de volgende twee factoren. Enerzijds ontlenen 
zij hun kracht aan het succes dat zij boeken in het verenigen en uitleggen van (met 
name natuurlijke) fenomenen die zonder de theorie van teleologie onbegrijpelijk en 
onverenigbaar zouden zijn met andere fenomenen. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn (a) 
Aristoteles’ verklaring van natuurlijke processen, praktisch handelen, en artistieke 
productie als variaties van een en hetzelfde causale patroon (waarbij dat van de 
natuur primair is), en (b) zijn gebruik van het beeld van de formele natuur als 
handwerksman in zijn biologie.  
Anderzijds ontlenen zij hun kracht ook aan de mate waarin zij erin slagen 
bevredigende wetenschappelijke bewijzen te leveren zoals dat vereist is binnen de 
natuurwetenschappen. Wanneer dat niet mogelijk is dienen zij tenminste iets van de 
onbegrijpelijkheid van het fenomeen weg te nemen.  
Het meest succesvol zijn de teleologische verklaringen die Aristoteles geeft 
in de biologie. De Partibus Animalium vertoont een grote diversiteit van teleologische 
verklaringen van waarom bepaalde delen toebehoren aan de dieren die ze hebben, 
waarom ze op een bepaalde manier gedifferentieerd zijn, en waarom sommige dieren 
onverwacht delen missen; en zoals gezegd, de structuur van deze verklaringen 
weerspiegelt die van wetenschappelijke bewijzen zoals gepresenteerd in APo.II.11. 
De verwijzingen naar functies in deze verklaringen zijn gegrond in Aristoteles’ leer 
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van de ziel: met uitzondering van de luxedelen is het gehele levende lichaam, met al 
zijn delen, structuren, en differentiaties zoals het is omwille van de beoefening van 
die capaciteiten die zijn leven karakteriseren. In de kosmologie, waar veel minder 
empirische gegevens voorhanden zijn dan in de biologie en doeloorzaken moeilijker 
te identificeren zijn, gebruikt Aristoteles teleologische principes om op die manier de 
eigenschappen en de bewegingen van de hemellichamen zoveel mogelijk te kunnen 
verklaren. Het vinden van doeloorzaken is belangrijk, omdat Aristoteles probeert 
zijn studie van de hemellichamen te integreren in zijn algemene studie van de natuur, 
waar kennis van alleen de materiële oorzaken onvoldoende is. Echter, vanwege het 
gebrek aan empirische gegevens bieden de teleologische verklaringen die Aristoteles 
uiteindelijk geeft weliswaar een plausibele of redelijke uitleg, maar geen 
wetenschappelijk bewijs in strikte zin. De verklarende kracht van teleologie voor 
zover deze gebruikt wordt als een principe van verklaring is dus beperkt in die 
domeinen van de natuur waar onze waarnemingen incompleet zijn. Aan de andere 
kant geeft Aristoteles’ poging om ook de kosmologische fenomenen te verklaren via 
het gebruik van teleologische principes blijk van de veelomvattendheid van zijn 
theorie van natuurlijke teleologie: uiteindelijk probeert Aristoteles een coherent beeld 
te geven van de gehele kosmos met alle natuurlijke wezens, waarin (tenminste voor 
het merendeel) dingen aanwezig, afwezig, of op een bepaalde manier gedifferentieerd 
zijn om een reden.  
 
Tot slot: als mijn interpretatie van de theorie en de praktijk van teleologische 
verklaringen in Aristoteles juist is, dan is de verklarende functie van doeloorzaken 
significant anders dan  traditioneel wordt gedacht. Doeloorzaken oefenen geen 
‘mysterieuze kracht’ uit vanuit de toekomst, maar functioneren daarentegen juist 
bijna letterlijk als eindpunten en grenzen van processen. Ze vormen de beginpunten 
van wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Dit betekent niet dat doeloorzaken slechts een 
heuristische functie hebben: omdat doeloorzaken deel zijn van de conclusie die in 
een wetenschappelijk bewijs wordt gedemonstreerd, demonstreert het bewijs het 
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